Karnataka High Court
Syndicate Bank vs R.G. Bhide on 10 March, 2003
Equivalent citations: (2003)IILLJ556KANT, 2003 LAB. I. C. 2120, 2003 AIR - KANT. H. C. R. 1511, (2003) 4 SERVLR 475, (2003) 2 LABLJ 556, (2003) 102 FJR 563
Author: K. Ramanna
Bench: K. Ramanna
JUDGMENT S.R. Nayak, J.
1. The management of Syndicate Bank, feeling aggrieved by the order of the learned single judge dated July 28, 1998, in Writ Petition No. 14806 of 1992 has preferred this writ appeal. By the order impugned in this writ appeal, the learned single judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent herein and directed the management of the bank to pay 50 per cent. back wages to the respondent from date of his removal from service up to the date of his retirement with all other consequential benefits proportionately within three months from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
2. The background facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are as follows:
The appellant is a nationalised bank having its Head Office at Manipal, Dakshina Kannada District. The respondent was serving as a Divisional Manager, Accounts Department, head office, Manipal. The respondent was a scale-IV officer employee. A charge-sheet was issued to the respondent on May 19, 1989 in respect of certain misconduct on his part, while he was functioning as the Chief Manager of Gurgaon, Cantonment branch. The charges were, that the respondent while functioning as the chief manager showed undue official favours to certain individuals and to certain concerns in which the individuals had vested interests. The respondent exceeded his authority in sanctioning the credit facilities and committed other irregularities in connection therewith and hence exhibited lack of integrity and honesty and conduct unbecoming of a bank officer and thereby contravened Regulation No. 3(1) of the Syndicate Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (for short "the Regulations"). The other charge pertained to failure on the part of the respondent to maintain/monitor the motor car expenditure account as the Chief Manager of Gurgaon, Cantonment branch. The charge-sheet was duly served on the respondent, who made representation in that behalf.
3. The disciplinary authority not being satisfied with the explanation tendered by the respondent, directed initiation of departmental enquiry regarding the charges levelled against the respondent. An enquiry was held by the enquiry officer appointed in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Syndicate Bank Officers Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (for short, "the Discipline Regulations"). The enquiry officer so appointed after holding a regular departmental enquiry against the respondent submitted a report dated May 11, 1991, wherein the enquiry officer found the respondent guilty of both the charges.
4. On receipt of the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority forwarded a copy of the report to the respondent and the respondent on receipt of the copy of the report submitted a written representation on June 24, 1991.
5. The disciplinary authority not being satisfied with the reply of the respondent by an order dated August 28, 1991, accepted the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and having regard to the gravity of misconduct on the part of the respondent in jeopardizing the interests of the bank to the tune of Rs. 20 lakhs, awarded the punishment of removal of the respondent from the services of bank, however, making it clear that the said punishment shall not be a disqualification for future employment.
6. The respondent feeling aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary authority preferred an appeal to the appellate authority by memorandum of appeal dated October 4, 1991. The appellate authority by its order dated November 6, 1991, after referring to the material on record and the contentions raised by the respondent confirmed the punishment awarded on the respondent of removal from services of the bank with immediate effect which shall not be a disqualification for future employment. The appellate authority thus dismissed the appeal.
7. The respondent aggrieved by the order of the disciplinary and appellate authorities, preferred Writ Petition No. 14806 of 1992. In the writ petition, the respondent contended that the procedure prescribed under Regulation No. 19 of the Disciplinary and Appeal Regulations provided for consultation of the Central Vigilance Commission and the report of the Central Vigilance Commission has not been made available to the respondent and hence the principles of natural justice have been violated and the punishment imposed on the respondent is liable to be quashed. It was also contended by the respondent that he is senior to Sri T. Ramesh Kamath who was appointed as enquiry authority to enquire into the charges framed, against him and therefore on that count itself the enquiry is vitiated. It was also contended that the enquiry officer, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have failed to notice that, errors of judgment/errors in the instructions, are not misconduct and failure to do so, has vitiated the orders of the disciplinary and appellate authorities. It was also contended that the findings recorded by the enquiry authority are perverse. It was contended that the order of the appellate authority confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority is, in the facts and circumstances of the case, illegal, arbitrary and highly unjust.
