Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
M/S Kailash Chand Gian Chand Jain vs Union Of India on 16 August, 2023
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Arbitration Application No. 35/2018
M/s Kailash Chand Gian Chand Jain, Through Its Proprietor Gian
Chand Jain S/o R.l.jain, R/o C-1/62, Safdarjung Development
Area, New Delhi - 110016
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through General Manager North Western
Railway, Jaipur
2. The Chief Administrative Officer/ Construction, Northern
Railway, New Delhi.
3. The Chief Administrative Officer/ Construction, North-
Western Railway, Jaipur.
4. The Deputy Chief Engineer/ Contruction-1, North Railway,
Jodhpur
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. N.A. Rajpurohit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Prateek Gattani
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
Judgment Reportable Reserved on 04/08/2023 Pronounced on 16/08/2023
1. The instant arbitration application has been filed by the applicant-Firm under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 1996') claiming the following reliefs:-
"It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that this arbitration application filed by the petitioner/applicant may kindly be allowed and an independent and impartial arbitrator may kindly be ordered (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (2 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] to be appointed to resolve the disputes between the parties, from penal of Court.
Any other order, which may kindly be deem, fit and proper may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner."
2. The respondents issued the tender for civil works pertaining to zone-II, i.e. filing, cutting, widening, raising etc. from KM 1/0 to KM 50/0 in c/w gauge conversion project of Jodhpur-Jaisalmer. The contract was executed between the applicant and the respondent no.2 on 20.09.1994. The tentative date for completion of the work was stipulated as 11.01.1995, but after extension, the work in question was completed on 31.05.1996, and that, the respondent no.4 vide letter dated 22.02.1997 issued the satisfactory performance certificate.
2.1 The final bill has been paid on 17.11.1998 after certain deductions; the said final final bill was signed 'Under Protest' by the applicant, but vide letter dated 23.06.1999 it was impressed upon the applicant to withdraw the said remark i.e. "Under Protest"; the applicant suggested that it shall withdraw such remark, subject to the condition that the respondent-Department shall make the complete payment as demanded vide letter (Annexure-5) issued in the month of July, 1999, but the said request was not considered by the respondent-Department. Thereafter, the applicant, for the first time on 16.11.2000, made a request for appointment of an Arbitrator.
2.2 The applicant also served a representation 07.11.2011 for invocation of the arbitration clause 64 of General Conditions of Contract (GCC), 1989, and for referring the dispute for arbitration. (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM)
(3 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] The applicant also preferred a civil writ petition (S.B.C.W.P. No. 5400/2012) before this Hon'ble Court, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 01.05.2018 with liberty to file an arbitration application.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant submitted that there is an existing arbitration agreement alongwith the present application, which contained an arbitration clause, and the same is sufficient for referring the dispute for arbitration.
3.1. The Arbitration Clause 64 of the GCC is reproduced as hereunder "
"64(1)(i) Demand for Arbitration.-In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or the respective rights and liabilities of the parties on any matter in question, dispute or difference on any account or as to the withholding by the Railway of any certificate to which the contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Railway fails to make a decision within 120 days, then and in any such case, but except in any of the 'excepted matters' referred to in clause- 63 of these conditions, the contractor, after 120 days but with in 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters, shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration.
64(1)(ii) - The demand for arbitration shall specify the matters which are in question or subject of the dispute or difference as also the amount of claim itemwise. Only such dispute(s) or difference(s) in respect of which the demand has been made together with counter claims or set off shall be referred to arbitration and other matters shall not be included in the reference.(Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM)
(4 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] 64(1)(ii)(a)- the Arbitration proceeding shall be assumed to have commenced from the day, a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by the Railway.
(b) The claimant shall submit his claim stating the facts supporting the claim alongwith all relevant documents and the relief or remedy sought after each claim within a period of 30 days from the date of appointment of the Arbitral Tribunal.
(c) The Railway shall submit its defence statement and counter claim(s), if any, within a period of 60 days of receipt of copy of claim from Tribunal thereafter unless otherwise extension has been granted by Tribunal.
64(1)(iii)- No claim shall be added during proceedings by either party. However, a party may amend or supplement the original, claim or defence thereof during the course of arbitration proceedings subject to acceptance by Tribunal having due regard to the delay in making it.
64(1)(iv)- If the contractor(s) does/do not prefer his/their specific and final claim in writing, within a period of 90 days of receiving the intimation from the Railways that the final bill is ready for payment, he/they will be deemed to have waived his/their claim(s) and the Railway shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect of these claims.
