Calcutta High Court
Smt. Monorama Devi And Ors. vs Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. And Anr. on 27 March, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003ACJ278, (2002)2CALLT167(HC)
Author: I. Banerjee
Bench: Indira Banerjee
JUDGMENT I. Banerjee, J.
1. This appeal is against the Judgment and order dated 26th May, 2000, passed by the Learned Judge, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Burdwan, dismissing the application of the appellants for compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, being MAC Case No. 180 of 1998.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal are briefly as follows:-
One, Mono) Kumar, hereinafter referred to as the victim, was the driver of truck bearing the Registration No. HR 29/CA-0549, of which the Respondent No. 2 is the owner. The said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 was covered by a policy of insurance issued by the Respondent No.l, which included third party risks.
3. The victim was. as driver of the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549, driving the said truck from Sahapur to Kolkata. On the way, the victim had to stop the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 on Grand Trunk Road, near the Rasulpur level crossing in Burdwan district.
4. A speeding truck from the opposite direction, the Registration number of which could not be noted (hereinafter referred to as the unknown truck) hit the truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 causing damage to the said truck and also Injuring the victim.
5. In the application for compensation before the learned Tribunal it is alleged that the victim got off the truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 to stop the unknown truck. The victim's brother who was the helper of the truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 and an eye witness to the accident, however, deposed before the learned Tribunal that the victim fell off the truck as a consequence of the collision.
6. Be that as it may, the victim was run over by the said unknown truck as soon as he was out of the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549. The victim was duly taken to hospital, but he succumbed to his Injuries.
7. The appellants, being the widow, the mother and the father of the victim filed the application being MAC Case No. 180 of 1998, before the learned Tribunal under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on structured formula basis as indicated in the Second Schedule to the said Act, from the respondents, being the insurer and the owner respectively of the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549.
8. Accordingly to the appellants, the victim was 24 years of age at the time of his death and had an income of Rs. 3,000/- per month as driver of the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549.
9. The Respondent No.1, being the insurer and the Respondent No. 2, being the owner of the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549, both contested the claim of appellants and filed their respective Written Statements, denying all the material averments in the claim application. The respondents have disputed their liability to pay compensation to the appellants on the ground that the victim did not die as a consequence of any accident involving the Truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 but was run over by the unknown truck.
10. The appellants examined two witnesses who were duly cross-examined on behalf of the Respondent No.1. The learned Tribunal was of the view that the oral evidence of the witnesses of the appellants derived effective support from documents on record including the First Information Report and the Post Mortem Report.
11. The learned Tribunal, however, accepted the contention of the respondents that the death of the victim could not be said to have been due to an accident arising out of the use of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549, since the victim was run over by the unknown truck after he got off truck No. HR 29/GA-0549.
12. The learned Tribunal dismissed the application of the appellants on contest, inter alia, holding that truck No. HR 29/GA 0549, of which the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 are insurer and owner respectively, was not involved in the accident in which the victim died and that the offending truck was still unidentified. Hence, this appeal.
13. Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 under which compensation has been claimed by the appellants provides as follows:-
" 163-A, Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis:-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or Instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorized insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of motor vehicle or the authorized Insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensa tion, as Indicated in the Second Schedule to, the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.
Explanation :-- For the purpose of this sub-section, "permanent disability" shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).
(2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.
(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule."
14. The liability of the owner of a vehicle or the insurer, to pay compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, arises in the case of death or permanent disablement due to an accident arising out of the use of that vehicle, irrespective of any negligence, fault or wrong on the part of any person including the accident victim.
15. The only question Involved in this appeal is, therefore, whether the accident in which the victim was killed can be said to have arisen out of the use of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549.
16. A statute is best interpreted when we know why it was enacted. In construing Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, reference may, therefore, be made to the circumstances which necessitated the enactment of the said provision and the mischief which was sought to be remedied by its enactment.
