Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Government Of A.P. And Others vs A.V. Papayya Sastry And Others on 27 April, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(4)ALD191, 2000(4)ALT69, 2000 A I H C 3352, (2000) 2 LACC 256, (2000) 4 ANDHLD 191, (2000) 4 ANDH LT 69
Author: P. Venkatarama Reddi
Bench: P. Venkatarama Reddi, R.M. Bapat
ORDER
P. Venkatarama Reddi, J
1. These writ appeals by the State Government (Revenue Department) and by Visakhapatnam Port Trust are preferred against two separate judgments of the learned single Judge in Writ Petition No.3102 of 1995 and WP No.11754 of 1994. Writ Appeal Nos.109 and 479 of 1997 are preferred against the judgment in Writ Petition No.3102 of 1995 and the remaining two writ appeals arise out of the order in WP No.11754 of 1994. WP No.11754 of 1994 was filed by the respondents 1 to 7 herein who claim to be having right and interest over the land in S. No.3/1, 3/2 and 4 of Kancherlapalem (extension) village within the municipal limits of Visakhapatnam. They sought for a direction to the Land Acquisition Officer to pass an award in pursuance of the notification dated 17-5-1991 issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. WP No.3102 of 1995 was filed by the same parties seeking a writ of Certiorari to quash the order of the Government in G.O. Ms. No.21 (Revenue UC-1) dated 20-1-1995. Both the writ petitions were allowed. In WP No.11754 of 1994, the learned single Judge directed a fresh notification under Section 4(1) to be published and an award to be passed within the prescribed time frame. It may at this stage be pointed out that the relief granted by the learned Judge goes beyond the scope of the writ petition insofar as the learned Judge directed a fresh notification to be issued because the prayer of the writ petitioners is to direct passing of an award on the basis of Section 4(1) notification dated 17-5-1991. After the writ petition was allowed on 4-6-1996, a fresh notification under Section 4(1) was issued in compliance with the directions of the learned single Judge, without prejudice to the contentions in the writ appeal. We are informed that such step was taken to avoid action under the Contempt of Courts Act.
2. The case has a long history starting from 1972. As many as three notifications have been issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. Proceedings were initiated by the Government after a lapse of 13 years to revise the order of the competent authority under the ULC Act.
3. Now, we shall go through the relevant facts and events. The Chairman of the Visakhapatnam Port Trust (hereinafter referred to as 'VPT") sent a requisition letter to the District Collector on 16-8-1972 for acquisition of lands measuring Ac.45.33 cents in S. Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Kanehcrlapalem village for the purpose of construction of staff quarters therein. As a prelude to the acquisition, an extent of Ac.18.39 cents, the bulk of which is in S. No.4, was taken possession by the Estate Manager of VPT on 29-8-1972. Late Sri Akulla Suryanurayana Rao, (brother of respondent No.l and father of respondent No.7) on behalf of himself and as agent and GPA of Sri A.V. Papaiah Sastry (first respondent) handed over the lands to the Estate Manager of VPT. In the statement recorded on 29-8-1972, it was made clear that there was a dispute under the A.P. Tenancy Act with the tcnaul by name K. Gurumurthy Reddy. in his further statement dated 18-7-1973, Sri Swyanarayana Rao confirmed that the possession of Ac. 18.39 cents was handed over on 29-8-1972 and expressed no objection for the acquisition. It was also stated therein that there were fruit bearing trees including mango and jack fruit trees on the land. He and his brother Papaiah Sastry claimed exclusive right in the compensation amount. The factum of taking advance possession of the lands from the land owners in S. Nos.3/1. 3/2 and 4 and also in S. No.1/1 and 1/2 was intimated to Revenue authorities on 28-9-1972. It is the case of the writ petitioners that a notification under Section 4(1) was issued for the first time on 10-8-1973. However, there is no proof to this effect. The Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, came into force in Andhra Pradesh with effect from 17-2-1976. It covered the Visakhapatnam Urban Agglomeration also. It appears that VPT requested the land owners to get clearance from ULC authorities. The writ petitioners filed declarations and took the stand that the possession of land having been already handed over to VPT before the Act came into force, the land in estion was nothit by the provisions of the ULC Act. On 