Delhi District Court
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(Deceased) ... vs . Dr. Nand Lal (Deceased) Through Lrs And ... on 30 May, 2023
IN THE COURT OF SH. ARUN KUMAR GARG,
ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE-05, CENTRAL
TIS HAZARI COURTS, DELHI
RCA No. 61216/2016
CNR No. - DLCT01-000429-2012
1. Gulam Mahaboob Subhani (deceased)
1A. Smt. Mahfooza Subhani (expired), (No Lrs.)
1B. Hakim Gulam Jillani Niazi (expired) (No. Lrs)
1C. Sh. Badar Rabhani Qutbi
1D. Sh. Badar Samdani Qutbi (Since deceased)
Through LRs
(i). Smt. Kaniz Ayisha
W/o Late Sh. Badar Samdani Qutabi
1E. Masood Paraze Qutbi
1F. Habibur Rehman Qutbi (Since deceased)
Through Lrs
(i) Smt. Ghousia Habbib
W/o Late Sh. Habibur Rehman Qutbi
(ii). Sh. Syed Shabihul Husan
S/o Late Habibur Rehman Qutbi
(iii) Sh. Syed Mehdi Husaain
S/o Late Habibur Rehman Qutbi
(iv) Ms. Sayeda Mahin Jamal
D/o Late Habibur Rehman Qutbi
(v) Ms. Tahoor Gul
D/o Late Habibur Rehman Qutbi
(vi) Ms. Sayeda Bushra
D/o Late Sh. Habibur Rehman Qutbi
1G. Naeema Begum (Expired (No. LRs).
RCA no. 61216/2016
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 1 of 44
1H Shamina Nayyar (Expired (No. LRs).
1I. Nasima Begum (Expired (No. LRs).
1J. Ahmad Jahan Begum (Expired (No. LRs).
1K. Ghizala Yasmine (Expired (No. LRs).
1L. Aziz Fatma
All Resident of Dargha Sharif Mehruli,
New Delhi. ........Petitioners
Versus
Dr. Nand Lal (Deceased)
1A. Sohan Lal Sabharwal (since deceased)
1A1. Smt. Sheel Rani Sabharwal
W/o Sh. Sohan Lal
1A2 Mrs. Bela Puri,
D/o Sh. Sohan Lal
1A3. Mrs. Rajni Khullar,
D/o Sh. Sohan Lal
1A4. Mr. Pardeep Sabharwal
S/o Sh. Sohan Lal
1A5. Mr. Dalip Sabharwal
S/o Sh. Sohan Lal
1A6. Mrs. Indra Bhawan
D/o Sh. Sohan Lal.
All resident of
H.No. 533, Ward no. 5,
Mehrauli, New Delhi.
1B. Sh. Vijay Sabharwal
S/o Dr. Nand Lal
1C. Sh. Ramesh Sabharwal
RCA no. 61216/2016
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 2 of 44
Both R/o H.No. 533,
Ward no. 5, Mehrauli, New Delhi.
1D. Mrs. Krishna Soni
D/o Dr. Nanl Lal,
R/o H.No. 533,
Ward No. 5, Mehrauli, New Delhi.
1E. Mrs. Raj Rani Chadha,
D/o Dr. Nand Lal,
R/o No. 63, West,
Patel Nagar, New Delhi.
1F. Mrs. Janki Rani,
5, Munirka Vihar,
5, FS Flats, New Delhi,
2. The Union of India,
Through Secretary
To the Government of India,
Ministry of Work and Rehabilitation Delhi ......Respondents
Date of Institution : 21.12.2012
Date of Judgment : 30.05.2023
JUDGMENT
1. By this judgment, I shall dispose of the regular first appeal filed by the LRs of deceased plaintiff in CS No.96B/2006 challenging the judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 passed by Ld. Civil Judge-02, Central in the aforesaid suit, whereby, their suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties, i.e. house no.533, Ward No.5, Village Mehrauli, New Delhi and the adjoining land known as Khandar, was dismissed on the ground that the jurisdiction of Civil Court was barred under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal are that the Predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had filed a civil suit RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 3 of 44for recovery of possession claiming himself to be the owner of the suit property bearing house no.533, Ward No.5, Village Mehrauli, New Delhi and the adjoining land known as Khandar and the Predecessor-in-interest of Respondent no.1 i.e. defendant no.1 in the suit as a tenant of the appellants/plaintiff. The case of the appellants as per the plaint was that the predecessor-in- interest of the appellants i.e. the plaintiff had permitted the defendant no.1 to occupy the suit property as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs.20/-, however, since the plaintiff was not able to manage the properties because of his family disputes, defendant no.1 being under employment with Rehabilitation Department got an opportunity to harass him and got some notices issued from the Rehabilitation Department which were later on withdrawn by the Rehabilitation Department.
3. Thereafter, according to the appellants/plaintiff, the rent was re-negotiated between the parties at Rs.100/- per month, however, the defendant no. 1 had merely paid rent for a period of two months and thereafter stopped paying the rent to the plaintiff. According to appellants/plaintiff, defendant no.1 got the suit property recorded as an evacuee property with the Rehabilitation Department without any knowledge of plaintiff despite the fact that plaintiff had never migrated to Pakistan. Since, according to the appellants/plaintiff, the defendant no. 1 had stopped making the payment of rent, he was served with a notice in February 1974, whereby, the plaintiff had demanded the payment of rent, however, in reply to the aforesaid notice, defendant no.1 started claiming himself to be the owner of the suit property on the basis of two sale deeds in favour of defendant no.1. The plaintiff was thus constrained to file the aforesaid suit for recovery of the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 4 of 44possession of the suit property after serving a notice under Section 80 of the CPC upon defendant no.2.
4. Upon receipt of the plaint, defendants were summoned. Both the defendants appeared in response to the summons of the suit and filed their respective written statements. Defendant no.1 has objected to the maintainability of the suit of the plaintiff inter-alia on the ground that the suit is not properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction and even otherwise, the same is barred under the Provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. It has further been contended by defendant no.1 that the suit is also liable to be dismissed on account of non-service of notice under Section 80 CPC by the plaintiff upon defendant no.2 before filing of the suit.
5. On merits, defendant no.1 has denied that he had ever been inducted as a tenant by the plaintiff. On the other hand, he has claimed himself to be the owner of the suit property on the basis of the two sale deeds dated 31.08.1962 (registered on 21.09.1962) and 13.02.1967(registered on 27.02.1967) allegedly executed on behalf of the President of India in respect of the suit property. Defendant no.1 has thus prayed for dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff with costs.
6. On the other hand, defendant no.2 has objected to the maintainability of the aforesaid suit on account of non-service of notice under Section 80 CPC by the plaintiff upon defendant no.2 and on the ground of limitation. Besides, according to defendant no.2, not only the suit of the plaintiff was without any cause of action but the same was even not properly valued for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction. Defendant no.2 has also disputed the jurisdiction of Civil Court to adjudicate the aforesaid suit of RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 5 of 44the plaintiff in view of the bar under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 and under Section 36 of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. It has been alleged in the written statement by defendant no.2 that the suit property belonged to the evacuee viz. Sh. Mohd. Ishaq and Gulam Dastgir and were transferred to defendant no.1, who was a displaced person, by the managing officer vide Order dated 18.05.1966.
7. Separate replications to the aforesaid written statements were thereafter filed by the plaintiff, wherein, he has reiterated the averments made in the plaint and has denied the contrary averments made by the defendants in their respective written statements.