8. Opposing the writ petition, on behalf of the management of the Syndicate Bank, it was contended that the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission were not binding on the disciplinary or appellate authorities in view of the settled position in law. It was also pointed out that though the appellant-management was required to consult the Central Vigilance Commission under Regulation No. 19. The recommendations made by the Central Vigilance Commission were not relied upon by the disciplinary or appellate authorities in the matter of imposing punishment and on the other hand, the punishment imposed is commensurate with the gravity of proved misconduct. It is also contended that the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission has not at all influenced the decision of the disciplinary and appellate authorities in the matter of awarding punishment. It was specifically pointed out that the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission were to award a punishment "not less than compulsory retirement", but the punishment awarded was removal from service and, therefore, it clearly indicates that the disciplinary and appellate authorities were not at all influenced by the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission.
9. The learned single judge having appreciated the pleading of the parties, evidence on record and contentions raised on behalf of them by his order dated July 28, 1998, allowed the writ petition mainly on the ground that the respondent had not been furnished with a copy of the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission and the same amounted to violation of the principles of natural justice. Applying the ratio of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal , the learned single judge while quashing the orders of the disciplinary and appellate authorities, directed the appellant to pay 50 per cent. of the back-wages to the respondent from the date of his removal from service till the date on which the respondent would have retired from service on account of superannuation, along with all Consequential benefits proportionately within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of the order. The learned single judge has held that since the respondent is no more in service and in view of the fact that the respondent has already attained the age of superannuation; no further enquiry could be held against the respondent. Hence, this writ appeal by the aggrieved management of the Syndicate Bank. The writ petitioner, Sri R. G. Bhide has also filed Writ Appeal No. 5795 of 1998 against the same judgment of the learned single judge, inter alia, contending that the learned single judge having set aside the order of penalty ought to have granted the normal relief of reinstatement with full back-wages. According to the writ petitioner, the order of the learned single judge restricting the relief to 50 per cent. of back-wages, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not justified and the writ petitioner is entitled to full back-wages.
10. We have heard Sri K. Radesh Prabhu, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri P.S. Rajagopal learned counsel for the respondent. Sri K. Radesh Prabhu contended that the order of the learned single judge suffers from several errors apparent on the face of the order and has been passed without considering material on record. Sri Radesh Prabhu would contend that the appellant was not required to furnish a copy of the report containing the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission and therefore the failure to furnish a copy of the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission in no way would vitiate the disciplinary proceedings. Sri Radesh Prabhu contended that the learned single judge ought not to have interfered with the disciplinary action taken against the respondent mechanically on the sole ground that the copy of the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission was not furnished to him without examining the question whether on account of non-supply of the said document the respondent has suffered any prejudice. Sri Radesh Prabhu contended that the interpretation placed by the learned single judge in construing Regulation No. 9 is defective and illegal. Sri Radesh Prabhu would conclude by contending that the charge framed against the respondent is established by adducing substantive legal evidence and there was absolutely no case made out for the respondent warranting interference by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
11. Sri P.S. Rajagopal, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission did influence the decision-making. Sri P.S. Rajagopal placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in State Bank of India v. D. C. Aggarwal (supra). Sri P.S. Rajagopal would highlight that, as could be seen from order of the disciplinary authority produced as annexure B dated August 28, 1991, there is no references to the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission in the list of references and therefore, Sri P.S. Rajagopal would maintain, the disciplinary authority clandestinely made use of the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission without disclosing the same to the charged officer. Sri P. S. Rajagopal also pointed out that even the appellate authority in its order dated November 6, 1991, produced as annexure A does not refer to the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission. Attacking the findings recorded in the enquiry, Sri P.S. Rajagopal would contend that the findings are perverse and such findings could not have been recorded by any reasonable man apprised of the facts and circumstances of the case. Lastly, Sri P.S. Rajagopal submitted that since the delinquent employee has already retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation, this Court itself can decide on the merits and give a quietus by passing appropriate order.