25-5-1991, the Special Officer, ULC, Visakhapatnam passed an order under Section 8(4) of the Act holding that the declarants are not surplus land holders and the disputed lands should be excluded from their holding. Thereafter, the notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act was approved by the Government on 29-8-1981 and the same was published in the Gazette on 1-9-1981. The urgency clause under Section 17(4) was nor invoked. Declaration under Section 6 was issued on 19-10-1982. While so, on 22-9-1983, the Government issued a notification withdrawing the land in S. No.1/1, 1/2 from acquisition. There was a protest by the Chairman, VPT. The Collector decided to cancel the withdrawal, but for want of provision in that behalf, such action could not be taken. Coming back to the lands in S. Nos.3/1, 3/2 and 4 with which we are concerned, the Secretary of VPT clarified on 19-12-1985 in reply to a query of the Special Tahsildar (LA) that acutal physical possession was not taken as the tenant did not hand over the lands. However, he stated that the staff of VPT were safeguarding the lands from possible encroachments. In the meanwhile, the Joint Collector, Visakhapatnam inspected the lands and approved PV statement for payment of compensation at Rs.25/- per sq. yd. Pursuant thereto, the VPT deposited a sum of Rs.28.92 lakhs towards the estimated compensation amount. The Joint Collector by his communications dated 29-10-1985 and 19-11-1985 instructed the Special Tahsildar to send up proposals for passing the award. However, no award was passed. No steps were taken presumably for the reason that the proceedings lapsed by reason of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act introduced by the Amendment Act of 1984. A fresh notification under Section 4(1) was issued which was published in the Gazette on 11-2-1986, but it related to the lands in S. Nos.1/1 and 1/2 and 2 which were earlier withdrawn from acquisition. Nonotification was issued in the year 1986 covering the lands in question, though, arguments were addressed on the footing that such notification was issued in the year 1986 in relation to the lands with which we are concerned. While the matter stood thus, the VPT's clarification that only paper possession was taken made the Special Tahsildar and the Collector to probe further into this aspect. Accordingly, the collector addressed a letter on 22-9-1986 to the VPT. The Secretary, VPT in his letter dated 23-9-1986 again stated that actual possession was not taken. On 3-2-1987, the Special Officer, ULC wrote to the Commissioner, ULC to address the Government to initiate action under Section 34 of the Act to annul the orders passed by his predecessor excluding the lands in question from the purview of ULC Act. On 12-7-1989, the Estate Officer, VPT addressed the District Collector not to reopen the ULC proceedings as the physical possession was taken from the land holders. Even the Chairman of VPT made a similar request to the Commissioner, ULC requesting the latter to give instructions to pass the award. By that time, as seen from the Government Memo dated 20-7-1994, the Commissioner of ULC already addressed a letter to the Government on 8-12-1988 seeking revision of the orders passed under Section 8(4) of the Act by exercising the powers under Section 34. It was followed by similar communications addressed during the years 1992 and 1993 by the Commissioner, ULC. In the meanwhile, in view of the lapse of the previous notification, a fresh notification was issued on 17-5-1991 under Section 4(1). Urgency clause under Section 17(4) was invoked. On 3-5-1992, declaration under Section 6 was issued. However, no award was passed. At last, on 20-7-1994, the Government decided to exercise suo motu revisional power under Section 34 and issued a show-cause notice proposing to set aside the proceedings dated 25-5-1981 of the competent authority under the ULC Actin CC Nos.6143 of 1976 etc. The first respondent and some others filed objections. The same were overruled and the impugned order dated 20-1-1995 was passed by the Government setting aside the order of the Urban Land Ceiling Authority and directing him to issue revised orders under Section 8(4) of the ULC Act. The objections filed by the wril petitioners were not dealt with at all in the said order. It was merely stated that the Government thought it fit to confirm the provisional conclusion arrived at in the memo dated 20-7-1994. Thereafter, Writ Petition No.3102 of 1995 was filed. The other writ petition seeking a direction to pass the award was filed earlier, after the show-cause notice under Section 34 of the ULC Act, was issued.
