Gujarat High Court
Shri Vakil Ahmed Aziz Ahmed @ Kalwa vs The State Of Gujarat And 2 Ors. on 17 April, 2008
Author: Akil Kureshi
Bench: Akil Kureshi
JUDGMENT Akil Kureshi, J.
1. Appellant was original accused No. 1. By impugned Judgment and order dated 27th July, 2006, learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 7, Vadodara in Sessions Case No. 102 of 2005 convicted the appellant for offences punishable under Sections 497 and 498 of IPC. For offence under Section 497 of IPC, he was sentenced to undergo S.I. for 5 years and pay fine of Rs. 10,000/-. For offence under Section 498 IPC, he was sentenced for S.I. for 2 years and pay fine of Rs. 5,000/-.
2. As per charge Exh.4, it was alleged that the appellant-original accused No. 1-Vakil Ahmed Ajij Ahmed Pathan and one Kafil Ahmed Ajij Ahmed Pathan- original Accused No. 2 on 7th April, 2004 at 10.30 in the morning, kidnapped married lady complainant along with her four year old son, namely, Saif when they were going to the house of the sister of the complainant. The two accused forcibly made the complainant to sit on the Motorcycle and took her to various places such as Surat and Indore during which period, both the accused had forcibly and against the wish of the complainant had sexual intercourse with her. It was further alleged that complainant was forced to marry accused No. 1 and was kept in confinement in a rented room. The accused were thus charged with offences punishable under Section 363, 376, 506(2), 498, 346 and 384 of IPC read with Section 114.
3. It may be recalled that the learned Additional Session Judge by the impugned Judgment and order convicted only accused No. 1-present appellant that too for offences punishable under Section 497 and 498 of IPC. The appellant was found not guilty of offences punishable under Section 363, 376 and other offences for which he was charged by the learned Judge. It may also be noted that learned Judge imposed maximum punishment awardable under both the provisions, namely, Section 497 and 498 of IPC.
4. At the outset, learned advocate Shri Pardiwala, appearing for the appellant submitted that the complaint was lodged by 'M' and in view of provisions of Section 198 of Cr.P.C., the learned Judge could not have taken cognizance of offence punishable under Section 497 and 498 of IPC, except, upon the complaint made by the husband of 'M'. He therefore contended that no cognizance of the aforesaid offence could have been taken by the learned Judge upon the complaint of 'M' and therefore the trial and the conviction of the appellant for offences punishable under Section 497 and 498 of IPC was wholly illegal. Learned advocate Shri Pardiwala, further, submitted that no charge for offence under Section 497 was framed and conviction and sentence of the appellant for the said offence was thus wholly impermissible.
5. In view of the above contentions and my conclusion thereon which will be recorded hereafter, it is not necessary to examine the entire evidence on record to find out whether the learned Judge was justified in arriving at the conclusion of the guilt of the appellant for the aforesaid offences.
6. However, to appreciate the factual background involved in the present appeal, evidence of some of the main witnesses may be noted in brief.
7. Complainant 'M', PW-1, was examined at Exh.17. In her deposition, she stated that she was married to one Abdul Hafiz and from the said marriage, she had one son aged 4 years named Saif Ali. On 7.4.2004 at 10.30 in the morning when she was walking towards her sister's house, the accused came from behind on a Motorcycle. Accused No. 1 was riding and accused No. 2 was sitting behind him. They forced her to sit between them on the Motorcycle, her son was made to sit on the petrol tank. Both the accused threatened her that they would kill her son. Accused No. 2 was carrying a gun with him. She was taken to a room blindfolded. After getting her there, she was taken to Surat and kept her in a Hotel where accused No. 1 and accused No. 2 committed rape on her. After 2 days, she was taken to Indore and was forced to marry accused No. 1. The accused No. 1, thereafter, committed rape on her several times. About 25 days thereafter, Fatehganj Police came to Indore with her relatives and she was brought to Fatehganj Police Station where under force, she was kept in a Women's Protection Home.
