Tripura High Court
The State Of Tripura vs Sri Mantosh Deb on 25 July, 2025
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
BA No.23 of 2025
The State of Tripura,
Represented by the Secretary to the
Government of Tripura, Home Department,
Agartala
---Applicant
-Vs-
Sri Mantosh Deb,
S/o Late Nripendra Kumar Deb
Resident of Salema,
Opposite of Bandhan Bank,
P.O. & P.S. - Salema, District- Dhalai Tripura at present
Residing at C/o Buddhadeb Datta, North Joynagar 15,
P.O- Agartala, P.S.- West Agartala,
District - West Tripura.
---Respondent
For Applicant(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, P.P.
Mr. Rajib Saha, Addl. P.P.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Ratan Datta, Adv.
Ms. Saswati Nag, Adv.
Mr. Ankan Tilak Paul, Adv.
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
25/07/2025
This application under Section 483(3) read with Section 528 of BNSS Act, 2023 is filed for cancellation of the bail granted to the accused-respondent person, Mantosh Deb in connection with Case No.East Agartala P.S. Case No.014/2025 registered under Sections 105/106(1)/281 of the BNS Act, and Sections 177/184/187 of Motor Vehicles Act.
Heard Learned P.P., Mr. Raju Datta along with Learned Addl. P.P., Mr. Rajib Saha appearing on behalf of the State-appellant and also heard Learned Counsel, Mr. Ratan Datta assisted by 2 Learned Counsel, Ms. Saswati Nag and Learned Counsel, Mr. Ankan Tilak Paul appearing on behalf of the accused-respondent.
Taking part in the hearing, first of all Learned P.P., Mr. R. Datta appearing on behalf of the State-appellant drawn the attention of the Court that on the basis of an FIR laid by one Shibsankar Shil to O/C East Agartala Police Station on 26.01.2025 the aforesaid case was registered under Sections 105/106(1)/281 of BNS read with Sections 177/184/187 of MV Act and in course of investigation the accused-respondent was produced under arrest before the Court of Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala on 27.01.2025. But the Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala by the said order dated 27.01.2025 came to the observation that there is no material for application of Section 105 of BNS against the accused-respondent. So by that order Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala granted interim bail to the accused which was later on extended time to time and as such the prosecution by the application has prayed for cancellation of the order dated 27.01.2025 delivered by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala and also the subsequent orders dated 24.02.2025, 10.03.2025 and 25.03.2025 in the aforenoted case.
Learned P.P. further drawn the attention of the Court that after release on bail the accused-respondent threatened the witnesses of the prosecution and in this regard GD entry was made and the I/O submitted prayer for cancellation of bail to the Learned Court below on 30.01.2025. But the Learned Court below 3 by order dated 30.01.2025 also cancelled the prayer of I/O. It was further submitted by Learned P.P. that during investigation the I/O could collect sufficient materials showing implication of the accused-respondent with the alleged offence punishable under Section 105 of BNS and as such the order passed by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala on 27.01.2025 was bad in law not supported by any cogent reasons and as such urged for cancellation of the said order dated 27.01.2025 and the subsequent orders by which the period of interim bail was further extended time to time. In support of his contention Learned P.P. referred few citations which would be discussed in due course of time.
On the other hand, Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta appearing on behalf of the accused-respondent drawn the attention of the Court that initially there was an FIR which was unknown and the name of the present accused-respondent was not mentioned in the FIR. Only the informant mentioned in the FIR that a private car black colour dashed against the scooty being driven by his younger brother along with his wife and daughter resulting which all the three riders fell down on the earth and his niece ultimately succumbed to her injury.
Learned Counsel further submitted that considering the materials on record only a case under Section 304 A of erstwhile IPC corresponding to Section 106 of BNS reveals to the extent and as such Learned Counsel submitted that Learned Trial Court by the order dated 27.01.2025 rightly opined that Section 105 of BNS would not apply in this case.
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Learned Counsel further submitted that the alleged incident took place on 25.01.2025 in the late night and the FIR was lodged on the following day. The accused-respondent was arrested and produced before the Learned Trial Court on 27.01.2025 and on that day the accused was released on bail. Thereafter, one GD Entry made on 28.01.2025 at about 2315 hrs. and on the same date the I/O submitted one PR against the accused-respondent. From Annexure-3 it appears that GD Entry was made by the informant of this case but the PR was submitted by one Santi Saha which shows that just to harass the accused-respondent, the case has been manufactured by the prosecution against him and furthermore before the Learned Court below although the I/O submitted prayer for cancellation of the bail but that could not inspire confidence of the Court for which the prayer of I/O was rejected.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta again submitted that on bare perusal of Annexure-4 it appears that the same was submitted in reference to GDE No.38 dated 28.01.2025 which according to prosecution was submitted by one Santi Saha but on perusal of Annexure-3 i.e. the extract copy of GD Entry No.38 it appears that the GD Entry was made by the informant of the case. There was no explanation in this regard from the side of the prosecution.
