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[Cites 34, Cited by 0]

Uttarakhand High Court

Raghunath Singh Negi vs State Of Uttarakhand & Others on 18 September, 2018

Bench: Rajiv Sharma, Manoj Kumar Tiwari

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL

             Writ Petition (PIL) No. 142 of 2018

Raghunath Singh Negi.                    ............        Petitioner

                              Versus

State of Uttarakhand & others.           .............. Respondents

Mr. M.C. Pant, Advocate for the petitioner.
Mr. S.N. Babulkar, Advocate General, with Mr. Paresh Tripathi, Chief
Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand / respondent Nos. 1, 2,
4 & 8.
Mr. Sanjay Bhatt, Standing Counsel (Central Govt.) for respondent
Nos. 6 & 9.
Mr. Sandeep Tandon, Advocate for respondent No. 7.

                           JUDGMENT

Coram: Hon'ble Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J. Hon'ble Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.

Dated: 18th September, 2018 RAJIV SHARMA, A.C.J. (Oral) Petitioner claims himself to be a public-spirited person and is working for the benefit of public at large in spreading knowledge of the Government schemes and educating general public. He is a social worker. His wife is having a small business. His father is a pensioner. He is raising public causes / grievances through Uttarakhand Jan Sangharsh Morcha.

2. Petitioner has sought a direction to respondent Nos. 1 & 2 for taking all steps towards the implementation of a Report known as Tripathi Commission's Report and also for taking appropriate action against the erring officers, including referring the matter to the Central Bureau of Investigation.

3. It transpired during the course of hearing of the writ petition that the petitioner was a member of the Bhartiya 2 Janta Party and he had tendered his resignation in the month of January, 2017.

4. The State Government has taken a preliminary objection qua the maintainability of this Public Interest Litigation. Mr. S.N. Babulkar, learned Advocate General appearing for the State Government has vehemently argued that the present writ petition is nothing but witch-hunting and it does not inspire confidence to be treated as a Public Interest Litigation. According to him, it is a case of vendetta and the present writ petition has been filed with political motives and for oblique considerations. Moreover, according to the learned Advocate General, the Report was already placed before the Legislative Assembly.

5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length only on the question of maintainability of the writ petition. Since we are dealing with the question of maintainability as preliminary issue, we have not gone into the merits of the case.

6. However, a few brief facts are required to be gone into in order to decide even the preliminary objection raised by the State Government qua the locus standi of the petitioner and the maintainability of the writ petition. A Commission was constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 on 28.03.2013. One Sri S.C. Tripathi was appointed as the one-man Commission. He tendered the Report on 09.04.2014. The case of the petitioner is that this Report has not been given effect to.

7. In order to complete the facts, it would be necessary to refer to the earlier round of litigation instituted by one Jaya Prakash Dabral by filing Writ Petition (PIL) No. 70 of 2015. The said writ petition was permitted to be withdrawn on 3 21.08.2018 with liberty reserved to the petitioner to institute fresh writ petition on the same or similar cause of action. Now, the present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, namely, Raghunath Singh Negi on similar grounds.

8. Learned Advocate General has argued that the Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is a fact-finding body and it is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and it has no adjudicatory functions.

9. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha vs. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1984 SC 802, have held that "the Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or busy body and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundamental right is violated should be allowed to activise the court". The Constitution makers deliberately did not lay down any particular form of proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right nor did they stipulate that such proceeding should conform to any rigid pattern or straight jacket formula as, for example, in England, because they knew that in a country like India, where there is so much of poverty, ignorance, illiteracy, deprivation and exploitation, any insistence on a rigid formula of proceeding for enforcement of a fundamental right would become self defeating. Their Lordships have held as under:

"11. The next preliminary objection urged by the learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the State of Haryana and Mr. Phadke on behalf of one of the mine-lessees was that the court had no power to appoint either Mr. Ashok Srivastava and Mr. Ashok Panda or Mr. Patwardhan as commissioners and the Reports made by them had no evidentiary value since 4 what was stated in the Reports was based only on ex- parte statements which had not been tested by cross- examination. The learned Additional Solicitor General as also Mr. Phadke relied on Order XLVI of the Supreme Court Rules 1966 which, as its heading shows, deals with commissions and contended that since the commissions issued by the court in the present case did not fall within the terms of any of the provisions of Order XLVI, they were outside the scope of the power of the court and the court was not entitled to place any reliance on their reports for the purpose of adjudicating the issues arising in the writ petition. This argument, plausible though it may seem at first sight, is in our opinion not well founded and must be rejected. It is based upon a total misconception of the true nature of a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. Article 32 is so frequently used by lawyers and Judges for enforcement of fundamental rights without any preliminary objection against its invocation being raised on behalf of the State, that we have rarely any occasion to examine its language and consider how large is the width and amplitude of its dimension and range. We are so much accustomed to the concepts of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence which require every legal proceeding including a proceeding for a high prerogative writ to be cast in a rigid or definitive mould and insist on observance of certain well settled rules of procedure, that we implicitly assume that the same sophisticated procedural rules must also govern a proceeding under Article 32 and the Supreme Court cannot permit itself to be freed from the shackles of these rules even if that be necessary for enforcement of a fundamental right. It was on the basis of this impression fostered by long association which the Anglo-Saxon system of administration of justice that for a number of years this court had taken the view that it is only a person whose fundamental right is violated who can approach the Supreme Court for relief under Article 32 or in other words, he must have a cause of action for enforcement of his fundamental right. It was only in the years 1981 in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case that this Court for the first time took the view that where a person or class of persons to whom legal injury is caused by reason of violation of a fundamental right is unable to approach the court for judicial redress on account of poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position, any member of the public acting bona fide can move the court for relief under Article 32 and a fortiorari, also under Article 226, so that the fundamental rights may become meaningful not only for the rich and the well-to-do who have the means to 5 approach the court but also for the large masses of people who are living a life of want and destitution and who are by reason of lack of awareness, assertiveness and resources unable to seek judicial redress. This view which we took in the Judges Appointment and Transfer Case is clearly within the terms of Article 32 if only we look at the language of this Article uninfluenced and uninhibited by any pre-conceptions and prejudices or any pre-conceived notions. Article 32 in so far it is material is in the following terms:
"Art. 32 (1): The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs including writ in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.

