Allahabad High Court
Shyam Sharan Tiwari vs State Of U.P. And Another on 6 February, 2018
Author: Karuna Nand Bajpayee
Bench: Karuna Nand Bajpayee
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD A.F.R. Court No. - 48 Case :- CRIMINAL REVISION No. - 352 of 2018 Revisionist :- Shyam Sharan Tiwari Opposite Party :- State Of U.P. And Another Counsel for Revisionist :- Arun Kumar Tiwari Counsel for Opposite Party :- G.A. Hon'ble Karuna Nand Bajpayee,J.
This case is a fall out of recurrent errors of law committed by the trial court as well as lower appellate court resulting into a shockingly anomalous situation, wherein both the courts below have concluded respective proceedings without having any jurisdiction. But here before this Court only the order passed by the lower appellate court is under challenge in the instant revision.
The accused revisionist Shyam Sharan Tiwari has approached this court by means of instant criminal revision challenging the judgment and order dated 05.12.2017 passed by the Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Jalaun at Orai in Criminal Appeal No. 56 of 2015 (Ramesh Chandra Nagaich vs. Shyam Sharan Tiwari), whereby the judgment and order of acquittal dated 10.09.2015 passed in favour of revisionist by the Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai in Complaint Case No.1003 of 2014 (Ramesh Chandra vs. Shyam Sharan Tiwari) u/s 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, Police Station-Kotwali Orai, District Jalaun has been set aside on the ground that the trial by the lower court was conducted without jurisdiction and with such finding, the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Orai has been directed to decide the Complaint Case No. 1003 of 2014 afresh after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties.
Heard Shri Arun Kumar Tiwari, learned counsel for the revisionist as well as learned A.G.A. Shri Vimlendu Tripathi, and perused the record.
The uncontroverted facts of the case in brief are like this. The complainant- opposite party no. 2 had filed a complaint case against the present accused-revisionist before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai for alleged offences u/s 138 of N.I. Act as well as Sections-404 and 420 of I.P.C. The complaint in question dated 17.10.2011 was registered as Misc. Case No.345 of 2011 and was supported with delay condonation application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act along with its affidavit. The complainant-opposite party no.2 alleges in his complaint dated 17.10.2011 that the present revisionist was having business terms for last few years regarding sale and purchase of Peas and Lentil and the revisionist was timely paying the dues of supply of said crops. Further allegation is that the opposite party no.2 sold total 20 quintals desi peas in the month of April 2011 to the present revisionist in usual course of business, for which the revisionist paid Rs.5,000/- in cash and promised to pay Rs.35,000/- after one month but later on, the revisionist started dilly-dallying payment of said remaining amount of Rs.35,000/- and when it was insisted upon by the opposite party no.2, a cheque No.478453 dated 24.06.2011 was issued by the revisionist in favour of opposite party no.2 in lieu of said dues, which was presented in the Bank on 30.06.2011 for payment but the same was dishonoured on account of insufficient funds and when the opposite party no.2 apprised the revisionist about insufficiency of funds in the account, he abused and threatened the opposite party no.2. Thereafter a legal notice dated 21.07.2011 was sent by the opposite party no.2 to the revisionist, to which the revisionist neither responded nor made any payment.
It may be culled out from the record that after filing of complaint in the year 2011, the cognizance was taken by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate on 17.10.2011 and the complaint proceedings were registered as Misc. Case No.345 of 2011, subsequent to which statements u/s 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. were recorded and thereafter, the accused -revisionist was summoned by the court vide order dated 29.05.2013, who appeared before the court below and was released on bail. It also reveals from the record that subsequently the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai passed order dated 20.9.2014 transferring the proceedings from his own court to the court of Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai, which after transfer was registered in the court of Special Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai as Case No.1003 of 2014 and said court proceeded with the same. After recording of evidence of rival parties, the case ended into acquittal of revisionist in respect of offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act vide judgement and order dated 10.09.2015 passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai. It may further be carved out from the record that the opposite party no.2 being aggrieved preferred Criminal Appeal No.56 of 2016 on 01.10.2015 before the Sessions Court against the said judgement and order of acquittal under the proviso of Section-372 of Code of Criminal Procedure. This criminal appeal has been decided by the court of Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Jalaun at Orai vide impugned judgement and order dated 05.12.2017 whereby the judgement and order of acquittal of the revisionist has been set aside primarily on the ground that the lower court was having no jurisdiction to try the case in question and with that finding the Chief Judicial Magistrate has been directed to decide the case afresh in accordance with law after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties.
Assailing the impugned lower appellate court's order learned counsel for the revisionist submits that the revisionist being accused of complaint case in question was acquitted vide judgement and order dated 10.09.2015 but appeal against the same was wrongly filed by the complainant before the Sessions Judge taking the dubious aid of inapplicable proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. while the same was not at all maintainable; yet the same has been allowed by means of impugned judgement whereby the order and the judgement of acquittal passed by Special Judicial Magistrate has been set aside and the matter has been remanded to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate to decide the case afresh in accordance with law after providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. The reason assigned by the lower appellate court in the impugned judgement is that the proceeding for offence u/s 138 N.I. Act cannot be tried by any court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of First Class, as has been provided u/s 142 (1)(c) of Negotiable Instrument Act. The sole argument raised on behalf of revisionist is that the impugned judgement passed by the lower appellate court is itself completely without jurisdiction as the lower appellate court was not vested with any jurisdiction in law to entertain the said appeal against the judgement of acquittal in view of clear provisions of Section-378(4) of Cr.P.C. which provides that appeal against the order of acquittal passed in any case instituted upon complaint is required to be filed before the High Court along with application for special leave to appeal. Further submission is that even if for the sake of arguments, the court of Special Judicial Magistrate is found to be incompetent to try offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act, such error can be rectified only by that appellate court which has authority and jurisdiction to entertain such appeal and deal with the judgement of acquittal, which in the present case is only the High Court.