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta further submitted that prosecution also relied upon the GD Entry No.21 dated 28.01.2025 which shows that the I/O made multiple calls to the accused- respondent but he did not respond. But surprisingly when the accused-respondent was produced before the Court that time his 5 mobile and vehicle was seized by I/O in connection with the case. But on bare perusal of Annexure-5 nowhere it will be found that on which mobile number or WhatsApp number the I/O made call to the accused-respondent which shows just to build up a case, the prosecution has manufactured those GDs. Similarly, prosecution relied upon Annexure-6, GD Entry No.15 dated 29.01.2025 which also is nothing but a concocted prosecution story to curtail the right of the accused and finally Learned Counsel, Mr. Datta referring the objection laid by him specifically in Para No.6, submitted that the alleged offending vehicle bearing Registration No.TR-01-CB-0624 (XUV-700) was in no way involved with the alleged offence and the accused-respondent did not drive his vehicle on the alleged date and time. It was further submitted that the same vehicle was used to drive by the professional driver engaged by the respondent. But I/O did not go into that aspect and falsely entangled him in this case. In support of his contention Learned Counsel, Mr. Datta also relied upon few citations and ultimately submitted that rejection of bail and cancellation of bail are two different aspects and simply on the basis of some purported allegations bail once granted cannot be cancelled and urged for dismissal of the application filed by the prosecution in this case.
Admittedly, in this case the accused-respondent was granted interim bail on 27.01.2025 by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala based on the Ejahar, Case Diary and the forwarding report of I/O. The case was registered on 26.01.2025 at about 1101 hrs. So, the I/O did not get sufficient 6 time to investigate the case properly because the accused was produced before the Court under arrest on the following day. However, considering the materials on record, Learned Trial Court granted interim bail. The investigation of the case is in progress and by this time the I/O has come across certain stages of investigation - recorded the statements of witnesses, collected the report of SFSL etc. Now at this stage, we are to see as to
(i) whether the prosecution has been able to collect materials showing implication of accused for the offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 105 of BNS? and
(ii) whether the accused violated the conditions of bail granted to him?
To answer these questions let us discuss about the relevant provisions of earlier Sections 299, 304 and 304(A) of IPC which provides as under:-
"299. Culpable homicide.- Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.- Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with Subs. By Act 26 if 1955 [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death;
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
304-A. Causing death by negligence.- Whoever causes the death of any person by doing 7 any rash and negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both."
From the aforesaid provisions of law, it appears that, Section 304-A of IPC corresponding to Section 106 of BNS will attract when the death is caused by doing rash and negligent act which does not amounting to culpable homicide under Section 299 of IPC or murder under Section 300 of IPC. Moreso it will also apply in a case where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. So for attracting the provision of Section 304-A of IPC corresponding to Section 106 of BNS negligence and rashness are the essential factors to be taken into consideration. But when rash and negligent act is preceded with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II of IPC corresponding to Section 105 of BNS would be attracted. The investigation of the case is not yet been completed.
On perusal of the order dated 27.01.2025 passed by Learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, West Tripura, Agartala it is not clear as to how the Learned Trial Court came to the observation that there was no basic ingredients expressly stated for bringing the liability for commission of offence under Section 105 of BNS. However, on that very particular day considering the materials on record Learned Trial Court perhaps considered to release the accused-respondent on interim bail. By this time I/O has recorded the statement of so many eye witnesses. Now, let us see what were the contents of the FIR.
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The FIR was submitted by one Shibsankar Shil. In the FIR he stated that on last 25.01.2025 at 2332 hrs his brother Pradip Shil and his wife and daughter were preceding towards home from Agartala towards Ranirbazar by a scooty bearing Registration No.TR01AS6919. Near Chandrapur Traffic Post a car which was proceeding towards Agartala from the opposite direction suddenly dashed against the scooty. Resulting which they fell down on the earth and sustained serious injuries and was taken to GB Hospital where the daughter died. It was further stated that the black private car dashed the scooty with high speed and due to the reckless and carelessness driving of the driver with the intention of killing the pedestrians and the drivers of other vehicles. It is the settled position of law that FIR need not contain all the details. The alleged informant was not present to the PO at the time of accident. May be after hearing the fact from some other persons he laid the FIR.