While interpreting Article 32, it must be borne in mind that our approach must be guided not by any verbal or formalistic canons of construction but by the paramount object and purpose for which this Article has been enacted as a Fundamental Right in the Constitution and its interpretation must receive illumination from the trinity of provisions which permeate and energies the entire Constitution namely, the Preamble, the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. Clause (1) of Article 32 confers the right to move the Supreme Court foe enforcement of any of the fundamental rights, but it does not say as to who shall have this right to move the Supreme Court nor does it say by what proceedings the Supreme Court may be so moved. There is no limitation in the words of Clause (1) of Article 32 that the fundamental right which is sought to be enforced by moving the Supreme Court should be one belonging to the person who moves the Supreme Court nor does it say that the Supreme Court should be moved only by a particular kind of proceeding. It is clear on the plain language of clause (1) of Article 32 that whenever there is a violation of a fundamental right any one can move the Supreme Court for enforcement of such fundamental right. Of course, the Court would not, in exercise of its discretion, intervene at the instance of a meddlesome interloper or busy body and would ordinarily insist that only a person whose fundamental right is violated should be allowed to activise the court, but there is no fetter upon the power of the court to entertain a proceeding initiated by any person other 6 than the one whose fundamental right is violated, though the court would not ordinarily entertain such a proceeding, since the person whose fundamental right is violated can always approach the court and if he does not wish to seek judicial redress by moving the court, why should someone else be allowed to do so on his behalf. This reasoning however breaks down when we have the case of a person or class of persons whose fundamental right is violated but who cannot have resort to the court on account of their poverty or disability or socially or economically disadvantaged position and in such a case, therefore, the court can and must allow any member of the public acting bona fide to espouse the cause of such person or class of persons and move the court for judicial enforcement of the fundamental right of such person or class of persons. This does not violate, in the slightest measure, the language of the constitutional provision enacted in clause (1) of Article 32.

51. This petition invokes the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, which confers the guaranteed right to move this Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights. The right exercised is a right to a constitutional remedy and the jurisdiction invoked is a constitutional jurisdiction. Bearing this in mind, we must also take into account that the provisions of Article 32 do not specifically indicate who can move the Court. In the absence of a confining provision in that respect. It is plain that a petitioner may be anyone in whom the law recognises a standing to maintain an action of such nature.

75. The substance of the grievance of the petitioners in this petition is that the workmen referred to in the communication addressed to this Court are bonded labourers. In 1976, the Parliament enacted the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 and by virtue of the provisions of the said Act, the bonded labour system has been declared to be illegal in this country. Any person who is wrongfully and illegally employed as a labourer in violation of the provisions of the Act, is in essence deprived of his liberty. A bonded labourer truly becomes a slave and the freedom of a bonded labourer in the matter of his employment and movement is more or less completely taken away and forced labour is thrust upon him. When any bonded labourer approaches this Court, the real grievance that he makes is that he should be freed from this bondage and he prays for being set at liberty and liberty is no doubt a fundamental right guaranteed to every person under the Constitution. There cannot be any manner of doubt that any person who is wrongfully and illegally 7 detained and is deprived of his liberty can approach this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for his freedom from wrongful and illegal detention, and for being set at liberty. In my opinion, whenever any person is wrongfully and illegally deprived of his liberty, it is open to anybody who is interested in the person to move this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution for his release. It may not very often be possible for the person who is deprived of his liberty to approach this Court, as by virtue of such illegal and wrongful detention, he may not be free and in a position to move this Court. The Petitioner in the instant case claims to be an association interested in the welfare of society and particularly of the weaker section. The Petitioner further states that the petitioner seeks to promote the welfare of the labourers and for promoting the welfare of labour, the petitioner seeks to move this Court for releasing the bonded labourers from their bondage and for restoring to them their freedom and other legitimate rights. The bonded labourers working in the far away places are generally poor and belong to the very weak section of the people. They are also not very literate and they may not be conscious of their own rights. Further, as they are kept in bondage their freedom is also restricted and they may not be in a position to approach this Court. Though no fundamental right of the petitioner may be said to be infringed, yet the petitioner who complains of the violation of the fundamental right of the workmen who have been wrongfully and illegally denied their freedom and deprived of their constitutional right must be held to be entitled to approach this Court on behalf of the bonded labourers for removing them from illegal bondage and deprivation of liberty. The locus standi of the petitioner to move this Court appear to be conclusively established by the decision of this Court in the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India & Anr.(1) Forced labour is constitutionally forbidden by Art. 23 of the Constitution. As in the present case the violation of the fundamental right of liberty of the workmen who are said to be kept in wrongful and illegal detention, employed in forced labour, is alleged, Art. 32 of the Constitution to my mind, is clearly attracted. The first ground raised on behalf of the respondents cannot, therefore, be sustained."