8. After completion of pleadings of the parties, six issues were settled by Ld. Trial Court vide Order dated 07.11.1978 including the issue on the point of jurisdiction of Civil Court to try the suit in view of admission in the plaint that the suit properties were declared as evacuee property and were sold to defendant no.1. Appellants/plaintiff have thereafter examined as many as 7 witnesses, whereas, defendant no.1 had examined two witnesses. No witness was examined on behalf of defendant no.2 and accordingly right of defendant no.2 to lead evidence in its defence was closed.
9. Subsequently, after hearing final arguments on behalf of all the parties, Ld. Trial Court vide impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff while deciding issue no.3, regarding jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide the suit in respect of the suit properties which were allegedly declared as evacuee properties and sold to defendant RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 6 of 44no.1, against the plaintiff. Although no issue was settled at the time of settlement of issue regarding bar on jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the suit in view of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, however, in view of arguments advanced on behalf of the parties on the aforesaid issue, Ld. Trial Court has settled an issue in the judgment in this regard and decided the same in favour of plaintiff. In view of finding on issue no. 3 that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view of bar under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, Ld. Trial Court did not give any findings on issues no.1, 2, 4 and
5.
10. While recording the finding on issue no.3 in favour of defendants, regarding bar of jurisdiction of Ld. Trial court to decide the aforesaid suit which includes adjudication of the issue as to whether the suit properties were lawfully declared as evacuee properties or not, Ld. Trial Court has relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Riaz Ahmed Vs. Union of India 1974 Delhi 151.
11. It is the aforesaid judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 which has been challenged by the appellants by way of the present appeal. As per the memorandum of the appeal, the impugned judgment has been challenged by the appellants on the ground that the same is based on conjectures and surmises and is contrary to the facts and circumstances of the case brought out before Ld. Trial Court. It has been alleged by the appellants that Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the Rehabilitation Department, during its own investigation, has clarified that one of the suit properties was not the evacuee property since the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants had never migrated to RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 7 of 44the Pakistan at the time of the partition.
12. Besides, according to appellants, Ld. Trial Court has further failed to appreciate that no proceedings under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 to declare the suit properties as evacuee property had ever been conducted by the Custodian before May, 1954 and since no such proceedings were pending on the date of coming into force of Section 7(A) of the Act, the jurisdiction of Custodian to declare the suit properties as evacuee property stood terminated under the aforesaid Section.
13. Appellants have further alleged in the appeal that Ld. Trial Court has failed to consider the document Ex.P-2, which was duly proved by the appellant, in terms of which the notice issued to the predecessor-in-interest of the appellants under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was withdrawn by the Custodian after proof by the plaintiff of the fact that his father Gulam Dasgir had already expired in the year 1941. It is further alleged that the onus to produce the relevant notifications/other documentary evidence regarding declaration of the suit property as evacuee property in terms of Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was upon the respondents, however, the respondents had failed to produce any such document.
14. It is further alleged in the appeal that Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 does not bar the jurisdiction of Civil Courts in cases where there had been no declaration of the property as evacuee property by the Custodian in pursuance to an inquiry under Section 7 of the said Act. Under the aforesaid RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 8 of 44circumstances, according to the appellants, neither Section 28 nor Section 46 of the 1950 Act could have come in way of the plaintiff in seeking a decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the defendant no.1.
15. Besides, according to appellants, Ld. Trial Court has also failed to appreciate that the necessary pre-requisite for acquiring the property under Section 12 of the Displaced persons(Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 was that the properties sought to be acquired by the Central Government must be Evacuee properties and since the respondents had failed to prove the declaration of either of the suit properties as an Evacuee property under Section 7 of the 1950 Act, the same could not have been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of the 1954 Act and hence, Section 27 of the 1954 Act, which bars the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, is not attracted to the facts of the present case.
16. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, it has been alleged by the appellants that Ld. Trial court has wrongly concluded that its jurisdiction is barred under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. Since, according to appellants, appellants have already proved themselves to be owner of the suit property by producing their ownership documents in respect of the suit property and the documents relied upon by the defendant no.1 had not been validly executed, the appellants were entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties in their favour since the suit had been filed by the appellants/their predecessor within 12 years of the date of first accrual of cause of action in favour of the plaintiff. The appellants have thus prayed for setting aside of the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 9 of 44impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 of Ld. Trial Court and for decree of the suit of the appellants as per prayers made in the plaint.
17. No reply to the aforesaid appeal has been filed on behalf of the either of the respondents and hence, final arguments on behalf of all the parties were heard. Besides, Ld. Counsel for LRs no. 1B and 1C of deceased Respondent no.1 has also filed brief written submissions in support of the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 of Ld. Trial Court.
18. It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for appellants that Ld. Trial Court has erroneously held that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit of plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit property was barred in terms of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. He submits that Ld. Trial Court has wrongly applied the observations of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Riaz Ahmed v. Union of India AIR 1974 Delhi 151 to the effect that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is a complete code in itself in the matter of dealing with the Evacuee Property and Section 46 of the Act was a complete bar to the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts in any matter which can be decided under Section 7 of the Act, without realizing that the judgments of Superior Courts are not to be read as Euclid's theorems and the same should be read in the context of the facts which had led to the observations made by the Superior Court.
19. According to him, Ld. Trial Court has erroneously read the admission of appellants in the plaint that the suit properties were declared as Evacuee Properties. In fact, according to him, a bare perusal of the entire plaint would reflect that the plaintiff had RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 10 of 44never admitted that the suit properties were ever declared as Evacuee Properties. On the other hand, according to him, in para 7 of the plaint, the appellants have merely alleged that while the plaintiff was busy in his personal litigation with his brother-in- law and could not sue the defendant No. 1, defendant no. 1 got the suit properties recorded as evacuee properties with the Department without any knowledge of the plaintiff. He submits that the plaintiff has categorically alleged in the same para that plaintiff had never migrated to Pakistan and he had not even had any idea to go to Pakistan, while, defendant No. 1, who was probably employed in the Custodian Department, in connivance with other officials of the rehabilitation department, managed in getting the properties recorded as evacuee properties without any notice and knowledge of the plaintiff for the property known as Khandar.
20. He submits that the aforesaid plea of plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint, regarding defendant no. 1 having managed to get the properties recorded as evacuee properties, in connivance with other officials of the Rehabilitation Department, does not amount to any admission on his part that the suit properties were ever declared as evacuee properties as per the procedure prescribed under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
21. It is further submitted by him that Ld. Trial Court in para 25 of the impugned judgment has only noted the contradiction in the case setup by the plaintiff in the plaint on the ground that at one place, the plaintiff had alleged that no notice as required under Section 7(1) of the Act was served upon him, however, at another place, it has been alleged by him that he had received the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 11 of 44notice under Section 7(1) of the Act from the Custodian Department and an inquiry was conducted. Besides, according to him, it was observed by Ld. Trial Court that PW1 had also deposed, having received a notice under Section 7(1) of the Act from the Custodian Department and conduct of an inquiry therein establishing that no one had gone to Pakistan, contrary to the stand taken by the plaintiff in the plaint. He submits that a bare perusal of the plaint as well as the evidence led on behalf of the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff had never admitted the receipt of any notice under Section 7(1) from the Custodian Department in respect of the suit property bearing no. 533, Ward no. 5, Mehrauli, New Delhi and had alleged that a notice under Section 7(1) of the Act was received by him from the Custodian Department merely in respect of the Khandar and even the said notice was discharged by the Assistant Custodian vide order dated 29.03.1957 while holding the aforesaid property to be non- evacuee property.