On perusal of the CD it appears that to the alleged PO another police vehicle was standing at a considerable distance and the offending vehicle came in very high speed and dashed against the scooty. Soon after the accident some persons who were standing nearby tried to detain the vehicle but the driver of the vehicle fled away from this PO and also from the statements of some witnesses who were present to the PO it appears that, although the fire service was informed but as they came late so through the police vehicle the injured persons were shifted to GBP Hospital wherein the niece of the informant succumbed to her injury.
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From the technical report, it also appears that at the time of accident the speed of the vehicle was 114 km per hour which prima facie shows that the vehicle was in very high speed. Whenever any vehicle is plied on a public road in that case it is always expected that a person should drive/run the vehicle in such a speed so that any untoward situation can be avoided. From the technical report it appears, the vehicle has some extra features like auto emergency braking system which was designed for safety purposes. Further from the report of Technical Manager, it also appears that the auto emergency braking system on that relevant point of time when the vehicle was examined was found to be in off condition or intentionally kept off which shows that the driver did not take any care or precaution to avoid any accident on that relevant point of time.
Now, from the statements of eye witnesses who were present to the alleged PO, it appears that the rider cum driver knowing fully that he had knowledge that if he drives a vehicle in a very high speed in that case there is chance of death of any person. The accused-respondent in his objection took the plea that his vehicle was not involved with the accident on that relevant point of time and on that day the vehicle was not plied through that road. In this regard it was the plea that some other person had driven the vehicle. But there was no defence from the side of the accused-respondent that apart from him, any other person who drove the vehicle and furthermore soon after the accident, the driver fled away from the PO along with the offending vehicle 10 bearing No.TR-01-CB-0624 (XUV-700). It is also not the defence that the said vehicle was not seized in connection with this case.
In this regard, Learned P.P. in course of hearing relied upon one citation of the High Court of Calcutta reported in 2022 SCC OnLine Cal 3989 in Arnav Choudhury Vs. State of West Bengal and Another wherein in Para Nos.16 and 20 the Hon'ble High Court of Calcutta observed as under:
"16. Plain reading of Section 304 makes it clear that it is in two parts the first part of the Section is generally refers to as "Section 304 Part-I,"
where as the second part as "Section 304 Part- II". The first part applies where the accused causes death to the victim with intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Part II on the other hand comes into play when death is caused by doing an act under knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
20. Section 304A, on the other hand, was inserted by the Penal Code, 1860 (Amendment) Act, 1870 and reads thus:-
"304A. Causing death by negligence.- Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.""
Referring the same, Learned P.P. submitted that Section 304 Part-II corresponding to Section 105 of BNS will come into play when the death is caused by doing an act under knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Learned P.P. further submitted that from the statements of witnesses so far collected by I/O it is crystal clear that the accused-respondent committed the offence punishable under Section 105 of BNS but the Learned Trial Court without affording 11 any opportunity to the I/O, on the following day of lodging FIR granted interim bail to him. Because since the victim was succumbed to her injury and without making of the formalities it was not possible on the part of the I/O to find out or to record the statement of all the witnesses of the prosecution and later on the witnesses who were present to the PO opened up their mouth and supported the prosecution story and moreso, the accident take place in the late night. So relying upon the said citation, Learned P.P. drawn the attention of the Court that the order of Learned Trial Court dated 27.01.2025 needs to be interfered with.
Learned P.P. again cited another judgment of the High Court of kerala reported in 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 6468 in Suseelan Vs. State of Kerala wherein in Para Nos.11.1, 11.2, 13 the said High Court observed as under:
"11.1. Section 304-A IPC carves out a specific offence where death is caused by doing a rash or negligent act and that act does not amount to culpable homicide under Section 299 IPC or murder under Section 300 IPC. If a person wilfully drives a vehicle into the midst of a crowd and thereby causes death of some person, it will not be a case of mere rash and negligent driving, and the act will amount to culpable homicide. Each case will, therefore, depend upon the particular facts established against the accused. Section 304-A IPC by its own definition totally excludes the ingredients of Section 299 or Section 300 IPC. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death are ingredients of the offence of culpable homicide. When intent or knowledge is the direct motivating force of the act complained of, Section 304-A IPC has to make room for the graver and more serious charge of culpable homicide. State of Gujarat v. Haidarali Kalubhai [(1976) 1 SCC 889].
