Central Administrative Tribunal - Delhi
Chandan Kumar vs Government Of India Press on 21 September, 2023
1
OA No.1834/2023
Central Administrative Tribunal
Principal Bench: New Delhi
OA No.1834/2023
Reserved on: 13.09.2023
Pronounced on:21.09.2023
Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)
Hon'ble Dr. Anand S. Khati, Member (A)
Chandan Kumar,
Aged about 30 years,
S/o Sh. Awdhesh Thakur,
R/o 88/426, Sector-1
DIZ Area, Gol Market,
New Delhi-110001.
-Applicant
(By Advocate : Shri S.K. Gupta)
Versus
1. Union of India
through the Secretary,
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
2. The Director,
Directorate of Printing,
Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs,
Nirman Bhawan,
New Delhi.
3. Manager,
Govt. of India Press,
Rashtrapati Bhawan,
Delhi-110004..
-Respondents
(By Advocate : Shri Ashish Rai)
2
OA No.1834/2023
ORDER
Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J):
Applicant has filed this Original Application (OA) under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, seeking the following reliefs:
"(i) quash and set aside the impugned action on the part of the respondents in terminating the services of the applicant under Rule 5 (1) of CCS (TS) Rules, 1965 and also quash the impugned office memorandum dated 12.06.2023;
(ia) Quash and set aside the order dated 17.06.2023 as received by the applicant on 05.07.2023 with all benefits;
(ii) direct the respondents to allow the applicant to work as Lower Division Clerk uninterruptedly and allow all consequential benefits available under the law;
(iii) May also pass any further order(s) as be deemed just and proper to meet the ends of justice."
2. Brief facts of the case are that in pursuance to the advertisement issued by the Staff Selection Commission the applicant applied for Combined Higher Secondary Level (CHSL), 2015 Examination for the post of Lower Division Clerk.
2.1 He appeared in Paper-I objective type examination on 20.12.2015 and on being declared successful he appeared in descriptive examination 3 OA No.1834/2023 conducted by the Staff Selection Commission (SSC) wherein also he was declared successful. 2.2 Thereupon, applicant was called for typing test which was conducted on 28.02.2017 and was declared successful therein. Accordingly, he was called for documents verification on 13.07.2017. 2.3 As the applicant had given preference for appointment in Central Government department for the post of LDC, the respondents declared the result on 19.12.2017 but his result was withheld under 'scrutiny category'.
2.4 Thereafter, the SSC, Recruitment Board, Allahabad issued letter dated 08.12.2017 wherein it was stated that biometric data taken during the different stages of examination are not matching and the applicant was directed to attend the office personally within 10 days with certain documents as mentioned in the letter and in case he fails to appear, it will be presumed that he has nothing to say in this regard and the Commission will take action accordingly.
2.5 Thereupon, applicant appeared before the SSC at Allahabad and after re-verification his 4 OA No.1834/2023 result was forwarded on 01.02.2018. Thereafter, offer of appointment was issued to the applicant on 02.05.2018. In the offer of appointment it was specifically mentioned that he is kept on probation for a period of two years.
2.6 The applicant joined the post of Lower Division Clerk in the office of respondent no.3 on 18.06.2018. However, to the utter surprise of applicant, after lapse of around 04 years, the SSC sent a Show Cause Notice (SCN) dated 10.05.2022, thereby asking him to explain the position in relation to the fact that some FSL reports were given which are stated to be against him, wherein it was revealed that his handwriting and biometric are not matching. Whereas the fact remains when the applicant appeared before the Staff Selection Commission, the Commission after satisfying itself sent dossiers of the applicant to respondent no.1 after declaration of his result and hence the entire exercise now being taken at this juncture in the year 2022 when he has already completed around 04 years is bad in law.
5OA No.1834/2023 2.7 There is no provision for extension of the probation under the terms of recruitment, even then the respondents have issued a communication stating therein that the confirmation of the applicant is withheld due to some clarification sought by the recruiting agency. 2.8 The applicant submitted the detailed reply to the aforesaid SCN on 25.05.2022 that once the dossiers have been sent to the user department and the applicant has already joined the post and have completed 04 years of service, no action can be taken by the SSC and even the SSC has no jurisdiction and even if it is presumed that the SSC has the jurisdiction, due process of law is required to be adopted by issuing the charge-sheet under Rule 14 and for conducting the full fledged enquiry.
