Punjab-Haryana High Court
Renu Devi vs Punjab State Power Corporation Limited ... on 17 October, 2025
CWP-31051-2025 -1-
115 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA
AT CHANDIGARH
CWP-31051-2025
Date of decision: 17.10.2025
Renu Devi ....Petitioner
Versus
Punjab State Power Corporation Limited and others ...Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARPREET SINGH BRAR
Present: Mr. Arvind Galav, Advocate
for the petitioner.
Ms. Eknoor Kaur, Advocate
for the respondents-PSPCL.
HARPREET SINGH BRAR, J. (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying for the issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari to quash the impugned order No. 596 dated 25.07.2025 (Annexure P-
14) and for a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to grant 100% family pension to the petitioner, revise the Pension Payment Order (RPPO No.156349/22-23), and release all outstanding arrears along with interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
2. Briefly the facts of the case are that the petitioner is the widow of Mithai Lal who was employed as a T.G.2 (Mechanical) with the respondent- Punjab State Power Corporation Limited (PSPCL) and died in harness on 27.10.2018. The death certificate records the petitioner as his wife. Prior to his marriage with the petitioner, he was married to Respondent No.5. Out of this wedlock, two sons were born. The late employee and Respondent No.5 1 of 9 ::: Downloaded on - 11-11-2025 17:29:53 ::: CWP-31051-2025 -2- obtained a customary divorce on 28.05.1996. Subsequent thereto, Respondent No.5 remarried one Ram Kishan, a fact corroborated by her Aadhar Card (Annexure P-2).Thereafter, the deceased married the petitioner on 25.07.1996, and this marriage was formally registered under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 14.02.2013 (Annexure P-3). Three children were born from this marriage. During his lifetime, he nominated the petitioner as his wife and sole beneficiary in all his service records for the purpose of retiral benefits. Upon the employee's death, the son from the second marriage,, was granted a compassionate appointment. The first wife, executed a sworn affidavit before an Executive Magistrate on 12.04.2022 (Annexure P-8), and subsequently another on 01.08.2024 (Annexure P-12), wherein she categorically stated that after her divorce and remarriage, she had no connection with late employee and relinquished all her claims, including family pension, in favour of the petitioner and her children.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner, inter alia, contends the respondent-PSPCL's action is a classic example of a hyper-technical and mechanical application of rules, completely divorced from the contextual facts and the object of the family pension scheme. Respondent No.5, having remarried and relinquished all her rights, ceased to be a 'widow' or 'dependent' of late employee for the purpose of family pension. To consider her as a surviving widow defies logic and the very essence of the welfare legislation. Further, the nomination by the deceased in favour of the petitioner, coupled with the unequivocal relinquishment by the first wife, creates an indefeasible right in favour of the petitioner to receive the entire family pension. The respondent's reliance on the void nature of the second marriage is misplaced.
2 of 9 ::: Downloaded on - 11-11-2025 17:29:54 ::: CWP-31051-2025 -3- Learned counsel further places heavy reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vidyadhari & Ors. Vs. Sukhrana Bai & Ors., (2008) 2 SCC 238, to argue that even if the marriage is void, the nominee, like the petitioner herein, who shouldered all marital responsibilities and was the person of confidence for the deceased, is preferable to a legally wedded wife who had long severed ties. He further relies upon a judgment of a Coordinate Bench of this Court in Top Khana Abhilekh Record Officer & Anr. vs. Daljit Kaur & Anr.(RSA No.166-2021), wherein it was held that once the first wife relinquishes her rights, the second wife becomes entitled to 100% of the pensionary benefits. Learned counsel submits that family pension is not a bounty but a valuable right and property under Article 300A of the Constitution, earned by the deceased through long service, intended to provide succor to his dependents. Depriving the petitioner of her full entitlement violates this constitutional right and her right to livelihood under Article 21 of the Constitution.
4. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents contends that the action of the respondent-PSPCL is strictly in conformity with the statutory rules, specifically, Rule 6.17(4) Note 1 of the PCSR. Since the deceased employee was survived by two wives, the rule mandates an equal division of the family pension. Learned counsel further states that the customary divorce is not a legal divorce as per the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Consequently, the first marriage subsisted in the eyes of the law, rendering the second marriage void. In such a scenario, the rule is clear and admits no exception. The affidavits of relinquishment do not override the statutory mandate.
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5. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record with their able assistance, this Court finds considerable force in the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner. The case at hand is squarely covered, both on facts and in law, by judgment rendered by this Court in Top Khana Abhilekh Record Officer v. Daljit Kaur (P&H) 2021 (3) SCT 166 and CWP-32831-2024, titled Abshekh Dutta and another Vs. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. and others, decided on 17.09.2025.
6. A Coordinate Bench of this Court in Top Khana (supra) observed as follows in this regard:
"6. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, learned First Appellate Court cannot be said to have erred in directing the payment of pensionary benefits to Smt. Daljit Kaur. The appellants are required to pay the amount of pensionary benefits to Smt. Dalip Kaur who is the widow of Late Sh. Mohinder Singh, once Smt.Bant Kaur has appeared in Court and suffered a statement relinquishing her right in favour of the other widow. Therefore, this Court does not find any error in the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court.
Hence, dismissed."
7. This Court in Abshekh Dutta (supra), conducted an exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence surrounding family pension especially where two wives were present. The following principles, which are directly applicable to the present case, were laid down:
7.1 Relying on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment in Ram Shridhar Chimurkar Vs. Union of India, (2023) 4 SCC 312, it was reiterated that family pension is designed as a social security measure to help the dependents of the deceased government servant to tide over the financial crisis arising from the said death. The definition of 'family' cannot be extended to include those who were not dependents on the government servant at the time of his death. In the present case, Respondent No.5, having remarried and lived a 4 of 9 ::: Downloaded on - 11-11-2025 17:29:54 ::: CWP-31051-2025 -5- separate life for over two decades, was unequivocally not dependent on the deceased employee.
7.2 Further, this Court in Abshekh Dutta (supra) explicitly condemned the "hyper-technical approach" of the employer in withholding benefits in "unfounded anticipation" of a claim by the first wife, especially when no such claim has been made for years, if not decades. The situation here is identical. Despite clear relinquishment affidavits, the respondents have withheld 50% of the pension, an action which is thoroughly unjustified. 7.3 This Court placed immense significance on the fact that the first wife had never staked a claim to any retiral benefits of the deceased. In the present case, the petitioner's position is significantly stronger as the first wife has not merely remained silent but has actively and formally relinquished her claims through sworn affidavits. This act of relinquishment, as recognized in Top Khana Abhilekh(supra), entitles the petitioner to the full pension. 7.4 The respondents' emphasis on the void nature of the second marriage is answered by the law laid down in Vidyadhari (supra) where, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that while the second marriage may be void, the children born therefrom are legitimate, and more importantly, the nominee (the second wife) who lived with the deceased as his wife and was his person of confidence, can be granted the succession certificate over the legally wedded wife who had never lived with him. This logic applies with full vigor to the grant of family pension to the petitioner in the present case as well. 7.5 Further reliance in this regard may be placed by on the two-Judge Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tulsa Devi Nirola & Ors. versus Radha Nirola & Ors. 2020 (2) SCT 301 where the fact of cohabitation, taking 5 of 9 ::: Downloaded on - 11-11-2025 17:29:54 ::: CWP-31051-2025 -6- care of spouse in illness, bearing expenses and nomination was given due importance, speaking through Justice Navin Sinha, the following was opined:-
"9. Rule 35 (5) provides that for the purpose of Rules 36, 37 and 38, family in relation to a government servant means wife or wives, including judicially separated wife. Rule 38 provides for nomination to be made by the government servant in Form 1 or 2 or 3 conferring on one or more persons, the right to receive death come retirement gratuity that may be due to him. In view of the partition deed the deceased while filling his nomination in the prescribed Form under Rule 38 mentioned the name of respondent no.1 only as the sole beneficiary of family pension. We are of the considered opinion that Rule 40(6) is conditional in nature and does not vest an automatic statutory right in appellant no.1 to equal share in the family pension. The family pension would be payable to more than one wife only if the government servant had made a nomination to that effect and which option was open to him under the Pension Rules.