64(2)- Obligation during pendency of arbitration.- Work under the contract shall, unless otherwise directed by the Engineer, continue during the arbitration proceeding, and no payment due or payable by the Railway shall be withheld on account of such proceedings, provided, however, it shall be open for Arbitral Tribunal to consider and decide whether or not such work should continue during arbitration proceedings.
64(3)(a)(i)- In cases where the total value of all claims in question added together does not exceed Rs.10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs only), the Arbitral Tribunal consist of a sole arbitrator who shall be either the General Manager or a (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (5 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] gazetted officer of Railway not below the grade of JA grade nominated by the General Manager in that behalf. The sole arbitrator shall be appointed within 60 days from the day when a written and valid demand for arbitration is received by Railway.
64(3)(a)(ii)- In cases not covered by clause 64(3)(a)(i), the Arbitral Tribunal shall consist of a panel of three Gazetted Rly. officers not below JA grade, as the arbitrators. For this purpose, the Railway will send a panal of more than 3 names of Gazetted Rly. officers of one or more departments, of the Rly. to the contractor who will be asked to suggest to General Manager upto 2 names out of panel of appointment as contractor's nominee. The General Manager shall appoint atleast one out of them as the contractor's nominee and will also simultaneously appoint the balance number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside the panel, duly indicating the presiding arbitrator from amongst the 3 arbitrators so appointed. While nominating the arbitrators it will be necessary to ensure that one of them is from the Accounts department. An officer of Selection Grade of the Accounts department shall be considered of equal status to the officers in SA grade of other departments of the Railways for the purpose of appointment of arbitrators. 64(3)(a)(iii)- If one or more of the arbitrators appointed as above refuses to act as arbitrator, withdraws from his office as arbitrator or vacates his/their office/offices or is/are unable or willing to perform his functions as arbitrator for any reason whatsoever or dies or in the opinion of the General Manager fails to act without undue delay, the General Manager shall appoint new arbitrator/arbitrators to act in his/their place in the same manner in which the earlier arbitrator/arbitrators had been appointed. Such re- constituted Tribunal may, at its discretion, proceed with the reference from the stage at which it was left by the previous arbitrator(s).
64(3)(a)(iv)- The arbitral Tribunal shall have power to call for such evidence by way of affidavits or otherwise as the Arbitral tribunal shall think proper, and it shall be the duty of (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (6 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] the parties hereto to do or cause done all such things as may be necessary to enable the Arbitral Tribunal to make the award without any delay.
64(3)(a)(v)- While appointing arbitrator(s) under sub clause
(i), (ii) and (iii) above, due care shall be taken that he/they is/are not the one/those who had an opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties as Railway servant(s) expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute or differences. The proceedings of the Arbitral Tribunal or the award made by such Tribunal will, however, not be invalid merely for the reason that one or more arbitrator had, in the course of his service, opportunity to deal with the matters to which the contract relates or who in the course of his/their duties expressed views on all or any of the matters under dispute.
64(3)(b)(i)- The arbitral award shall state itemwise, the sum and reasons upon which it is based.
64(3)(b)(ii)- A party may apply for corrections of any computational errors, any typographical or clerical errors or any other error of similar nature ocuring in the award and interpretation of a specific point of award to tribunal within 30 days or receipt of the award.
64(3)(b)(iii)- A party may apply to tribunal within 30 days of receipt of award to make an additional award as to claims presented in the arbitral proceedings but omitted from the arbitral award.
64.4 In case of the Tribunal, comprising of three members, any ruling or award shall be made by a majority of Members of Tribunal. In the absence of such a majority, the views of the Presiding Arbitrator shall prevail.
64.5 Where the arbitral award is for the payment of money, no interest shall be payable on whole or any part of the money for any period till the date on which the award is made.
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(7 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] 64.6 The cost of arbitration shall be borne by the respective parties. The cost shall interlia include fee of the arbitrator(s) as per the rates fixed by the Rly. Administration from time to time.
64.7 Subject to the provisions of the aforesaid Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the rules there under and any statutory modification thereof shall apply to the arbitration proceedings under this clause."
3.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the question of limitation is not involved, because in the present case, it is only to be seen whether there is an existing arbitration clause in the Contract in question, and therefore, when such clause is in existence and the same is part of the record, the dispute in question deserves to be referred for arbitration and accordingly, an independent and impartial Arbitrator may be appointed by this Court.