2.9 The applicant performed the duties for another year and all of a sudden, he came across the communication dated 12.06.2023 issued by the office of respondent no.1&2, wherein based upon the specific allegation of misconduct as spelt out in FSL reports, the respondent no.3 was 6 OA No.1834/2023 directed to initiate termination proceedings against the applicant under Rule 5 (1) of CCS (TS) Rules, 1965, no formal proceedings are conducted and the termination order is required to be issued and once the respondent nos.1&2 have directed the respondent no.3 to initiate the proceedings, i.e., good enough for the applicant to approach this Tribunal.
3. Shri S.K. Gupta, learned counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the impugned orders dated 14.06.20232 and the order dated 12.06.2023 are bad in law being stigmatic. It is submitted that by invoking Rule 5 (1) of CCS (TS) Rules, the respondents have passed stigmatic and punitive order, based on the specific allegation that his biometric data taken during the different stages of examination do not match, which is contrary to the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyandra Nath Bose, 2005 AIR SCW 3816.
3.1 Mr. Gupta further submitted that the termination of the services of the applicant is violative of Article 311 of the Constitution of India, 7 OA No.1834/2023 as under the garb of issuing the termination order, no stigma can be attached whereas in the communication dated 12.06.2023 it is clear that there is a definite stigma attached and the impugned action termination his services is bad in law.
3.2 Mr. Gupta submitted that it is well settled position of law that the courts and the Tribunals can lift the veil to find out the reasons for termination and in the case in hand the reasons are obvious as contained in the impugned office memorandum dated 12.06.2023 and hence the entire action is bad in law.
3.3 Mr. Gupta further referring to Office Memorandum dated 11th March, 2019 issued by Ministry of Personnel, PG & Pensions, Department of Personnel and Training, submitted that under no circumstances the period of probation can be extended to the double of the original period of probation and hence the applicant is required to be declared confirmed for all purpose. Concluding his arguments, Mr. Gupta submitted that the case of the applicant is squarely covered by the decision 8 OA No.1834/2023 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Ltd. & Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 2. 3.4 In view of the above, the learned counsel submitted that since the termination of the applicant is based on his specific misconduct, it cannot be termed as an order simpliciter. The impugned orders, are, therefore, found punitive and stigmatic, as passed without the protection of Article 311 and hence the veil is not required to be lifted. As such, the impugned order are required to be quashed and set aside by allowing the instant OA.
4. Pursuant to the notices issued by the Tribunal, the respondents entered appearance and filed their reply, thereby vehemently opposing the averments made by the applicant in his OA. 4.1 Mr. Ashish Rai, learned counsel for the respondents referring to the reply filed by the respondents submitted that applicant was selected through the SSC CHSL Examination, 2015. The SSC vide its letter dated 31.07.2018 stated that a complaint was received against Shri Deepak Kumar 9 OA No.1834/2023 and applicant and requested this Directorate to collect handwriting, signature and thumb impression samples from the candidates and get it examined with respect to handwriting, LTI and signatures available at Commission copy of different tiers and if not satisfied send these samples along with dossiers to Central Forensic Science Laboratory (CFSL) for precise verification of those documents. If an adverse report is obtained from CFSL, then initiate the cancellation of their candidatures. Accordingly, action to collect the requested samples from Deepak Kumar and applicant in the presence of the Officer-in-Charge of the respective presses where they were posted was started and the collected samples were forwarded to FSL in Delhi for thorough examination and analysis.
4.2 The FSL submitted its report on 22.09.2021, where in the case of the applicant, the report indicated as follows:
Chandan Kumar (Applicant) Handwriting/Signature: The handwriting in the dossier related to various tests matched the sample collected from the candidate, except for Paper-I and II.10 OA No.1834/2023
Photographs: The FSL found six photographs in the dossier were not suitable for comparison, and no conclusive opinion could be made on three questioned photographs.