Agreeing and disagreeing both in part with the contentions raised on behalf of revisionist, learned A.G.A. Shri Vimlendu Tripathi, with his usual clarity on law and facts, has submitted that both the orders i.e. order dated 10.09.2015 as well as the impugned order dated 05.12.2017 suffer from jurisdictional error. On one hand, the concerned trial court i.e. the court of Special Judicial Magistrate was not competent to try the offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act, whereas on the other hand the lower appellate court i.e. the court of Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Jalaun at Orai was also not having any jurisdiction to entertain criminal Appeal No.56 of 2015 in view of the clear provisions of Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C. as well as the correct position of law regarding proviso of Section-372. Another limb of his submission is that although the criminal appeal in question was not maintainable before the Sessions court but fortuitously enough the eventual conclusion drawn by the lower appellate court has happened to be correct and has by default no flaw in the same, as in the wake of the conspicuous jurisdictional controversy involved in respect of the judgement of acquittal dated 10.09.2015 wherein the trial court itself lacked the competence to try the offence, the resultant effect or finding would have been the same which any appellate court having legal jurisdiction to deal with such appeal against acquittal could have inevitably given or arrived at. It appears to be a case where a right finding has been given by a wrong court. Learned A.G.A. has tried to explain that in case this Court proceeds to set aside the impugned order passed by the lower appellate court for reasons of it having no jurisdiction then the resultant consequence would be to restore and revive back the acquittal of the accused which has in fact been recorded by a court of Magistrate who never had any jurisdiction to try this case. Thus it has been sought to be argued that if this Court stays content only by setting aside the lower appellant court's order, it shall be unwittingly allowing a gross illegality to perpetuate. In this regard it has been emphasized by the learned A.G.A. that in the wake of this conspicuous backdrop of events this Court should not shut its eyes or shelve the issue just because of opposite party no.2 having not approached this Court and should in fact take up upon itself the task of ironing out the illegalities committed by both the courts below with the aid and in exercise of its suo-motu authority, as has been provided u/s 397/401 read with Section-482 of Cr.P.C. Learned A.G.A. has pressed upon the suo-motu authority of High Court to act on its own and has elaborated his arguments in this regard by submitting that this Court has immense authority to chisel out illegal angularities, irregularities and set the record straight, so as to avoid any unnecessary delay in the conclusion of proceedings by the competent court of law. Learned A.G.A. has sought to fortify his arguments on the strength of various case laws, which shall be dealt with later at an appropriate place in this order.
After considering the submissions advanced at the bar as well as record of the case, the controversy in hand appears to be such that this Court deems it proper to finally decide the instant criminal revision without issuing notice to the opposite party no. 2 as the same involves pure questions of law. The other course shall be even detrimental to the cause of opposite party no.2 as in case of issuing notice this matter is not likely to be taken up at any early date due to staggering pendency of cases in this Court where dockets are already bursting on their seams.
In the thoughtful consideration of this court the instant controversy involves following legal issues:
Firstly, whether appeal against any judgment of acquittal passed in a trial arising out a complaint case for offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 is maintainable before the Sessions Court under proviso of section 372 of Code of Criminal Procedure or the same lies before the High Court under the provision of section 378 (4) of Code of Criminal Procedure?
Secondly, what is the scope of suo moto authority of High Court under Section 397 read with 401 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure? and Thirdly, in what manner the suo moto authority of High Court may or should be exercised in the present case.
The very first issue revolves around the statutory arrangement made in the Cr.P.C. for remedy of appeal against acquittal. In this regard, there is no gainsaying that the remedy of appeal is a statutory remedy and can be availed of by any person but only in accordance with the statutory arrangement made in this regard. The provisions contained in Chapter-XXIX (Appeals) of the Cr.P.C. provide statutory remedy of appeal with opening words of section 372 that "No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force" . The forgoing sections of this chapter provide appeal against the judgment of conviction as well as acquittal, as the case may be, passed by the trial courts. The appeal against acquittal has been arranged under Section 378 of the Cr.P.C., wherein sub-section (4), (5) and (6) are meant for appeal against judgment of acquittal passed in a trial arising out a complaint case. The provisions of section 378 (4), (5) and (6) of the Cr.P.C. read as follows:
"Section 378. Appeals in case of acquittal.-
(1) ..................
(2) ..................
(3) ..................
(4) If such an order of acquittal is passed in any case instituted upon complaint and the High Court, on an application made to it by the complainant in this behalf, grants special leave to appeal from the order of acquittal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court.
(5) No application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal shall be entertained by the High Court after the expiry of six months, where the complainant is a public servant, and sixty days in every other case, computed from the date of that order of acquittal.
(6) If, in any case, the application under sub-section (4) for the grant of special leave to appeal from an order of acquittal is refused, no appeal from that order of acquittal shall lie under subsection (1) or under sub-section (2)."