17. Accidental deaths and disablement are an Inevitable consequence of modern civilization. The faster the pace of life, the more the number of accidents. Many of such accidents are caused by motor vehicles. Every accidental disablement and death brings unfold suffering not only to the victim but also to the victim's family. The victims of traumatic injury and the family members of those killed, face in most cases, a variety of problems physical, psychological, social and financial. Such problems could be all the more serious if it is the breadwinner who has been killed or permanently disabled.
18. An average Indian family, with its usual hand to mouth existence, would find it extremely difficult to cope with the financial hardship that results from its breadwinner's death or disablement.
19. The provisions of Chapters X, XI and XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which correspond to the provisions of Chapter VIII of the repealed Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, barring some motor notifications, have been enacted with a view to provide speedy financial relief to victims of motor accidents.
20. The Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act 1994, which came into fore with effect from 14th November 1994, made some motor changes in the existing provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act 1988, and in addition, Introduced two more sections, namely Sections 163A and 163B. The Said sections provide for expeditious payment of compensation on structured formula basis as per the Second Schedule to the said Act, in case of death or permanent disablement, due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle.
21. The liability to pay compensation under the Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is based on the principle of no fault liability. It is therefore, not necessary to plead or establish any default, wrong or negligence on the part of the owner, the driver or any other person, in an application for compensation under the said section.
22. Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in the nature of a social welfare legislation, for the benefit of two distinct classes of people, namely, the unfortunate victims of accidents arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, who are permanently disabled, and the heirs of the unfortunate victims killed in such accidents.
23. In interpreting a social welfare legislation, the Courts normally adopt an Interpretation which would favour persons sought to be benefited by the legislation. Where the Courts are faced with a choice between a wider meaning which carries out, what appears to have been the object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, the Courts choose the former. Each word, phrase or sentence in the statute is to be construed in the light of the general purposes of the statute.
24. Significantly, the expression used in Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1983 is 'accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle' and not 'accident caused by the motor vehicle' or 'accident in which Uie motor vehicle is involved'.
25. The adoption of the expression 'accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle'. In preference to 'accident caused by the motor vehicle', or "accident in which the motor vehicle is involved' is, therefore, important and clearly indicates that a much wider meaning was intended by adoption of that expression.
26. The Courts have consistently adopted a beneficial construction in such situations and held that the expression 'arising out of the use of the vehicle' be given a liberal and wide interpretation.
27. Mr. Banlk. appearing on behalf of the appellant cited a catena of decisions in support of his argument that the case of the victim fell squarely with the expression 'arising out of the use of the vehicle.'
28. Mr. Banlk relied on the case of Shivaji Patil v. Smt. Vatschala Uttam More where the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the scope of the expressions 'use of the vehicle' and 'arising out of the use of the vehicle'.
29. In that case, there was a collision between a petrol tanker and a truck as a result of which the petrol tanker overturned some distance away from the high way. The petrol in the tanker leaked out. After about 4 hours an explosion took place in the petrol tanker which resulted in outbreak of fire. A number of persons who had assembled near the tanker sustained burns and some of them succumbed to burn injuries.
30. The mother, of one of the persons burnt to death, filed an application for compensation under Section 110 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and also made a claim under Section 92A of the said Act. The concerned Tribunal, however, rejected the application for compensation on the ground that the explosion and the fire resulting in Injuries to the deceased could not be said to be an accident 'arising out of the use of the vehicle' since that explosion and the fire took place about 4 hours after the vehicle had overturned. The Supreme Court did not accept the view taken by the Tribunal and held as follows :-
"The petrol tanker was a vehicle manufactured for the purpose of transporting petrol. It was a vehicle which had been adapted for such use and was suitable for use in the road for transporting petrol. At the time when the petrol tanker collided with the truck on the national highway, it was being used for the purpose of transporting petrol. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that when the said collision took place it was a motor vehicle as the said expression was defined in Section 2 (18) of the Act. Did it cease to be motor vehicle after the collision with the truck on account of Its lying turtle on its side at some distance from the road as a result of the said collision? in our view, this question must be answered in the negative. Merely because the petrol tanker had turned turtle as a result of the collision and was lying at a short distance away from the road, does not mean that it had ceased to be suitable or fit for use on the road and it had ceased to be motor vehicle. No material had been placed on record to show that the petrol tanker would not have been in position to move after it was put back on the wheels."