"40. Family Pension- (6) (a) (i) Where the family pension is payable to more widows than one, the family pension shall be paid to the widows in equal shares."
10. The Pension Rules therefore recognize the nomination of a wife or wives for the purpose of family pension. True, the family pension did not constitute a part of the estate of the deceased. If the settlement deed had not been executed and acted upon different considerations may have arisen. The right to family pension in more than one wife being conditional in nature and not absolute, in view of nomination in favour of respondent no.1 alone, appellant no 1 in the facts of the case can also be said to have waived her statutory right to pension in lieu of benefits received by her under the settlement deed. The deceased resided exclusively with respondent no.1 and occasionally visited appellant no.1. The deceased was exclusively taken care of by respondent no.1 during his illness including the expenditure incurred on his treatment. In view of the statutory rules, it is not possible to accept the argument that respondent no.1 was nominated only for purpose of receipt of the family pension and per force was required to share it equally with appellant no.1." (emphasis added)
8. Oftentimes, retiral benefits are the only source of income for many families, especially when the primary breadwinner has passed away. The retired employees and their kin not only rely on the same for fiscal security but also for their very survival. It was also observed in D.K. Nakara and others Vs. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 305 that pension and retiral benefits are akin to wages, relied upon by the pensioner and his family for assistance post-retirement.
6 of 9 ::: Downloaded on - 11-11-2025 17:29:54 ::: CWP-31051-2025 -7- Reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Olga Tellis Vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) 3 SCC 545, whereby the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution of India was expanded by interpreting it to include the right to livelihood. Speaking through Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, the following was observed:
32. ...An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. ..."
9. Furthermore, the right to life enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India, is not limited to mere animal-like existence but includes the right to live a meaningful life, with dignity in the truest sense of the term.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Francis Coralie Mullin Vs. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 has opined that any act offending human dignity constitutes violation thereof. It was further clarified that bare necessities such as "adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings" as well as any other activities constituting a "bare minimum expression of human self,"
subject to the degree of economic development of the State, form a part and parcel of right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
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10. The impugned order dated 25.07.2025 (Annexure P-14) is manifestly erroneous as it fails to recognize the pivotal facts of remarriage and relinquishment by the first wife, rendering it perverse, non-speaking, and arbitrary. It latches onto the initial existence of two marriages while completely ignoring their subsequent dissolution in fact and through conduct, and the relinquishment of the other claimant. Such a myopic view cannot be sustained in law. In the absence of any claim from the first wife who relinquished it, the respondent-PSPCL was thoroughly unjustified to unilaterally release only 50% of the pensionary benefits to the petitioner, thus also amounting violation of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
11. In view of the discussions above the present petition is allowed. The impugned order No. 596 dated 25.07.2025 (Annexure P-14) is hereby quashed and set aside.
12. Accordingly, the respondents/competent authority are directed as under:
a) To grant 100% family pension to the petitioner, with effect from the date it became due, i.e., 28.10.2018.
b) To revise the Pension Payment Order (RPPO No.156349/22
23) accordingly, within a period of one month from the receipt of a certified copy of this order.
c) To release the entire arrears of family pension to the petitioner, after adjusting the 50% pension already paid, along with interest @ 7.5% per annum from the date the respective installments became due till the date of actual payment. The entire exercise of calculating and releasing the arrears with interest shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this order.
13. All pending miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.
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14. A copy of this judgment be sent to the respondents for necessary compliance.
(HARPREET SINGH BRAR)
JUDGE
17.10.2025
Neha
Whether speaking/reasoned : Yes/No
Whether reportable : Yes/No
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