With the evolutionary development of criminal jurisprudence, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its various judgements took note of the fact that sometimes the accused, who could wield influence, both political and financial or otherwise, were successfully managing to get away off the hook even after committing heinous crimes. In the event of an unmerited acquittal of any such case where the State was the prosecuting agency, only the State could file an appel against such judgment. In the wake of sole entrustment of authority upon the State to deal with such accused, the victim was very often left in a lurch without remedy either of filing any appeal or challenging the inadequate compensation which might have been awarded in a given case. Considering various case-laws, the Law Commission of India, in its 154th report, on the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in Chapter XV dealing with "Victimology", at para 6.2, referred to the definition of "victim" as defined in the Declaration of the United Nations. While laying special emphasis on the subject of "Victimology", the Law Commission also referred to the Declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 96th plenary meeting laying down the basic principles of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power. Subsequently the Legislature, based on the 154th report of the Law Commission, passed Act 5 of 2009, whereby various amendments were carried out in the Cr.P.C.. The amendment came into force w.e.f. 31.12.2009, whereby along with several other amendments, the definition of the term "victim" was introduced by inserting section 2(wa) and the provision of Section 372 Cr.P.C. was also amended by adding a proviso, which after the amendment reads as follows:
"372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided. - No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Court or by any other law for the time being in force:
Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court."
To understand the true import of amendment introduced in Cr.P.C. vide Act 5 of 2009, especially in respect of proviso to Section 372 introducing remedy of appeal to the victim against acquittal of the case qua the already existing provision for appeal against acquittal under section 378, it will be useful to recapitulate a few case-laws of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the law given by Full Benches of this court, which have direct bearing on the issue involved in instant case.
In the case of Subhash Chand vs. State (Delhi Administration), (2013) 2 SCC 17, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with controversy of a complaint case filed by the State through its Local Health Authority for offence punishable under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, wherein the High Court of Delhi through its impugned order had held that an appeal filed by the State against an order of acquittal shall lie to the Sessions Court under Section 378(1) of the Cr.P.C. and not to the High Court under Section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C.. Expatiating upon this issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that complainant's appeal under Section 378 (4) of Cr.P.C. against an order of acquittal is a category by itself. The extract of relevant paragraphs is quoted herein below:
"19. Sub-Section (4) of Section 378 makes provision for appeal against an order of acquittal passed in case instituted upon complaint. It states that in such case if the complainant makes an application to the High Court and the High Court grants special leave to appeal, the complainant may present such an appeal to the High Court. This sub-section speaks of ''special leave' as against sub-section (3) relating to other appeals which speaks of ''leave'. Thus, complainant's appeal against an order of acquittal is a category by itself. The complainant could be a private person or a public servant. This is evident from sub-section (5) which refers to application filed for ''special leave' by the complainant. It grants six months period of limitation to a complainant who is a public servant and sixty days in every other case for filing application. Sub- Section (6) is important. It states that if in any case complainant's application for ''special leave' under sub-Section (4) is refused no appeal from order of acquittal shall lie under sub-section (1) or under sub- section (2). Thus, if ''special leave' is not granted to the complainant to appeal against an order of acquittal the matter must end there. Neither the District Magistrate not the State Government can appeal against that order of acquittal. The idea appears to be to accord quietus to the case in such a situation.
18. Since the words ''police report' are dropped from Section 378(1) (a) despite the Law Commission's recommendation, it is not necessary to dwell on it. A police report is defined under Section 2(r) of the Code to mean a report forwarded by a police officer to a Magistrate under sub-section (2) of Section 173 of the Code. It is a culmination of investigation by the police into an offence after receiving information of a cognizable or a non-cognizable offence. Section 2(d) defines a complaint to mean any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate with a view to his taking action under the Code, that some person, whether known or unknown has committed an offence, but does not include a police report. Explanation to Section 2(d) states that a report made by a police officer in a case which discloses after investigation, the commission of a non- cognizable offence shall be deemed to be a complaint, and the police officer by whom such report is made shall be deemed to be the complainant. Sometimes investigation into cognizable offence conducted under Section 154 of the Code may culminate into a complaint case (cases under the Drugs & Cosmetics Act, 1940). Under the PFA Act, cases are instituted on filing of a complaint before the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate as specified in Section 20 of the PFA Act and offences under the PFA Act are both cognizable and non-cognizable. Thus, whether a case is a case instituted on a complaint depends on the legal provisions relating to the offence involved therein. But once it is a case instituted on a complaint and an order of acquittal is passed, whether the offence be bailable or non-bailable, cognizable or non-cognizable, the complainant can file an application under Section 378(4) for special leave to appeal against it in the High Court. Section 378(4) places no restriction on the complainant. So far as the State is concerned, as per Section 378(1)(b), it can in any case, that is even in a case instituted on a complaint, direct the Public Prosecutor to file an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than High Court. But there is, as stated by us hereinabove, an important inbuilt and categorical restriction on the State's power. It cannot direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-cognizable offence. In such a case the District Magistrate may under Section 378(1)(a) direct the Public Prosecutor to file an appeal to the Session Court. This appears to be the right approach and correct interpretation of Section 378 of the Code.
21. Mr. Malhotra is right in submitting that it is only when Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 was amended in 1955 that the complainant was given a right to seek special leave from the High Court to file an appeal to challenge an acquittal order. Section 417 was replaced by Section 378 in the Code. It contained similar provision. But, Act No. 25 of 2005 brought about a major amendment in the Code. It introduced Section 378(1)(a) which permitted the District Magistrate, in any case, to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Court of Session from an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence. For the first time a provision was introduced whereunder an appeal against an order of acquittal could be filed in the Sessions Court. Such appeals were restricted to orders passed by a Magistrate in cognizable and non-bailable offences. Section 378(1)(b) specifically and in clear words placed a restriction on the State's right to file such appeals. It states that the State Government may, in any case, direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the High Court from an original or appellate order of acquittal passed by any court other than a High Court not being an order under clause (a) or an order of acquittal passed by the Sessions Court in revision. Thus, the State Government cannot present an appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of a cognizable and non-bailable offence. We have already noted Clause 37 of the 154th Report of the Law Commission of India and Clause 37 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Bill, 1994 which state that in order to guard against the arbitrary exercise of power and to reduce reckless acquittals Section 378 was sought to be amended to provide appeal against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in respect of cognizable and non-bailable offence. Thus, this step is taken by the legislature to check arbitrary and reckless acquittals. It appears that being conscious of rise in unmerited acquittals, in case of certain acquittals, the legislature has enabled the District Magistrate to direct the Public Prosecutor to present an appeal to the Sessions Court, thereby avoiding the tedious and time consuming procedure of approaching the State with a proposal, getting it sanctioned and then filing an appeal.