10. Learned Advocate General has placed reliance upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray vs. Justice B. Lentin and others, reported in (1988) 4 SCC 419. Their Lordships of 8 the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the Commission is appointed by the appropriate government 'for the information of its mind' in order to decide as to the course of action to be followed and is merely a fact-finding body and the Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set-up bodies and tribunals and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character; but they are not courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may have some of the trappings of a court. Their Lordships have held as under:

"32. In view of the change in law, we fail to appreciate the contention of the learned Advocate- General, without meaning any disrespect, that the principles laid down by the majority in Lalji Haridas case that on a combined reading of sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act read in the context of sub-section (4), an Income-tax Officer must still be regarded to be a Court for the purposes of Section 195(1)(b), despite the enactment of sub-section (3) of Section 195. A Commission of Inquiry is not a Court properly so called. A Commission is obviously appointed by the appropriate Government 'for the information of its mind' in order for it to decide as to the course of action to be followed. It is therefore a fact-finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory function. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has the power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court.
33. In Virindar Kumar Satyawadi v. State of Punjab, a three Judge Bench speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. relying upon the celebrated decision of the House of Lords in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal Commissioner of Taxation LR (1931) AC 275 explained the legal connotation of the term 'Court' in these words:
(W)hat distinguishes a Court from a quasi-

judicial tribunal is that it is charged with a duty to decide disputes in a judicial manner and declare the rights of parties in a definitive judgment. To decide in a judicial manner involves that the parties are entitled as a matter of right to 9 be heard in support of their claim and to adduce evidence in proof of it. And it also imports an obligation on the part of the authority to decide the matter on a consideration of the evidence adduced and in accordance with law. When a question therefore arises as to whether an authority created by an Act is a Court as distinguished from a quasi-judicial tribunal, what has to be decided is whether having regard to the provisions of the Act it possesses all the attributes of a Court.

It is a familiar feature of modern legislation to set up bodies and tribunals, and entrust them with work of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative character, but they are not Courts in the accepted sense of that term, though they may possess, as observed by Lord Sankey, L.C. in Shell Co. of Australia's case, some of the trappings of a Court. Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Virindar Kumar Satyawadi has referred to several decisions of the Courts in England and Australia as to what are the essential characteristics of a Court as distinguished from tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.

36. We are satisfied that the decision of the Nagpur High Court in M.V. Rajwade's case and that of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Puhupram lay down the correct law. The least that is required of a Court is the capacity to deliver a 'definitive judgment', and merely because the procedure adopted by it is of a legal character and it has power to administer an oath will not impart to it the status of a Court. That being so, it must be held that a Commission of Inquiry appointed by the appropriate Government under Section 3(1) of the Commissions of Inquiry Act is not a Court for the purposes of Section 195 of the Code."

11. In the case of Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary & others, reported in (1992) 4 SCC 305, their Lordships have held that, though the scope of locus standi is wider than relating to private interest litigation; but mere busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit cannot be allowed to abuse the process of the court by initiating vexatious and frivolous litigation. Their Lordships have held as under:

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"64. In contrast, the strict rule of locus standi applicable to private litigation is relaxed and a broad rule is evolved which gives the right of locus standi to any member of the public acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in instituting an action for redressal of public wrong or public injury, but who is not a mere busybody or a meddlesome interloper; since the dominant object of PIL is to ensure observance of the provisions of the Constitution or the law which can be best achieved to advance the cause of community or disadvantaged groups and individuals or public interest by permitting any person, having no personal gain or private motivation or any other oblique consideration but acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in maintaining an action for judicial redress for public injury to put the judicial machinery in motion like actio popularis of Roman Law whereby any citizen could bring such an action in respect of a public delict.
68. Though we have, in our country, recognised a departure from the strict rule of locus standi as applicable to a person in private action and broadened and liberalised the rule of standing and thereby permitted a member of the public, having no personal gain or oblique motive to approach the court for enforcement of the constitutional or legal rights of socially or economically disadvantaged persons who on account of their poverty or total ignorance of their fundamental rights are unable to enter the portals of the courts for judicial redress, yet no precise and inflexible working definition has been evolved in respect of locus standi of an individual seeking judicial remedy and various activities in the field of PIL. Probably, some reservation and diversity of approach to the philosophy of PIL among some of the Judges of this Court as reflected from the various decisions of this Court, is one of the reasons for this Court finding it difficult to evolve a consistent jurisprudence in the field of PIL. True, in defining the rule of locus standi no 'rigid litmus test' can be applied since the broad contours of PIL are still developing apace seemingly with divergent views on several aspects of the concept of this newly developed law and discovered jurisdiction leading to a rapid transformation of judicial activism with a far reaching change both in the nature and form of the judicial process.
89. From the above pronouncements, it emerges that this summit Court has widely enlarged the scope of PIL by relaxing and liberalising the rule of standing by treating letters or petitions sent by any person or association complaining violation of any fundamental rights and also entertaining Writ Petitions filed 11 under Article 32 of the Constitution by public-spirited and policy-oriented activist persons or journalists or of any organisation rejecting serious challenges made with regard to the maintainability of such petitions and rendered many virtuosic pronouncements and issued manifold directions to the Central and the State Governments, all local and other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India for the betterment of the public at large in many fields in conformity with constitutional prescriptions of what constitutes a good life in a socially just democracy. The newly invented proposition of law laid down by many learned Judges of this Court in the arena of PIL irrefutably and manifestly establish that our dynamic activism in the field of PIL is by no means less than those of other activist judicial systems in other parts of the world.
109. It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly, a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL brought before the court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold.
112. Further, we would like to make it clear that it should not be misunderstood that by the expression of our above view, there is any question of retreating or recoiling from the earlier views expressed by this Court about the philosophy of public interest litigation in many outstanding judgments which we have already referred to; on the other hand, we look back to the vantage point from which we started our journey and proceed on our onward journey in the field of PIL.
119. After deeply and carefully considering the submissions of all the parties, we see much force in the submissions made by the learned Solicitor General, Mr. A.D. Giri and Mr. Jethamalani, senior counsel. A perusal of the petitions filed by H.S. Chowdhary before the Special Judge and the High Court clearly unfolds that Mr. Chowdhary appears to be very much concerned with the personal and private interest of the accused in the criminal case and there is absolutely no involvement of public interest. Can it be said that this litigation is in the nature of PIL to vindicate and effectuate the public interest? The emphatic answer would be 'Not even a single ray of the characteristic of public interest litigation is visibly seen'.
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120. Indeed, we are surprised to note that in the petition filed before the High Court, Mr. Chowdhary has stated that it is his duty to see that 'individuals' get justice from the Indian Courts. From whichever angle we survey and audit the contentions in both the petitions before the Courts below and the petition filed before this Court, there can be no escape except to come to the conclusion that Mr. Chowdhary has no locus standi at all to file these petitions, as found by the Courts below."

12. In the case of Kushum Lata vs. Union of India & others, reported in (2006) 6 SCC 180, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that, when there is material to show that a petition styled as a Public Interest Litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Their Lordships have further held that Public Interest Litigation, which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law, should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". Their Lordships have held as under:

"5. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". The High Court has found that the case at hand belongs to the second category. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. The Courts of justice should not be 13 allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305) and Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116). A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective.
6. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of the expression 'public interest litigation'. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:
"Public Interest - (1) a matter of public or general interest 'does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement; but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected'."

7. In Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition), "public interest" is defined as follows:

"Public Interest - Something in which the public, the community at large, has some pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as the interests of the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs of local, State or national government."

8. In Janata Dal case (supra) this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 53 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows:

"53. The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein, initiated in a Court of law with the purpose of enforcing a right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means a legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected.""
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13. In State of Uttaranchal vs. Balwant Singh Chaufal & others, reported in (2010) 3 SCC 402, their Lordships, after considering the entire gamut of Public Interest Litigations have laid down as many as eight tests to determine the true nature of Public Interest Litigations. Their Lordships have held as under:

"143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out, created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and nonmonetary directions by the courts.
144. In BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India & Others AIR 2002 SC 350, this Court recognized that there have been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of public interest litigation. Accordingly, the Court has devised a number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief. Firstly, the Supreme Court has limited standing in PIL to individuals "acting bonafide." Secondly, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the imposition of "exemplary costs" as a deterrent against frivolous and vexatious public interest litigations. Thirdly, the Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to be more selective in entertaining the public interest litigations.
145. In S. P. Gupta's case, this Court has found that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing to individuals "acting bona fide". To avoid entertaining frivolous and vexatious petitions under the guise of PIL, the Court has excluded two groups of persons from obtaining standing in PIL petitions. First, the Supreme Court has rejected awarding standing to "meddlesome interlopers". Second, the Court has denied standing to interveners bringing public interest litigation for personal gain.
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146. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (supra), the Court withheld standing from the applicant on grounds that the applicant brought the suit motivated by enmity between the parties.
147. Thus, the Supreme Court has attempted to create a body of jurisprudence that accords broad enough standing to admit genuine PIL petitions, but nonetheless limits standing to thwart frivolous and vexations petitions. The Supreme Court broadly tried to curtail the frivolous public interest litigation petitions by two methods - one monetary and second, non- monetary.
148. The first category of cases is that where the court on the filing of frivolous public interest litigation petitions, dismissed the petitions with exemplary costs. In Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others AIR 2007 SC 758, the Court concluded that it is necessary to impose exemplary costs to ensure that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
149. In S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda & Others AIR 1997 SC 272, the Court warned that it is of utmost importance that those who invoke the jurisdiction of this Court "seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well-versed".