Thumb Impression (Left) : Thumb impressions in certain tests matched those in the dossier, but impressions from Paper-I and II did not match."
4.3 Based on the above report, the SSC directed respondent no.2 to take necessary action that if adverse reports were received from the FSL, the candidature of the concerned candidate should be cancelled, and their services should be terminated. In this regard, opinion of DoP&T was also sought to clarify the employment status of the candidates. The DoP&T opinined that Shri Chandan Kumar and applicant should be treated as probationers/temporary employees until a final decision is made regarding their employment. In the light of the above adverse reports from the FSL and the recommendation from the DoP&T, termination proceedings were instituted against Shri Chandan Kumar and Shri Deepak Kumar.
The respective Government of India Presses (GIPs), where they were working namely GIP Rashtrapati Bhawan and GIP Nashik were directed to initiate termination proceedings against the candidates. 11 OA No.1834/2023 Accordingly, termination letters were issued to Shri Chandan Kumar and applicant.
4.4 As regards the Master Circular on Probation/Confirmation in Central Services dated 11.03.2019, referred and relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicant, it is submitted that the appointing authority may declare successful completion or extend the period of probation or terminate the services of a temporary employee on probation, on the basis of evaluation of performance. It is further submitted that the same circular under the heading 'Confirmation' at point no.25 states that if during the period of probation or any extension thereof, as the case may be, the Government is of the opinion that an officer is not fit for permanent appointment, the Government may either discharge or revert the officer to the post held by him prior to his appointment in the service, as the case may be. 4.5 Mr. Rai submitted that the impugned orders are not punitive as no stigma has been cast on the applicant and the impugned termination order is an order simpliciter and carries no evil 12 OA No.1834/2023 consequences, hence the same is in accordance with law. This is not a case where the impugned order is founded on any misconduct and at the best it can be a case of termination with motive of incident. The learned counsel submitted that if the foundation for the impugned order is the misconduct, the order can be interfered by this Tribunal. The termination has been passed in exercise of the power conferred under the rules and regulations.
4.6 In view of the submissions made above, it is prayed that the OA is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merit and also not maintainable on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
5. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and have gone through the pleadings on record.
6. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has considered a similar controversy in Nina Lath Gupta, 2023:DHC:2944. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows:
"27. Therefore, what emerges from the conspectus of the aforesaid judgments is that if an order is founded on allegations, the order is stigmatic and punitive and 13 OA No.1834/2023 services of an employee cannot be dispensed with without affording him an opportunity of defending the accusations/allegations made against him in a full- fledged inquiry. Since this case relates to a tenure appointment, it will be pertinent to look at the law with respect to stigmatic orders in the context of tenure appointments. In Dr. L.P. Agarwal v. Union of India and Others, (1992) 3 SCC 526, Petitioner was Director, AIIMS, who had been appointed for a period of 5 years or till he attained the age of 62 years, whichever was earlier, the Supreme Court examined the meaning and connotation of the term 'tenure' and observed that tenure is a term during which an office is held. It is a condition of holding office and once a person is appointed to a tenure post, his appointment begins when he joins and comes to an end on completion of the tenure, unless curtailed on 'justifiable' grounds. Such a person does not superannuate, he only goes out of office on completion of his tenure and thus, the question of prematurely retiring him does not arise. In A.P. State Federation of Coop. Spinning Mills Ltd (supra), Respondent was appointed as General Manager (Finance) for a period of 3 years and prior to the said period coming to an end, his services were terminated. Respondent approached the High Court in a writ petition seeking quashing of the order and the learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition after coming to a conclusion that the termination order was innocuous and not penal in nature and termination being in accordance with the contract of service, after giving three months' salary in lieu of the notice, required no interference. The Division Bench, allowing the appeal held that though the order on the face of it appeared to be innocuous, however, if the attendant circumstances were examined, more particularly, the stand in the counter affidavit, the conclusion was irresistible that the order was penal in nature and since penalty was imposed without affording opportunity to meet the charge, the order was unsustainable. This order of the Division Bench was challenged before the Supreme Court and the contention of the Appellant was that the reasons indicated in the order were the motive for termination and not the foundation, requiring an inquiry, prior to termination. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Division Bench, to the extent that the order of termination was vitiated and ruled as follows:-