4. The Government has given two reasons for annulling the order passed by the competent authority under the ULC Act : (1) though on paper, the possession was taken over in anticipation of Land Acquisition proceedings in August, 1972 with the consent of land holders, the physical possession of the lands was not handed over as per the VPT's letter dated 19-12-1985 addressed to the Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Visakhapatnam. (2) Even if VPT shall be deemed to be in possession of the lands by the date the ULC Act came into force, still the title remains with the writ petitioners as the land acquisition proceedings were not concluded and therefore they were liable to surrender the excess vacant lands. For these reasons, the Government set aside the orders passed by the Special Officer-cum-competent authority under the ULC Act and he was directed to issue revised orders under Section 8(4) of the Act.
5. The learned single Judge quashed the Order of the Government mainly on the ground that there was unreasonable delay in initiating the revision proceedings and bysuch delayed action on the pan of the Government, the writ petitioners shall not be deprived of the compensation for the land which has already been notified under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. The learned Judge also took the view that the competent authority under the ULC Act had taken the correct view in excluding the lands which were not in their possession by the date of commencement of the Act The learned Judge also relied on the decision of another learned single Judge of this Court in WP No. 17622 of 1994 in which the show-cause notice issued by the Government was quashed. It may be mentioned here that the writ appeal against the said judgment is pending.
6. The other writ petition, namely, WP No.l 1754 of 1994 (which is the subject matter of Writ Appeal Nos.176 of 1997 and 292 of 1998) was allowed by the learned, single Judge with a direction to the concerned authorities to issue fresh notification and to pass an award within a period of three months. The learned Judge upheld the contention of the writ petitioners that the previous notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act stood cancelled with the issuance of the fresh notification on 17-5-1991. The learned Judge observed that there was no justification whatsoever for delaying the passing of the award indefinitely, having obtained advance possession and having initiated proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act. As already noted, a fresh notification was issued on 8-10-1996 pursuant to the judgment in Writ Petition No.11754 of 1994 in compliance with the order of the learned Judge.
7. Pending these writ appeals, by an order dated 20-7-1998, we directed that a sum of Rs.30 lakhs should be released to the respondents (the original land holders or their LRs.). We observed that this shall be treated as tentative and ad hoc paymenttowards compensation. The reasons for passing such order were recorded in detail. Later on, when certain other persons impleaded themselves claiming interest over the disputed land, we directed that the amount of Rs.30 lakhs should be released on condition of furnishing Bank Guarantee. Accordingly, it has been released.
8. Now, we shall take up for consideration the Writ Appeal Nos.109 of 1997 and 479 of 1997 preferred by the State Government and Visakhapatnam Port trust respectively against the judgment in WP No.3102 of 1995.
9. The learned Government Pleader for Land Acquisition contends that the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, have over-riding effect and the excess vacant land falling within the net and ambit of the Act has be to be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of that Act and the initiation of proceedings under Land Acquisition Act does not have the effect of extricating the excess land from the clutches of ULC Act. When once the land in the urban agglomeration is considered to be excess vacant land, the land vests with the State in accordance with the provisions of the ULC Act and the compensation is liable to be paid only in accordance with that Act but not under the Land Acquisition Act. Reliance is placed in support of his contention on the decision of this Court in and on the decision of the Supreme Court in . It is then contended by the Government Pleader for Land Acquisition that the Government has given relevant reasons for revising the order of the Special Officer, ULC. It is further contended that there is no bar against the exercise ofrevisional powers even after 13 years if the facts and circumstances of the case justify such revision. It is on these grounds, the learned single Judge's decision is assailed.
10. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents 1 to 7 while justifying the conclusion reached by the learned single Judge contended that the competent authority under ULC Act rightly excluded the lands from the holdings of the declarants as they severed their connection with the land by handing over the possession thereof to VPT long before the commencement of the Act, In any case, it is submiiled that the land being a garden land having fruit bearing trees which was being cultivated by a tenant, it 'does not fall within the description of urban land or vacant land within the meaning of Section 2(o) and 2(p) of ULC Act and this aspect has not been gone into at all by the State Government, The learned Counsel has also submitted that in order to expedite the process of passing the award and to avoid prolonged litigation, the respondents are prepared to receive compensation at the market rate prevailing on 17-5-1991 in accordance with the prayer in the writ petition.
11. In the light of these contentions and the view taken by the learned single Judge, the twin questions which need to be resolved are:
(1) Whether the Government is justified on merits in revising the decision of the competent authority under ULC Act?
12. To elaborate, an answer to this question should depend on whether the disputed land is 'vacant land' within the meaning of ULC Act and, if so, whether the writ petitioners must be deemed to be holding such vacant land in excess of ceiling limit on the dale of commencement of the Act, i.e., 1-2-1977.
(2) Irrespective of the correctness of the order of the ULC authority whether the Government was justified in exercising its suo motu revisionalpowers under Section 34 of the ULC Act after a lapse of about 13 years?
13. There is much to be said in favour of the view taken by the Government that by the date of commencement of the ULC Act, the landholders did not lose their title to the iand. The mere fact that possession was handed over by the land owners to VPT in the year 1972 does not mean that the land owners were divested of the title to the land, in fact, possession that was delivered to VPT could not be, in the very nature of things, an effective possession inasmuch as the tenant was cultivating the lands. Thus, the ground of exclusion of the land in question from the holding of the declarants (writ petitioners or their predecessors in title) in the course of proceedings under Section 8(4) of ULC Act, does not appear to be a valid ground. However, it is not necessary to enter into an elaborate discussion on this aspect, having regard to the view we are taking on the second aspect of the case, i.e., whether it was vacant land on the relevant date so as to attract the provisions of ULC Act.
14. 'Vacant land' is defined by Section 2(q) to mean "the land, not being land mainly used for the purpose of agriculture in an urban agglomeration". That does not include certain categories of land enumerated in clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) which are not relevant for our purpose. According to clause (B) of the Explanation to Section 2(o), "land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture, if such land is not entered in the revenue or land records before the appointed day for the purpose of agriculture". The provisos to clause (B) are not relevant for our purpose. The appointed date in relation to the State of Andhra Pradesh is 17-2-1976.
15. Clause (c) of Explanation to Section 2(o) is also relevant. It reads:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of this Explanation, the land shall not be deemed to be mainly used for the purpose of agriculture, if the land has been specified in the master plan for a purpose other than agriculture."
16. If clause (c) which is a non obstante and deeming provision applies, the land shall be regarded as vacant land within the meaning of the Act irrespective of the agricultural user of the land. The letter of the Vice-Chairman of Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority ('VUDA') in Re. No.562/98-G1, dated 8-7-1998 addressed to the District Collector, Visakhapatnam shows that the general town planning scheme for Visakhapatnam city and its vicinity was sanctioned in the year 1970 vide G.O. Ms. No.703, MA dated 29-8-1970 under the provisions of A.P. Town Planning Act, 1920. Thereafter, the VUDA was constituted in the year 1978. The master plan for the Visakhapatriam Metropolitan region including Visakhapatnam city was prepared on 23-5-1989 under the A.P. Urban Areas Development Act, 1975. Thus, on the date of commencement of the ULC Act, the general town planning scheme was in force. As early as in the year 1966, a number of revenue villages including Kancharlapalem village with which we are concerned were merged in the then existing Visakhapatnam Municipality by G.O. 338 (MA) dated 24-3-1966. The Vice-Chairman, VUDA by his letter dated 8-7-1998 reported that the land covered by in S. Nos.2, 3 and 4 of Kancharlapalem village forming part of Visakhapatnam Municipality was shown as 'picnic gardens' in the old sanctioned plan of the year 1970. 'Agriculture', according to clause (A) to the Explanation to Section 2(o), includes horticulture. The revenue records as well as correspondence which we shall refer to in more detail bear ample testimony to the fact that the land in question situate in S. Nos.3 and 4 is agarden land with a number of fruit bearing trees. The zoning of the land as 'picnic garden land' is not incompatible with the rearing up of fruit bearing trees by horticultural operations because the garden can only be sustained and nursed by horticultural operations. Thus, clause (c) does not come in the way of the land being treated as land used for the purpose of agriculture-wliich includes horticulture.