22. He submits that Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that no document whatsoever was produced either by the defendants or by the witness examined by them in support of their case from Evacuee Property Cell of the Land and Building Department, Union of India indicating that any inquiry under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was ever conducted by the Custodian Department in respect of either of the properties, other than the inquiry as alleged by the plaintiff in his plaint, leading to declaration of either of the suit properties as evacuee property. He further submits that Ld. Trial Court has wrongly placed the onus, to prove that the suit properties were never declared as evacuee properties, upon the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 12 of 44plaintiff, whereas, it was incumbent upon the defendants to prove that the suit properties were declared as evacuee properties by the comptetent authority under the provisions of Section 7 of Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
23. Since, according to him, the defendants have failed to lead any evidence of the aforesaid fact and rather it was admitted by DW1 during his evidence that no notice, other than the notice Mark A-1 under Section 7(1) of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, or any order declaring the suit properties as the evacuee properties were available on records produced by him, the sale deeds relied upon by defendant no. 1 as a proof of his ownership over the suit properties were nullity, more so, when the defendants have also failed to produce any notification in terms of Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954.
24. Under the aforesaid circumstances, according to him, since no order under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, declaring either of the suit properties as evacuee properties, had ever been passed by the competent authority under the aforesaid Act of 1950, there was no occasion for Ld. Trial Court to hold that the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court, to entertain and adjudicate the suit of plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit properties, was barred either in terms of Section 28 or in terms of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
25. He has thus prayed for setting aside of the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 passed by Ld. Trial Court.
26. On the other hand, Ld. Counsels for Respondents have supported the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 13 of 44of Ld. Trial Court, while pointing out various contradictions as well as vagueness in the pleadings of the plaintiff in his plaint. Ld. Counsels for Respondents have relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab v. Jafran Begum AIR 1968 SC 169 to contend that since the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 is a complete code in itself in the matter of dealing with the evacuee property, it was not open for Ld. Trial Court to entertain or decide the issue with regard to legality or validity of orders passed by the authorities exercising powers under 1950 Act and the declaration made by an officer exercising powers under the aforesaid Act could not be called in question in any Civil Court.
27. Ld. Counsel for Respondents no. 1B and 1C has further relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in Ghanchi Pirbhai Kala (Decd) Through his heirs Adam Pirbhai & Ors. v. Meghamal Sirumal Rajkot 1989(1) Gujarat Law Reporter 183 to contend that the plea regarding any declaration under the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, declaring any property to be evacuee property, being not in accordance with law on account of non-compliance with the basic requirements before making the declaration under Section 7 could not be raised in a Civil Court. So far as the Order dated 29.03.1957 of the Assistant Custodian Sh. Lakshmi Das, which was tendered by the plaintiff as Ex. P-2 in his evidence and proved through witness from Rehabilitation Department, is concerned, it is alleged by Ld. Counsel for Respondent no. 1B and 1C that the same does not relate to the suit properties, in as much as, no municipal number of the suit properties had been given in the aforesaid order and even the description of the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 14 of 44properties, which were the subject matter of the aforesaid order, does not match with the description of the suit properties.
28. It is further submitted by him that no exceptional circumstances have been shown by the plaintiff which would include violation of the principles of natural justice before notifying the suit properties as Evacuee Properties. Admission of PW1, during his evidence, regarding receipt of notice by him under Section 7(1) of the 1950 Act from the Custodian Department and regarding conduct of inquiry in respect of the suit properties, according to him, besides admission of plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint regarding declaration of the suit properties as evacuee properties, completely bars the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court to entertain the suit for recovery of possession and hence the suit of the plaintiff has been rightly dismissed by Ld. Trial court.
29. Arguments were also addressed by Ld. Counsel for Respondents no, 1B and 1C on other issues, which have not been decided by Ld. Trial Court in view of its findings on issue no. 3 regarding bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the aforesaid suit, however, this Court does not deem it appropriate to deal with the same at this stage and the same shall be dealt with only after adjudication of the issue as to whether issue no. 3 has or has not been rightly decided by Ld. Trial Court through the impugned judgment.
30. I have heard the submissions made on behalf of the parties and have also carefully gone through the entire material available on record, including the judgments relied upon by Ld. Counsels for parties.
31. At the outset, I would like to note that Ld. Trial Court RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 15 of 44appears to have swayed by the observations of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in para 8 of the judgment reported as Riaz Ahmad v. Union of India AIR 1974 Delhi 151, wherein, Hon'ble Delhi High Court while referring to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab v. Jafran Begum AIR 1968 SC 169 has observed that the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 was a complete code in itself in the matter of dealing with the evacuee property and the question, whether a particular person had or had not become evacuee and whether the property in dispute belongs to him, had to be decided by the Custodian under Section 7 of the Act while Section 46 of the Act was a complete bar to the jurisdiction of Civil and Revenue Courts in any matter which can be decided under Section 7 of the Act which stood reinforced by the provisions contained in Section 4(1) of the Act which overrode Section 9 of the CPC.
32. Although, there can be no dispute about the aforesaid propositions of law laid down in para No. 8 of the aforesaid judgment by Hon'ble Delhi High Court, however, in my considered opinion, Ld. Trial Court has failed to appreciate that the aforesaid observations were not applicable to the facts of the present case, which are altogether different from the facts of the case before Hon'ble Delhi High Court. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment would show that there was no dispute in the aforesaid case before Hon'ble Delhi High Court regarding declaration of the property, which was subject matter of the aforesaid case, by the custodian of the evacuee property as an evacuee property. The only objection of the petitioners to the aforesaid declaration was that the father of petitioners namely Mohd. Ahmad had not RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 16 of 44been heard of since 1947 and hence the petitioners were entitled to inherit the aforesaid property. It was further their case that they did not receive any notice from the custodian department to the effect that the property was being declared as evacuee property despite the fact that they had sufficient interest in the property. The petitioners, according to them, were thus deprived of the opportunity to contest the vesting of the aforesaid property in the Custodian.
33. It was under the aforesaid circumstances that it had been observed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in para 7 of the judgment that the plaintiffs had failed to make any allegations so as to bring the suit within the exceptions laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court to the exclusion of jurisdiction of Civil Court in Srinivasa v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1971 SC 71. It was observed in para 7 of the aforesaid judgment by Hon'ble Delhi High Court that though Ld. Counsel for petitioner in the aforesaid case had sought to contend that the petitioners had become owners of the property before it had been declared as an evacuee property, however, there was no allegation to the aforesaid effect made in the plaint. It was further observed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court that in the plaint, the petitioners had alleged that Khuda Baksh had died and his property had devolved upto Mohd. Ahmad without any whisper as to where and when Khuda Baksh had died. Even in respect of Mohd. Ahmad, as per the aforesaid judgment, the plaint was extremely vague and misleading, in as much as, it was merely mentioned that Mohd. Ahmad was not being heard of since 1947. Under the aforesaid circumstances, it was observed by Hon'ble Delhi High Court that it cannot be said that, Mohd. Ahmad had died at any RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 17 of 44time before and not after 14.08.1947.
34. In fact, it was found by Hon'ble Delhi High Court that the plaintiffs in the aforesaid case had not even alleged the death of Mohd. Ahmad categorically, much less, had they given any particulars about the date or the place of his death, and hence the claim of plaintiffs in the aforesaid case regarding their having become heirs and legal representatives of Mohd. Ahmad before the property was declared to be evacuee property was found to be wholly untenable.
35. It was under the aforesaid facts and circumstances, in my considered opinion, it was held by Hon'ble Delhi High Court that the Ld. Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit of plaintiffs on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the same by virtue of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
36. Next challenge by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit was to the acquisition and sale of the suit property by the Central Government under Sections 12 and 20 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 and even the same was held to be not sustainable by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the aforesaid case as recorded in para 10 of the judgment.