"3. The legal position is fairly well settled that an order of termination of a temporary employee or a probationer or even a tenure employee, simpliciter without casting any stigma may not be interfered with by the court. But the court is not debarred from looking at the attendant circumstances, namely, the circumstances prior to the issuance of order of 14 OA No.1834/2023 termination to find out whether the alleged inefficiency really was the motive for the order of termination or formed the foundation for the same order. If the court comes to a conclusion that the order was, in fact, the motive, then obviously the order would not be interfered with, but if the court comes to a conclusion that the so-called inefficiency was the real foundation for passing of order of termination, then obviously such an order would be held to be penal in nature and must be interfered with since the appropriate procedure has not been followed. The decisions of this Court relied upon by Mr K. Ram Kumar also stipulate that if an allegation of arbitrariness is made in assailing an order of termination, it will be open for the employer to indicate how and what was the motive for passing the order of termination, and it is in that sense in the counter-affidavit it can be indicated that the unsuitability of the person was the reason for which the employer acted in accordance with the terms of employment and it never wanted to punish the employee. But on examining the assertions made in paras 13 and 14 of the counter-affidavit, in the present case it would be difficult for us to hold that in the case in hand, the appellant-employer really terminated the services in accordance with the terms of the employment and not by way of imposing the penalty in question.
4. In fact, the letter of the Commissioner for Handlooms and Director of Handlooms and Textiles dated 19-5-1993 was the foundation for the employer to terminate the services and as such the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court was justified in holding that the order of termination is based upon a misconduct, though on the face of it, it is innocuous in nature. We therefore do not find any infirmity with the said conclusion of the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court requiring our interference."
xxx xxx xxx
29. Another judgment, which needs a mention and is close on facts, is in the case of Dr. Vijayakumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and Others, (2020) 12 SCC 426, wherein the Supreme Court observed that the termination order was issued in the backdrop of Internal Complaints Committee Report and going by the terms and tenor of the order, it was incomprehensible to construe such an order to be an order simplicitor when the report of the Inquiry Committee was the foundation. The Supreme Court also reiterated the position of law that the material which amounts to stigma need not be contained in the termination order and may be in any document 15 OA No.1834/2023 referred to therein, which reference will inevitably effect the future prospects of the incumbent and if so, the order must be construed as an ex facie stigmatic order of termination."
7. Further the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in Vijay Raj v. Union of India, Writ A. No.63968 of 2005, decided on 05.03.2020, has considered the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a catena of decisions, including in a few Constitution Bench judgements and has ruled in paras 61 and 62 as follows:
"61. From the above discussions, the principles discernible to find out whether a simple order of termination/discharge of a temporary employee or probationer is punitive or not, broadly, may be stated as under :
(a) The termination of services of a temporary servant or probationer under the rules of his employment or in exercise of contractual right is neither per se dismissal nor removal and does not attract the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution.
(b) An order of termination simplicitor prima facie is not a punishment and carries no evil consequences.
(c) Where termination simplicitor is challenged on the ground of casting stigma or penal in nature, the Court initially would glance the order itself to find out whether it cast any stigma and can be said to be penal or not. If it does not, no further enquiry shall be held unless there is some material to show certain circumstances, preceding or attending, shadowing the simplicitorness of the said order.
(d) The Court is not precluded from going beyond the order to find out as to whether circumstances, preceding or attending, makes it punitive or not. If the circumstances, preceding or attending, show only the motive of the employer to terminate, it being immaterial would not vitiate the order unless it is found that order is founded on such act or omission constituting misconduct.
16OA No.1834/2023
(e) If the order visits the public servant with evil consequences or casts aspersions against his character or integrity, it would be an order by way of punishment irrespective of whether the employee was a mere probationer or temporary.
(f) "Motive" and "foundation" are distinct, though the distinction is either very thin or overlapping. "Motive" is the moving power, which impels action for a definite result, or to put it differently. "Motive" is that which incites or stimulates a person to do an act. "Foundation", however, is the basis, i.e., the conduct of the employee, When his acts and omissions treated to be misconduct, proved or founded, it becomes a case of foundation.