17. The next question is whether it !s classified in the revenue or land records as agricultural land. If so, the deeming provision under clause (B) will not stand in the way of the land being treated as agricultural/horticultural land. If clause (B) does not come in the way of the wril petitioners, the next question would be whether, factually, the land was on the relevant date being mainly used for the purpose of agriculture whieh includes horticulture. To have a clear picture on these two aspects and in order to shorten the course of litigation, we called for a finding from the competent authority under the ULC Act to report whether on the date of commencement of the Act, the land in question was being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture. The competent authority submitted a report after giving an opportunity of hearing to the writ petitioners also. We shall now extract the relevant portion of that report.
"(1) In Revenue Account No.2 (Adangal of falsi years 1379 to 1381, fasli 1383 to 1385, fasli 1388 and 1389 corresponding to the respective years 1969 to 1971, 1973 to 1975, 1978 and 1979. Mango topes and Cashew tope S. No.3/1 and 3/2 and Mango, Panasa, Sapota, Cashew and Coconut plants in S. No.4 was recorded.
(2) In ryolwari Patta No.59 measuring Ac.1-40 in S. No.3/2. the land is covered by 50 years old cashew tope as on 30-9-1958.
(3) In the declaration filed under 8/18 of APLR (COAH) Act, 1973 in Case No.48 of 1975, the then Talisildar verified these lands under agriculture category and declared them as non-surplus land holders on 30-9-1975.
(4) In the declarations filed under Section 6(1) of the ULC Act, 1976, the petitioners claimed those lands as vacant lands.
(5) The Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling issued draft statement under Section 8(1) of the Act on 12-12-1978 declaring those lands as agriculture lands, (6) The Special Officer, Urban Land Ceiling by treating those lands as agriculture lands situated in Urban area of Visakhapalnam Municipal limits recommended for exemption of those lands under Section 20(1 )(a) of the Acl to the Government in Rc.No.434/78/B dated 12-12-1978 as per the G.O. Ms. No. 1797 dated 24-10-1978.
(7) In Special Tahsildar's Re. No.2833/ 77/R1-2 dated 26-10-1985 addressed to the Collector, Visakhapatnam, it was clearly written in the tree valuation statement that in S. No.3/1 only 10 Palmyrah trees, in S. No.3/2 only 3 Palmyrah trees and in S. ts'o.4 119 Palmyrah trees, 21 cashew trees, 16 Sapota trees. 8 Soapnut trees, 1 Tamarind tree, 1 Teakwood tree, 34 Date-palm trees and 30 Mango trees were present and they were valued for Rs.13,381/-.
From the above discussion, it appears that the lands in S. No.3/1, 3/2 and 4 of Kancharlapalem were treated as agriculture lands situated in Urban area of Visakhapatnam Municipality on the appointed day. With that view only those lands were initially recommended for exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the ULC Act. But I believe that there is no support of the view that effective cultivation is present in any year in those lands before or after the commencement of the ULC Act in 1976. Fvcn in Revenue records, only horticulture plants like Cashew, Mango, etc., were recorded but not effective agriculture crops like paddy, surgarcane etc. As said earlier, the character of the land is to be determined with reference to its principal use (Section 20(O)(A) of ULC Act). Mere the lands are not put to effective cultivalon but they are used for raising plants like Mango, cashew, etc. As per revenue records, horticulture crops were recorded against almost entire extent of Ac. 18-39 in S. No.3/1, 3/2 and 4. But. mere entry in revenue records is not decisive to determine the use of the land as horticulture.''