31. The Supreme Court then proceeded to consider the further question whether the explosion and fire which caused Injuries to the deceased could be said to have taken place due to an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, that is, the petrol tanker and held as follows:-
"The expression 'caused by' was used in Sections 95 (10)(b)(1) and (11) and 96 (2)(b)(il) of the Act. In Section 92-A, Parliament, however, chose to use the expression 'arising out of "which indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92-A the causal relationship between the use of the motor vehicle and the accident resulting in death or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. The construction of the expression 'arising out of the use of a motor vehicle' in Section 92-A enlarges the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and 19 in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment".
32. The Supreme Court concluded that the explosion and fire resulting in the injuries which led to the death was due to an accident arising out of the use of the motor vehicle.
33. Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is in part materia with section 92A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 and the law laid by the Supreme Court in interpreting the expression "arising out of the use of the motor vehicle" in that section must govern the construction of the expression in Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well.
34. Mr. Banik has also relied on a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Rita Devi and Ors. v. New India Assurance Company and Anr. . In that case, an auto rickshaw hired from the stand by some unknown persons went missing and was reported stolen. On the next day, the police recovered the dead body of the driver, but the auto rickshaw could not be traced. The claim of the widow and other heirs of the driver for compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 was contested by the owner and the insurer on the ground that the driver had been murdered and that his death could not be said to have been caused by an accident arising out of the use of the autorickshaw. The Supreme Court, relying on several English decisions and following its earlier decision in Shivaji Dayanu Patil's case (supra) held that the murder of the deceased was due to an accident arising out of the use of the vehicle.
35. As held by the Supreme Court, in the case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil (supra), the word 'use' in the context of motor vehicles is to be construed in the wider sense to Include the period when the vehicle is not moving and is stationary, being parked on the road.
36. The truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 was, therefore in use when it stopped near the Rasulpur level crossing in the Burdwan district and was hit by the unknown truck from the opposite direction. Merely because the victim was run over by the unknown truck when he got off truck No. HR 29/GA-0549, just after it was hit by the unknown truck, can it be said that the death of the victim was not due to an accident arising out of the use of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549?
37. In construing a welfare statute the Courts ought to give to it the widest operation which Its language will permit. The words of such a statute must be so construed as to give the most complete relief which the phraseology will permit so as to ensure that the benefit contemplated by the statute is not denied to the class for whom the benefit was Intended.
38. The provisions of a social benefit legislation must, to the extent possible, be construed in favour of the accident victim, without of course doing violence to the language. Equitable considerations may find an Important place in the construction of a beneficent provision.
39. When a beneficial statute is reasonably capable of two constructions, that construction should be preferred which furthers the policy of the act and is more beneficial to those in whose interest the statute has been passed. There can hardly be any doubt that Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been enacted in the Interest of those unfortunate accident victims who are either killed or are Incapacitated for life.
40. In the instant case, the only eye witness has deposed that the victim fell off truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 after the said truck was hit by the unknown truck. Even assuming that the victim got off truck No. HR 29/ GA-0549 to stop the unknown truck. It would make no difference. The victim had to come out of truck No, HR 29/GA-0549 because of the collision between the said truck and the unknown truck. The accident, in which the victim got killed, therefore, had connection with the use of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 even though the connection may not have been direct.
41. Furthermore, apart from just stopping the offending truck, it must also have been necessary for the victim as driver to Inspect the extent of the damage to the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 before re-starting the same. Unfortunately, the victim was not there to explain what exactly weighed with him when he got off the said truck No. HR 29/GA-0549.