150. In Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India & Others AIR 2005 SC 2841, this Court went a step further by imposing a monetary penalty against an Advocate for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition. The Court found that the petition was devoid of public interest, and instead labelled it as "publicity interest litigation". Thus, the Court dismissed the petition with costs of Rs.10,000/-.

151. Similarly, in Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra & Others (2005) 1 SCC 590, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's monetary penalty against a member of the Bar for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition. This Court found that the petition was nothing but a camouflage to foster personal dispute. Observing that no one should be permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession, the Court concluded that the imposition of the penalty of Rs. 25,000 by the High Court was appropriate. Evidently, the Supreme Court has set clear precedent validating the imposition of monetary penalties against frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions, especially when filed by Advocates.

152. This Court, in the second category of cases, even passed harsher orders. In Charan Lal Sahu & Others v. Giani Zail Singh & Another AIR 1984 SC 309, the Supreme Court observed that, "we would have been 16 justified in passing a heavy order of costs against the two petitioners" for filing a "light-hearted and indifferent" PIL petition. However, to prevent "nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future occasion,"

the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on the petitioners." In that case, this Court concluded that the petition was careless, meaningless, clumsy and against public interest. Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry to initiate prosecution proceedings against the petitioner under the Contempt of Courts Act. Additionally, the court forbade the Registry from entertaining any future PIL petitions filed by the petitioner, who was an advocate in that case.

153. In J. Jayalalitha v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Others (1999) 1 SCC 53, this court laid down that public interest litigation can be filed by any person challenging the misuse or improper use of any public property including the political party in power for the reason that interest of individuals cannot be placed above or preferred to a larger public interest.

154. This court has been quite conscious that the forum of this court should not be abused by any one for personal gain or for any oblique motive. In BALCO, this court held that the jurisdiction is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal gain. Therefore, the court must take care that the forum be not abused by any person for personal gain.

155. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware (supra), this court expressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the court under the garb of public interest litigation and observed that the "public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armoury of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. ...The court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations..."

156. In Thaware's case, the Court encouraged the imposition of a non-monetary penalty against a PIL petition filed by a member of the bar. The Court directed the Bar Councils and Bar Associations to ensure that no member of the Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name of Public Interest Litigation. This direction impels the Bar Councils and Bar Associations to disbar members found guilty of filing frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions.

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157. In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra & Others AIR 2008 SC 913, this Court observed as under:

"10......12. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy, whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters - government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders, etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the Courts never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system."

158. The Court cautioned by observing that:-

"10. ..... 13. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, 18 vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. ...
15. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. The Court has to strike a balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public- spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect."

159. The malice of frivolous and vexatious petitions did not originate in India. The jurisprudence developed by the Indian judiciary regarding the imposition of exemplary costs upon frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions is consistent with jurisprudence developed in other countries. The U.S. Federal Courts and Canadian Courts have also imposed monetary penalties upon public interest claims regarded as frivolous. The courts also imposed non-monetary penalties upon Advocates for filing frivolous claims. In Everywoman's Health Centre Society v. Bridges 54 B.C.L.R. (2nd Edn.) 294, the British Columbia Court of Appeal granted special costs against the Appellants for bringing a meritless appeal.

160. The U.S. Federal Courts too have imposed monetary penalties against plaintiffs for bringing frivolous public interest claims. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") permits Courts to apply an "appropriate sanction" on any party for filing 19 frivolous claims. Federal Courts have relied on this rule to impose monetary penalties upon frivolous public interest claims.

161. For example, in Harris v. Marsh, the District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina imposed a monetary sanction upon two civil rights plaintiffs for bringing a frivolous, vexatious, and meritless employment discrimination claim. The Court explained that "the increasingly crowded dockets of the federal courts cannot accept or tolerate the heavy burden posed by factually baseless and claims that drain judicial resources." As a deterrent against such wasteful claims, the Court levied a cost of $83,913.62 upon two individual civil rights plaintiffs and their legal counsel for abusing the judicial process.

162. Case law in Canadian Courts and U.S. Federal Courts exhibits that the imposition of monetary penalties upon frivolous public interest claims is not unique to Indian jurisprudence.

163. Additionally, U.S. Federal Courts have imposed nonmonetary penalties upon Attorneys for bringing frivolous claims. Federal rules and case law leave the door open for such non-monetary penalties to be applied equally in private claims and public interest claims. Rule 11 of the FRCP additionally permits courts to apply an "appropriate sanction" on attorneys for filing frivolous claims on behalf of their clients. The U.S. Federal Courts have imposed non-monetary sanctions upon attorneys for bringing frivolous claims under Rule 11.

