Allahabad High Court
Harsh Vardhan vs Sri Rahul Pandey, The District ... on 15 October, 2025
Author: Neeraj Tiwari
Bench: Neeraj Tiwari
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
Neutral Citation No. - 2025:AHC:184065
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD
CONTEMPT APPLICATION (CIVIL) No. - 2916 of 2025
A.F.R.
Harsh Vardhan
.....Applicant(s)
Versus
Sri Rahul Pandey, The District Magistrate
.....Opposite Party(s)
Counsel for Applicant(s)
:
Shreya Gupta, V.R. Tiwari
Counsel for Opposite Party(s)
:
Court No. - 1
HON'BLE NEERAJ TIWARI, J.
1. Heard Ms. Shreya Gupta, learned counsel for the applicant and Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel/Additional Advocate General along with Sri Brijesh Kumar, learned Standing Counsel for the opposite party.
2. Present contempt application has been filed to punish the opposite party for violation of order of Writ Court dated 12.05.2025 in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6389 of 2024.
3. Brief facts of the case are that against the applicant, opposite party- District Magistrate, Hathras vide order dated 9.4.2025 has attached the applicant with District Head Quarter/ Collectorate, Hathras. The said order was challenged before this Court and Court has stayed the order dated 9.4.2025 as well as disciplinary proceeding with a finding that it is open for competent authority, namely, Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the applicant as per law. In compliance of order of Writ Court dated 12.05.2025, attachment order was withdrawn vide order dated 10.06.2025. Against the petitioner, a three member enquiry was also going on, which was not stayed on the ground that there is no stay upon enquiry proceeding. The enquiry was completed holding the applicant guilty and recommendation was made to lodge FIR upon which under the order of opposite party dated 27.05.2025, FIR has been lodged. Later on, Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 6389 of 2024 was disposed of vide order dated 12.05.2025 with certain observations and Court has also vacated the interim order earlier so granted.
4. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that once the Court has stayed the attachment order as well as disciplinary proceeding, there is no occasion for three member committee to continue with the enquiry so earlier started and further, opposite party should never pass the order of lodging of FIR based upon said enquiry as it was in teeth of interim order of Writ Court dated 12.05.2025. Therefore, such conduct of opposite party is a case of wilful disobedience of interim order of Writ Court dated 12.05.2025. She also submitted that though the petition was disposed of, but in light of law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla & another Vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. Etc.; 1997 0 Supreme (SC) 299 as well as of this Court in the matter of Cantonment Exec. Officer, Cantonment Board, Meerut and another Vs. Smt. Puspa Devi and others passed in Contempt Application (Civil) No. 380 of 2001 dated 29.01.2014, act of contempt shall be considered on the date of passing of order and mere disposal of petition may not exempt the opposite party contemnor from the contempt proceeding. Therefore, this Court may summon the opposite party and punish under the provisions of Contempt of Court Act, 1971.
5. Per contra, Sri M.C. Chaturvedi, learned Senior Counsel has opposed the submissions and submitted that it is not a case of wilful disobedience. Immediately after interim order of Writ Court dated 12.05.2025, attachment order was withdrawn and so far as enquiry is concerned that is not arising out of disciplinary proceeding rather it was only a fact finding enquiry upon which there was no stay order of Writ Court and in the said enquiry, applicant was found guilty, therefore, direction was issued to lodge FIR. Lodging of FIR is not the part of disciplinary proceeding. He next submitted that after order of Writ Court, Director, Urban Local Bodies Directorate, Lucknow has issued an office letter dated 28.07.2025 nominating the Chief Engineer, Urban Local Bodies Directorate, Lucknow as Inquiry Officer to conduct the departmental proceeding against the applicant, which is still going on. Therefore, act of opposite party does not come within the purview of wilful disobedience as provided in Section 2 (b) of the Contempt Act.
6. He further submitted that it is settled principle of law that once the final order has been passed in writ petition, all earlier interim orders merge into the final order and interim orders cease to exist and consequently, any direction given in interim order is also ceased to exist. Under such circumstances of the case, contempt application is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention, he has placed reliance upon the judgement of Apex Court in the matters of Dinesh Kumar Gupta Vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. And others; (2010) 12 SCC 770, judgments of this Court in the matters of Anand Prakash Agarwal Vs. Cantonment Executive Officer, Cantonment Road and 4 others in Contempt Appeal No. 3 of 2014 dated 1.3.2016 and Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Alok Tandon and others passed in Contempt Application (Civil) no. 5162 of 2019 dated 17.01.2020. He has also relied upon the judgments of Apex Court in the matters of Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhan and others; (2004) 7 SCC 261 and Prem Chandra Agarwal and others Vs. U.P. Financial Corp. and others; (2009)11 SCC479.