22. It is true that the State has an overall control over the law and order and public order of the area under its jurisdiction. Till Section 378 was amended by Act 25 of 2005 the State could prefer appeals against all acquittal orders. But the major amendment made in Section 378 by Act 25 of 2005 cannot be ignored. It has a purpose. It does not throw the concern of security of the community to the winds. In fact, it makes filing of appeals against certain types of acquittal orders described in Section 378(1)(a) easier, less cumbersome and less time consuming. The judgments cited by Mr. Malhotra pertain to Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 and Section 378 prior to its amendment by Act 25 of 2005 and will, therefore, have no relevance to the present case.
23. In view of the above, we conclude that a complainant can file an application for special leave to appeal against an order of acquittal of any kind only to the High Court. He cannot file such appeal in the Sessions Court. In the instant case the complaint alleging offences punishable under Section 16(1)(1A) read with Section 7 of the PFA Act and the Rules is filed by complainant Shri Jaiswal, Local Health Authority through Delhi Administration. The appellant was acquitted by the Metropolitan Magistrate, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi. The complainant can challenge the order of acquittal by filing an application for special leave to appeal in the Delhi High Court and not in the Sessions Court. Therefore, the impugned order holding that this case is not governed by Section 378(4) of the Code is quashed and set aside. In the circumstances the appeal is allowed."
(Emphasis supplied) Although the Subhash Chand's case (supra) does not deal with the scope of proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C., but it authoritatively recognises the difference and thereby distinguishes between appeal against acquittal in a complaint case and appeal against acquittal in a case of police report and to that effect, the ratio of Subhash Chand's case (supra) has a conclusive bearing upon the issue at hand and cannot be ignored even after amendment in the Cr.P.C. by means of Act 5 of 2009.
Subsequently, the scope of proviso to section 372 inserted by means of Act 5 of 2009 was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satya Pal Singh Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., 2015 (91) ACC 955, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court elaborated the rules of interpretation of statutes to find out the effect of proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C. and after relying upon few earlier judgments concluded in following manner:
"It is well established that the proviso of a statute must be given an interpretation limited to the subject-matter of the enacting provision.
..........................
............................
Thus, from a reading of the abovesaid legal position laid down by this Court in the cases referred to supra, it is abundantly clear that the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its main enactment i.e., Section 372 itself and together with sub-Section (3) to Section 378 of Cr.P.C. otherwise the substantive provision of Section 372 of Cr.P.C. will be rendered nugatory, as it clearly states that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided by Cr.P.C."
This court, in a full bench reference in the case of Manoj Kumar Singh vs. State Of U.P. & 3 Others reported in 2016 (97) ACC 861 has dealt with the question as to who will fall within the definition of victim as contemplated by Section 2 (wa) of the Code, inserted by the Act No. 5 of 2009 for the purpose of availing remedy of appeal against acquittal under proviso to Section 372 of the Code. The relevant extract of the determination of full bench may be usefully extracted and quoted herein below:
"Having examined various authorities, the inevitable conclusion is that remedy of appeal is a statutory remedy and powers of Appellate Court under Code of Criminal Procedure is an ordinary appellate power, which is regulated by the provisions meant for appeal against acquittal/conviction under Chapter XXIX (Section 372 to 394) of the Code."
The full bench in Manoj Kumar Singh (supra) further considered the dicta of Satya Pal Singh case (supra), which has a material bearing over the issue involved in present case and concluded in following terms:
"The Full Bench of Delhi High Court, the Division Bench of Patna High Court and the Full Bench of Punjab & Haryana High Court are unanimous in their conclusion that the proviso of section 372 is not an exception but confers an independent statutory right of appeal to a 'victim', hence, no leave to appeal is required as provided under section 378 of the Code. This particular conclusion, that has been arrived at, has been specifically overruled by the Apex Court in the case of Satya Pal Singh vs. State of M.P. & others reported in 2015 CrLJ 4929 SC by holding that the proviso to Section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its main enactment i.e. Section 372 and together with sub-section (3) of Section 378 of the Code otherwise the substantive provision of Section 372 of the Code would be rendered nugatory, as it clearly provides that no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided by the Code. Consequently, in view of dictum of Apex Court in Satya Pal Singh (supra), the legal position stands clarified that proviso of Section 372 is an exception to its main provision and cannot be construed as an independent statutory right in complete detachment with main statutory arrangement. In the said case the deceased's father had preferred appeal."
(Emphasis supplied) In a recent judgment of full bench of this Court dated 19.01.2018 passed in Criminal Misc. Application U/S 372 Cr.P.C. (Leave to Appeal) No. - 351 of 2017 " Mast Ram Tiwari vs. State of U.P. & 3 Ors.", while considering the question as to whether the limitation for filing an appeal at the instance of the victim or the first informant is 60 days from the date of acquittal as laid down under Section 378 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'CrPC') or 90 days, the full bench (presided by Hon'ble the Chief Justice) has elaborately considered the above noted pronouncement of Hon'ble Supreme Court given in Satya Pal Singh case (supra). It may be useful to reproduce the relevant part of the judgment of full bench, which is as follows:
"The Supreme Court in Satya Pal Singh (supra), in the backdrop of the legislative history and the language employed in Section 372 and Section 378 of CrPC, considered the question whether there is a need for the victim, in terms of definition under Section 2(wa), to seek the leave of the High Court, as required under sub-section (3) of Section 378 of CrPC, to prefer an appeal under the proviso to Section 372.