42. We are. therefore, unable to accept the view of the learned Tribunal that truck No. HR 29/GA-0549, was in no way Involved. In any event, the learned Tribunal has, in our view, erred in Its Interpretation of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The learned Tribunal has in effect read into the said section, the word 'Involved' which is not there in the section and the introduction of which would restrict the rights of a large number of unfortunate accident victims for whose benefit the provision is Intended.
43. The expression 'accident' arising out of the use of motor vehicle has a wide connotation and it would not be proper to restrict the relief under Section 163-A only to cases of death and permanent disablement due to an accident in which the motor vehicle is directly involved. If the view taken by the learned Tribunal is accepted the very purport and object of Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 would be defeated.
44. For the reasons which weighed with the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Shivaji Dayanu Patil (supra) and Ratna Devi (supra) we hold that the death of the victim was due to an accident arising out of the use of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 and that his heirs are entitled to compensation from the respondents under Section 163-A of the Mother Vehicles Act, 1988 on the basis of structured formula as per the Second Schedule to the Act.
45. The Appellant as also the Respondents had sufficient opportunity to adduce evidence before the learned Tribunal. The evidence on record is sufficient to enable us to determine the amount of compensation to which the heirs of the victim are entitled under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. We, therefore, see no reason for a remand of the application for compensation to the learned Tribunal.
46. The Post Mortem Report and the First Information Report bear testimony to the age of the victim as declared by the appellants, which has also been corroborated by the oral evidence of the Appellant No. 3. The learned Tribunal has duly accepted the oral evidence adduced on behalf of the Appellants.
47. The contention of the appellants that the victim was earning Rs. 3,000/- per month as driver of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 has not been disputed by the Respondent No. 2 in his written statement filed before the learned Tribunal. The Respondent No. 2 as owner of truck No. HR 29/GA-0549 and employer of the victim obviously had knowledge of the income of the victim. Even otherwise, the claim of the appellants with regard to the victim's Income has been corroborated by the oral evidence of the Appellant No. 3 which has duly been accepted by the learned Tribunal.
48. We accept that the victim was 24 years of age and had an income of Rs. 3,000/- per month at the time of the accident. The respondents will Jointly and severally be liable to pay compensation of Rs. 4, 18,500/- on account of the death of the victim as per the particulars indicated hereinbelow :-
Annual Income (Rs. 3,000/- x 12) Rs. 36,000/-
Rs. 36,000/-
x 17 [Multiplier as per age of deceased (24 years)] Rs. 6,12,000 /-
Less: 1/3 on account of personal expenses of deceased Rs. 2,03,000/-
Rs. 4,09,000/-
Funeral expenses Rs. 2000/- Loss of Estate Rs. 2,500/- Rs. 4,13,500/- Loss of consortium Rs. 5,000/- (payable to spouse) Rs. 4,18,500/-
49. Out of the said sum of Rs. 4,18,500, a sum of Rs. 4,13,500/, that is, the aforesaid compensation amount, less Rs. 5,000/-awarded for the loss of consortium, will be apportioned equally between the Appellant Nos. 1 and 2, who, being the wife and the mother respectively of the victim are his Class I heirs under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The Appellant No. 1, as wife of the victim, will in addition, get Rs. 5,000/- on account of compensation for loss of consortium. Since the victim has left Class I heirs, the Appellant No. 3, who ts a Class II heir, will not be entitled to any compensation.
50. The appeal is thus allowed. The impugned judgment and order of the learned Tribunal is set aside.
The Respondent No. 1 is directed to deposit the said sum of Rs. 4,18,500/-in the Tribunal below within a period of 4 weeks from date along with interest @ 12% per annum on the said amount from the date of filing of the application for compensation in the Tribunal till the date of deposit of the full amount in the Tribunal.
The records of the Tribunal are directed to be sent back forthwith. There will be no order as to costs.
S. Banerjea, J.
51. I agree.