(g) If an order has a punitive flavour in cause or consequence, it is dismissal, but if it falls short of it, it would not.
(h) Where the employer is satisfied of the misconduct and the consequent desirability of termination, it is dismissal even though the order is worded innocuously. However, where there is mere suspicion of misconduct and the employer does not wish to bother about it, and, instead of going into the correctness of guilt, feel like not to keep the employee and thus terminate him, it is simpliciter termination and not punitive.
(i) Where the termination simplicitor is preceded by an enquiry, preliminary or regular, the Court would see the purpose, object of such enquiry as also the stage at which, the order of termination has been passed.
(j) Every enquiry preceding the order of termination/discharge, would not make it punitive. Where an enquiry contemplated in the rules before terminating an probationer or temporary employee is held, it would not make the order punitive.
(k) If the enquiry is to find out whether the employee is fit to be confirmed or retained in service or to continue, such an enquiry would not render termination punitive.
(l) Where the employer hold a formal enquiry to find out the correctness of the alleged misconduct of the employee and proceed on the finding thereof, such an order would be punitive, and, cannot be passed without giving an opportunity to the concerned employee.
(m) If some formal departmental enquiry commenced but not pursued to the end. Instead a simple order of termination is passed, the motive operating in the mind of the authority would be immaterial and such an order would be non punitive 17 OA No.1834/2023
(n) When an order of termination is assailed on the ground of mala fide or arbitrariness, while defending the plea of mala fide, if the authority has referred certain facts justifying the order of discharge relating to misconduct, negligence or inefficiency of the employee in the appeal or in the affidavit filed before the Court, that would not make the order founded on any misconduct.
(o) Sometimes when some reason is mentioned in the order, that by itself would not make the order punitive or stigmatic. The following words mentioned in the order have not been held to be punitive.
i. "want of application", ii. "lack of potential", iii. "found not dependable", iv. "under suspension", v. "work is unsatisfactory", vi. "unlikely to prove an efficient officer".
(p) Description of background facts also have not been held to be stigmatic.
(q) However, the words "undesirable to be retained in Government service", have been held stigmatic.
(r) If there is (i) a full scale formal enquiry, (ii) in the allegations involving moral turpitude or misconduct, (iii) which culminated in a finding of guilt; where all these three factors are present, the order of termination would be punitive irrespective of the form. However, if any one of three factors is missing, then it would not be punitive.
62. The aforesaid are not exhaustive, but lay down some of the principles to find out whether termination of an employee is simplicitor or punitive. Each and every case has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, but broadly the aforesaid are the factors to find out whether termination of an employee is punitive or not."
8. From the aforesaid judgment it stands settled that each and every case has to be considered in the light of the facts and circumstances of case, of course, broadly keeping in view the factors as recorded in the said judgment to find out whether the termination of an employee is punitive or not? It also stands settled 18 OA No.1834/2023 that while deciding whether the termination of a probationer is a termination simpliciter or punitive, the Tribunal can travel beyond the order of termination to find out what in reality weighed with the employer to terminate the services of the probationer.
9. From the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in Nina Lath Gupta (supra) it is settled that even if the order of termination of the probationer, on the face of it, appears to be innocuous and or order simpliciter, however, if the attending circumstances, more particularly the stand taken in the counter-affidavit, the conclusion was irresistible that the order was penal in nature and since the penalty was imposed without affording an opportunity to meet the charge, the order was not sustainable in the eyes of law.
10. In the aforesaid background, even if it is assumed that the impugned termination order is an order simpliciter, however, in view of the specific stand taken by the respondents in the counter-reply, precisely recorded hereinabove, we are of the considered view that the impugned order 19 OA No.1834/2023 of termination is founded on an act of specific misconduct of applicant and, therefore, the impugned order is found to be punitive and stigmatic. The same being passed without holding an enquiry and without following the principles of natural justice is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Similar view has also been taken by a Coordinate Bench, consisting one of us (Hon'ble Mr. R.N. Singh, Member (J)), of this Tribunal in Satyender v. Govt. of NCT Delhi & Ors., OA No.1319/2021, decided on 02.06.2023 and Manjeet Singh v. Union of India & Ors., OA No.4727/2015, decided on 28.07.2023. For parity of reasons we follow the same. This view of ours is further fortified by the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satvendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sc., Calcutta, (1999) 3 SCC 60, where their Lordships of Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:
"(1) In what circumstances, the termination of a probationer's services can be said to be founded on misconduct and in what circumstances could it be said that the allegations were only the motive?