18. Thus, it is unequivocally reported that as per the revenue records, the existence of mango 'topes', cashew plantations and other fruit bearing trees was noted in respect of S. Nos.3/1, 3/2 and 4, that the Talisildar at the time of enquiry under A.P. Land Reforms Act classified them under the category of agricultural lands and that the Special Officer, ULC also treated them as agricultural lands. In fact, in the report dated 26-10-1985 of the Special Deputy Collector. (Land Acquisition). Visakhapatnam referred to in para 3 supra, it was reported that there were good number of Irees iikc palmyrah, mango, cashew in these survey numbers and there were also thatched sheds or houses in S. No.4. As early as on 17-9-1973, while addressing the Collector. Visakhapatnam. the Land Acquisition Collector stated that the lands in S. Nos.3/1. 3/2 and 4 were agricultural lands. The fact that there was a tenant reinforces the inference that theland in question was agricultural/horticultural land.
19. Having noted the factual position as per the revenue records and on the ground, the reporting authority viz.. Special Officer, ULC, Visakhapatnam however made a "volte face' in the concluding para, and by a strained reasoning, took the stand that the lands cannot he construed to be horticultural lands. The reason given is that most of the trees are palmyrah trees which are not generally known as horticultural in nature and the lands were not being put to effective cultivation by raising crops like paddy, sugar cane etc. He concluded that the lands in S. Nos.3/1, 3/2 and 4 are "nearer to the classification or character of vacant lands."
20. The reasoning thai cultivation with agricultural crops was not being done, suffers from a rallacy. The land used for horticulture, is also agricultural land by the inclusive definition. The fact that there arc a large number of palmyrah trees which are also fruit bearing trees which do not require any operations to nurse and sustain them is not a ground to delete it from the classification of horticultural land. It may be that sufficient number of trees were not found on a vast extent of Ac.18.00 by the date of inspection and valuation in the year 1985. But, the factual situation in the year 1976 could be different. Be that as it may, even going by the number of fruit bearing trees of different types found right from the year 1969 upto 1985 coupled with the cultivation by tenant, it would unerringly indicate that the land in question was being primarily used for the purpose of horticulture. The authorities concerned with the Urban Land Ceilings, Agricultural Land Ceilings and Land Acquisition treated the lands in question as agricultural lands as evident from the report of the Special Officer, ULC referred to supra. Therefore, the said land is liable to be excluded from thedefinition of 'vacant land' as it falls under the category of land used for agriculture as defined in Section 2(o).
21. The Government while revising and setting aside the order of the competent authority under ULC Act did not take this crucial fact into account. Having regard to the declaration filed by the writ petitioners, the finding of the Special Officer while finalising the statement under Section 8(1) that it is agricultural land and the exemption proposals submitted to the Government, the Government ought to have applied its mind to this aspect and recorded its opinion. When a revision was taken up after a long lapse of time to the detriment of the landholders, the legitimate expectation could allcast be that the revising authority would comprehensively consider all the relevant aspects. Unfortunately, the Government adopted a truncated approach and decided only two aspects: (1) that effective possession was not given to VPT in the year 1972 and (2) that the title continued to remain with the landholders on the date of commencement of ULC Act. These aspects may be relevant, but equally relevant if not a more relevant factory that should have been considered was whether the lands in question were being used mainly for the purpose of agriculture on the crucial date. There is no point in directing the Government to record a finding on this aspect at this distance of time, thereby prolonging the agony of the writ petitioners. That is why, we have adopted the course of calling for a report from the Special Officer, ULC who is the competent authority under the Act and considered the facts disclosed therein to arrive at the above conclusion.