7. I have considered the submissions raised by learned counsel for the parties and perused the records, judgments relied upon as well as Act.
8. I have also perused the interim order dated 12.05.2025, which stayed the impugned order dated 9.4.2025 and also stayed the disciplinary proceeding with liberty to Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to initiate disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner as per law. Thereafter, opposite party has withdrawn the impugned order dated 9.4.2025 vide order dated 10.06.2025.
9. Now, coming to the question is as to whether the enquiry is the part of disciplinary proceeding or not and in case of stay of disciplinary proceeding, same may continue or not. As per service jurisprudence, disciplinary proceeding is having self contained procedure to conduct disciplinary proceeding and conclude the same. First of all, disciplinary authority shall appoint an Inquiry Officer and either he himself or Inquiry Officer shall issue a charge sheet to concern employee for submission of reply. After receiving the reply, enquiry proceeding shall be completed and enquiry report shall be submitted before the disciplinary authority. Disciplinary authority shall provide the copy of enquiry report to employee concerned for his objection and after considering the same, he shall pass appropriate order either awarding punishment or exonerate from the charges. So far as present case is concerned, upon complaint received against the applicant, a three member committee was appointed to submit fact finding enquiry report, therefore, this cannot be said that vide interim order dated 12.05.2025, fact finding enquiry has also been stayed. Based upon which, FIR has been lodged. Another question is whether lodging of FIR is any punishment or not pursuant to disciplinary proceeding. Certainly, in light of service jurisprudence, lodging of FIR cannot said to be punishment, therefore, that would also not be the violation of interim order dated 12.05.2025.
10. Apart this to proceed with to punish for civil contempt it has to be seen as to whether it is wilful disobedience or not. Section 2 (b) of the Contempt Act provides the definition of civil contempt. The same is reproduce herein below;
?2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,-
(a)??.....?
(b). "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c). ....?
(i). xxxxx
(ii). Xxxxx
(iii). Xxxxx
(d). ......."
11. From the perusal of same, it is clear that civil contempt means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. From perusal of interim order, it is absolutely clear that it was an order to stay the attachment order as well as disciplinary proceeding with liberty to Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to proceed disciplinary proceeding, therefore, continuance of fact finding enquiry and lodging of FIR cannot be termed a wilful act of disobedience.
12. I have also perused the judgement relied by learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla (supra). Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?16. The learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2 submitted that this is not a proceeding for contempt but a proceeding under Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel submitted that proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A are a part of the coercive process to secure obedience to its injunction and that once it is found that the Court has no jurisdiction, question of securing obedience to its orders any further does not arise. Learned counsel also submitted that enforcing the interim order after it is found that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the said suit would not only be unjust and illegal but would also reflect adversely upon the dignity and authority of the Court. It is also suggested that the plaintiff had instituted the present suit in the Civil Court knowing full well that it had no jurisdiction to try it . It is not possible to agree with any of these submission not only on principle but also in the light of the specific provision contained in Section 9-A of Code of Civil Procedure (Maharashtra Amendment). In the light of the said provision, it would not be right to say that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to pass interim order or interim injunction, as the case may be, pending decision on the question of jurisdiction. The orders made were within the jurisdiction of the Court and once this is so, they have to be obeyed and implemented. It is not as if the defendants are being sought to be punished for violations committed after the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. Here the defendants are sought to be punished for the disobedience and violation of the order of injunction committed before the decision of the High Court in Vishanji Virji Mepani. According to Section 9-A, the Civil Court- and the High Court - did have the power to pass interim orders until that decision. If they had that power they must also have the power to enforce them. In the light of the said provision, it cannot also be held that those orders could be enforced only till the said decision but not thereafter. The said decision does not render them (the interim orders passed meanwhile) either non-est or without jurisdiction. Punishing the defendants for violation of the said order committed before the said decision (Vishanji Virji Mepani) does not amount, in any event, to enforcing them after the said decision. Only the orders are being passed now. The violations are those committed before the said decision.