11.2. In Naresh Giri v. State of M.P. [(2008) 1 SCC 791], it has been held that Section 304-A IPC applies to cases where there is no intention to cause death and no knowledge that the act done in all probability will cause death. The provision is directed at offences outside the range of Sections 299 and 300 IPC. Section 304-A IPC applies only 12 to such acts which are rash and negligent and are directly the cause of death of another person. Negligence and rashness are essential elements under Section 304-A IPC. Doing an act with the intent to kill a person or knowledge that doing an act was likely to cause a person's death is culpable homicide.
13. Having thus reminded myself of the law on the point, I now proceed to consider the question whether the act of the accused preceded with the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death attracting the punishment contemplated under Section 304 Part II IPC. As pointed by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant-accused and as held in Satish case [(1998) 8 SCC 493], there can be no doubt that vehicles are intended to be driven in speed. Merely because the vehicle is being driven at a high speed does not show that the driver was rash or negligent by itself. "High speed" or "over speed" as it is often referred to, is a relative term. It is for the prosecution to bring on record materials to establish as to what is meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of proving everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject of course to some statutory exceptions. In the absence of any material-on-record, no presumption of "rashness"
or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur"."
Admittedly, in both the cases chargesheets were submitted, in one case accused was convicted and in other case the accused prayed for quashing of the proceeding.
Lastly, Learned P.P. further relied upon one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2025) 4 SCC 172 in Shabeen Ahmad Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh wherein in Para No.18 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
18. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary‟s resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the court room, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalising a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by 13 this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem [(2024) 10 SCC 768] in the following paras: (SCC pp. 783-84, paras 26-28) "26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v.
Rajesh Ranjan [(2004) 7 SCC 528];
Masroor v. State of U.P [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [(2014) 16 SCC 508];
Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Dethi)[(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v.
Rajesh Kumar [(2020) 2 SCC 118.]
27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P. v. State of M.P.[(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224, para 24) „24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to 14 retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.‟ Considerations for setting aside bail orders
28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive.
However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.""
Referring the same he submitted that an unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open to interference by the superior Court and urged for cancellation of the bail granted by Learned Trial Court by order dated 27.01.2025.
So, it appears from the materials on record so far collected by I/O during investigation that, on that relevant point of time the accused had the knowledge that his act may cause death of the person due to his negligent and reckless driving as it is found that the vehicle was driving at a speed of 114 km per hour which according to this Court was in excessive speed and in such a 15 situation it is quite natural that in such a speed it was not suggestive on his part to drive the vehicle through a very busy road although the accident took place in the late night which shows the knowledge of the accused-respondent to cause accident and due to this accident took place and ultimately the victim had lost her life. Furthermore from the statement of witnesses it transpires that the accused had driven the vehicle in such a manner without taking any care and precautions which resulted the accident.
On the other hand, to counter the submission, Learned defence Counsel, Mr. R. Datta relied upon one citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Crl. A. No.861 of 2025 dated 20.02.2025 in Kailash Kumar Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh & Anr. wherein in Para Nos.11 and 13 the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:
"11. Despite quoting relevant passages from the decision in Ajwar (supra), the High Court does not appear to have adverted to any of the relevant considerations in the present case; hence, the question of recording a satisfaction that bail granted should be cancelled does not arise.
13. Suffice to observe, liberty of an individual being a precious right under the Constitution, the Courts ought to be wary that such liberty is not lightly interfered. We are satisfied that there was no valid reason for the High Court to cancel the bail without there being any material to show, even prima facie, that conduct of the appellant post grant of bail has been such that he should be deprived of his liberty. There are also no allegations of influence being exerted or threat extended to the witnesses or of tampering the evidence. Material to demonstrate that dilatory tactics have been adopted to procrastinate the trial is also conspicuous by its absence."
Learned Counsel, Mr. R. Datta also relied upon order dated 05.03.2025 passed by a coordinate bench of this High Court in A.B. No.11 of 2025, order dated 22.02.2024 passed by a 16 coordinate bench of this High Court in B.A. No.29 of 2023 and also order passed by this Court on 16.12.2024 in connection with B.A. No.57 of 2023 and relied upon another citation of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in Crl. MC. No.854 of 2023 in Renjith Vs. State of Kerala wherein in Para Nos.10 and 11 the said High Court observed as under:
"10. Despite the above, is the bail granted to the petitioner liable to be cancelled because later, an FIR is registered against him? In the decision in Imran v. Muhammed Bhava [2022 SCC Online SC 496] it has been held that certain supervening circumstances impeding a fair trial must develop after granting bail to an accused for its cancellation. After referring to the above decisions, the Supreme Court in the deicision in P. v. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra) observed that cancellation of bail already granted would indeed require significant scrutiny.