.............................
..............................
It is clear from the observations made by the Supreme Court in Lalu Prasad Yadav, that though sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 378 deal with appeal in case of acquittal by the State Government or the Central Government for which leave of the High Court is made mandatory under sub-section (3), having regard to the language employed in Section 372 in particular, the opening sentence, i.e. "no appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force." The Supreme Court in Satya Pal Singh observed that even a victim when desires to challenge the order of acquittal in exercise of his rights conferred under the proviso to Section 372, leave of the High Court as contemplated under sub-section (3) is necessary. Thus, it appears that the proviso added to Section 372 requires to be read with the provisions contained in Section 378." (Emphasis supplied) In totality of discussion, the Full Bench of this Court has held that the proviso of a statute must be given an interpretation limited to the subject-matter of the enacting provision. A proviso ordinarily is but a proviso, although the golden rule is to read the whole section, inclusive of the proviso, in such manner that they mutually throw light on each other and result in a harmonious construction and hence, the proviso to section 372 of Cr.P.C. must be read along with its main enactment i.e., section 372 itself and together with subsection (3) to section 378 of Cr.P.C.
The issue of reconsideration of the dicta of Satya Pal Singh's case (supra) has also been negated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment dated 11.04.2017 passed in Roopendra Singh vs. State of Tripura & Anr. reported in 2017 CrLJ 2826, wherein the conclusion of High Court of Tripura was in question, according to which it was held that there was an unfettered right conferred upon the victim by Section 372 Cr. P.C. and leave was not required for the victim to file such appeal and consequently, there was no necessity for converting the appeal to one under Section 372 read with 378 Cr.P.C.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while quoting paragraph nos. 14 to 18 of the Satya Pal Singh's case (supra) has negated the issue of reconsideration of the dicta of Satya Pal Singh's case (supra) and has observed as follows:
"8. Though the learned Amicus Curie has suggested that these matters be referred to larger Bench to reconsider the decision of this Court in Satya Pal Singh, we do not think that such course ought to be adopted in the present matter. The special leave petition has been pending in this Court for last 5 years. In any case, in the present matter the victim had preferred an application to treat the appeal initially filed under Section 372 to be one under Section 372 read with Section 378 Cr.P.C. Though the High Court observed that no such leave was necessary, the matter now assumes different complexion in the light of the decision in Satya Pal Singh."
Although the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Satya Pal Singh's case (supra) as well as Full Benches of this court in Manoj Kumar Singh (supra) and Mast Ram Tiwari (Supra) have deliberated upon the effect of proviso of section 372 of Cr.P.C. in different contexts but what has been expounded therein, in relation to the principles for interpretation of statute especially in reference to the proviso to Section 372 read with section 378 of Cr.P.C., is equally applicable in the case of interpretation regarding applicability of the proviso to Section 372 in reference to Section 378 (4) of Cr.P.C.
The overall view of these provisions of law, the background of amendments carried out in the Cr.P.C. as well as the position of law clarified by Hon'ble Supreme Court and Full Benches of this court makes it amply clear that the remedy of appeal against acquittal under proviso of section 372 and under section 378 (4) are apparently meant to provide for and deal with altogether different situations and thereby serve different purposes. In fact the proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C. has been introduced in order to arm an unarmed class of persons with the power and right to file an appeal if they are feeling aggrieved by the judgment of acquittal. In matters where State was the prosecuting agency, it was only the State agencies which had the right to file appeal against acquittal while the more proximately affected party, the victim himself had no say in the matter and who was simply compelled to resign to his fate and get reconciled to the unfavourable decision made by the State authorities in this regard. The amendment in Section 372 Cr.P.C. has simply introduced a new class of persons, the victims of offence, who have been empowered and have been conferred with the right to file appeal against undesirable acquittals. So far as the acquittal in complaint cases is concerned, the legislature had already provided the remedy, and the complainant was already having this right to file appeal in the High Court. The methodology, the legal modalities and the procedure with regard to complaint cases were already pre-existing in Statute book in great detail. The period of limitation, necessity to obtain leave and the higher judicial forum in the nature of the High Court itself had already been provided by the legislature in its wisdom. The amendment in Section 372 Cr.P.C. was supposed only to augment the class of persons who could file the appeal and not to mitigate the detailed procedure that was already existing with regard to appeals against acquittal in complaint cases. So far as appeal against judgment of acquittal passed in a trial arising out a complaint case especially under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 is concerned, the complainant of complaint case under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 has a conspicuous nature or to say a peculiar different position, as he enjoys the status of complainant and victim both at the same time. In this context, the provisions of Section-142(1)(a) of the Negotiable Instrument Act needs reference, wherein it has been provided that "no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may, the holder in due course of the cheque.". If a person having such status is permitted to choose the remedy according to his wish, the result may be catastrophic on various counts, as it may lead to by-passing the already existing provision of section 378 (4), (5) and (6) of the Cr.P.C. and would lead to great uncertainty regarding the forum of statutory remedy to be availed regarding appeal against acquittal. The principles of interpretation guide this court to observe that whenever the court is called upon to provide solution for the dichotomy between two provisions of law, the court must lean towards such harmonious interpretation, which permits those two provisions of law coexist to serve the intention of legislature. In this view of the matter, it may also be seen that introducing the right of "victim" of crime in question to appeal against acquittal by means of Act 5 of 2009 is an old remedy of appeal bestowed upon a new class of persons under proviso of section 372 Cr.P.C. without at all disturbing the already existing remedy of appeal against acquittal under section 378 Cr.P.C. as a whole. In fact, this recognition of right of the "victim" for the purpose of enabling him to appeal against acquittal does not appear to be in derogation but in addition to the already existing remedy of appeal against acquittal under section 378 as a whole. The provisions of section 378 (4), (5) and (6) of the Cr.P.C. stand beside the matters arising out of police report cases, as the same relate to and with the complaint cases, where the complainant drives and is in-charge of prosecution against the alleged accused from the very threshold. If that is so, and the court has reason to hold that it is so, the newly inserted additional remedy of appeal under proviso of Section 372 Cr.P.C. can not be interpreted so as to disturb or surpass much less than to mutilate the already existing statutory arrangement provided by Section 378 of Cr.P.C. which deals with the independent separate category of complaint cases.
