Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
K. Matura Bai And Ors. vs A. Shiva Nageswar Rao And Ors. on 4 March, 2004
Equivalent citations: III(2004)ACC592, 2006ACJ1341, 2004(3)ALD658, 2004(4)ALT304, AIR 2005 (NOC) 6 (AP), 2004 A I H C 3413, (2004) 3 ANDHLD 658, (2004) 4 ANDH LT 304, (2004) 2 TAC 747, (2004) 3 ACC 592, (2006) 2 ACJ 1341
JUDGMENT T. Ch. Surya Rao, J.
1. Since all the three appeals arise out of one and the same judgment dated .7.1999 passed by the learned Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, in OP No. 129 of 1996, they can be disposed of together.
2. The second respondent/Insurer is the appellant in C.M.A. No. 3021/1999, the third respondent/APSRTC ('the Corporation' for brevity) is the appellant in C.M.A. No. 1069/2000 and the claimants are the appellants in C.M.A. No. 2550/1999. The Insurer and the Corporation in the respective appeals are assailing the finding of the Tribunal below that the Respondents 1 to 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation. In addition thereto, the Corporation is assailing the quantum of compensation assessed by the Tribunal, The claimants are questioning the inadequacy of the compensation.
3. The claimant filed O.P. No. 129 of 1996 claiming a compensation of Rs. 4 lakhs for the death of the husband of the first claimant and father of the Claimants 2 and 3 in a motor accident that occurred on 8.1.1996 at about 7.20 p.m., on account of the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus bearing No. AP-7T-2288 owned by the first respondent, insured with the second respondent and on hire with the third respondent; and that on account of the accident the deceased was run over and died on his way to Gandhi Hospital; and that on account of his death, the family suffered financially and mentally. According to the claimants, the deceased was working as a Welder in the Corporation and was earning Rs. 5,000/-per month.
4. The claim was resisted by the respondents. The first respondent/owner of the offending vehicle while generally denying the allegations made by the claimants pleaded that since the bus was insured with the second respondent/insurer and on contract of hire with the third respondent/Corporation, the Respondents 2 and 3 were liable to pay the compensation.
5. The case of the second respondent/ insurer was that the claim of the claimants was exorbitant and since the vehicle was under the contract of hire with the third respondent, the insurer was not liable to pay the compensation.
6. The case of the third respondent Corporation was that the Corporation entered into an agreement for hire with the first respondent for limited purpose. The just compensation determined by the Tribunal, therefore, must be paid by the Respondents 1 and 2 who were jointly and severally liable being the insured and insurer of the offending vehicle. The liability of the insured and insurer was not excluded merely because the vehicle had been hired to a third party. The driver of the offending vehicle had been in the employment of the first respondent and his services had not been transferred to the third respondent along with complete control to the Corporation, and hence the Corporation could not initiate any action against the driver; and that the vehicle was under the maintenance of the first respondent and, therefore, the Corporation was not liable to pay the compensation; and that the compensation claimed was highly excessive.
7. On an appreciation of evidence available on record, the Tribunal eventually found that the accident in this case was due to the negligence of the driver of the bus. Having regard to the oral testimony of P.W.2, the duty constable at the place of accident, buttressed by Ex.A. 1, FIR given by him to the Station House Officer, Ctilkalguda Police Station coupled with the oral evidence of P.W.3 and Exs.A.3, A.4, A.5 and A.6, the inquest report, panchanama with regard to the scene at the place of accident, MVI Report and charge-sheet respectively, the Tribunal was of the clear view, that the accident in this case was due to the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the bus. No rebuttal evidence has been adduced on the side of the respondents. Both P.Ws.2 and 3 are independent witnesses. They are natural witnesses and their presence near the place of accident cannot be doubted. Their evidence has also not been shaken in any manner in the cross-examination. In view of the unimpeachable evidence on the side of the claimants, I am of the considered view that the Tribunal below has rightly appreciated their evidence and has arrived at right conclusion on the issue of rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle by its driver. For the above reasons, the finding shall have to be upheld.