12. In the light of the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties before us, mainly two questions arise for decision. They are:
(i) Whether non-supply of a copy of the report containing the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission to the respondent employee vitiated the validity of I the enquiry and the final order passed by the disciplinary authority ? and
(ii) Whether the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority are perverse for want of legal evidence?
In respect of the contention that non-supply of a copy of the report containing the recommendations of the Central Vigilance Commission vitiated the enquiry and the final order made by the disciplinary authority, Sri P.S. Rajagopal placed reliance on the judgments of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal (supra), Nagaraj Shivrao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal, and Satyendra Chandra Jain v. Punjab National Bank . Before considering the above judgment it is necessary to refer to the relevant regulation under which the disciplinary authority consulted the Central Vigilance Commission and sought its advice and the relevant Government Order issued by the Government of India in that regard.
14. The Disciplinary Regulations have been framed under Section 19 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. The Disciplinary Regulations were framed by the board of. directors of the Syndicate Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank of India and with the previous sanction of the Central Government. Regulation 4 prescribes penalty for acts of misconduct. Regulation 5 specifies the authority to institute disciplinary proceedings and impose penalties. Regulation 6 lays down procedure for imposing major penalties and Regulation 7 provides for action on the inquiry report. Regulation 7 confers powers to the disciplinary authority either to agree or disagree with the findings of the inquiry authority on any article of charge. The disciplinary authority may reach its own conclusion on the material on record and impose any penalty prescribed under Regulation 4. Or, if it is of the opinion that no penalty should be imposed on the delinquent officer, it may pass an order exonerating the delinquent officer. Regulation 17 provides for appeals against the order imposing any of the penalties specified in Regulation 4. The appellate authority has been given the power to pass any order of penalty or remitting the case to the disciplinary authority or to any other authority for fresh disposal. Regulation 19 with which we are concerned in this case provides for consultation with the Central Vigilance Commission. It states that the bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle. There is no other regulation requiring the bank to consult the Central Vigilance Commission. However, the Central Vigilance Commission has framed guidelines for banks to consult the commission in respect of cases where major penalty is prescribed under the Discipline Regulations. Article 22 of the Central Vigilance Commission Manual reads:
"The scheme of consultation with the commission in respect of major penalty cases pertaining to such officers envisages consultation with the commission at two stages. The first stage of consultation arises when initiating disciplinary proceedings while the second consultation is taken at the conclusion of the proceedings."
Article 23.2 of the Central Vigilance Commission reads:
"In all the cases where C.V.C. advises initiation of major penalty proceedings, it also nominates simultaneously a Commissioner for Departmental Inquiries to whom the enquiry should be entrusted."
On July 21, 1984, the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), wrote a letter to all banking institutions, inter alia, stating, "Recently, a case has been reported where a bank has revised the punishment awarded to an officer in a disciplinary case contrary to the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission. The case has figured in the annual report of the CVC as a case of non-consultation with the Commission and thus created an embarrassing situation. You will, perhaps, be aware of the annual reports of the CVC, which contain cases where the disciplinary authorities had not accepted its recommendations or had not consulted it, are laid on the tables of both the Houses of the Parliament. This may thereafter be discussed in the Parliament also. You will agree that under no circumstances the advice of the CVC should be modified except with the prior concurrence of the commission and this Ministry. I may mention here that revision of the penalty imposed on a delinquent officer as a result of an appeal filed by him before the appellate authority against the decision of the original disciplinary authority also amounts to non-consultation non- acceptance of the advice of the CVCand is included in CVC's annual report.
Kindly circulate these instructions to the concerned officers in your bank for strict compliance. The receipt of this D. O. letter may please be acknowledged. A copy of this D.O. letter is being marked to CVO in your bank separately."
15. In pursuance of the above circular issued by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of:
Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), the then Chairman and Managing Director of the Syndicate Bank issued a circular dated July 27, 1984, to all branches of the bank.