In view of above discussion in respect of the first issue framed herein before, the Court is of the view that the appeal against any judgment of acquittal passed in a trial arising out a complaint case for offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 is not maintainable before the Sessions Court under proviso of section 372 of Code of Criminal Procedure and the right to file such appeal falls only under the provision of section 378 (4) of Code of Criminal Procedure.
To deal with the second issue framed herein before as to what is the scope of suo moto authority of High Court under Section 397 read with 401 and 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, it may be useful to recapitulate the language used in these sections. Sub-section (1) of Section 397 is as follows:
"397. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.--
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding. Sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond pending the examination of the record."
Like-wise, Sub-section (1) of Section 401 is as follows:
"401. High Court's powers of revision.
(1) In the case of any proceeding the record of which has been called for by itself or which otherwise comes to its knowledge, the High Court may, in its discretion, exercise any of the powers conferred on a Court of Appeal by sections 386, 389, 390 and 391 or on a Court of Session by section 307 and, when the Judges composing the Court of revision are equally divided in opinion, the case shall be disposed of in the manner provided by section 392."
To appreciate the Suo Motu revisional power of High Court inherently inbuilt under above quoted provisions of law, a brief survey of a few representative judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court may be conducive, wherein various instances of Suo Motu revisional power of High Court have been examined and the law in this regard has been expatiated upon.
In the case of Cricket Association of Bengal vs. State of West Bengal, 1971 (3) SCC 239, a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, on the basis of news paper report, issued suo motu Rule (Criminal Revision under the authority of section 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.C.) to the complainant and accused persons of the criminal case to show cause why the orders discharging the accused persons should not be set aside and after hearing the parties, the High Court reversed the orders passed by the Magistrate, discharging the accused. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while examining the correctness of said judgment, set aside the judgment for certain other reasons but recognised the suo motu authority of High Court and observed in following terms: -
16. We accordingly hold that the Division Bench was not justified in interfering with the orders dated March 20, and June 8, 1967 passed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate, in the circumstances of this case. We, however, make it clear that we have no doubt that in proper cases the High Court can take action suo motu against the orders passed by the subordinate Courts without being moved by any party. (Emphasis supplied).
In a controversy regarding suo motu exercise of revisional authority by High Court for enhancement of sentence, the amplitude of High Court's revisional power has also been lucidly explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nadir Khan v. State (The Delhi Administration), 1976 CriLJ 1721 (paragraphs 1, 4 and 5), which reads as follows:
"I am reluctant to leave this matter with the usual monomial order since the submission of the learned counsel has sought to cast an unmerited doubt on the undoubted jurisdiction of the High Court in acting suo motu in criminal revision in appropriate cases. The attempt has to be nipped in the bud.
..........................
..........................
4. It is well known and has been ever recognised that the High Court is not required to act in revision merely through a conduit application at the instance of an aggrieved party. The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil, and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law. The character of the offence and the nature of disposal of a particular case by the subordinate court prompt remedial action on the part of the High Court for the ultimate social good of the community, even though the State may be slow or silent in preferring an appeal provided for under the new Code. The High Court as given case of public importance e.g. in now too familiar cases of food adulteration, reacts to public concern over the problem and may act suo motu on perusal of newspaper reports disclosing imposition of grossly inadequate sentence upon such offenders. This position was true and extant in the old Code of 1898 and this salutary power has not been denied by Parliament under the new Code by rearrangement of the sections. It is true, the new Code has expressly given a right to the State under Section 377, Cr.P.C. to appeal against inadequacy of sentence which was not there under the old Code. That however does not exclude revisional jurisdiction of the high Court to act suo motu for enhancement of sentence in appropriate cases. What is an appropriate case has to be left to the discretion of the High Court. This Court will be slow to interfere with exercise of such discretion under Art. 136 of the Constitution.
5. Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call for the records without the intervention of another agency and had kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court."
(Emphasis supplied) Once again the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Eknath Shankarrao Mukkawar vs. State of Maharashtra (1977) 3 SCC 25, clarified the law in respect of High Court's suo motu Revisional powers. The relevant extract of the judgment is quoted thus:
6. We should at once remove the misgiving that the new CrPC, 1973, has abolished the High Court's power of enhancement of sentence by exercising revisional jurisdiction, suo motu. The provision for appeal against inadequacy of sentence by the State Government or the Central Government does not lead to such a conclusion. High Court's power of enhancement of sentence, in an appropriate case, by exercising suo motu power of revision is still extant under Section 397 read with Section 401 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, inasmuch as the High Court can "by itself call for the record of proceedings of any inferior criminal court under its jurisdiction, The provision of Section 401(4) is a bar to a party, who does not appeal, when appeal lies, but applies in revision. Such a legal bar under Section 401(4) does not stand in the way of the High Court's exercise of power of revision, suo motu, which continues as before in the new Code.