164. In Frye v. Pena, for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's order to disbar an attorney for having "brought and pressed frivolous claims, made personal attacks on various government officials in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment, and demonstrated a lack of candor to, and contempt for, the court."

This judicial stance endorses the ethical obligation embodied in Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC):

"3.1. a lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous."

Together, FRCP, The U.S. federal case law, and the MRPC endorse the imposition of non-monetary penalties upon attorneys for bringing frivolous private claims or public interest claims.

165. In Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra) this court was apprehensive that by widening the legal 20 standing there may be flood of litigation but loosening the definition is also essential in the larger public interest. To arrest the mischief is the obligation and tribute to the judicial system.

166. In SP Gupta (supra) the court cautioned that important jurisdiction of public interest litigation may be confined to legal wrongs and legal injuries for a group of people or class of persons. It should not be used for individual wrongs because individuals can always seek redress from legal aid organizations. This is a matter of prudence and not a rule of law.

167. In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (supra) this court again emphasized that Article 32 is a great and salutary safeguard for preservation of fundamental rights of the citizens. The superior courts have to ensure that this weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or abused by any individual or organization.

168. In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Others (1992) 4 SCC 305, the court rightly cautioned that expanded role of courts in modern 'social' state demands for greater judicial responsibility. The PIL has given a new hope to millions of justice-starved people of this country. The court must encourage genuine PIL and discard PIL filed with oblique motives.

169. In Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee & Another v. C.K. Rajan & Others (2003) 7 SCC 546, it was reiterated that the court must ensure that its process is not abused and in order to prevent abuse of the process, the court would be justified in insisting on furnishing of security before granting injunction in appropriate cases. The courts may impose heavy costs to ensure that judicial process is not misused.

170. In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware (supra) this court again cautioned and observed that the court must look into the petition carefully and ensure that there is genuine public interest involved in the case before invoking its jurisdiction. The court should be careful that its jurisdiction is not abused by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or to satisfy his or their personal grudge or grudges. The stream of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants.

171. In Neetu (supra) this court observed that under the guise of redressing a public grievance the public interest litigation should not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.

172. In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this court observed that the judges who exercise the jurisdiction should be extremely careful to see that 21 behind the beautiful veil of PIL, an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking. The court should ensure that there is no abuse of the process of the court.

173. When we revert to the facts of the present case then the conclusion is obvious that this case is a classic case of the abuse of the process of the court. In the present case a practicing lawyer has deliberately abused the process of the court. In that process, he has made a serious attempt to demean an important constitutional office. The petitioner ought to have known that the controversy which he has been raising in the petition stands concluded half a century ago by a Division Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in Karkare (supra) and the said case was approved by a Constitution Bench of this court. The controversy involved in this case is no longer res integra. It is unfortunate that even after such a clear enunciation of the legal position, a large number of similar petitions have been filed from time to time in various High Courts. The petitioner ought to have refrained from filing such a frivolous petition.

174. A degree of precision and purity in presentation is a sine qua non for a petition filed by a member of the Bar under the label of public interest litigation. It is expected from a member of the Bar to at least carry out the basic research whether the point raised by him is res integra or not. The lawyer who files such a petition cannot plead ignorance.

175. We would like to make it clear that we are not saying that the petitioner cannot ask the court to review its own judgment because of flaws and lacunae, but that should have been a bona fide presentation with listing of all relevant cases in a chronological order and that a brief description of what judicial opinion has been and cogent and clear request why where should be re-consideration of the existing law. Unfortunately, the petitioner has not done this exercise. The petition which has been filed in the High Court is a clear abuse of the process of law and we have no doubt that the petition has been filed for extraneous considerations. The petition also has the potentiality of demeaning a very important constitutional office. Such petition deserves to be discarded and discouraged so that no one in future would attempt to file a similar petition.

176. On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we allow the appeals filed by the State and quash the proceedings of the Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No. 689 (M/B) of 2001 filed in the Uttaranchal High Court. We further direct that the respondents (who were the petitioners before 22 the High Court) to pay costs of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh) in the name of Registrar General of the High court of Uttarakhand. The costs to be paid by the respondents within two months. If the costs are not deposited within two months, the same would be recovered as the arrears of the Land Revenue.

177. We request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of Uttrakhand High Court to create a fund in the name of Uttarakhand High Court Lawyers Welfare Fund if not already in existence. The fund could be utilized for providing necessary help to deserving young lawyers by the Chief Justice of Uttarakhand in consultation with the President of the Bar.

178. We must abundantly make it clear that we are not discouraging the public interest litigation in any manner, what we are trying to curb is its misuse and abuse. According to us, this is a very important branch and, in a large number of PIL petitions, significant directions have been given by the courts for improving ecology and environment, and the directions helped in preservation of forests, wildlife, marine life, etc. etc. It is the bounden duty and obligation of the courts to encourage genuine bona fide PIL petitions and pass directions and orders in the public interest which are in consonance with the Constitution and the Laws.

179. The Public Interest Litigation, which has been in existence in our country for more than four decades, has a glorious record. This Court and the High Courts by their judicial creativity and craftsmanship have passed a number of directions in the larger public interest in consonance with the inherent spirits of the Constitution. The conditions of marginalized and vulnerable section of society have significantly improved on account of courts directions in P.I.L.