37. As per observations made in para 10 of the aforesaid judgment, the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit had sought to dispute the sale by the Central Government on the ground that the same had taken place on 19.12.1964, which was a public holiday on account of Shabe-Barat and the sale had taken place in collusion with the officers of defendant no.1. In fact, as per the observations made in para 10 of the aforesaid judgment, the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 18 of 44plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit had even challenged the aforesaid sale before the concerned Authorities under the 1954 Act.
38. In stark contradiction to the facts of the aforesaid case before Hon'ble Delhi High Court, in the present case, plaintiff has categorically alleged that he was surprised to know in March 1974 that the suit properties had been sold to defendant No. 1 by the Custodian Department without his knowledge and without any notice to him. In para 10 of the plaint, the plaintiff has categorically alleged that these properties were not evacuee properties as no notice relating to property No. 533 had ever been served on the plaintiff by the Custodian of evacuee property as required under the 1950 Act and hence the same cannot be declared as evacuee property. It is further alleged in the same para that if the same had been declared as evacuee property that is illegal, uncalled for void and without jurisdiction because no procedure prescribed for it had been followed as laid down under the Act to declare any property as evacuee property. In any case, according to him, he was not bound by any such order, if there is any. He has further alleged that only one notice relating to the Khandar attached with the property was received by the plaintiff from the Custodian and it was duly contested, whereafter, it was withdrawn by defendant no. 2.
39. In para 11 of the plaint, the plaintiff has categorically alleged that after receipt of the reply of legal notice served by him upon defendant no. 1, he had made inquiries through his sons and his counsel from defendant no. 2 but nothing was found from the record of defendant no. 2, whereafter, he issued notice to defendant no. 2 but even no reply to the aforesaid notice had been received from defendant no. 2.
RCA no. 61216/2016Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 19 of 4440. In view of the aforesaid pleadings, in my considered opinion, Ld. Trial Court has erroneously inferred an admission on the part of plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint to the effect that the plaintiff had admitted that the suit properties were declared as evacuee properties, albeit without any knowledge of the plaintiff. It is significant to note in this regard that no such admission was made by the plaintiff in para 7 of the plaint. The only plea which has been taken by the plaintiff in para 7 was that the defendant got the suit properties recorded as evacuee properties with the Department without any knowledge of the plaintiff. Recording of suit properties as evacuee properties is altogether different from declaration of the suit properties as evacuee properties. In my considered opinion, it is well settled legal position that the pleadings of a party are to be read as a whole and no admission on the part of any party to the suit can be inferred by reading one sentence from here and another from there. Upon a meaningful reading of the entire plaint of the plaintiff, in my considered opinion, there was no occasion for Ld. Trial Court for inferring any admission on the part of plaintiff to the effect that the suit properties were ever declared by the Custodian Department as evacuee properties by following the procedure prescribed under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950.
41. The very use of words "if the same has been declared that is illegal, uncalled for, void and without jurisdiction because no procedure prescribed for it has been followed as laid down under the Act to declare any property as evacuee property and in any case he was not bound by any such order, if there is any." by the plaintiff, in my considered opinion, indicates that the plaintiff had never admitted the declaration of the suit properties as RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 20 of 44evacuee properties by the Custodian Department in exercise of powers under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 by following due procedure in terms of the aforesaid Act.
42. So far as one of the suit properties i.e. the Khandar under attached with property no. 533 is concerned, it has been categorically alleged by the plaintiff in para 10 of the plaint that although he had received a notice from the Custodian in respect of the aforesaid property, he had duly contested the same, whereafter, the said notice was withdrawn by defendant no. 2.
43. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my considered opinion, the plea of plaintiff in para No. 7 of the plaintiff regarding the defendant having got the properties recorded as evacuee properties with the Department without any knowledge of the plaintiff were based merely on the assumption of the plaintiff on account of alleged sale of the said properties by defendant no. 2 to defendant no. 1 through two separate sale deeds.
44. Once, it is found that there was no admission on the part of plaintiff of declaration of either of the suit properties as evacuee properties by the Competent Authority after following due procedure under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, in my considered opinion, it was incumbent upon the defendants to produce any orders/declarations/notifications under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 so as to oust the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court to adjudicate the suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties on account of bar in terms of Section 28 and Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 21 of 44Property Act, 1950. However, a bare perusal of the trial court record would reveal that no such declaration/order/notification was produced by either of the defendants despite service of notice under Order 11 Rule 16 CPC by Ld. Counsel for plaintiff upon Ld. Counsel for defendant no. 2. The defendants have also failed to get the record, in respect of any such orders/declaration/notifications under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 summoned and produced from the concerned department during their evidence.
45. In fact, a bare perusal of record reveals that Sh. Vijay Prakash UDC from the office of Land and Building Department, Evacuee Property Cell, Managing Officer was examined by the defendants as DW1 who was repeatedly directed to produce the entire record in respect of declaration of the suit properties as evacuee properties, however, he could not produce any such record. A bare perusal of the testimony of DW1 further shows that admittedly in the record produced by him, there was no notice under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, other than the notice, copy of which had been placed on record by the plaintiff along with the plaint as Mark A-1. He has also admitted during his cross-examination that there was no order, other than the order Ex. P-2 dated 29.03.1957, available on the record produced by him.
46. A bare perusal of the register of evacuee properties, produced by him, further indicates that there was no proper entry in respect of property No. V/533, Mehrauli, New Delhi in the aforesaid register. Although DW1 had pointed towards one entry in respect of the aforesaid property made between serial numbers 130 and 131, however, admittedly the same was in an altogether RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 22 of 44different handwriting than the handwriting of the previous and following entries. Moreover, it was admitted by DW1 that all the entries in the aforesaid registered in respect of all the evacuee properties were having a specific serial no., however, the entry in respect of property no. V/533 was not having any serial number, but seems to have been interpolated subsequently. In any case the aforesaid entry does not bear the signatures of any officer making the aforesaid entry. Besides, in the absence of any order/declaration under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, there is no legal value of the aforesaid entry made in the register.
47. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my considered opinion, Ld. Trial Court has fallen into an error in placing the onus of proving that the proper procedure was not followed by the Custodian Department in declaring the suit properties as Evacuee Properties upon the plaintiff. The aforesaid observation of Ld. Trial Court, in my considered opinion, is based on the wrong premise that the plaintiff had admitted the declaration of the suit properties as Evacuee Properties by the Custodian Department, whereas, it has already been observed hereinabove that no such admission can be inferred from the pleadings of the plaintiff in the plaint or from the evidence led by him. Moreover, the aforesaid finding is also erroneous on the ground that a person cannot be expected to lead evidence to prove a negative fact and since it was the assertion of defendants that the suit properties were declared as evacuee properties, it was incumbent upon them to prove the aforesaid fact by producing the record of proceedings under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 in respect of the suit properties or any RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 23 of 44orders/declaration/notifications under the aforesaid provision which they have failed to produce despite opportunity.