8. The Tribunal below then proceeded to assess the compensation and ultimately awarded an amount of Rs. 1,70,500/- as compensation to the claimants as against the claim of Rs. 4 lakhs. In the process, the Tribunal adopted a multiplier of 3 and assessed the compensation towards pecuniary damages at Rs. 1,20,060/- and the remaining towards non-pecuniary damages including the compensation towards loss of consortium to the first claimant. Ultimately, the Respondents 1 to 3 are held to be jointly and severally liable to pay the said compensation. In the process of assessing the pecuniary damages, inasmuch as the deceased was working in the Corporation as Welder, his age and emoluments at the relevant date have been rightly considered with reference to the evidence adduced on the point. Exs.B.1-service register and B-2-salary certificate are the two documents from which the age and salary particulars of the deceased could be ascertained. The Tribunal, therefore, has rightly taken into consideration the annual dependency after deducting 1/3rd from out of the total emoluments of the deceased at Rs. 3,335/-. However, it fixed the multiplier of 3 having picked up the same from the table given in Bhagwandas case, 1987 ACJ 1052. The date of birth as can be seen from Ex.B.1 is 21.8.1939 and his salary as per Ex.B.2-salary certificate was Rs. 4,989/- at the relevant date. In view of the same, the loss of dependency per month Rs. 3,335/- as arrived at by the Tribunal is quite impeccable, but the multiplier of 3 appears to be not correct.
9. The learned Counsel appearing for the appellants seeks to contend that the multiplier as given in the Second Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Act ('the Act' for brevity) should have been taken into consideration instead of picking up the multiplier from the table given in Bhagwandas case. Precisely that is the point involved in these appeals. The judgment in Bhagwandas case was rendered wayback in the year 1987 by this Court. The data relevant at that time has been considered while fixing the relevant multiplier with reference to the ages of the deceased. There has been no revision whatsoever since the date of that judgment. Since then the Courts have been following the said judgment while assessing the compensation. However, in the year 1994, there had been an amendment to the Act whereunder Sections 163-A and 163-B were incorporated and Second Schedule was appended to the Act. The vertical first column of the Second Schedule contains the ages of the victims and the second column contains the multiplier relevant to that age. The rest of the columns contain the amounts to be awarded as compensation in case of death depending upon the income of the deceased at the relevant time as given horizontally on the top of the table. It is obvious, therefore, by appending Second Schedule to the statute pursuant to the provisions contained in Section 163-A the statute fixes the multipliers which are relevant to the respective ages as given in the first column thereto. In ordinary course, the suitable multiplier should be picked up as given in the Second Schedule being the statutory provision vis-a-vis the table as given in the judgment rendered by this Court in Bhagwandas case wayback in the year 1987. A fortiori having regard to the fact that the data which was relevant for fixing the suitable multiplier at the time of rendering the judgment by this Court in Bhagwandas case required to be updated having due regard to the longevity period, which is increased, inflation and other relevant data. However, the Courts are uniform in picking up the multiplier relevant to the age of the victim of the fatal accident. Some Courts have been still following the Bhagwandas case in preference to the statutory provision contained in Section 163-A read with Second Schedule appended to the Act. Some Courts are following the multiplier given in the Second Schedule being the statutory provision.
10. In view of the significance attached to the point, it is appropriate to notice the law on the point.
11. A three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in UPSRTC v. Trilok Chandra, , held thus:
"Neither the Tribunal nor the Courts can go by the ready reckoner. It can only be used as a guide. Besides, the selection of multiplier cannot in all cases be solely dependent on the age of the deceased. But these mistakes are limited to actual calculations only and not in respect of other items."
In the process, the Apex Court considered the mistakes in the calculation of compensation as given in the ready reckoner table by illustrating it in para 18 of its judgment. That has nothing to do with the multiplier given in the second column of the table given in the Second Schedule.
12. In Rattan Lal Mehta v. Rajinder Kapoor, 1996 ACJ 327, Justice M. Jagannadha Rao (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division of the Delhi High Court in para 31 held thus:
"31. A statutory multiplier Table has arrived in India with effect from 14.11.1994. That' means that our Parliament is ahead of the Parliament in U.K. arid other countries. The amendment by Act 54 of 1994 to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, contains a multiplier Table in the Second Schedule. The amendment is prospective and applies to cases of accidents which have occurred after 14.11.1994. (Unfortunately, in the quantum fixed for different levels of loss of annual earnings, there are clear arithmetical errors in multiplication. In our view, the arithmetical mistakes in the Table can be corrected by the Courts/Tribunals for if there is an obvious arithmetical mistake in the Table appended to a statute, the Courts can correct the same. The mistakes are confined to the other columns which refer to the amounts in rupees. While the column relating to the appropriate multiplier for different age levels does not contain any mistakes, the mistakes are confined to the other columns which refer to the amounts in rupees).