7.1 In the cross-examination, she denied the suggestion that she had an affiar with the appellant and that she had left her husband's house voluntarily and joined the accused. She also denied the suggestion that shortly before the incident, her husband had caught her and the appellant in compromising position and quarreled with them. She admitted that she was taken on a Motorcycle from Vadodara to Surat and when they left from Surat to go to Indore, she could not state whether it was morning, afternoon or night. They reached Indore after two days. They stopped on the riad side Tea Stall but did not have any food. She had never complained to anybody at such places about her being kidnapped. She had not tried to run away, she could not state whether the appellant had filled petrol. To the Molana who performed the marriage ceremony also, she did not complain.
8. Husband of the complainant had independently lodged the complaint on 23rd April, 2004 which is produced at Exh.25. In which, he had stated that his wife had left for her sister's house on 7th April, 2004 but had not reach there. Thereafter, on the third day, he came to know that his wife had run away with the appellant.
9. Husband of the complainant, Abdul Hafiz was examined as PW-3 at Exh.28. In his deposition, he stated that he had a quarrel with his wife on 6th April, 2004. Thereafter, he had left for work in the morning. When he returned in the evening, the house was locked. Upon inquiry, he found that his wife had left for her sister's place. When inquired with the sister, he found that his wife had not reached there. He learnt that his wife had left with the appellant. His wife had relations with the appellant and the appellant used to visit his house in his absence. He was informed about this by the neighbors and he himself had also seen the appellant coming to his house. He stated that his wife and the appellant had illicit relations. One day when he came home early, he had seen his wife and the appellant in his house. It was on account of quarrel with his wife on 6th April, 2004 that she ran away the next day.
9.1 In the cross-examination, he stated that the appellant and his wife had relations since one year. Though he tried to persude his wife, she did not change. On 6th April, 2004, when he returned home in his truck, he found his wife and the appellant sleeping in the house. He had, therefore, beaten up his wife as well as the appellant.
10. On the basis of the evidence led by the prosecution on record, the learned Judge did not believe the allegations of the appellant and the co-accused having kidnapped and raped her.
11. In view of clear evidence of the husband of the complainant PW-3, I find that learned Judge was perfectly justified in totally discarding the allegation of forcible abduction and intercourse on the complainant by the appellant. This was a clear case where the complainant had voluntarily left her matrimonial home and joined the appellant on account of long standing affair between the two. The complainant has made large number of contradictory and completely unbelievable statements in her deposition. The entire version of her and her son being forcibly taken on motorcycle by the appellant is unbelievable. The complainant stated that she was taken from Vadodara to Surat on a motorcycle and kept in a hotel for two days in confinement and thereafter, taken to Indore by road. At Indore, she was forced to perform marriage ceremony. All this while, she complained to no one. In view of the learned Trial Judge having discarded the entire theory of kidnapping and rape, it is not necessary for me to discuss the evidence in this regard any further.
12. The learned Judge, however, came to the conclusion that the appellant was guilty of adultery punishable under Section 497 of IPC and enticing a married woman with intent to marry her, punishable under Section 498 of IPC. The learned Judge as noted, imposed maximum punishment prescribed for the said offences.
13. At the outset, it may be noted that in the charge Exh.4, there was no mention of offence under Section 497 of IPC. For offence of adultery, Section 497 prescribes punishment upto 5 years. Section 498 provides punishment for enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married woman and is punishable for maximum 2 years of imprisonment or fine. Thus, in absence of charge under Section 497, learned Judge could not have convicted the appellant for the said offence relying on the charge framed under Section 498 of IPC.
14. More importantly, the learned advocate for the appellant is justified in contending that the complaint was filed by the wife and for offences under Sections 497 and 498 of IPC to permit the learned Judge to take cognizance of the offences, it was necessary that such complaint ought to have been filed by the person aggrieved as defind under Section 198(2) of Cr.P.C.