48. Since the defendants have failed to produce the record of any inquiry under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950 allegedly conducted by the Competent Authority under the aforesaid Act nor have they been able to produce the copies of any orders/declaration/notifications under the aforesaid provision, in my considered opinion, the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the suit of the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit properties was not barred either under Section 28 or under Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. While taking the aforesaid view, I derive support from the following observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra & Ors. (1980)4 SCC 364:
"9. The main contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant is twofold: (a) In view of Section 46 of the 1950 Act, the civil court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the question whether the suit property or any right or interest therein is or is not evacuee property. (Reliance for this contention has been placed on the decision of this Court in Custodian of Evacuee Property, Punjab v. Jafran Begum [AIR 1968 SC 169 : (1967) 3 SCR 736 :
(1968) 1 SCJ 782] ); (b) The sale of the suit property has been effected in favour of the appellant under Section 20 of the 1954 Act, after it had been acquired by the Central Government under Section 12 of that Act, free from all encumbrances, arid formed part of the compensation pool. It will therefore, be presumed that prior to its acquisition under Section 12 of the 1954 Act, it was evacuee property vesting in the Custodian. The orders of its acquisition passed under Section 12 and its sale under Section 20 of the 1954 Act had become final RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 24 of 44
and conclusive. The respondents could not be allowed to go behind those orders and question their finality on the ground that the property has never been evacuee property vesting in the Custodian, because Section 27 of the 1954 Act bars the jurisdiction of the civil court to go into this question. The only remedy of the defendants-respondents is to claim compensation under the 1954 Act. Reference in this connection has been made to N.S. Gujral v. Custodian of Evacuee Property [AIR 1968 SC 457 :
(1968) 1 SCR 497 : (1968) 2 SCJ 202] .
10. Before dealing with these contentions, some basic facts concurrently found by all the courts below may be noticed.
11. Qazi Abdul Rashid obtained a money decree in Suit No. 523 of 1935 against one Ami Chand s/o Phool Chand and brother of present respondents (original Defendants 1 to 4). In execution of that decree, he purchased with the permission of the court, the share of Ami Chand in 1937. At that time, a partition Suit No. 3 of 1931 amongst the family members of the said Ami Chand was pending in the court of the Civil Judge, Bulandshahr. Qazi Abdul Rashid did not join as a party in the said partition suit. However, he instituted Suit No. 452 of 1949 against the said Phool Chand and others in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for partition and separate possession of his share. The suit was contested. The munsif decreed the suit holding that Qazi Abdul Rashid had 1/16th share in the house in question and one other shop. Applying the provisions of Section 4 of the Partition Act, the Munsif evaluated Qazi Abdul Rashid's 1/16th share in the suit house at Rs 343 and directed the sale of that share.
12. Feeling aggrieved by the said decree, Qazi Abdul Rashid preferred Civil Appeal No. 289 of 1953. The first appellate court by its judgment, dated December 20, 1954 (Ex. A-2), partly allowed the appeal and modified the decree of the trial court insofar as it related to the shop. But it upheld the decree of the trial court insofar as it related to the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 25 of 44house now in question, whereby Phool Chand defendant was required to deposit Rs 343 as the value of Qazi Abdul Rashid's share. In accordance with the decree affirmed by the first appellate court, Phool Chand on July 31, 1953 deposited Rs 343 (vide Ex A-1) to the credit of Qazi Abdul Rashid, the then plaintiff in the court. Qazi Abdul Rashid being aggrieved by the decree of the first appellate court, preferred Second Appeal No. 235 of 1955 in the High Court. The High Court dismissed this appeal as abated by an order, dated February 25, 1959 due to the failure of Qazi Abdul Rashid to take proper steps for substitution of the legal representatives of the then Respondents 7 and 11, who had died during the pendency of the appeal.
13. During the pendency of the said litigation, Phool Chand and his two sons, Gyan Chandra and Raghbur Sharan, instituted Suit No. 323 of 1953 in the court of the Munsif, Khurja for the recovery of the damages for use and occupation of the house in dispute against Qazi Abdul Rashid. By a judgment dated September 30, 1959 (Ext. A-4) the trial court decreed that suit against Qazi Abdul Rashid.
Aggrieved by that judgment and decree, Qazi Abdul Rashid preferred Civil Appeal No. 461 of 1959 which was partly allowed by the first appellate Court on December 21, 1960.
14. The trial court further found -- and this finding has been upheld by the first appellate court and the High Court -- that Abdul Rashid definitely remained in India at least till 1963, if not till 1965. Up to 1963, he was directly receiving rent from his tenant, the father of the present plaintiff-appellant, in respect of the suit house. This was held primarily on the basis of documentary evidence (Ext. A-14/A).
15. In view of the fact that Qazi Abdul Rashid remained in India continuously up to 1963, no question of automatic vesting under the U.P. Ordinance 1 of 1949, could arise. That ordinance was hot applicable to him at all. For our purpose, only the 1950 Act and the 1954 Act are relevant. It RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 26 of 44will, therefore, be worthwhile to notice, very briefly, the material provisions of these statutes.
16. ......Sub-section (1) of Section 7 requires that where the Custodian is of opinion that any property is evacuee property within the meaning of this Act, he may, after causing notice thereof to be given in such manner as may be prescribed to the persons interested, and after holding such inquiry into the matter as the circumstances of the case permit, pass an order declaring any such property to be evacuee property. Sub-section (3) of the section peremptorily requires the Custodian to notify from time to time by publication in the official Gazette or in such other manner as may be prescribed, all properties declared by him to be evacuee properties under sub-section (1).
17. Rule 6 of the Rules framed under the 1950 Act requires that the notice to be served under Section 7(1) on persons interested in the property proposed to be declared evacuee property shall be in Form 'I'.
18. .....
19. From a conjoint reading of Sections 7 and 8, it is clear that the making of a declaration after inquiry under Section 7, that the property is "evacuee property", is a sine qua non for giving the Custodian dominion over the property. If no proceeding is taken under Section 7, there can be no vesting of the property in the Custodian (see observations in Fazalbhoy Currimbhoy v. Official Trustee of Maharashtra [(1979) 3 SCC 189, 199 : (1979) 2 SCR 699, 712] ).
20. The other point to be noted is that in the case of an "evacuee" falling under sub-clause (i) of the definition of "evacuee" that is one, who on account of the things mentioned in that sub-clause, leaves India or has left India on or after August 14, 1947 (sic March 1, 1947), the vesting will date from the date he leaves India for any outside destination. In the instant case, Qazi Abdul Rashid left India to settle in Pakistan long after August 14, 1947 (sic RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 27 of 44March 1, 1947)(in 1963).
21. Section 9 gives power to the Custodian to take possession of evacuee property which vests in him under Section 8.
22. Then, there is Section 7-A which was inserted by the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954 (42 of 1954) with effect from May 7, 1954:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, no property shall be declared to be evacuee property on or after the 7th day of May, 1954."
This is made subject to two provisos. Clause (a) of the first proviso saves from the application of this section any property in respect of which proceedings are pending on the 7th day of May, 1954 for declaring such property to be evacuee property. Clause (b) of the proviso saves from the bar of this section property of any person who became an evacuee on or after March 1, 1947, and who on May 7, 1954 was resident in Pakistan. The second proviso lays down that no notice under Section 7 for declaring any property to be evacuee property with reference to clause (b) of the preceding proviso shall be issued after the expiry of six months from the commencement of the Administration of Evacuee Property (Amendment) Act, 1954. Then, there are three Explanations, which are not material for our purpose.
23. It is clear from the facts concurrently found in the instant case that Qazi Abdul Rashid was throughout residing in India and personally managing the suit property and collecting its rent till 1963. He migrated or went away from India for good sometime in 1963 or thereafter. Therefore, if the Custodian had not taken any proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act to declare the suit property as evacuee property before May 7, 1954, and no such proceedings were pending on May 7, 1954, the property of Qazi Abdul Rashid could not be declared evacuee property under the Act, the power of the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 28 of 44Custodian to do so having been terminated by Section 7-A.