It reads as follows:
"I am enclosing herewith a photostat copy of the DO letter No. 41/3/84-Vig. dated July 21, 1984, received by me from Shri Ashok Kumar, Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), Vigilance Cell, New Delhi, in the above connection for strict compliance of the instructions contained therein.
As the advice in vigilance cases received from Central Vigilance Commission is communicated to the authorities concerned by the Chief Vigilance Officer, I advise, that the Chief Vigilance Officer's advice, as explained in my above referred to DO letter, should be complied with.
Even when a revision of the penalty imposed on a delinquent officer at the advice of the Chief Vigilance Officer by the original disciplinary authority were to be considered as a result of an appeal filed by him before the appellate/higher authorities such revision shall be effected only after consulting the Chief Vigilance Officer.
Please acknowledge receipt of this and ensure compliance of the instructions contained herein."
Subsequently, on September 8, 1986, the then Chairman and Managing Director of the Syndicate Bank issued another circular to all branches of the bank.
It reads:
"All vigilance cases in the bank are being investigated/processed at Vigilance Cell at the HO, under the administrative control of the Chief Vigilance Officer, who is reporting directly to me. After processing of the reports is concluded, the cases are referred to Central Vigilance Commission as per the existing procedure and the advice received from commission is being communicated to the disciplinary appellate authorities, by the Chief Vigilance Officer.
If the advice tendered by the Commission is not accepted/acted upon, it will amount to non-acceptance of the advice of the Commission and such instance will figure in the annual report of the Central Vigilance Commission placed before Parliament.
This apart the non-acceptance of the advice in vigilance cases is likely to lead to a situation in which, different types of decisions are possible to be taken in similar cases, which is sure to result in avoidable complications and injustice to certain Sections of the officers/employees community. Again in such a situation, ensuring uniform standards in finalising action on vigilance cases will also become a very difficult phenomenon, which is not a desirable trend and does not augur well for the healthy functioning of the vigilance machinery in the bank.
I, therefore, advise all disciplinary appellate authorities to see that they refer as hitherto all vigilance cases to the Chief Vigilance Officer and consult him on such cases and act upon his advice....
If for any reasons, the authorities concerned feel that the advice needs to be reconsidered or a departure is called for, they may refer back the matter to Chief Vigilance Officer for reconsideration of the advice, with the reasons for such disagreement and the Chief Vigilance Officer will see whether and to what extent such reconsideration is desirable or feasible and will tender advice again on reconsideration. If the authority concerned is still not disposed to act on the advice, the disinclination on the part of the authority concerned will have to be brought to my notice and the advice given by me in respect of such cases shall be treated as final. It is also necessary that the authorities concerned should for obvious reasons keep the advice in strict confidence and see that no reference thereof is made in any of the correspondent communication, whatever emanating from their end."
16. The learned single judge placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. D. C. Aggarwal (supra) and an unreported judgment of this Court in the case of Govindarajan v. Canara Bank (W.P. No. 6558 of 1993, dated June 18, 1998) has held that non-supply of a copy of the report containing the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission to the delinquent-employee vitiated the enquiry and the final order made by the disciplinary authority. It is the contention of Sri Radesh Prabhu that judgment in State Bank of India v. D. C. Aggarwal (supra) was handed down by the. Supreme Court at a time when the circular issued by the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division dated July 21, 1984, was holding the field and that circular was struck down by the Apex Court in Nagaraj Shivrao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal, and in that case the Supreme Court directed the Syndicate Bank to withdraw the circular dated July 27, 1984, and subsequent circular dated September 8, 1986. Therefore, according to Sri Radesh Prabhu, the judgments of the Supreme Court and this Court handed down prior to quashing of the circular dated July 21, 1984, are of no help to the delinquent employee to contend that non-supply of a copy of the report containing the recommendation/ advice of the Central Vigilance Commission vitiated the enquiry and the final order made by the disciplinary authority.