15. Relevant portion of Section 198 of Cr.P.C. reads as follows:
198. Prosecution for offences against marriage: (1) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence:
Provided that:
(a) where such person is under the age of eighteen years, or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity unable to make a complaint, or is a woman, who according to the local, customs and manners, ought not to be compelled to appear in public, some other person may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her behalf;
(b) where such person is the husband and he is serving in any of the Armed Forces of the Union under conditions which are certified by his Commanding Officer as precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable him to make a complaint in person, some other person authorized by the husband in accordance with the provisions of Sub-section (4) may make a complaint on his behalf;
(c) where the person aggrieved by an offence punishable under [Section 494 or Section 495] of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is the wife, complaint may be made on her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or daughter or by her father's or mother's, brother or sister [, with the leave of the Court, by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption].
(2) For the purpose of Sub-section (1), no person other than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by any offence punishable under Section 497 or Section 498 of the said Code:
Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when such offence was committed may, with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his behalf.
16. From the provisions of Section 198, it can be seen that for offences punishable under Chapter XX of the IPC, no Court can take cognizance of offence except upon such complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offences. The person aggrieved for the purpose of offence, punishable under Sections 497 and 498 of the IPC is the husband of the woman and no other person is deemed to be a person aggrieved. In that view of the matter, the complaint not having been filed by the husband of the woman, the entire act of taking cognizance thereof was wholly impermissible. In the case of V. Revathi v. Union of India and Ors. , The Apex Court while upholding the constitution validity of Section 497 and Section 198(2) of Cr.P.C. made following observations:
5. Section 497, Penal Code, and Section 198(1) read with Section 198(2), Criminal P.C. go hand in hand and constitute a legislative packet to deal with the offence committed by an outsider to the matrimonial unit who invades the peace and privacy of the matrimonial unit and poisons the relationship between the two partners constituting the matrimonial unit. The community punishes the 'outsider' who breaks into the matrimonial home and occasions the violation of sanctity of the matrimonial tie by developing an illicit relationship with one of the spouses subject to the rider that the erring 'man' alone can be punished and not the erring woman. It does not arm the two spouses to hit each other with the weapon of criminal law. That is why neither the husband can prosecute the wife and send her to jail nor can the wife prosecute the husband and send him to jail. There is no discrimination based on sex. While the outsider who violates the sanctity of the matrimonial home is punished a rider has been added that if the outsider is a woman she is not punished. There is thus reverse discrimination in 'favour' of the woman rather than 'against' her. The law does not envisage the punishment of any of the spouses at the instance of each other. Thus there is no discrimination against the woman in so far as she is not permitted to prosecute her husband. A husband is not permitted because the wife is not treated an offender in the eye of law. The wife is not permitted as Section 198(1) read with Section 198(2) does not permit her to do so. In the ultimate analysis the law has meted out even handed justice to both of them in the matter of prosecuting each other or securing the incarceration of each other. Thus no discrimination has been practised in circumscribing the scope of Section 198(2) and fashioning it so that the right to prosecute the adulterer is restricted to the husband of the adulteress but has not been extended to the wife of the adulterer.
16.1 In the case of G. Narasimhan and Ors. etc. v. T.V. Chokkappa , the Apex Court made following observations:
Section 13. On these contentions, the principal question for determination is whether the respondent could be said to be an aggrieved person entitled to maintain the complaint within the meaning of Section 198 of the Code. That section lays down that no magistrate shall take cognizance of an offence falling inter alia under Ch. XXI of the Penal Code (that is, Sections 499 to 508) except upon a complaint made by some persons aggrieved of such offence. Section 198, thus, lays down an exception to the general rule that a complaint can be filed by anybody whether he is an aggrieved person or not, and modifies that rule by permitting only an aggrieved person to move a magistrate in cases of defamation. The section is mandatory, so that if a magistrate were to take cognizance of the offence of defamation on a complaint filed by one who is not an aggrieved person, the trial and conviction of an accused in such a case by the Magistrate would be void and illegal.
17. In the result, on the short ground of the complaint for offences under Section 497 and 498 not having been made by the person aggrieved and the cognizance of the said complaint having been taken by the learned Judge, I find that subsequent trial and conviction of the appellant was wholly impermissible and vitiated.
18. In the result, the conviction and sentence of the appellant is set aside. He would be released forthwith, if not required in any other criminal case. Fine, if any paid, may be refunded.