24. It was for the plaintiff-appellant to show by producing relevant notifications or other documentary evidence that the Custodian had taken proceedings and declared the suit property to be evacuee property in accordance with the provisions of Section 7 or that such proceedings had been initiated earlier and were pending on May 7,1954. Despite ample opportunity granted to the plaintiff, he did not produce any such documentary evidence in the courts below. All that he showed was that the rehabilitation authorities had, purporting to act under the 1954 Act, sold the suit property to him and issued the sale certificate in his favour on April 1, 1969 [ Ed. : See para 2] .
25. .....
26. .....
27. .....
28. The scope of Sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act came up for consideration before this Court in Jafran Begum case [AIR 1968 SC 169 : (1967) 3 SCR 736 : (1968) 1 SCJ 782] . The facts of that case were that a person who was in possession of a house in India, migrated to Pakistan. Notice was issued to his son under Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, and after hearing him the Deputy Custodian declared the house to be evacuee property. Jafran Begum, who was the mother of the evacuee and on whom the notice under Section 7 of the Act was not served, started proceedings before the Custodian, claiming that the owner of the house had executed a will bequeathing the property to her and so the property could not be declared evacuee property. That application was dismissed by the Custodian. When she failed before the authorities constituted under the Act, she filed a suit in the civil court basing her case on the will and prayed for a permanent injunction restraining the authorities from evicting her from the house. On the RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 29 of 44question of jurisdiction being raised, the High Court held that determination of a complicated question of law relating to title by authorities under the 1950 Act was not final and could be reopened in the civil court, and Section 46 did not bar the civil court's jurisdiction to entertain such a question. After examining the scheme of the 1950 Act, Wanchoo, C.J., speaking for the Bench constituted by three learned Judges, laid down the law, thus:
"(Where) the question whether certain properties are evacuee pro-perties has been decided under Section 7 etc., whether that decision is based on issues of fact or issues of law, jurisdiction of courts is clearly barred under Section 46(a). It is difficult to see how a distinction can be drawn between decisions under Section 7 based on questions of fact and decisions based on questions of law. The decision is made final whether based on issues of law or of fact by Section 28 and Section 46 bars the jurisdiction of civil and revenue courts in matters which are decided under Section 7 whatever may be the basis of decision, whether issues of fact or of law and whether simple or complicated. (emphasis supplied) ... Section 46 is a complete bar to the jurisdiction of civil or revenue courts in any matter which can be decided under Section 7. This conclusion is reinforced by the provision contained in Section 4(1) of the Act which provides that the Act overrides other laws and would thus override Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure on a combined reading of Sections 4, 28 and 46. (But) ... Section 46 or Section 28 cannot bar the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
(emphasis supplied)"
From the crucial words underlined in the above extract, it is clear that even according to the rule of the above decision Section 46 will not bar the jurisdiction of the civil court where the Custodian has never declared the property as evacuee property after taking proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act.RCA no. 61216/2016
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 30 of 44
29. A Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Khalil Ahamad Khan v. Malka Mehar Nigar Begum [AIR 1954 All 362 : 1953 AWR 736 (HC)] held that where the matter as to whether a property is evacuee property or not, has never been adjudicated upon by the Custodian himself but he merely takes action on the basis of the judgment of the court of first instance, without deciding the matter for himself, that judgment being subject to correction by the court of appeal does not become final merely because the Custodian had taken action on the basis thereof. In such a case, the jurisdiction of the civil court of appeal to determine the correctness of an adjudication already made by the civil court is not barred. This decision was noticed by this Court in Jafran Begum [AIR 1968 SC 169 : (1967) 3 SCR 736 : (1968) 1 SCJ 782] , and it was observed that to some extent, "this case is in line with the view we have taken".
30. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. Clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 postulate that at the time when the question whether or not a property is evacuee property comes for adjudication, the power of the Custodian-General or the Custodian under this Act of 1950 to determine that question is subsisting. That is to say, if at the point of time when the question arises, the power of the authorities constituted under this Act to adjudicate that question stands terminated or extinguished by the operation of Section 7-A of 1954, none of the clauses (a), (c) and (d) of Section 46 will bar the jurisdiction of the civil court to determine that question, which had not been decided by the Custodian during the period he had the power to determine it.
31. Section 28 has no application to the facts of the instant case because no order made by any of the authorities, mentioned in that section is being called in question. Section 46, also, does not come in the way because no proceedings under Section 7 of the 1950 Act to declare the suit house an evacuee property were taken by the Custodian against Qazi Abdul Rashid. No notification under sub-section (3) RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 31 of 44of Section 7 published in the Official Gazette has been placed on the record. Nor was it shown that any proceedings initiated under Section 7 of the Act to declare it evacuee property were pending on May 7, 1954, and the question of saving those proceedings under the proviso to Section 7-A does not arise.
32. Qazi Abdul Rashid was throughout a resident of India till 1963 and was personally managing the suit house and collecting rent of it from the tenant. After May 7, 1954, therefore, the Custodian had no jurisdiction under the 1950 Act to declare the suit house as evacuee property. The jurisdiction of the courts below to go into this question was thus not barred by anything in Sections 28 and 46 of the 1950 Act.
33. We, therefore, negative the first contention of the appellant." (Emphasis mine)
49. It is significant to note that the aforesaid judgment was referred to by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in para 15 to 17 of the judgment in Ghanchi Pirbhai Kala's case (supra) relied upon by Ld. Counsel for Respondents no. 1B and 1C and was distinguished on facts. In my considered opinion, the facts of the present case are similar to the facts of the case before Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma's case (supra) and not similar to the facts of case before Hon'ble Gujarat High Court and hence, the Respondents can't derive any assistance from the observations made by Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the judgment relied upon by them.
50. Even the finding of Ld. Trial Court in para 28 of the impugned judgment to the effect that since defendant no. 1 had purchased the property from the Custodian of Evacuee Properties, it means that the suit properties must have been taken RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 32 of 44over by the Custodian Department and then only sold to defendant no. 1, in my considered opinion, runs contrary to the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment reported as Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra & Ors. (1980)4 SCC 364, wherein it was held that necessary prerequisite for acquiring the property in terms of Section 12 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, is that the same must be an evacuee property in terms of Section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. It was further held in the aforesaid judgment that in the absence of this essential prerequisite, the Central Government was not competent to acquire that property under Section 12 of the Act for throwing the same into the Compensation pool.
51. It was further held in the aforesaid judgment by Hon'ble Supreme Court that the necessary pre-requisite for even the sale under Section 20 of the 1954 Act is that the property must have been declared as an evacuee property in terms of Section 7 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950. If the property was never the evacuee property in terms of Section 2(c) of the Act, it does not form part of the compensation pool and hence, cannot be transferred in terms of Section 20 of the 1954 Act. Hon'ble Supreme Court has thereafter rejected the contention of the defendants/respondents in the aforesaid case to the effect that the only remedy for the plaintiffs/appellants was to challenge the order under Section 20 of 1954 Act in an Appeal/Revision in terms of Sections 22, 23 and 24 of the 1954 Act and in the absence of any such Appeal/Revision, the Order under Section 20 of the 1954 Act attains finality in terms of Section 27 of the Act and hence, could not have been challenged in the Civil Court.
RCA no. 61216/2016Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 33 of 4452. While rejecting the aforesaid contention of Ld. Counsel for defendants/respondents in the aforesaid case, Hon'ble Supreme Court has categorically observed that any order passed by the Competent Authority under Section 20 of the 1954 Act in respect of a property, which was never declared as an evacuee property in terms of Section 7 of the 1950 Act cannot be considered to be an order passed under the Act, which is a necessary pre-requisite for applicability of Section 27 of 1954 Act. Such an order, it was categorically held by Hon'ble Supreme Court, can be challenged in a Civil Court since the language of Section 27 of 1954 Act was not as wide as the language of Section 46 of the 1950 Act.