In paras 36 to 39 it was further held thus:
"36. Question arises as to whether the multiplier in the Table appended by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which is prospective, can also be of relevance in respect of accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994 on which date the Table came into force. In our opinion, the statutory multiplier Table is clearly relevant for the following reasons.
37. Actuarial multipliers are based on mortality rates of different persons bearing different ages and are published by the Registrar General, Government of India. Census in our country is taken once in 10 years. In our view, there can be no difficulty in taking judicial notice of the fact that over last 10 years medical facilities have increased considerably and that is why there is also a general increase in the survival rates or decrease in the mortality rates. This position has been accepted by the Supreme Court. The multiplier published in the Amending Act, 1994 is based on the mortality or rather survival rates officially published for the period just before 1994. If a Court or Tribunal is considering the case of an accident which had occurred prior to 14.11.1994 when death rates were higher and survival rates lesser, then it is obvious that these multipliers in the statutory Table are more favourable to the claimants if a later multiplier based upon a higher survival rate of a later date, immediately preceding 1994, is applied in respect of an accident which occurred long before 14.11.1994. This can be explained from another angle. If in fact a multiplier Table had been published by Parliament (say) for 1984 then those multipliers would have been lesser than the multipliers now published in 1994. This is because survival rates in 1984 and earlier thereto were less than those in 1994. That is why we are of the view that even in regard to cases of accidents prior to 14.11.1994 the date from which the Table in Second Schedule brought in by the Amending Act, 1994, has come into force, it will be open to the Courts/ Tribunals to take the multiplier as per the said statutory Table as relevant. (In fact, the objection or dispute must come from the tortfeasors or the insurance companies. Even if they do raise an objection, we may say from experience that the defendants need not be apprehensive of a higher award on the basis of the 1994 statutory Table, because difference in each multiplier over a period of 10 years will be higher only by small fractions ranging between 0.25 and 0.50 generally).
38. If the above procedure enunciated by us based on the statutory multiplier provided by Parliament is applied, we can steer clear of conflicts in the multipliers applied by Courts on the judicial side in several cases. This approach of ours will help in rationalising awards, remove ad hocism in selection of multipliers based on individual preferences. A whole range of discrimination between case and case can easily be avoided. That is why we have taken pains to give reasons as to why the statutory multiplier Table provided for prospective use can also be used for accidents which occurred before 14.11.1994.
39. In fact, if ad hoc multipliers like 26, etc., are used for pre-14.11.1994 accidents and only maximum multiplier of 18 as per the Table is bound to be used for post-14.11.1994 accidents, there will be undue overpayment in regard to accidents prior to 14.11.1994, i.e., in the seventies or eighties, when survival rates were far less than in 1994. Our view will eliminate any such anomaly."
13. In Supe Dei v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., , a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court held in Para 8 thus:
"While considering the question of just compensation payable in a case all relevant factors including the appropriate multiplier are to be kept in mind. The position is well settled that the Second Schedule under Section 163-A to the Act which gives the amount of compensation to be determined for the purpose of claim under the section can be taken as a guideline while determining the compensation under Section 166 of the Act."