17. The correct principle, therefore, is the one recognised and reiterated in Section 9-A - to wit, where an objection to jurisdiction of a civil court is raised to entertain a suit and to pass any interim orders therein, the Court should decide the question of jurisdiction in the first instance but that does not mean that pending the decision on the question of jurisdiction, the Court has no jurisdiction to pass interim orders as may be called for in the facts and circumstances of the case. A mere objection to jurisdiction does not instantly disable the court from passing any interim orders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. the interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situation, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in foce, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the court on the question of Jurisdiction.?
13. From perusal of paragraphs 16 & 17, it is clear that facts of the case are entirely different and in that matter while Court has passed the order, having no jurisdiction and later, it was found and accordingly, interim orders came to an end. The issue was as to whether when the interim order was in operation, it has to be complied with or not and for that contempt proceeding may be initiated or not. Certainly, if it is not held that Court is having lack of jurisdiction and interim order was operative, it has to be complied with and for that contempt proceeding may be initiated, but in present case, only this aspect was considered and issue of wilful disobedience as well as disposal of writ petition has not been considered. Therefore, ratio of law laid down in that Court would not be useful in the present case.
14. I have also perused the judgement of this Court relied by learned counsel for the petitioner in the matter of Cantonment Exec. Officer (supra). Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?The above argument has no legs to stand. An interim order passed in a case is valid, existing and operative so long as the case is pending until and unless such order is vacated/ withdrawn/ modified/ discharged/ not extended by specific order or the case itself is finally decided. In the present case none of the above eventualities took place. Mere filing of an application to dismiss the appeal cannot be take away the effect of the interim order dated 13.04.1995. In fact it was part of the sinister design of the appellants (opposite parties) to file the application for dismissal on the one hand and to keep the appeal pending on the other hand as would be clear from the following facts.
There is one more aspect which may be recorded. It has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwall and anothers Versus Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. And others reported in (1997) 3 Supreme Court Cases 443 that where interim order had been passed by the Court while the decision on the question of jurisdiction was pending and ultimately it was held that Court had no jurisdiction, violation of such interim order would still be punishable. Further a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Rakesh Singhal and another Vs. Vth A.D.J., Bullandshahar and others reported in (1989)2 AWC 1360 has also taken a similar view. Thus, in the present case even if the appeal had been dismissed subsequently but during pendency of the appeal and existence of the interim order the opposite parties had violated the same, they would still be liable to be tried in the contempt proceedings.?
15. From perusal of said judgment, it is clear that Court itself is saying that unless interim order passed in a case is valid, existing and operative so long as the case is pending until and unless such order is vacated/ withdrawn/ modified/ discharged/ not extended by specific order or the case itself is finally decided. In the present case, there is no doubt that along with disposal of writ petition, interim order was also vacated. Therefore, in light of such facts, no case of contempt is made out.
16. Conduct of wilful disobedience has also came before Apex Court and this Court on many occasions. Apex Court in the matter of Dinesh Kumar Gupta (Supra) has considered the same. Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?18. Besides this, it would also not be correct to overlook or ignore an important statutory ingredient of contempt of a civil nature given out u/s 2 (b) of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience to the order. Bearing this important factor in mind, it is relevant to note that a proceeding for civil contempt would not lie if the order alleged to have been disobeyed itself provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order or circumstance which is the factual position in the instant matter. It would equally not be correct to infer that a party although acting due to misapprehension of the correct legal position and in good faith without any motive to defeat or defy the order of the Court, should be viewed as a serious ground so as to give rise to a contempt proceeding.
19. To reinforce the aforesaid legal position further, it would be relevant and appropriate to take into consideration the settled legal position as reflected in the judgment and order delivered in the matter of Ahmad Ali Vs. Supdt., District Jail, AIR 1987 SC 1491 : Supp. SCC 556 that mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt and although, disobedience might have been established, absence of wilful disobedience on the part of the contemnor, will not hold him guilty unless the contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, accidental or unintentional disobedience is not sufficient to justify one for holding guilty of contempt. It is further relevant to bear in mind the settled law on the law of contempt that casual or accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestion of contumacy, would amount to a contempt in theory only and does not render the contemnor liable to punishment and this was the view expressed also in cases reported in AIR 1954 Patna 513, State of Bihar Vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari and AIR 1957 Patna 528, N. Bakshi Vs. O.K. Ghosh.?
17. Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Anand Prakash Agarwal (Supra) has also considered the issue of wilful disobedience. Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?The Court has been further informed today that Original Suit No. 581 of 1994 filed by appellant giving rise to the First Appeal From Order referred to above, was ultimately got dismissed as withdrawn on 30.11.2000 i.e. the date on which the first appeal filed by Union of India arising out of Suit No. 581 of 1994 was dismissed. The result of dismissal of the Suit No. 581 of 1994 is that the interim order passed therein including the order passed in First Appeal would merge in the final judgment and, therefore, it can be safely recorded that there ceases to be any injunction operative in the eye of law at any point of time (Ref: Shree Chamundi Mopeds Ltd. vs Church Or South India Trust Assn., 1992 AIR 1439).
We have no hesitation to record that the temporary injunction proceedings cannot continue beyond the suit proceedings itself. The matter however does not end there because the contemnor-appellant before us has taken benefit of the interim injunction order, which he obtained. He has also breached the same injunction orders in so far it directed status quo to be maintained and constructions being not raised. Therefore, we proceed to examine the appeals on merits.
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We approve the reasons recorded in the order of the learned Judge and see no reason to take any different view in the matter.
In view of what has been recorded above, we find no merit in the present appeal. The appeal is dismissed. Interim order, if any, stands discharged.?
18. The issue of wilful disobedience was again subject matter by this Court in the matter of Mayur Farm Pvt. Ltd. (Supra). Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?13. The contempt jurisdiction is limited to punish the contemnor, not for disobedience of the order, but upon returning a finding that the disobedience is wilful. Mere disobedience is not sufficient unless it is shown and proved that the disobedience is wilful, deliberate and intentional.
14. In Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Dharam Dhoda and others4, Supreme Court while explaining the expression ''wilful' and Section 2 of the Contempt Act, held, that it means an act or omission done voluntarily and intentionally with the specific intent not to do something that the law requires to be done. In order to constitute contempt, the order of the court must be of such nature which is capable of execution in normal circumstances.
"17. ...... "Wilful" means an act or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally and with the specific intent to do something the law forbids or with the specific intent to fail to do something the law requires to be done, that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law. It signifies a deliberate action done with evil intent or with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore, in order to constitute contempt the order of the court must be of such a nature which is capable of execution by the person charged in normal circumstances. It should not require any extraordinary effort nor should be dependent, either wholly or in part, upon any act or omission of a third party for its compliance. This has to be judged having regard to the facts and circumstances of each case..?"
15. The Court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience, but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful and intentional. If from the circumstances of a particular case, the Court is satisfied that although there has been a disobedience but the disobedience is the result of some compelling circumstances under which it is not possible for the contemnor to comply the order, the court would not punish the alleged contemnor.
16. Supreme Court in Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India Insurance Company Ltd.5, while analysing the scope of Section 2(b) of the Contempt Act observed as under:
"17. This now leads us to the next question and a more relevant one, as to whether a proceeding for contempt initiated against the appellant can be held to be sustainable merely on speculation, assumption and inference drawn from facts and circumstances of the instant case. In our considered opinion, the answer clearly has to be in the negative in view of the well- settled legal position reflected in a catena of decisions of this Court that contempt of a civil nature can be held to have been made out only if there has been a wilful disobedience of the order and even though there may be disobedience, yet if the same does not reflect that it has been a conscious and wilful disobedience, a case for contempt cannot be held to have been made out. In fact, if an order is capable of more than one interpretation giving rise to variety of consequences, non-compliance with the same cannot be held to be wilful disobedience of the order so as to make out a case of contempt entailing the serious consequence including imposition of punishment. However, when the courts are confronted with a question as to whether a given situation could be treated to be a case of wilful disobedience, or a case of alame excuse, in order to subvert its compliance, howsoever articulate it may be, will obviously depend on the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but while deciding so, it would not be legally correct to be too speculative based on assumption as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 clearly postulates and emphasises that the ingredient of wilful disobedience must be there before anyone can be hauled up for the charge of contempt of a civil nature."
17. It thus follows that the Court would not overlook or ignore the statutory ingredients of contempt of a civil nature under Section 2(b), that the disobedience to the order alleging contempt has to satisfy the test that it is a wilful disobedience. In other words Section 2(b) could be invoked only when there is wilful disobedience and the Section provides scope for reasonable or rational interpretation of an order or the facts and circumstances arising therein. Mere unintentional disobedience is not enough to hold anyone guilty of contempt although disobedience might have been established. Absence of wilful disobedience on part of the contemnor will not hold guilty unless contempt involves a degree of fault or misconduct. Thus, the unintentional disobedience is not sufficient to justify for holding one guilty of contempt.