(Emphasis supplied) Again in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Girdharilal Sapuru, 1981 (2) SCC 758, the Hon'ble Supreme Court indoctrinated the scope of High Court's suo motu Revisional power. The relevant observations are as follows:
5. It, however, appears that the respondents contended that the revision petition was barred by limitation. Even this contention is founded on a very technical ground that even though the revision petition was filed very much in time the requisite power of attorney of the learned advocate on behalf of the petition was not legally complete and when it was re-submitted the limitation had expired. Without going into the nicety of this too technical contention, we may notice that Section 397 of the Code of Criminal Procedure enables the High Court to exercise power of revision suo motu and when the attention of the High Court was drawn to a clear illegality the High Court could not have rejected the petition as time barred thereby perpetuating the illegality and miscarriage of justice. The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore, it is revisable under Section 397 (1), Cr. P. C. and Section 397 (1) in terms confers power of suo motu revision on the High Court, and if the High Court exercises suo motu revision power the same cannot be denied on the ground that there is some limitation prescribed for the exercise of the power because none such is prescribed. If in such a situation the suo motu power is not exercised what a glaring illegality goes unnoticed can be demonstrably established by this case itself. We, however, do not propose to say a single word on the merits of the cause because there should not be even a whisper of prejudice to the accused who in view of this judgment would have to face the trial before the learned Magistrate.
In the case of Janata Dal vs. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors., (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was examining the question as to whether Mr. Justice M.K. Chawla, the then Judge of the High Court of Delhi, in exercise of inherent power, was justified in making certain observation regarding the authority of C.B.I. for launching and investigating a criminal case and directing the office of the High Court to register a case under the title, "Court on its own motion vs. State and CBI" so that he could exercise his discretionary revisional and inherent powers to call upon the CBI and the State to show cause as to why the proceedings of criminal case be not quashed. In that case, the C.B.I. had launched and was investigating a criminal case regarding allegation broadcasted by Swedish Radio Broadcast that bribes had been paid to senior Indian politicians and key Defence figures to win the contract awarded by the Government of India to the Swedish firm for arms order. The Hon'ble Supreme Court with elaborated discussion on various legal issues quashed the latter part of the order of Single Judge whereby he had taken suo moto cognizance under Sections 397, 401 read with 482 of the Code issuing show-cause notice to the CBI and the State. However, the relevant part of determination of Hon'ble Supreme Court, which may be useful for present controversy, is as follows:
"125. The next question of law that comes for our consideration is the suo moto power of the High Court in exercise of its powers under Sections 190 (dealing with powers of the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence), 397 (empowering the High Court or any Session Judge to exercise powers of revision), 401 (dealing with the High Court's powers of revision) and 482 (dealing with the inherent powers of the High Court) of the CrPC.
...................................
...................................
128. Sections 397, 401 and 482 of the new Code are analogous to Section 435, 439 and 561(A) of the old code of 1898 except for certain substitutions, omissions and modifications. Under Section 397, the High Court possesses the general power of superintendence over the actions of Courts subordinate to it which the discretionary power when administered on administration side, is known as the power of superintendence and on the judicial side as the power of revision. In exercise of the discretionary powers conferred on the High Court under the provisions of this Section, the High Court can, at any stage, on its own motion, if it so desires and certainly when illegalities and irregularities resulting in injustice are brought to its notice, call for the records and examine them. The words in Section 435 are, however, very general and they empower the High Court to call for the record of a case not only when it intends to satisfy itself about the correctness of any finding, sentence or order but also as to the regularity of any proceeding of any subordinate Court.
129. By virtue of the power under Section 401, the High Court can examine the proceedings of inferior Courts if the necessity for doing so is brought to its notice in any manner, namely, (1) when the records have been called for by itself, or (2) when the proceedings otherwise comes to its knowledge.
130. The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal Courts - a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction - in order to correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on the one hand, or on the other hand in some underserved hardship to individuals. The controlling power of the High Court is discretionary and it must be exercised in the interest of justice with regard to all facts and circumstances of each particular case, anxious attention being given to the said facts and circumstances which vary greatly from case to case.
131. Section 482 which corresponds to Section 561A of the old Code and to Section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code proceeds on the same principle and deals with the inherent powers of the High Court. The rule of inherent powers has its source in the maxim "Quadolex a liquid alicia concedit, conceder videtur id sine quo ipso, ess uon protest" which means that when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself could not exist.
132. The criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the Courts exist. The powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles."
(Emphasis supplied) In view of above, the position of law in this regard may be summarized in following points:
The High Court possesses the general power of superintendence over the actions of Courts subordinate to it. The discretionary power when administered on administration side, is known as the power of superintendence and on the judicial side as the power of revision.
The High Court, as an effective instrument for administration of criminal justice, keeps a constant vigil, and wherever it finds that justice has suffered, it takes upon itself as its bounden duty to suo motu act where there is flagrant abuse of the law.
Section 401 expressly preserves the power of the High Court, by itself, to call for the records without the intervention of another agency and had kept alive the ancient exercise of power when something extraordinary comes to the knowledge of the High Court. Section 401 empowers the High Court to call for the record of a case not only when it intends to satisfy itself about the correctness of any finding, sentence or order but also as to the regularity of any proceeding of any subordinate Court. (Emphasis supplied) The object of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 401 is to confer power upon superior criminal Courts - a kind of paternal or supervisory jurisdiction - in order to obviate correct miscarriage of justice arising from misconception of law, irregularity of procedure, neglect of proper precaution or apparent harshness of treatment which has resulted on one hand, or on the other in some undeserved hardship to some individual.