14. In Oriental Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Hansrajbhai, 2001 (3) ALT 34 (SC), a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court was of the view that the compensation to be granted as per structured formula basis was not in addition but in the alternative to determination of compensation on the basis of fault liability or no fault liability. Ultimately, the Apex Court was of the view that the object in providing Section 163-A was to avoid delay in determination of compensation on regular basis under Section 166 of the Act. The reason is not far to seek. The structured formula contains the maximum annual dependency as Rs. 40,000/- in the last column contained at the top of the table. The victims of the accident who earn more and the annual dependency of the claimants in that view of the matter is more than Rs. 40,000/-, the structured formula contained in the Second Schedule cannot be used. In that view of the matter and for other reasons, the Apex Court was of the view that assessment of compensation as per the structured formula is obviously to avoid delay which would naturally be occasioned in all cases of assessment of compensation by the Tribunal in regular basis under Section 166 of the Act. Yet another reason given by the Apex Court was the absence of provision in the Act for adjustment of compensation granted in accordance with the structured formula ultimately in the compensation to be granted regularly by the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act unlike in the case of Section 140 which prescribes the compensation to be granted in a fixed amount under no fault liability basis. Thus, the Apex Court distinguished the claims under Sections 140, 163-A and 166 of the Act. Yet another reason which has not been considered by the Apex Court which is obvious from the provisions of Section 163-A of the Act is that the compensation on structured formula shall have to be granted in the case of death or permanent disablement. Therefore, in all other cases where the victims of the accident sustained injuries though they do not result in permanent disablement, those cases have not been covered under Section 163-A of the Act. Both under Sections 140 and 163-A, the compensation shall have to be granted notwithstanding the fault or no fault in cases where the death or permanent disablement is the consequence of the accident. While Section 140 of the Act fixes the liability on the owner or owners of the vehicles jointly and severally which involve in the accident, Section 163-A fixes the liability on the owner as well as the authorised Insurer. However Courts interpreted the said provision and held that Insurer is also liable. Obviously both these Sections do not cover the fault liability, a fortiori when they deal with the cases of death or permanent disablement leaving the other cases where the victims sustained injuries albeit those injuries have not resulted in permanent disablement. Section 163-B of the Act mandates that the claimant has to choose, before preferring the claim for compensation, either under Section 140 or Section 163 and both the provisions cannot at the same be resorted to.
15. Very recently a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Abati Bezbaruah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India, , it was held in para 11 thus: :
"It is now a well-settled principle of law that the payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided for under the Second Schedule should not ordinarily be deviated from. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down the guidelines for determination of the amount of compensation in terms of Section 166 thereof. Deviation from the structured formula, however, as has been held by this Court, may be resorted to in exceptional cases. Furthermore, the amount of compensation should be just and fair in the facts and circumstances of each case."
16. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Etc. Etc. v. Patricia Jean Mahajan, , the Apex Court held in para 17 thus:
"Though, normally the multiplier as indicated in second schedule should be applied as it is as found to be a safe guide for the purpose of calculation of amount of compensation. ............... It is true as also noticed by the High Court that the Second Schedule should be taken as a guide, but it does not mean that no deviation in the figure of multiplier itself, would be permissible in any case whatsoever. Normally, second schedule may provide a guide for application of multiplier but for valid and proper reasons, different multiplier can be applied, indeed not exceeding 18 in any case on the upper side."
17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Muneer, , a Division Bench of Kerala High Court held in para 18 thus:
"The above discussion lead us to the conclusion that the Second Schedule does not suffer from any vice which can persuade a Court to ignore or discard the Second Schedule altogether. The Courts cannot throw their hands up in helplessness merely because of the inelegance or seeming imperfections in the statute. Statutory interpretation is both an act and a science. It would be improper to develop cold feet and to lose sight of the destination when one comes across such surmountable obstructions.
Quantum of compensation payable under Section 163-A can thus certainly be ascertained and granted."
18. From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that there is every distinction between the claims under Sections 140, 163-A and 166 of the Act. No fault liability is in respect of death or permanent disablement under Section 140 of the Act and the owner is liable to pay the compensation. However, under Section 163-A even though there has been no fault on the part of the driver, the owner and Insurer are liable to pay the compensation in respect of death or permanent disablement as given in the structured formula in the Second Schedule appended to the Act. However, Section 166 mandates that the Tribunal should consider the facts and circumstances of each case and determine just compensation. This is in respect of death or grievous injuries resulting in permanent disablement or any other injuries to qualify them. This distinction cannot be overlooked. Be it the case of assessment of compensation under Section 163-A or assessment of compensation under Section 166, the multiplier in the structured formula as given in the Second Schedule appended to the Act being the statutory provision shall have to be followed. A fortiori the multiplier table as given in Bhagwandas case having not been updated so far, there is no option for the Tribunal except to follow the statutory multiplier as given in the structured formula. Deviation is permissible from these multipliers as held by the judgments of the Apex Court only in proper cases and under the compelling circumstances. The legal position thus appears to be obvious from the concatenation of the cases discussed hereinabove.