53. Thus, in my considered opinion, the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court was not even barred under Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. Relevant observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dr. Rajendra Prakash Sharma v. Gyan Chandra & Ors. (1980)4 SCC 364 in this regard are being reproduced herein below for ready reference:
"36. .....It may be noted that the necessary prerequisite for acquiring property under Section 12 is that it must be "evacuee property" as defined in Section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. In the absence of this essential prerequisite, the Central Government is not competent to acquire that property under this section for throwing it into the compensation pool. This prerequisite or condition precedent, as already noticed, was lacking in the instant case. No notifications published in the Official Gazette either under sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) of Section 12 appear to have been brought on the record of this case. Our attention was not drawn to any such notifications.
37. Then, there is Section 20 which confers power RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 34 of 44
on the managing officer to transfer any property out of the compensation pool by sale or in any other manner indicated in clauses (b) to (e) of that section. Again, the necessary prerequisite for sale is that the property must have been declared under Section 7 of the 1950 Act to be evacuee property by the Custodian or it must be evacuee property under the deeming provisions of any law which may be applicable to the case of the evacuee. In other words, only that property which was evacuee property could be acquired under Section 12 and form part of the compensation pool which satisfies the definition of "evacuee property" given in Section 2(c) of the 1954 Act. If the property was never evacuee property, as defined in Section 2(c), it does not legally form part of the compensation pool and, therefore, cannot be disposed of under Section 20 or the rules framed under this statute.
38. Then, there are Sections 22, 23 and 24. Section 22 gives a right of appeal to a person aggrieved by an order of the Settlement Officer or a managing officer, to the Settlement Commissioner. Any person aggrieved by the order of the Settlement Commissioner/Additional Settlement Commissioner/Assistant Settlement Commissioner or a managing corporation has been given a right to prefer an appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner under Section 23. But no appeal is competent from any order passed in appeal under Section 22. Section 24 confers the power of revision on the Chief Settlement Commissioner to revise any order of the authorities mentioned in that section, including that of the managing officer.
39. Some argument was made by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the only remedy of the respondents was to prefer an appeal or revision under the aforesaid provisions of this Act and that since they did not avail of the same, under Section 27, the sale made by the managing officer in favour of the plaintiff-appellant has become final and cannot be questioned in any court. Section 27 reads thus:RCA no. 61216/2016
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 35 of 44
"27. Finality of orders.--Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, every order made by any officer or authority under this Act, including a managing corporation, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any court by way of an appeal or revision or in any original suit, application or execution proceeding."
40. It will be seen that Section 27 is not attracted because the plaintiff, who filed the original suit and is now coming before us by way of appeal, is not questioning the finality of the order of the sale alleged to have been made by the managing officer. It is the defendant-respondents who are resisting the plaintiff's claim on the ground that the sale is a nullity. It could not be made under this Act of 1954 for the reason that it was never declared evacuee property under Section 7 of the 1950 Act and thus never formed part of the compensation pool. The words "under this Act" occurring in Section 27 are significant. They show that those orders which are not made by any officer or authority in accordance with the provisions of this Act, but outside the provisions of this Act in excess of jurisdiction, can be called in question in the civil court. It may be noted that the language of Section 27 is not as wide as that of Section 46 of the 1950 Act." (Emphasis mine)
54. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in my considered opinion, the finding of Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment dated 21.11.2012 on issue no. 3 is liable to be reversed.
55. So far as the finding of Ld. Trial Court on the issue of bar of jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in favour of plaintiff/appellants, is concerned, it is significant to note that the same has not been challenged by the respondents by filing any cross-objections. However, relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. v. B. Ranga Reddy (D) by LRs and Ors.
RCA no. 61216/2016Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 36 of 44(2020)15 SCC 681 and the judgment of Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in R. Ganesh Mudali v. Murugesa Mudali & Ors. 2004 SCC OnLine AP 146, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for Respondents no. 1B and 1C that even in the absence of any challenge to the aforesaid finding by the respondents by filing any cross-objections, this Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can go into the correctness of the same in terms of provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 and Rule 33 CPC.
56. I find force in the aforesaid submission made on behalf of Respondents no. 1B and 1C. A bare perusal of the impugned judgment shows that in para 32 thereof, it has been categorically observed by Ld. Trial Court that although in para 4 and 5 of the plaint, the plaintiff had stated that the premises in question were in occupation of defendant no. 1 by virtue of he being a tenant under the plaintiff, however the suit of plaintiff was primarily based upon the fact that defendant No. 1 had now become the owner of the suit properties. It was thus observed by Ld. Trial Court that since the plaintiff had sought eviction of defendant no. 1 from the suit properties based upon his title which stood denied by the defendants who claimed defendant no. 1 to be the owner of the suit properties on the basis of two sale deeds, the suit for recovery of possession was not barred under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.
57. A bare perusal of the trial court record reveals that initially the suit for recovery of possession was filed by the plaintiff on the ground that on 10.03.1974, the plaintiff had come to know through his counsel that defendant no. 1 had allegedly purchased the suit properties illegally from defendant no. 2, however, he had valued the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 37 of 44on the basis of annual letting value of the suit properties in para 14 of the plaint. The aforesaid valuation of the suit was disputed by the defendants in their respective written statements on the ground that the suit was required to be valued by the plaintiff as per the market value of the suit properties.
58. In fact, defendant no. 1, in para 1 of his preliminary objections of the written statement has categorically alleged that the suit for recovery of possession had been filed by the plaintiff on the basis of denial of title of the plaintiff by the defendants and hence, the value of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction was to be fixed at the market value of the suit properties. An issue, i.e. issue no. 1 was accordingly settled by Ld. Trial Court to the effect as to whether the plaint had been properly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction, while placing the onus to prove the same upon the plaintiff.
59. A bare perusal of the trial court record further reveals that an application for amendment of the plaint was thereafter filed by the plaintiff so as to incorporate the relief of declaration of the act of defendant no. 2 declaring the plaintiff's properties as evacuee properties as illegal, void, uncalled for and without jurisdiction and the relief of cancellation of conveyance deeds dated 31.08.1962 and 13.02.1967 and also to amend the valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction at the market value of the suit properties. The aforesaid application of the plaintiff was disposed of by Ld. Trial Court vide order dated 03.05.1997, whereby, the prayer of the plaintiff for incorporation of additional reliefs in the original plaint was rejected, however, the plaintiff was permitted to amend the plaint so as to value the suit properly for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee and RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 38 of 44thereafter, an amended plaint was filed by the plaintiff on 03.09.1997, thereby, valuing the suit for the purpose of jurisdiction and court fee at Rs. 80,000/-.
60. Under the aforesaid circumstances, in my considered opinion, since the defendant no. 1 has disputed the existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the parties through his reply to the legal notice of the plaintiff, served upon him prior to filing of the present suit, and thereafter the suit has been filed by the plaintiff for recovery of possession of the suit property on the basis of his ownership, while disputing the alleged sale of the suit properties by defendant no. 2 to defendant no. 1, in my considered opinion, it has been rightly held by Ld. Trial Court that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to entertain the present suit is not barred in terms of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1950. While taking the aforesaid view, I derive support from the following observations made by Hon'ble Delhi High Court in Naeem Ahmed v. Yash Pal Malhotra, 2012 SCC OnLine Del 1189 : (2012) 129 DRJ 546 : (2012) 188 DLT 579:
"9. In Kurella's case (supra) the Supreme Court also affirmed the decision in Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa, (1985) 2 SCC 54. In that case the appellant had filed a suit for possession and mesne profits treating the defendants/respondents as trespassers. One of the defences in the written statement filed by the respondents therein was that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit as plaintiff had pleaded in the plaint that the second defendant was tenant of the disputed plot and therefore they could seek possession only by filing an application in the Revenue court under the Tenancy Act. The Supreme Court in that case found that though the plaintiff had referred to the tenancy of the second defendant in the plaint, they had filed a suit treating the defendants as trespassers, as the defendants had RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 39 of 44
denied their title. The Supreme Court held that a suit against the trespassers lie only in the civil court and not in the Revenue court.