3.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the dismissal of the earlier arbitration application by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court for non- prosecution, does not operate as res judicata in the present case.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, while opposing the aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the applicant, submitted that the present application is not maintainable, because the applicant had already filed an application before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court (Arbitration Application No. 72 of 2001) on 22.02.2001 for appointment of arbitration, which was dismissed on 23.04.2004, and in absence of any challenge thereto, the same had already attained finality, and (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (8 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] thus, the same clearly operates as res judicata qua the present application.
4.1. Learned counsel further submitted that the delay in preparation of the final bill of the works in question, is clearly attributable to the present applicant, because despite several reminders through E-mail(s) and letter(s), the applicant has not appeared in the office of IOW (Const.) East Jodhpur. 4.2. Learned counsel also submitted that the applicant filed the present application, after an inordinate delay of 19 years, since the date of dismissal of the earlier application for appointment of arbitrator, by the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in the year 2004. 4.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent vide letter dated 27.12.2011 rejected the request for appointment of arbitrator on the ground of dismissal of the aforementioned arbitration application by the Hon'ble Court in the year 2004. 4.4. Learned counsel also submitted that the aforementioned civil writ petition filed by the applicant was also not maintainable, on count of the arbitration clause, but despite the same, the applicant endeavoured to keep the said petition pending for almost 6 years, whereafter the same was withdrawn with liberty to file the arbitration application. Therefore, as per learned counsel, the present application deserves dismissal.
4.5. In support of such submissions, learned counsel relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Nortel Networks India Pvt Ltd. (Civil Appeal Nos. 843-844 of 2021, decided (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (9 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] on 10.03.2021) and B and T AG Vs. Ministry of Defence (Arbitration Pertition (C) No.13 of 2023, decided on 18.05.2023); and order passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Hon'ble Court in the case of M/s Kamla Construction Company Vs Rajasthan Rajya, (S.B. Arbitration Application No. 21/2020, decided on 10.02.2023).
5. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the record of the case alongwith the judgments cited at the Bar.
6. This Court observes that the present application seeking appointment of an arbitrator, as per the aforementioned arbitration clause 64 of the GCC, 1989, pursuant to the contract in question, which was executed between the applicant and the respondents on 20.09.1994.
7. At this juncture, this Court considers it appropriate to reproduce the relevant portions of the judgments rendered in the cases of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (supra) and B and T AG (Supra), as hereunder:
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. & Ors. (Supra):
"1. The present Appeals raise two important issues for our consideration: (i) the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ("the 1996 Act"); and (ii) whether the Court may refuse to make the reference under Section 11 where the claims are ex facie time- barred?
9.......In Consolidated Engineering v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation, this Court held that :(Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM)
(10 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] "45......Section 43 of the AC Act, apart from making the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitrations, reiterates that the Limitation Act applies to proceedings in court. Therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to all proceedings under the AC Act, both in court and in arbitration, except to the extent expressly excluded by the provisions of the AC Act." ....
13. Various High Courts have taken the view that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act.
15. The reasoning in all these judgments seems to be that since an application under Section 11 is to be filed in a court of law, and since no specific Article of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies, the residual Article would become applicable. The effect being that the period of limitation to file an application under Section 11 is 3 years' from the date of refusal to appoint the arbitrator, or on expiry of 30 days', whichever is earlier.
17. Given the vacuum in the law to provide a period of limitation under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation 1996, the Courts have taken recourse to the position that the limitation period would be governed by Article 137, which provides a period of 3 years from the date when the right to apply accrues. However, this is an unduly long period for filing an application u/S. 11, since it would defeat the very object of the Act, which provides for expeditious resolution of commercial disputes within a time bound period. The 1996 Act has been amended twice over in 2015 and 2019, to provide for further time limits to ensure that the arbitration proceedings are conducted and concluded expeditiously. Section 29A mandates that the arbitral tribunal will conclude the proceedings within a period of 18 months. In view of the legislative intent, the period of 3 years for filing an application under Section 11 would run contrary to the scheme of the Act. It would be necessary for Parliament to effect an amendment to Section 11, prescribing a specific period of limitation within which a party may move the court (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (11 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] for making an application for appointment of the arbitration under Section 11 of the 1996 Act.
18. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the present case, we find that the application under Section 11 was filed within the limitation period prescribed under Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Nortel issued the notice of arbitration vide letter dated 29.04.2020, which was rejected by BSNL vide its reply dated 09.06.2020. The application under Section 11 was filed before the High Court on 24.07.2020 i.e. within the period of 3 years of rejection of the request for appointment of the arbitrator.
Discussion on Second issue
19. We will now discuss the second issue which has arisen for consideration i.e. whether the Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 is obligated to appoint an arbitrator even in a case where the claims are ex facie time-barred.
Limitation is normally a mixed question of fact and law, and would lie within the domain of the arbitral tribunal. There is, however, a distinction between jurisdictional and admissibility issues. An issue of 'jurisdiction' pertains to the power and authority of the arbitrators to hear and decide a case. Jurisdictional issues include objections to the competence of the arbitrator or tribunal to hear a dispute, such as lack of consent, or a dispute falling outside the scope of the arbitration agreement. Issues with respect to the existence, scope and validity of the arbitration agreement are invariably regarded as jurisdictional issues, since these issues pertain to the jurisdiction of the tribunal.
31. Admissibility issues however relate to procedural requirements, such as a breach of pre-arbitration requirements, for instance, a mandatory requirement for mediation before the commencement of arbitration, or a challenge to a claim or a part of the claim being either time- barred, or prohibited, until some pre-condition has been fulfilled. Admissibility relates to the nature of the claim or the circumstances connected therewith. An admissibility issue is (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (12 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] not a challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the claim.
32. The issue of limitation, in essence, goes to the maintainability or admissibility of the claim, which is to be decided by the arbitral tribunal. For instance, a challenge that a claim is time-barred, or prohibited until some precondition is fulfilled, is a challenge to the admissibility of that claim, and not a challenge to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator to decide the claim itself.
36. In a recent judgment delivered by a three-judge bench in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corporation, on the scope of power under Sections 8 and 11, it has been held that the Court must undertake a primary first review to weed out "manifestly ex facie non-existent and invalid arbitration agreements, or non-arbitrable disputes." The prima facie review at the reference stage is to cut the deadwood, where dismissal is bare faced and pellucid, and when on the facts and law, the litigation must stop at the first stage. Only when the Court is certain that no valid arbitration agreement exists, or that the subject matter is not arbitrable, that reference may be refused. In paragraph 144, the Court observed that the judgment in Mayavati Trading had rightly held that the judgment in Patel Engineering had been legislatively overruled.
While exercising jurisdiction under Section 11 as the judicial forum, the court may exercise the prima facie test to screen and knockdown ex facie meritless, frivolous, and dishonest litigation. Limited jurisdiction of the Courts would ensure expeditious and efficient disposal at the referral stage. At the referral stage, the Court can interfere "only" when it is "manifest" that the claims are ex facie time barred and dead, or there is no subsisting dispute.
37. The upshot of the judgment in Vidya Drolia is affirmation of the position of law expounded in Duro Felguera and Mayavati Trading, which continue to hold the field. It must (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (13 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] be understood clearly that Vidya Drolia has not resurrected the pre-amendment position on the scope of power as held in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering (supra). It is only in the very limited category of cases, where there is not even a vestige of doubt that the claim is ex facie time- barred, or that the dispute is non-arbitrable, that the court may decline to make the reference. However, if there is even the slightest doubt, the rule is to refer the disputes to arbitration, otherwise it would encroach upon what is essentially a matter to be determined by the tribunal.
38. Applying the law to the facts of the present case, it is clear that this is a case where the claims are ex facie time barred by over 5 ½ years, since Nortel did not take any action whatsoever after the rejection of its claim by BSNL on 04.08.2014. The notice of arbitration was invoked on 29.04.2020. There is not even an averment either in the notice of arbitration, or the petition filed under Section 11, or before this Court, of any intervening facts which may have occurred, which would extend the period of limitation falling within Sections 5 to 20 of the Limitation Act. Unless, there is a pleaded case specifically adverting to the applicable Section, and how it extends the limitation from the date on which the cause of action originally arose, there can be no basis to save the time of limitation.
40.Conclusion Accordingly, we hold that:
(i) The period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. The period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the arbitrator; It has been suggested that the Parliament may consider amending Section 11 of the 1996 Act to provide a period of limitation for filing an application under this provision, which is in consonance with the object of expeditious disposal of arbitration proceedings;
(ii) In rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time barred, and it is manifest that there (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (14 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference".