22. The next point which needs to be considered is whether the rcvisional order of the Government is vitiated by reason of exercise of power after a long lapse of time. We agree with the learned singleJudge that in the circumstances of the case, such power should not have been exercised after a lapse of nearly 13 years. It is not a case where the true facts did not come to light for a long time on account of fraud or collusion of the officials with the land holders. All the relevant facts were before the LAO as well as ULC authority. Atleast, from 1986 onwards, the District Collector and Commissioner, ULC were requested by the LAO as well as the Special Officer, ULC to address the Government to initiate revision. The Commissioner in. his turn wrote to the Government in December, 1988 as seen from the impugned order itself followed by further reminders in 1992 and 1993. But, till 20-7-1994, for reasons unexplained by the Government, no steps were taken to revise the order passed by the Special Officer, ULC under Section 8(4) of the Act. There may not be fixed period of limitation, but the rules of fair play and justice and the salutary principle that there should be finality to the litigation coupled with the legitimate expectation that might have been entertained by the affected party would all go to point out that the power of revision was exercised by the Government after an unreasonably long period of time. This has introduced an element of arbitrariness and unreasonableness in the action of the Government. The decisions of the Supreme Court in State of Gujarat v. P. Raghav, . etc., and the decision in Koyya Veerraju v. M.R.O., , have laid down the proposition that the statutory power of revision cannot be exercised ad infinitum at any point of time.
23. In Government of India v. Citadel Fine Pharmaceuticals, 184 ITR 467, the principle was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following words;
"In the absence of any period of limitation, it is settled that every authority is to exercise the power within a reasonable period. Whenever a questionregarding inordinate delay in the issuance of a notice of demand is raised, it would be open to the asscssee to contend that it is bad on the ground of delay and it will be for the Officer concerned to consider the question whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the notice of demand for recovery was made within a reasonable period. What would be a reasonable period would depend on the facts of each case, and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard."
24. in Government of A. P. v. Kalleti Chengaiah, , the Supreme Court observed while dealing with a case under A.P. Estates Abolition Act:
"It is settled law that the power of suo motu revision can be exercised within a reasonable time. When it is held that the power may be exercised from time to time, what would be the reasonable time depends upon facts of each case."
25. Having regard to the sequence of events set out above, tt cannot be said that the power of revision has been invoked by the Government in the year 1994 within a reasonable time. Such power, if at all, could have been exercised much earlier when the facts affording prima facie justification for such revision, came to surface. Even after the Commissioner, ULC wrote to the Government, the Government took more than four years to initiate revision proceedings. In the meanwhile, one more notification was issued under the [.and Acquisition Act for the reason that earlier notification had lapsed. No attempt has been made in the counter-affidavit to explain the reasons for such inordinate delay. The respondents-writ petitioners are therefore entitled to succeed on this ground too.
26. In view of the above discussion and in view of the fact that the requisitioningdepartment - VPT is still bent on acquiring the land, the appellants are bound to finalise the acquisition proceedings by passing an award. The question then arises - what the relevant date is for the purpose of assessing the market value of the land?
27. The decision of the Supreme Court in Raghunath v. State of Maharashtra, , is an authority for the proposition that when successive notifications are issued under the Land Acquisition Act, the latest notification will prevail because the earlier notifications must be deemed to have been superseded. Therefore, by the dale of fifing the writ petition, the notification issued on 17-5-1991 was in force and it is that date which is crucial for the purpose of payment of compensation. In fact, the writ petitioners have prayed for passing of award and payment of compensation taking the notification dated 17-5-1991 as the basis. However, as already noted a further notification was issued in 1996. That was only pursuant to the order of the learned single Judge which strictly speaking goes beyond the relief sought for in the writ petition. It may be mat the learned single Judge issued such direction under the impression that the notification of 1991 had lapsed. But, in view of the categorical statement of the learned Counsel for the petitioners that they will abide by the prayer in the writ petition and are not interested in claiming more compensation on the basis of notification issued subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition, it is not necessary to probe into the question whether the earlier notification survives. However, one fact that should be taken note of is that in the notification dated 17-5-1991, the Government invoked urgency clause under Section 17(4). The advance possession taken should also be recognised as the possession taken pursuant to the provisions of Land Acquisition Act as held by Full Bench of this Court in RDO, Guntur v. Vasireddy, . No doubt, as contended on behalf of the Government and VPT, effective possession was not taken inasmuch as the tenant did not surrender the possession. However, the tenant himself agreed for acquisition and receipt of compensation as per the joint letter addressed to Chairman, VPT on 12-10-1991. Thus, atlcast from that day, it must be regarded that for all practical purposes, the effective possession was taken as there was no impediment from any quarters. That being the position, by reason of Section 17(1), the land absolutely vests with the Government free from any encumbrance. After such vesting, the question of issuing a further notification does not arise. In this context, the observations of the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Join v. Slate of U.P., . are worth quoting:
"When Section 17(1) is applied by reason of urgency, the Government takes possession of the land prior to the making of the award under Section 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land and it is vested in the Government. Section 17(1) states so in unmistakable terms."