180. In our considered view, now it has become imperative to streamline the P.I.L.

181. We have carefully considered the facts of the present case. We have also examined the law declared by this court and other courts in a number of judgments. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions:-

(1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.
(2) Instead of every individual judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives.
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Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this court immediately thereafter. (3) The courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a P.I.L. (4) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.

(5) The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.

(6) The court should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions. (7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation.

(8) The court should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations."

14. In the case of Pathan Mohammed Suleman Rehmatkhan vs. State of Gujarat & others, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 156, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that CAG is also the final audit authority and is a part of the machinery through which the legislature enforces the regulatory and economy in the administration of public finance; however, it is the Government which administers and runs the State, which is accountable to the people. If every decision taken by the State is tested by a microscopic and a suspicious eye, the administration will come to a standstill and the decision-makers will lose all their initiative and enthusiasm. Their Lordships have held as under:

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"10. CAG is a key figure in the system of parliamentary control of finance and is empowered to delve into the economy, efficiency and effectiveness with which the departmental authorities or other bodies had used their resources in discharging their functions. CAG is also the final audit authority and is a part of the machinery through which the legislature enforces the regulatory and economy in the administration of public finance, as has been rightly pointed out by the High Court. But we cannot lose sight of the fact that it is the Government which administers and runs the State, which is accountable to the people. State's welfare, progress, requirements and needs of the people are better answered by the State, also as to how the resources are to be utilized for achieving various objectives. If every decision taken by the State is tested by a microscopic and a suspicious eye, the administration will come to stand still and the decisions-makers will lose all their initiative and enthusiasm. At hindsight, it is easy to comment upon or criticize the action of the decision maker. Sometimes, decisions taken by the State or its administrative authorities may go wrong and sometimes it may achieve the desired results. Criticisms are always welcome in a Parliamentary democracy, but a decision taken in good faith, with good intentions, without any extraneous considerations, cannot belittled, even if that decision was ultimately proved to be wrong.
11. We have extensively referred to these principles in Arun Agrawal's case (supra), where we have held as follows:-
"This Court sitting in the jurisdiction cannot sit in judgment over the commercial or business decision taken by parties to the agreement, after evaluating and assessing its monetary and financial implications, unless the decision is in clear violation of any statutory provisions or perverse or taken for extraneous considerations or improper motives. States and its instrumentalities can enter into various contracts which may involve complex economic factors. State or the State undertaking being a party to a contract, have to make various decisions which they deem just and proper. There is always an element of risk in such decisions, ultimately it may turn out to be correct decision or a wrong one. But if the decision is taken bona fide and in public interest, the mere fact that decision has ultimately proved to be wrong, that itself is not a ground to hold that the decision was mala fide or taken with ulterior motives."
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12. Reference in this regard may also be made to the judgment of this Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 2012 SC 3725, wherein it was held that when the CAG report is subject to scrutiny by the Public Accounts Committee and the Joint Parliamentary Committee, it would not be proper to refer the findings and conclusions contained therein. The Court even went on to say that it is not necessary to advert to the reasoning and suggestions made, as well.

13. We have gone through the salient features of the Project referred to in the various orders passed by the State Government and the resolutions dated 22.3.2011 and 7.6.2011 allotting lands to fourth respondent and also the notification dated 18.8.2011 issued under the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005, and we are in agreement with the High Court that it cannot be said that the State has acted against public interest. The Government has noticed the development and the employment opportunities that the project would bring into the State. The decision taken by the Government was also transparent and that the Government has also got substantial stake in the Public Private Partnership and has also taken care of its interests while entering into the various agreements. Learned senior counsel fairly submitted that he is not attributing any motives or stating that the decision was taken for extraneous reasons, but contended that the Government had, without any application of mind, parted with a large tracks of land worth crores of rupees to the private party, which is not in the interest of the State.

14. We are of the view that these are purely policy decisions taken by the State Government and, while so, it has examined the benefits the project would bring into the State and to the people of the State. It is well settled that non-floating of tenders or absence of public auction or invitation alone is not a sufficient reason to characterize the action of a public authority as either arbitrary or unreasonable or amounted to mala fide or improper exercise of power. The Courts have always held that it is open to the State and the authorities to take economic and management decision depending upon the exigencies of a situation guided by appropriate financial policy notified in public interest. We are of the view that is what has been done in the instant case and the High Court has rightly held so. We, therefore, find no reason to entertain this Special Leave Petition and the same is dismissed."