The High Court possesses undoubted jurisdiction to act suo motu in criminal revision and in appropriate cases, can take action suo motu against the orders passed by the subordinate Courts without being moved by any party.
To conclude in sum and substance, the suo moto authority of High Court under Section 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.c. is fairly well settled and if the facts so warrant, there is no fetter on the power of this Court to regulate the proceedings of subordinate courts in an appropriate case by exercising its extensive supervisory jurisdiction under Sections 397 read with Section 401 of Cr.P.C. without being moved by any party.
With regard to the last issue as to why and in what manner the suo moto authority of High Court ought to be exercised in present case, we have to keep in perspective and revert back to the uncontroverted facts of the case which have already been mentioned in the earlier part of the order, according to which the complaint proceedings in question were initiated before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai, whereupon the cognizance was taken by that court and the procedure of Chapter-XV of was followed and summoning order dated 29.5.2013 was issued in pursuance to which the accused-revisionist appeared before the court below and was released on bail. The record reveals that the matter was pending before the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai till 20.09.2014, on which date the Chief Judicial Magistrate passed order transferring the proceedings from his own court to the court of Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai, where after the proceedings in question were dealt with by the court of Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai till its conclusion vide judgement of acquittal of accused-revisionist dated 10.9.2015.
In the law as it stands today, according to provision of Section 142 (c) of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872, no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138. In the case in hand, the trial of complaint case for alleged offence u/s 138 of N.I. Act has been conducted by the court of Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai, which had status of Judicial Magistrate of the second class, as has been clearly recorded by the lower appellate court in impugned appellate order. Chapter XXXV of Cr.P.C. deals with Irregular Proceedings and Section 461 of the Cr.P.C. categorises Irregularities which vitiate proceedings. According to sub-section (I) of section 461, if any Magistrate, not being empowered by law in this behalf, tries an offender, such irregularity shall vitiate the proceeding of trial and under the scheme of Cr.P.C., there is no exception of this statutory arrangement. As such, the error of law committed by the trial court, i.e. conducting trial of the case without being competent court of law, vitiates the trial and the judgment of acquittal has no force of law. It is, as it has to be called in the circumstances, 'nonest' in the eyes of law. However, the record reveals and it may be observed that the proceedings of complaint case in question had been transferred to the Court of the Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai after the stage of cognizance as well as the stage of issuance of summons in the complaint case (vide order dated 20.9.2014 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate) was over, hence till that stage the proceedings of the complaint case in question did not suffer from any irregularity or illegality.
But ironically enough, in view of what has been discussed above regarding the scope of proviso to section 372 Cr.P.C. as well as maintainability of appeal against acquittal in a complaint case for offence under section 138 of Negotiable Act, 1872 in context to section 378(4) of the Cr.P.C., it is apparent on the face of record that lower appellate court too was bereft of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal against acquittal of accused revisionist in the trial of a complaint proceeding for offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 and as such, the impugned judgment passed by lower appellate court also has no legal sanctity or force of law. This being the position of record of the case, the only desirable way out is to get the trial of the case conducted afresh through a court of competent jurisdiction.
In case, this court eschews to exercise its suo muto authority under Section 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.C., the inevitable result will be unwarranted delay in conclusion of entire proceeding of complaint case, with regard to which Section 143 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1872 prescribes procedure of a summons trial and in appropriate cases, even procedure of a summary trial. The case in hand relates to the year 2011 and more than six years have already gone by and in case this court postpones the adjudication of case in hand for want of representation of opposite party no. 2, it will not only be detrimental to the ends of justice but may even cause miscarriage of justice. In this view of the matter, the only way out left in present case is to get the trial of the case conducted afresh through a court of competent jurisdiction.
In totality of facts and circumstances of the case, discussed herein above and before, this Court feels that it owes an inevitable obligation to ensure regularity of proceeding of subordinate Courts by exercising its suo muto authority under Section 397 read with 401 of Cr.P.C. and set aside both the judgment and orders i.e., the impugned judgement and order dated 05.12.2017 passed by the court of Special Judge (SC/ST Act), Jalaun at Orai being lower appellate court as well as the judgement and order dated 10.09.2015 passed by the Special Judicial Magistrate-Ist, Jalaun at Orai, being the trial court. Resultantly, the trial of complaint case in question shall be conducted afresh by the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai and every endeavour shall be made by the court below to complete the trial at the earliest without granting any unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties.
It is made clear that this Court has not touched upon the merits of allegations made in the complaint against the revisionist as the matter falls within the realm of the trial court, which alone may adequately adjudicate upon the same. A threadbare discussion of various facts and circumstances, as they emerge from the allegations made against the accused, is being purposely avoided by the Court for the reason, lest the same might cause any prejudice to either side during trial.
Last but not the least; this Court must record its approbation for the able assistance which has been rendered to the Court by learned A.G.A. Shri Vimlendu Tripathi. His masterly command over the facts could be matched only by his masterly exposition of law. Such exemplary performance needs to be imitated by his fellow peers representing the State.
The Court also records its appreciation for the fairness and polite sobriety with which counsel for the revisionist Shri Arun Kumar Tiwari placed his submissions and presented his case.
The office is directed to send the copy of this Order to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jalaun at Orai forthwith.
The instant criminal revision is allowed to aforesaid extent and in aforesaid terms. No order to cost.
Order Date: - 6.2.2018 M. Kumar