17. In Nagaraj Shivrao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal (supra), the petitioner therein was a manager of the Syndicate Bank at East Patel Nagar branch at New Delhi. In the year 1983, on certain charges of misconduct a regular departmental enquiry was held against him and the disciplinary authority after considering the enquiry report and affording an opportunity to the petitioner passed on order dated October 7, 1987, imposing on the petitioner the penalty of compulsory retirement. The petitioner appealed to the general manager challenging the punishment. On August 27, 1988, the general manager dismissed the appeal concurring with the findings recorded and the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. The petitioner thereupon moved the Bombay High Court for relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court also dismissed the writ petition. The petitioner therefore carried the matter to the Apex Court. It was the contention of the petitioner before the Apex Court that he had been complaining throughout that the punishing authorities did not apply their mind and did not exercise their power in considering the merits of the case independently and have in fact imposed on him the penalty of compulsory retirement in strict obedience of the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission which has been made binding on them by the direction dated July 21, 1984 issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division). In other words, it was the contention of the petitioner that the disciplinary authority blindly followed the advice given by the Central Vigilance Commission without regard to the merits of the matter and contrary to the statutory regulations governing the departmental inquiries. In that case, admittedly, the Central Vigilance Commission had recommended punishment of compulsory retirement. The bank's management after receipt of the advice, made two representations; one in 1986 and another in 1987 to the Central Vigilance Commission for taking a lenient view of the matter and to impose lesser punishment on the petitioner therein and those representations were not accepted by the Central Vigilance Commission.
18. In the backdrop of the facts of that case, the Supreme Court held:
"We are indeed surprised to see the impugned directive issued by the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division). Firstly, under the regulation, the bank's consultation with Central Vigilance Commission in every case is not mandatory Regulation 20 provides that the bank shall consult the Central Vigilance Commission wherever necessary, in respect of all disciplinary cases having a vigilance angle. Even if the bank has made a self imposed rule to consult the Central Vigilance Commission in every disciplinary matter, it does not make the Commission's advice binding on the punishing authority. In this context, reference may be made to Article 320(3) of the Constitution. The Article 320(3) like Regulation 20 with which we are concerned provides that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted on all disciplinary matters affecting a civil servant including memorials or petitions relating to such matters. This Court in A.N. D'Siiva v. Union of India 1962 Suppl. (1) SCR 968 has expressed (he view that the Commission's junction is purely advisory. It is not an appellate authority over the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority. The advice tendered by the Commission is not binding on the Government. Similarly, in the present case, the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission is not binding on the bank or the punishing authority. It is not obligatory upon the punishing authority to accept the advice of the Central Vigilance Commission.
Secondly, the Ministry of Finance, Government of India has no jurisdiction to issue the impugned directive to banking institutions. The Government may regulate the banking institutions within the power located under the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970. So far as we could see, Section 8 is the only provision which empowers the Government to issue directions. Section 8 reads:
"..... every corresponding new bank shall, in the discharge of its functions, be guided by such directions in regard to matters of policy involving public interest as the Central Government may, after consultation with the Governor of the Reserve Bank, give."
19. In view of those findings, the Apex Court allowed the appeal of the charged officer and quashed the directive issued by the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) dated July 21, 1984, and issued direction to the Chairman of the Syndicate Bank to withdraw the circular letters dated July 27, 1984, and September 8, 1986. It is quite clear from the above judgment of the Supreme Court that the Finance Ministry, by issuing the directive dated July 21, 1984, had exceeded its jurisdiction and acted ultra vires the regulations. The present case is the case which arose after the Apex Court quashed the directive of the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) dated July 21, 1984. The judgment in Nagaraj Shivrao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal (supra), is dated April 30, 1991.
20. The judgment of the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v. D.C. Aggarwal (supra), could also be distinguished on facts. Firstly, that judgment also dealt with a disciplinary action taken against the respondent therein when the circular of the Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) dated July 21, 1984, was holding the field. Secondly, in that case, the Central Vigilance Commission examined the inquiry report and recorded its own findings on each of the charges and, sent its recommendations running into nearly 50 pages to the bank. The Central Vigilance Commission not only disagreed with the inquiry officer and found charges I, II, III, IV, VIII, XI to XIII to have been proved but it advised, "imposition of a major penalty not less than removal from service". The Supreme Court on examination of the entire materials on record found, as a matter of fact, that the disciplinary authority agreed with each and every finding recorded by the Central Vigilance Commission. The disagreement was limited to the quantum of punishment only. In the facts and circumstances of that case, and having found that the disciplinary authority was swayed away by the findings recorded by the Central Vigilance Commission, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State Bank of India and confirmed the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, which quashed the disciplinary action taken against the respondent in that case. Therefore, that judgment cannot be construed as a binding authority in the present case, particularly having regard to the vital differences between the two.
