Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Unknown vs Mr. Manoj Bhandari on 23 February, 2015
Author: Arun Bhansali
Bench: Arun Bhansali
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S.B. CIVIL CONTEMPT PETITION NO.666/2013
Date of Order :: 23.02.2015
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN BHANSALI
Mr. Manoj Bhandari, for the petitioner.
Dr. P.S. Bhati, Addl. Advocate General with Mr. S.S. Rathore, for
the respondents.
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An application has been filed by the petitioner seeking amendment in the contempt petition and for addition and implementation of the contemnors in the contempt petition.
The contempt petition has been filed on 19.11.2013 alleging willful disobedience of order dated 03.08.2005 passed by this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5570/1993.
By the said Order, this Court while leaving it open for the respondent to proceed against the petitioner afresh under Rule 16 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, 1958, quashed the order dated 27.11.1991 and 26.07.1993 with all consequential benefits.
It appears that the order dated 03.08.2005 was challenged by the State by filing D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No.6/2008, wherein by order dated 17.01.2008, it was directed that the disciplinary inquiry re-initiated shall continue, however, the order passed by the Single Judge regarding payment of consequential benefits shall remain stayed till further orders.
By order dated 21.05.2008, the petitioner reinstated in service, keeping the issue pertaining to consequential benefits dependent on the decision of a disciplinary proceedings. 2
The Special Appeal filed by the State came to be rejected by order dated 12.12.2011 by the Division Bench. Whereafter, the petitioner by filing representations, sought grant of consequential benefits and when the same were not paid, filed the present contempt petition.
By order dated 03.02.2014, notices were ordered to be issued in the contempt petition to the respondents.
In the reply filed by the respondents on 20.05.2014, it was indicated that by order dated 29.07.2013, the re-initiated inquiry proceedings against the petitioner have culminated and declared dies non and the petitioner has been punished with down grading in four stage and by order dated 06.05.2014, it was directed that the period the period between 08.12.1989 to 21.05.2008 would be treated as dies non.
The present application seeking amendment in the contempt petition has been filed to allege that the orders dated 29.07.2013 and 06.05.2014 passed by the respondents amounts to willful disobedience of orders passed by this Court and, therefore, the petitioner may be permitted to amend the contempt petition to add certain paragraphs in this regard.
A reply has been filed by the respondents to the application, inter alia, raising preliminary objections that the original contempt petition itself is barred by limitation under Section 20 of the Contempts of Courts Act, 1971 ('the Act') as the contempt petition was filed with a delay of more than 8 years, the delay in filing the contempt petition cannot be condoned and, therefore, the application and the contempt 3 petition both deserves to be dismissed.
It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the order dated 29.07.2013 and 06.05.2014 have been filed/passed by the respondents during the pendency of the contempt petition and the orders are in willful disobedience of orders passed by this Court and, therefore, the petitioner may be permitted to amend the contempt petition so as to include the said aspect. It was further submitted that the objection of the respondents regarding Section 20 of the Act has no application to the facts of the present case as the present case is a case of non-compliance of the directions issued by this Court, which is continuous wrong.
Reliance was placed on Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar v. Kalu Ram & Ors.: AIR 1989 SC 2285.
Vehemently opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the order was passed way back in the year 2005, the order of the Division Bench was passed on 12.12.2011 and the contempt petition has been filed after a passage of one year on 19.11.2013 and the notices were ordered to be issued by this Court on 03.02.2014, the application filed is ex facie barred by limitation. The petitioner is not entitled to seek any condonation of delay.
Reliance was place on Pallav Sheth v. Custodian & Ors.:
(2001) 7 SCC 549.
I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.
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The provision of Section 20 of the Act reads as under:-
"20. Limitation for actions for contempt. - No court shall initiate any proceedings of contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed."
The requirement of the above provision is that a bar is created against Court from initiating any proceedings for contempt either of its motion or otherwise after expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed.
Issue as to terminus court for the purpose of Section 20 of the Act has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth (supra), wherein it has been held as under:-
"41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part of the Court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the section in the manner canvassed by Mr. Venugopal would mean that the court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed and the same having been brought to the notice of the court soon after the committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same. Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigant as also by placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt, successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation must therefore be avoided.