xxx xxx xxx Point 1:
20OA No.1834/2023
As to in what circumstances an order of termination of a probationer can be said to be punitive or not depends upon whether certain allegations which are the cause of the termination are the motive or foundation. In this area, as pointed out by Shah,J. (as he then was) in Madan Gopal vs. State of Punjab [AIR 1963 S.C. 531] there is no difference between cases where services of a temporary employee are terminated and where a probationer is discharged. This very question was gone into recently in R.S.Gupta vs. U.P.State Agro Industries Corporation Ltd. & Anr. [J.T. 1998 (8) S.C. 585] and reference was made to the development of the law from time to time starting from Purshottam Lal Dhingra vs. Union of India [1958 SCR 828], to the concept of `purpose of inquiry' introduced by Shah,J. (as he then was) in State of Orissa vs. Ram Narayan Das [1961 (1) SCR 606] and to the seven Bench decision in Samsher Singh vs. State of Punjab [1974 (2) SCC 831] and to post Samsher Singh case- law. This Court had occasion to make a detailed examination of what is the `motive' and what is the `foundation' on which innocuous order is based.
This Court in that connection referred to the principles laid down by Krishna Iyer,J. in Gujarat Steel Tube vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sangh [1980 (2) SCC 593]. As to `foundation', it was said by Krishna Iyer,J. as follows:
".....a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case, the grounds are recorded in different proceedings from the formal order, does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the inquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service, the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non- injurious terminolgy is used."
and as to motive:
"On the contrary, even if there is suspicioun of misconduct, the master may say that he does not wish to bother about it and may not go into his guilt but may feel like not keeping a man he is not happy with. He may not like to investigate nor take the risk of continuing a dubious servant. Then it is not dismissal but termination simpliciter, if no injurious 21 OA No.1834/2023 record of reasons or pecuniary cut-back on his full terminal benefits is found. For, in fact, misconduct is not then the moving factor in the discharge."
As to motive one other example is the case of State of Punjab vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur [1968(3) SCR 234] where a charge memo for a regular inquiry was served, reply given and at that stage itself the proceedings were dropped and a simple termination order was issued. It was held, the order of simple termination was not founded on any findings as to misconduct. In that case, this Court referred to A.S.Benjamin vs. Union of India (Civil Appeal No.1341 of 1966 dt. 13.12.1966) (SC) where a charge memo was issued, explanation was received, an inquiry officer was also appointed but before the inquiry could be completed, the proceedings were dropped and a simple order of termination was passed, the reason for dropping the proceedings was that "departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the foundation, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves'. The termination was upheld.
If findings were arrived at in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as `founded' on the allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.
In the light of the above principles, laid down in R.S.Gupta's case we do not think anything more is to be added. Point 1 is decided accordingly."
11. This view has further been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2000) 5 SCC 152.
22OA No.1834/2023
12. As regards the preliminary objection that the applicant has not challenged the termination order dated 17.06.2023 and hence the OA is not maintainable, we are of the considered view that since the said order has been passed in compliance of the order dated 12.01.2023, as such the objection is overruled.
13. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the impugned orders dated 12.06.2023 and 14.06.2023 are quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to reinstate the applicant in service, as expeditiously as possible, and preferably within four weeks of receipt of a certified copy of this order. The applicant shall be entitled to consequential benefits in accordance with the relevant rules and instructions on the subject. However, the respondents shall be at liberty to initiate disciplinary enquiry and or to take action in accordance with the relevant rules, if they so decide.
14. The OA stands partly allowed in the aforesaid terms. However, in the facts and 23 OA No.1834/2023 circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.
15. Pending MA(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly.
(Dr. Anand S. Khati) (R.N. Singh)
Member (A) Member (J)
'San.'