21. If we can see that the conclusion of the disciplinary authority was not based on the advice tendered by Central Vigilance Commission but, was arrived at independently, on the basis of the charges, the relevant materials placed before the inquiry officer in support of the charges and the defence of the delinquent officer, it may be totally inappropriate for the Court to interfere with the disciplinary action taken by the disciplinary authority and affirmed by the appellate authority on technical ground that copy of the report containing the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission was not given to the delinquent employee. In that regard, the following observation of the Supreme Court in Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal, are quite opposite:
"We think that if the disciplinary authority arrived at its own conclusion on the material available to it, its findings and decision cannot be said to be tainted with any illegality merely because the disciplinary authority consulted the Vigilance Commissioner and obtained his views on the very same material."
22. In the above case, the appellant contended that the Vigilance Commissioner had no statutory status and he should not have been consulted by the Government. The grievance of the appellant was that the report of the Vigilance Commissioner was not furnished to him though the ultimate findings of the Government was based on the report of the Vigilance Commissioner. In the context of that contention, the Supreme Court having found that what was communicated to the appellant were the findings recorded by the disciplinary authority and not of the Vigilance Commissioner, rejected the claim of the appellant-delinquent that he should have been furnished a copy of the findings recorded by the Vigilance Commissioner. While doing so, the Supreme Court held:
"We do not see any justification for the insistent request made by the appellant to the disciplinary authority that the report of the Vigilance Commissioner should be made available to him. In the preliminary findings of the disciplinary authority which were communicated to the appellant there was no reference to the views of the Vigilance Commissioner. The findings which were communicated to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and it was wholly unnecessary for the disciplinary authority to furnish the appellant with a copy of the report of the Vigilance Commissioner when the findings communicated to the appellant were those of the disciplinary authority and not of the Vigilance Commission. That the preliminary findings of the disciplinary authority happened to coincide with the views of the Vigilance Commission is neither here nor there."
23. Similarly, the judgment of Supreme Court in Satyendra Chandra Jain v. Punjab National Bank (supra) is also distinguishable on facts. In that case, the disciplinary authority, who, after departmental enquiry proposed them penalty of reduction in rank but on the recommendation of the Chief Vigilance Officer imposed the penalty of removal from service. In those circumstances, the Apex Court held that the recommendation of the Chief Vigilance Officer regarding quantum of punishment is not binding on the disciplinary authority and since the disciplinary authority blindly imposed the penalty of removal from the service on the delinquent, as directed by the Chief Vigilance Officer, directed the disciplinary authority to reconsider the penalty to be imposed on the delinquent, in the light of misconduct established against him. It is also relevant to notice that when the disciplinary authority had passed the punishment order, the directive issued by the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division) dated July 21, 1984, was in currency.