18. It is settled law that casual, accidental or unintentional acts of disobedience under the circumstances which negate any suggestions of contumacy, may amount to a contempt in theory only but that does not render the contemnor liable to punishment. To hold somebody guilty of contempt of Court, the concerned person must have wilfully disobeyed judgment, decree etc. or should have wilfully committed breach of an undertaking given to a Court. (Refer: B.K. Kar vs. High Court of Orissa6; State of Bihar vs. Rani Sonabati Kumari7 and N. Baksi vs. O.K. Ghosh8, the principle was reiterated in Jiwani Kumari Parikh vs. Satyabrata Chakravorty9 and Gyani Chandra vs. State of Andhra Pradesh10).
19. In Niaz Mohammad and others vs. State of Haryana and others11, wherein, the contemnors had not obeyed the judgment and released the salary, disobedience was held, in the given facts not wilful so as to tantamount to civil contempt. The Supreme Court drew a distinction between a court executing an order and punishing for contempt. Reliance was placed on Dushyant Somal vs. Sushma Somal12, to hold that where the contemnor is able to place before the court sufficient material to conclude that it is impossible to obey the order, the court will not be justified in punishing the alleged contemnor.
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24. The contempt proceedings being quasi-criminal in nature, the standard of proof required is the same as in other criminal cases. The alleged contemnor is entitled to the protection of all safeguards/rights which are provided in Criminal Jurisprudence, including, the benefit of doubt. There must be a clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the said provision. The case should not rest only on surmises and conjectures. In Debabrata Bandopadhyay and others vs. The State of West Bengal and another19, Supreme Court observed as under:
"A question whether there is contempt of court or not is a serious one. The court is both the accuser as well as the judge of the accusation. It behoves the court to act with as great circumspection as possible making all allowances for errors of judgment and difficulties arising from inveterate practices in courts and tribunals. It is only when a clear case of contumacious conduct not explainable otherwise, arises that the contemnor must be punished......... Punishment under the law of Contempt is called for when the lapse is deliberate and in disregard of one's duty and in defiance of authority. To take action in an unclear case is to make the law of contempt do duty for other measures and is not to be encouraged."
19. From the perusal of judgements, it is apparently clear that while punishing the opposite party-contemnor, it has to be seen as to whether conduct of wilful disobedience is made out or not and in case, it is found that it is not wilful disobedience, he may not be punished.
20. So far as present case is concerned, undisputedly, the Court has only stayed the impugned order as well as disciplinary proceeding with liberty to Nagar Palika Parishad, Hathras to proceed with the enquiry. Earlier enquiry so initiated was a three member fact finding enquiry that cannot be termed as disciplinary proceeding, therefore, in continuance of the same and consequences thereof, lodging of FIR does not come within the purview of disciplinary proceeding resulting into the wilful disobedience. Therefore, in light of law laid down by the Courts as well as facts of the case, no case of wilful disobedience is made out against the opposite party.
21. Another issue was what would the consequence of contempt proceeding in case interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted. This was considered by the Apex Court in the matter of Prithawi Nath Ram (Supra). Relevant paragraph is being quoted below;
?In a given case, even if ultimately the interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted to a party, the other side cannot take that as a ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court.?
22. This issue was again before the Apex Court in the matter of Prem Chandra Agarwal (Supra). Relevant paragraphs are being quoted below;
?4. It is a well-settled principle that once a final order is passed, all earlier interim orders merge into the final order, and the interim orders cease to exist.
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7. In view of the aforesaid decision, Contempt Petition is dismissed.?
23. Apex Court in both the matters have taken the specific view that once, interim order is vacated or relief in the main proceeding is not granted, at this stage, other side cannot take ground for disobedience of any interim order passed by the Court. Court has further held that once, final order is passed, all earlier interim orders merge into the final order and the interim orders cease to exist.
24. So far as present case is concerned, there is no dispute on the point that vide order dated 12.05.2025, petition was disposed of and interim order stands vacated, therefore, in light of law laid down by the Apex Court, no case of contempt is made out against the opposite party.
25. Therefore, in light of facts of the case as well as law discussed herein above, no case of contempt is made out.
26. Accordingly, application lacks merit and is dismissed.
(Neeraj Tiwari,J.) October 15, 2025 Arvind