11. The mere registration of a subsequent crime against the accused by itself cannot result in an automatic cancellation of bail. Registration of a subsequent crime is only an indication of an allegation or a complaint of the accused having been involved in a subsequent crime. The presumption of innocence available to the accused in the second crime, the right to liberty as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India which envelops every provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure are factors which cannot be forgotten by the Court when called upon to cancel the bail. The possibility of false accusations being alleged with oblique motives also cannot be ignored. The nature of the subsequent offence and the persons against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed, the stage of the case wherein cancellation is sought are also factors that require appreciation. Apart from the above, while arriving at the conclusion to cancel the bail, the Court must also consider whether the accused had misused the liberty granted in such a manner that it has a tendency to interfere with the due course of the administration of justice. Thus, every case presents a unique situation and close scrutiny ought to be indulged in to identify whether overwhelming circumstances are indeed present in the subsequent crime which necessitates the cancellation of bail earlier granted."
Referring the same, Learned defence Counsel submitted that the materials on record does not justify cancellation of the bail 17 granted to the accused and furthermore, referring the documents relied upon by the prosecutions specifically the GD Entries and the PR, he submitted that those were manufactured by I/O to implicate the accused in connection with this case. So he urged for rejection of the application for cancellation of bail filed by the prosecution.
The accused-respondent took the plea that he did not drive the vehicle on that day. But there was no whisper from his side that who had driven the vehicle on that day. So it appears that the accused took a different stand. In one place it was submitted on his behalf that he has been falsely implicated and in this case in another plea he is submitting that he did not drive the vehicle on that day. But from the materials so far collected by I/O up to this stage of investigation, the prima facie involvement of the accused-respondent cannot be ruled out. Also from the materials on record it appears to this Court that due to his reckless driving and also there is evidence on record that the accused had the knowledge that his act will cause death of the victim dashed against the scooty which ultimately resulted the death of the victim. So the observation of Learned Trial Court that Section 105 of BNS would not apply in this case was not a sound proposition of law and it appears that the Learned Trial Court without affording any opportunity to the I/O came to that observation, for which that portion of order of the prosecution is liable to be cancelled and it appears to this Court after considering the materials on record that Section 105 of BNS would attract in the given facts and circumstances of the case. Now regarding violations of the 18 conditions of the bail as alleged by the prosecution, it appears that prosecution could not place any convincing materials on record which prima facie shows that the accused-respondent flouted conditions of the bail.
As relied upon by Learned P.P. in Shabeen Ahmad (supra) unreasoned or perverse order of bail is always open for interference by the superior Court. The accused-respondent also could not approach with clean hands. In course of hearing, Learned defence Counsel submitted that the mobile of the accused-respondent was seized by I/O but on perusal of the record nowhere I find that his mobile was seized by I/O rather the offending vehicle was seized which shows that the accused did not co-operate with the I/O for proper investigation of the case. Thus it appears that he has violated one of the conditions of bail granted to him by the Learned Trial Court for proper investigation of the case. So as a law abiding person it was his duty to fully co- operate with the investing agency to substantiate that he was not responsible for the accident and he was not in any manner involved with the accident. Rather by his act and conduct he tried to avoid co-operation with the investigating agency. Thus he has also violated the conditions of bail. So after hearing both the sides and considering the materials on record it appears that the order dated 27.01.2025 delivered by Learned Additional CJM, West Tripura, Agartala was not a sound proposition of law regarding non application of Section 105 of BNS and accordingly, the same is interfered with and is cancelled. It is also on record that the accused-respondent failed to co-operate with the investigating 19 agency during the period of bail, which also shows his subsequent conduct contrary to the prosecution.
In view of the above, the prayer of the prosecution is allowed to that extent. The order dated 27.01.2025 is accordingly stands cancelled. The accused is to surrender before the Learned Trial Court on or before 08.08.2025 and pray for regular bail. However, liberty is granted to the Learned Trial Court to consider the bail application of the accused-respondent considering the nature and stage of investigation and the merits of the case.
With this observation, this application stands disposed of. Send down the record of the Learned Trial Court along with a copy of this order.
Send down the CD to the I/O through Learned P.P. along with a copy of this order.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
Amrita
Digitally signed by AMRITA DEB
AMRITA DEB Date: 2025.07.29 17:07:37
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