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15. The judgment passed in the case of Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray (supra) was upheld by a Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Subramanian Swamy vs. Arun Shourie, reported in (2014) 12 SCC 344, whereby the Hon'ble Supreme Court has approved the judgment in the case of Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray (supra), as quoted herein above. In the said judgment, their Lordships have held as under:

"34. We agree with the view in Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray and approve the decision of the Nagpur High Court in M.V.Rajwade18. We are also in agreement with the submission of Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Solicitor General that a Commission appointed under the 1952 Act is in the nature of a statutory Commission and merely because a Commission of Inquiry is headed by a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court, it does not become an extended arm of this Court. The Commission constituted under the 1952 Act is a fact finding body to enable the appropriate Government to decide as to the course of action to be followed. Such Commission is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory functions. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. The mere fact that the procedure adopted by the Commission is of a legal character and it has the power to administer oath will not clothe it with the status of Court. That being so, in our view, the Commission appointed under the 1952 Act is not a Court for the purposes of Contempt of Courts Act even though it is headed by a sitting Supreme Court Judge. Moreover, Section 10A of the 1952 Act leaves no matter of doubt that the High Court has been conferred with the power to take cognizance of the complaint in respect of the acts calculated to bring the Commission or any member thereof into disrepute. Section 10A provides the power of constructive contempt to the Commission by making a reference to the High Court with a right of appeal to this Court. Our answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative."

16. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil vs. Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi & others, reported in AIR 1987 27 SC 294. In the said decision, their Lordships have held as under:

"35. It was submitted that in view of the infirmities of the affidavit of Dr. Mishra upon which the original petitioner, Dr. Mahesh Madhav Gosavi based his own petition was of such an unreliable credience that the courts should not have entertained the application. The Division Bench was unable to accept that position. We are in agreement with the Division Bench.
36. The allegations made in the petition disclose a lamentable state of affairs in one of the premier universities of India. The petitioner might have moved in his private interest but enquiry into the conduct of the examiners of the Bombay University in one Of the highest medical degrees was a matter of public interest. Such state of affairs having been brought to the notice of the court, it was the duty of the court to the public that the truth and the validity of the allegations made be inquired into. It was in furtherance of public interest that an enquiry into the state of affairs of public institution becomes necessary and private litigation assumes the character of public interest litigation and such an enquiry cannot be avoided if it is necessary and essential for the administration of justice."

17. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ratanlal vs. Prahlad Jat and others, reported in (2017) 9 SCC 340. In the said judgment, their Lordships have held as under:

8. In Black's Law Dictionary, the meaning assigned to the term 'locus standi' is 'the right to bring an action or to be heard in a given forum'. One of the meanings assigned to the term 'locus standi' in Law Lexicon of Sri P.Ramanatha Aiyar, is 'a right of appearance in a Court of justice'. The traditional view of locus standi has been that the person who is aggrieved or affected has the standing before the court, that is to say, he only has a right to move the court for seeking justice. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the 28 Court has undergone a sea change with the development of constitutional law in India and the Constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dislodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds.

It is now well-settled that if the person is found to be not merely a stranger to the case, he cannot be non- suited on the ground of his not having locus standi.

9. However, criminal trial is conducted largely by following the procedure laid down in Cr.P.C. Locus standi of the complaint is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. Anyone can set the criminal law in motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. This general principle is founded on a policy that an offence, that is an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force, is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against the society. Therefore, in respect of such offences which are treated against the society, it becomes the duty of the State to punish the offender. In A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak & Anr. (1984) 2 SCC 500, a Constitution Bench of this Court has considered this aspect as under:-

"In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [See Section 2(n) CrPC] is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to 29 criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception".

18. In Shivajirao Nilangekar Patil (supra), their Lordships have held that it is the duty of the court to hold inquiry into the allegations; however, locus standi is required to be taken into consideration before the court proceeds with the matter. As far as the judgment in the case of Ratanlal (supra) is concerned, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that the concept of locus standi of the complainant is foreign to criminal jurisprudence.

19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Yogendra Kumar Jaiswal vs. State of Bihar and others, reported in AIR 2016 SC 1474. The ratio of this judgment will not apply in the present case since the question of locus standi was not gone into in the said case.

20. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the following quote from an Article under the caption "Reforming American Government" by James L. Sundquist:

"The remedies will come - if they come at all - not through any sudden and sweeping reform measures but through the gradual development and adoption of new doctrine by the elite cadre of political activist and, through them, by the public at large, which will lead to incremental changes in institutions and behavior."

21. Mr. M.C. Pant, learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn the attention of the Court to the representation dated 09.08.2017 (Annexure No. 4) sent by the petitioner. However, even thereafter, petitioner has slept over the issue.

22. As held by Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient 30 interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Their Lordships have categorically laid down that the courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a PIL. The court should also be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.

23. In the instant case, petitioner was a member of the Bhartiya Janta Party. He has resigned in the month of January, 2017. He was also the Vice-Chairman of Garhwal Mandal Vikas Nigam. In case, the petitioner was keen to file the writ petition, he should have approached this Court at the earliest. The Report is dated 09.04.2014 and the present writ petition has been filed on 11.09.2018. We have verified the credentials of the petitioner. He had a political background. We are of the considered view that the petitioner lacks locus standi to file the present writ petition. This writ petition has been filed as a camouflage to reap political mileage.

24. Accordingly, in view of the definitive law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited herein above, we hold that the petitioner has no locus standi, being an ex-member of the Bhartiya Janta Party, to file the present writ petition. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.

(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) (Rajiv Sharma, A.C.J.) 18.09.2018 18.09.2018 G