42. The decision in Om Prakash Jaiswal case to the effect that initiation of proceedings under Section 20 can only be said to have occurred when the court formed the prima facie opinion that contempt has 5 been committed and issued notice to the contemner to show cause why it should not be punished, is taking too narrow a view of Section 20 which does not seem to be warranted and is not only going to cause hardship but would perpetrate injustice. A provision like Section 20 has to be interpreted having regard to the realities of the situation. For instance, in a case where a contempt of a subordinate court is committed, a report is prepared whether on an application to court or otherwise, and reference made by the subordinate court to the High Court. It is only thereafter that a High Court can take further action under Section 15. In the process, more often than not, a period of one year elapses. If the interpretation of Section 20 put in Om Prakash Jaiswal case is correct, it would mean that notwithstanding both the subordinate court and the High Court being prima facie satisfied that contempt has been committed the High Court would become powerless to take any action. On the other hand, if the filing of an application before the subordinate court or the High Court, making of a reference by a subordinate court on its own motion or the filing an application before an Advocate General for permission to initiate contempt proceedings is regarded as initiation by the Court for the purposes of Section 20, then such an interpretation would not impinge on or stultify the power of the High Court to punish for contempt which power, dehors the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is enshrined in Article 215 of the Constitution. Such an interpretation of Section 20 would harmonise that section with the powers of the courts to punish for contempt which is recognised by the Constitution."
In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth (supra), that date of filing petition is the date recognized for the purpose of provision of Section 20 of the Act. In the present case, the contempt petition was filed by the petitioner alleging in-action on part of the respondents in following the directions given by this Court on 03.08.2005 as upheld by the Division Bench on 12.12.2011.
In a case of present nature, where the allegation is of non- compliance of directions issued by this Court has to be made that whether the allegation pertains to omission or commission. In case the allegation pertains to omission to comply with the directions issued by this Court, till such time that the directions 6 are complied with, the respondents/authority or a party obliged to comply with the directions issued by this Court would be in continues contempt and would committing contempt everyday by not following the directions.
The above aspect has to be distinguished from a case of commission, wherein an allegation is made that an act has been committed by the respondents, which amounts to violation of directions/orders passed by the Court and in that case of commission, the limitation would start running from the date of alleged commission.
In the present case, the petition was filed alleging willful disobedience of orders by way of omitting for grant of consequential relief and, therefore, it cannot be said that after the interim order passed by the Division Bench came to an end with the dismissal of appeal on 12.12.2011, on that day itself the respondents committed contempt on the other hand till such time that the orders dated 29.07.2013/06.05.2014 were passed by the respondents, they allegedly committed contempt on that day only.
In the present case itself the omission continues till 29.07.2013/06.05.2014 and the commission, if any, the same took place on 29.07.2013/06.05.2014. The petition having been filed on 19.11.2013, it cannot be said that the petition has filed was barred under Section 20 of the Act.
The observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Firm Ganpat Ram Rajkumar (supra) are act for the present circumstance, which reads as under:- 7
"7. Another point was taken about limitation of this application under section 20 of the Act. S. 20 states that no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committed. In this case, the present application was filed on or about 3rd November, 1988 as appears from the affidavit in support of the application. The contempt consisted, inter alia, of the act of not giving the possession by force of the order of the learned Sr. Sub-Judge, Narnaul dated 3rd November, 1988. Therefore, the application was well within the period of one year. Failure to give possession, if it amounts to a contempt in a situation of this nature is a continuing wrong. There was no scope for application of S. 20 of the Act."
So far as the objection made by learned counsel for the respondents regarding the fact that the order passed during the pendency of the contempt petition cannot be permitted to be made a subject matter of the contempt petition is concerned, once any order is passed by the respondents and the petitioner if feels that the same may also amounts to further aggravation of the contempt alleged to have been committed, it is always open for the petitioner to make the same a subject matter of the contempt petition.
In view of the above, the objection raised by the respondents regarding the applicability of Section 20 of the Act for the purpose of amount as sought by the petitioner is concerned, there is no substance in the same.
The application filed by the petitioner seeking amendment is allowed. The amended petition be filed by the petitioner within a period of two weeks.
However, it is made clear that any observations made hereinbefore have only been made for the purpose of disposal of the application filed by the petitioner seeking amendment and 8 nothing indicated hereinbefore would amount to ex facie in any opinion whatsoever on the merits of the allegations made in the contempt petition and/or in the amendment application.
List on 09.03.2015.
(ARUN BHANSALI), J.
PKS-7