24. Therefore, in view of the fact that the circular of the Finance Ministry, Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division), dated July 21, 1984, was quashed by the Supreme Court in Nagaraj Shivrao Karjagi v. Syndicate Bank Head Office, Manipal (supra), it cannot be said that whatever be the advice or. recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission with regard to the disciplinary action to be taken against a delinquent employee by disciplinary authority, such disciplinary authority is bound by such recommendation or advice. This position is made very clear in Satyendra Chandra Jain v. Punjab National Bank (supra). Nevertheless as held by the Supreme Court in State Bank of India v D.C. Aggarwal (supra), if the disciplinary authority has taken into account the advice/recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission in imposing the penalty of removal, then, the impugned action could not be sustained, if not for any other reason, but at least for the reason that such action was taken in violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as the disciplinary authority placed reliance or made use of an adverse material against the delinquent employee without disclosing the same to him. The question, therefore, is whether in this case the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission was taken into consideration in imposing the penalty of removal of the delinquent employee or not. Having perused the order of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, we find that the list of references in both the orders do not refer to the recommendation/advice of the Central Vigilance Commission. However, it is stated in the pleading of the bank that the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission was taken into account while passing the final order. Simply because the recommendation made by the Central Vigilance Commission which is not binding on the disciplinary authority was taken note of by the disciplinary authority, only on that ground and without anything further to establish prejudice to the interest of the delinquent, disciplinary action cannot be quashed. No doubt, the affected should be appraised is a Constitutional creed flowing from Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In the instant case, the admitted position is that the Central Vigilance Commission recommended punishment of compulsory retirement, whereas, the disciplinary authority having appreciated the gravity of misconduct committed by the charged officer thought it appropriate to impose higher penalty of removal from service. This action of the disciplinary authority is a clear indication to show that the disciplinary authority independently considered the merits of the case and arrived at the punishment on the basis of the evidence placed before it. Therefore, we do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the delinquent officer that but for the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission, there was every possibility of the disciplinary authority awarding lesser punishment than compulsory retirement. If the disciplinary authority in fact wanted to impose lesser punishment than compulsory retirement and at the same time it also thought that the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission binds it, the disciplinary authority would have, in normal course, imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement and not the penalty of removal from service. The very fact that the disciplinary authority despite the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission to impose penalty of compulsory retirement proceeded to impose penalty of removal, clinchingly proves that the disciplinary authority independently dealt with the matter and appreciated the merits of the case and arrived at an independent conclusion. Therefore, we are fully satisfied that the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission in the present case, in no way, influenced the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority in decision-making.
25. It is not that the High Court should interfere under Article 226 with disciplinary action against a delinquent officer/employee wherever it finds an irregularity or breach of law. The essence of the matter is that on account of such breach or irregularity, substantive injustice is caused to the concerned delinquent employee. This is not one such case. As quite often said and reiterated that the object of the principles of natural justice is to foster justice and not to thwart justice. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to interfere with the disciplinary action taken against the delinquent officer/employee merely on the ground that the disciplinary authority did not furnish a copy of the recommendation of the Central Vigilance Commission. This takes us to the other contention of Sri P.S. Rajagopal that the findings recorded by the appellate authority and accepted by the disciplinary authority are perverse. The judicial review strictly speaking, is not against the decision, but against the decision-making. It is well-settled that this Court while reviewing the administrative action, particularly the findings recorded in a disciplinary proceedings, cannot go into the question of adequacy or sufficiency of evidence on the basis of which such findings are recorded. The only thing to be seen by the Court is, whether the findings recorded by the inquiry authority are based on some legal evidence or not. If the Court finds that the findings could be sustained on the basis of some legal evidence on record, it cannot interfere with such findings.
26. A copy of the inquiry report is produced as annexure-G at pages 105-131. We have perused the report. The inquiry authority in extenso has referred to and considered the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced in the inquiry and has recorded the finding that the articles of the charges are proved conclusively and beyond any shadow of doubt. This conclusion reached by the inquiry authority is preceded by cogent and sound reasoning. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination it can be said that the findings recorded by the inquiry officer are perverse. On the other hand, the findings recorded by the enquiry officer and accepted by the disciplinary authority are based on substantive legal evidence. Sri P.S. Rajagopal, was not in a position to demonstrate how the findings could be condemned as perverse though such argument was placed before us by him meekly.
27. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ appeal and set aside the order of the learned single Judge dated July28, 1998, and dismiss Writ Petition No. 14806 of 1992 with no order as to costs.
28. Since we have allowed Writ Appeal No. 4619 of 1998, filed by the management of the bank and dismissed the Writ Petition No. 14806of 1992, it is trite, Writ Appeal No. 5797 of 1998 filed by the writ petitioner seeking full back-wages is liable to be dismissed for the same reason stated by us (supra). Accordingly, we dismiss Writ Appeal No. 5795 of 1998 with no order as to costs.