10. Now turning our attention to the ratio of the decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar case (supra) it is observed that in the said decision it was held that determination of lease in accordance with the Transfer of Property Act is unnecessary and a mere surplusage because the landlord cannot get eviction of the tenant even after such determination. That being so, making out a case under the Rent Act for eviction of the tenant by itself is sufficient and it is not obligatory to found the proceeding on the basis of the determination of the lease by issue of notice in accordance with Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. It is trite to state that a decision is an authority for what it holds and not what flows from it.
11. From the above, it is observed that the decision in V. Dhanapal Chettiar case (supra) is not an authority for the proposition that even if a tenant denies the title of the landlord and claims himself to be owner, he continues to be a tenant in the eyes of law and the protection of the Delhi Rent Control Act is still available to him.
12. As aforesaid, in Kurella's case (supra) and Abdulla Bin AIVs case (supra) when the tenants deny the title of the landlord and the tenancy, the suit filed for recovery of possession is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, and would lie only in the civil suit and not otherwise. In the present case also it is observed that in response to the legal notice, the respondent no. 1 denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and denied that the appellant had let out the premises in suit to the respondent no. 1.
Consequently, the respondent no. 1 had repudiated and renounced the relationship of landlord and tenant and set up his own title in the property. Therefore, the appellant had filed the suit for recovery of possession in the civil court since the occupation of the respondent no. 1 had become RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 40 of 44unauthorized and that of a trespasser.
13. In view of the above we hold that the ratio of the decision in S. Makhan Singh case (supra) does not warrant reconsideration. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case the suit was cognizable by the civil court and the impugned order was erroneous, inasmuch as it held that the same was barred by provisions of Section 50(4) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. The appeal is allowed accordingly. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside. The case is remanded back to the Trial Court with directions to readmit the suit under its original number in the register of civil suits and to proceed to determine the suit from the stage when the impugned order was passed in accordance with law. A copy of this order and judgment along with Trial Court record be transmitted to the court of the concerned District Judge with directions that the matter to be posted before the concerned civil judge for further proceedings." (Emphasis mine)
61. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the finding of Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment dated 21.11.2012 on issue no. 3, to the effect that the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court was barred in terms of Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1950, is hereby set-aside. On the other hand, the finding of Ld. Trial Court to the effect that the jurisdiction of Ld. Trial Court was not barred under the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, is upheld.
62. Once, this Court has held that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to decide the suit of plaintiff was neither barred under the provisions of Section 28 or Section 46 of the Administration of Evacuee property Act, 1950, nor under Section 36 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954, nor even under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 41 of 44the next question which arises for consideration of this Court is - Whether this Court should proceed to decide the suit of plaintiff on merits in the light of evidence led on behalf of the parties, despite the fact that no findings had been returned by Ld. Trial Court on the issues no. 1, 2, 4 and 5 in view of its finding on issue no. 3 or the matter should be remanded back to Ld. Trial Court for adjudication of all the remaining issues which have not been decided in the impugned judgment in view of erroneous finding of Ld. Trial Court on issue no. 3?
63. Although, in their appeal, the appellants have not prayed for remanding the present matter back to Ld. Trial Court for fresh adjudication, after setting aside the finding of Ld. Trial Court on issue no. 3 and they have rather prayed in the appeal for decree of their suit as per the prayers made in the plaint, however, during the course of arguments, it was submitted by Ld. Counsel for appellants that the judgment of Ld. Trial Court is in violation of the provisions of Order 20 Rule 5 and Order 14 Rule 2 CPC and hence, the case should be remanded back to Ld. Trial Court for adjudication of all the issues settled by Ld. Trial Court.
64. Without prejudice to his aforesaid submission, Ld. Counsel for appellants has also advanced arguments on all the issues settled by Ld. Trial Court on the ground that if the court is not inclined to remand the matter back to Ld. Trial Court for fresh adjudication, the appellants are entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit properties on the basis of evidence led by them in support of their case before Ld. Trial Court. The arguments have also been advanced by Ld. Counsel for respondents no. 1B and 1C on all the issues and he has prayed for adjudication of all the issues by this Court in the present appeal RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 42 of 44since according to him, this court has the jurisdiction to decide the present suit finally even in the absence of finding of Ld. Trial Court on all the issues settled in the case, since the parties have already led their evidence on all the issues.
65. There can be no dispute about the power of this Court under Order 41 Rule 23 and 24 of the CPC to adjudicate the present suit finally after appreciation of evidence led on behalf of the parties on all the issues, however, in my considered opinion, such a course of action on the part of this Court shall cause serious prejudice to both the parties, in as much as, the party aggrieved by the order of this Court in appeal shall lose its right of first appeal against the findings recorded by this Court on the remaining issues which have not been adjudicated by Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment in view of its findings on issue No. 3.
66. Right of first appeal of an aggrieved party under the Code of Civil Procedure, in my considered opinion, is a valuable right of the parties in a civil suit, in as much as, though, the second appeal can be heard only on the substantial questions of law, however, the first Appellate Court can reverse even the findings of fact recorded by Ld. Trial Court after re-appreciation of the entire evidence.
67. In view of the aforesaid discussion, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, I do not deem it appropriate to proceed with adjudication of the suit of plaintiff on merits, in the absence of findings of Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment on the remaining issues no. 1, 2, 4 and 5.
68. The present appeal is thus allowed and finding of Ld. Trial Court in the impugned judgment dated 21.12.2012 on issue no. 3 RCA no. 61216/2016 Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 43 of 44is hereby reversed, whereas, finding on the issue as to bar of Jurisdiction of Civil Court under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 is affirmed. The impugned judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 of Ld. Civil Judge-02 (Central) in Civil Suit No. 96B /2006 is hereby set-aside and the matter is hereby remanded back to Ld. Trial Court/Successor Court for adjudication of issues no. 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 settled vide order dated 07.11.1978 on the basis of evidence already led on behalf of the parties. Ld. Trial Court is directed to re-admit the suit under its original number in the Register of Civil Suits and proceed to determine the suit as per aforesaid directions. Moreover, considering the fact that the proceedings which are the subject matter of the present appeal have originated in the year 1974 i.e. almost five decades ago, Ld. Trial Court is requested to dispose of the suit by recording findings on all the remaining issues other than issue No. 3 preferably within a period of 3 months from today.
69. Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly.
70. TCR along with copy of this judgment be sent to Ld. Trial Court forthwith for requisite compliance with a direction to the parties to appear before Ld. Trial Court on 06.06.2023 at 2 PM.
Announced in the open court on this 30th day of May, 2023.
This Judgment consists of 44 number of signed pages. ARUN Digitally signed by
ARUN KUMAR
KUMAR GARG
Date: 2023.05.30
GARG 15:44:16 +05'30'
(ARUN KUMAR GARG)
Additional District Judge-05 (Central),
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi.
RCA no. 61216/2016
Gulam Mahboob Subhani(deceased) through LRs. Vs. Dr. Nand Lal (deceased) through LRs and Anr..
Judgment dated 30.05.2023 Page 44 of 44