19. This then takes us to consider the other question as to who among the Corporation and the Insurer is liable to pay the compensation. As can be seen from the factual matrix, the owner of the offending vehicle hired the bus to the Corporation. Admittedly, it was insured with the Insurer in this case and by the date of accident the policy was in vogue. Under the contract of hire, the bus was given by its original owner to the Corporation along with the driver. It is being plied by the Corporation in the route earmarked to it. The original contract under which the bus was given on hire in between the owner and the Corporation has not been filed into the Court so as to know the terms incorporated therein. From the above factual matrix emerging from the record, it is to be seen as to who among the Corporation and the Insurer of the bus is liable. The Apex Court in Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Kailash Nath Kothari, , had an occasion to deal with a similar problem. The only difference being the contract of hire has been filed in that case unlike the instant case. Having regard to the fact that the passengers being carried by the bus under hire to the RSRTC and there has been privity of contract in between the passengers and the RSRTC as regards the safety of the passengers and that the vehicle in question has been in actual control of the RSRTC for the purpose of running on the specified route and that the driver of the bus who was the employee of the original owner of the offending vehicle has to act under the control of the Corporation for operation of the bus on the routes specified by the RSRTC and finally in view of the definition of the owner enjoined under Section 2(19) of the Old Act, 1939 the Apex Court interpreted giving wider connotation as the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose directions and commands the driver is obliged to operate the bus notwithstanding the fact that there has been a specific clause incorporated under the contract of hire that upon the accident of the bus taking place, the owner of the original bus is liable for the loss, damages and for the liabilities relating to the safely of the passengers, and ultimately held that the RSRTC is vicariously liable. In para 17 of its judgment, the Apex Court held that the liability of the owner is vicarious for the tort committed by its employee during the course of his employment and it would be a question of fact in which case as to whom can vicarious liability be fastened in the case of an accident. Ultimately, having regard to the above factual matrix, the Apex Court was of the clear view that RSRTC is vicariously liable. It may be reiterated here that a specific condition has been incorporated inter alia in the contract of hire as condition No. 15 to the effect that in the event of an accident, the owner of the bus shall be liable for the loss, damages and for the liabilities relating to the safety of passengers. Regardless of the same, the RSRTC was held to be vicariously liable as the owner thereof although the original owner is a different person. Thus, both on facts and in law, the Apex Court affirmed the concurrent finding of the Tribunal as well as the High Court in the matter that the liability to pay compensation for the accident must fall on the RSRTC. The Tribunal passed a composite award granting relief to the victims against the Insurer as well as the RSRTC, which was upheld by the High Court of Rajasthan. The only question that was agitated before the Apex Court was in regard to the liability of the RSRTC having due regard to the condition No. 15 incorporated inter alia in the contract of hire in between the owner of the vehicle and the RSRTC inter se. Of course, the Tribunal was of the view that the condition No. 15 is opposed to public policy which was upheld by the High Court. However, the Apex Court left it open without deciding the same. From the above judgment, it is obvious that the definition of owner is extended to the person who has in actual possession of the vehicle. That has been further reinforced with the fact that the privity of contract is in between the passengers and the RSRTC and, therefore, their safety becomes the plain obligation of the RSRTC. Those two conditions ultimately have tilted the scales.
20. Turning to the case on hand although the contract of hire has not been produced before the Tribunal, in view of the judgment of the Apex Court, there can be no difficulty in holding that the Corporation, for the purpose of this case, shall have to be considered as the owner of the vehicle having been in physical control and possession of the vehicle and running the same in the route earmarked to it and under its control. The conductor of the bus being the employee of the Corporation, the fares from the passengers being collected by the Corporation thereby creating a privity of contract in between them inter se, the Corporation cannot disown its liability in the event of an accident jeopardising the safety of its passengers. Similar view has been taken by two learned Single Judges of this Court separately in Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. Bodapati Kanaka Ratnaba, 2001 ACJ 401 and in APSRTC v. K. Suseelamma and Ors., . For the above reasons, the Corporation is vicariously liable.