28. Applying the dicta laid down by the Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of U.P., (supra), a Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (PVR, J.), was a party held in Government of A.P. v. Mohd. Moimiddin Hussan, , as follows:
"The land having vested in the Government absolutely and free from encumbrances as per the legislative mandate contained in Section 17(1). issuance of any further notifications under Section 4(1) and Section 6 will be a futile, meaningless and superfluous exercise. Notification under Section 4(1) is meant to initiate or set in motion the proceedings culminating in the vestingof land with the Government even before the award is passed in case Section 17( 1) applies and after the award passed in case the acquisition is de hors Section 17. That being the case, there was no point in issuing further notification as if the acquisition did not take a start. It would amount to overlooking the plain effect of latter part of Section 17(1). The subsequent notifications under Section 4(1) issued in the year 1989 and 1995 must be deemed to he 'non est' in the eye of law apart from being superfluous. Naturally, such notifications cannot form the basis for fixation of market value."
29. Thus, the concession that the compensation may be paid to them taking 1991 notification as the basis, is backed up by the statutory provision as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
30. The learned Government Pleader at one stage argued that second notification was issued in the year 1986 invoking the urgency clause, but on further verification, he stated that the notification issued in the year 1986 does not relate to the land in question, but some other contiguous land. However, the learned Government Pleader contended that the writ petitioners as well as the tenant gave a joint letter addressed to Chairman, VPT on 12-10-1991, according to which they agreed to receive the compensation as per the market value as in the year 1981 when the first notification was issued and therefore they are bound by it in any case. Obviously, such statement was given out of desperation to purchase peace and receive the compensation at the earliest. But the appellants did not act on such representation. They stuck to their guns and persisted in their stand that the land was hit by the provisions of ULC Act and therefore, no compensation under the Land Acquisition Act is payable. In the face of the stand taken by the Governmentand their inaction in not accepting the offer of the respondents-writ petitioners, it cannot be contended that they are still bound by their statement made in the letter dated i 2-10-1 991 addressed to Chairman, VPT, Such statement has lost its relevance and binding effect, thanks to the attitude adopted by the appellants. We cannot therefore accept the contention of the learned Government Pleader that the respondents cannot claim compensation over and above 1981 market rates.
31. In the result, the order of the learned single Judge is modified by deleting the direction to issue the notification afresh and the notification issued on 8-10-1996 pursuant to the judgment of the learned single Judge shall be deemed to be 'nan esf in the eye of law and need not be implemented. However, we agree with the learned single Judge that this writ petition has to he allowed and the compensation should be paid to the petitioners without further delay by passing the award under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. In order to expedite the passing of award, we reiterate the statement made by the learned Counsel for the respondents and impleaded parlies that they have no objection to secure compensation, taking 17-5-1991 as the crucial dale. Without deciding the question whether the impleaded parties have interest in the land, we direct the Land Acquisition Collector to give an opportunity to the impleaded parties to participate in award proceedings before passing the award.
32. The writ appeals are allowed to the limited extent as indicated above subject to the observations made herein. We make no order as to costs.