B and T A G (Supra):-
"63. Negotiations may continue even for a period of ten years or twenty years after the cause of action had arisen. Mere negotiations will not postpone the "cause of action" for the purpose of limitation. The Legislature has prescribed a limit of three years for the enforcement of a claim and this statutory time period cannot be defeated on the ground that the parties were negotiating.
64. In Panchu Gopal Bose v. Board of Trustees for Port of Calcutta reported in (1993) 4 SCC 338, this Court had held that the provisions of the Act 1963 would apply to arbitrations and notwithstanding any term in the contract to the contrary, cause of arbitration for the purpose of limitation shall be deemed to have accrued to the party, in respect of any such matter at the time when it should have accrued but for the contract. Cause of arbitration shall be deemed to have commenced when one party serves the notice on the other party requiring the appointment of an arbitrator. The question was when the cause of arbitration arises in the absence of issuance of a notice or omission to issue notice for a long time after the contract was executed? Arbitration implies to charter out timeous commencement of arbitration availing of the arbitral agreement, as soon as difference or dispute has arisen. Delay defeats justice and equity aids promptitude and resultant consequences. Defaulting party should bear the hardship and should not transmit the hardship to the other party, after the claim in the cause of arbitration was allowed to be barred. It was further held that where the arbitration agreement does not really exist or ceased to exist or where the dispute applies outside the scope of arbitration agreement allowing the claim, after a considerable lapse of time, would be a harassment to (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (15 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] the opposite party. It was accordingly held in that case that since the petitioner slept over his rights for more than 10 years, by his conduct he allowed the arbitration to be barred by limitation and the Court would be justified in relieving the party from arbitration agreement under Sections 5 and 12(2)(b) of the Act. [See: State of Orissa v. Damodar Das, (1996) 2 SCC 216]
66. The case on hand is clearly and undoubtedly, one of a hopelessly barred claim, as the petitioner by its conduct slept over its right for more than five years. Statutory arbitrations stand apart. 67. In view of the aforesaid, this petition fails and is hereby rejected."
8. This Court also observes that the payment towards the final bill has been paid to the applicant on 17.11.1998, though after certain deductions; the applicant, for the first time, made a request for appointment of an arbitrator on 16.11.2000 by way of filing an application before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court, but the same was dismissed on 23.04.2004; thereafter, the applicant again served a notice on 07.11.2011 upon the respondents for appointment of the arbitrator. Thus, it is clear that the applicant slept over the matter for a long period from the year 2004 to 2011, which is beyond the prescribed period of limitation.
9. This Court further observes that the applicant also filed aforementioned a writ petition in the year 2012, but the same was dismissed as withdrawn in the year 2018. The applicant during the entire period did not make an attempt to avail the legal remedy, and preferred the instant application, after dismissal of the earlier writ petition, as mentioned above.
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10. This Court also observes that Article 137 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the period of limitation provided under the said Article is 3 years. In the present case, even if the period during which the aforementioned writ petition remained pending, is excluded, then also for the period from 2004 to 2011 (7 years), the application did not make any attempt to avail the appropriate legal remedy.
11. This Court also observes that on the issue of limitation, so raised, due assistance has been rendered not only on behalf of the respondent herein, but also by the other Members of the Bar (including Senior Advocates and Additional Advocate General), who furnished before this Court the precedent laws governing the issue, which enabled this Court to deal with the said issue in an appropriate manner during the present adjudication. However, while the identical arbitration applications, on the earlier occasions, were being heard, the precedent laws on the issue of limitation, as furnished herein, were not placed before this Court, and thereafter, the issue of limitation was left to be adjudicated by the arbitrator, which does not seem to be in conformity with the precedent law cited at the Bar.
12. This Court further observes that the Hon'ble Apex in the aforementioned precedent law, that, "In rare and exceptional cases where the claims are ex facie time barred, and it is manifest that there is no subsisting dispute, the Court may refuse to make the reference". The present case clearly falls (Downloaded on 12/11/2023 at 04:19:08 AM) (17 of 17) [ARBAP-35/2018] under the said category, being barred by limitation, and therefore, the prayer for referring the dispute for arbitration and appointment of the Arbitrator, deserves refusal.
13. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and in view of the aforementioned precedent laws as well as looking into the factual matrix of the present case, this Court does not find it a fit case so as to grant any relief to the applicant in the present application.
14. Consequently, the present application is dismissed.
(DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI), J.
SKant/-
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