21. As regards the liability of the Insurer, as discussed hereinabove, the policy of Insurance was in vogue at the relevant time regardless of the fact that the owner of the vehicle is liable or the Corporation is liable, and in view of the policy covering the offending vehicle, the Insurer cannot escape its liability. The problem can be examined in another view also. The Apex Court in Rikhi Ram v. Sukhrania, , held that the liability of the Insurer would not cease even if the owner or the purchaser did not give any intimation of transfer of the vehicle to the Insurer. The above view was taken by the Apex Court having regard to Section 94 of the old Act according to which once the vehicle was insured, besides the owner other person could also use the vehicle with the consent of the owner and Section 94 did not require that the other person who will use the vehicle should also insure the vehicle in respect of his separate use. Section 146 of the new Act is akin to Section 94 of the old Act. In view of the above authoritative pronouncement of the Apex Court, although the vehicle was insured with the Insurer by the owner of the vehicle but the vehicle has been used with the consent of the owner by the Corporation it does not require the vehicle to be insured once again by the Corporation and the original policy under which the vehicle has been covered which runs with the vehicle is still enforceable notwithstanding the fact that the Insurer has not been informed of the same by the owner or the Corporation, as the case may be. In any view of the matter, the liability of the Insurer will not cease in view of the transfer. But, here is a case where there has been no sale of the vehicle but it is only a contract of hire. For the above reasons, I am of the considered view that the Corporation is vicariously liable for the rash and negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle and the Insurer is liable to indemnify the owner as per the terms of the policy under which the vehicle has been covered.
22. Turning to the assessment of compensation, the Tribunal has rightly fixed the contribution of the deceased towards family at Rs. 3,335/- per month after deducting 1/3rd from out of his salary as evidence by Ex.B.2-salary certificate. While it is the case of the claimants that the multiplier of 3 as fixed by the Tribunal is not correct and it ought to have been 8 as can be seen from the Second Schedule; it is the case of the Corporation that inasmuch as the deceased was having only 20 months of service left by the date of his death, assessing the compensation by fixing the multiplier of either 3 or 8, as the case may be, is not correct. As can be seen from the finding of the Tribunal, the deceased was 56 years, 4 months and 7 days as on the date of his death and roughly he has only 20 months service ahead before his superannuation and consequential retirement from service. The claimants are certainly entitled to the pensionary benefits of the deceased although he died a premature death. As discussed hereinabove, deviation is permissible in certain cases from the multiplier theory wherever the fact situation warrants. I am of the considered view that this is one such case. Had the deceased been alive, he would have contributed a sum of Rs. 66,700/- (Rs. 3,335/-x 20 months) more to the family and after his superannuation he is entitled to the pensionary benefits. If the multiplier of 3 is applied the compensation comes to Rs. 1,20,060/- and if the multiplier of 8 is applied it comes to Rs. 3,20,160/-. In my considered view, it is squarely a case where what is loss to the family shall have to be quantified in deviation to the multiplier theory. However, one aspect should not be lost sight of which the Tribunal indeed has also lost sight of. The promotional aspects of the deceased have not been taken into consideration in which case the salary would be more. In that view of the matter, although multiplier of either 3 or 8 cannot be applied, the pecuniary loss to the claimants would come more or less to the amount as awarded by the Tribunal towards pecuniary loss. In that view of the matter and in the interests of justice, I am of the considered view that it is not expedient to disturb the said assessment towards pecuniary loss. In addition thereto, they are also entitled to non-pecuniary damages comprising of loss to estate, pain and suffering and loss of amenities. The Tribunal granted an amount of Rs. 25,000/- under this head and the same shall have to be confirmed. The Tribunal further granted an amount of Rs. 25,000/-towards loss of consortium and the same shall have also to be confirmed.
23. In the result, all these appeals in C.M.A. No. 3021/99 filed by the Insurer; C.M.A. No. 1069/99 filed by the Corporation; and CMA No. 2550/99 filed by the claimants must fail and are dismissed accordingly. Consequently, the Respondents 2 and 3 are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation as granted by the Tribunal below. Under the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.
.