Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
Osmania University vs R. Madhavi And Ors. on 2 September, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)ALD212, 1998(1)ALT309, AIR 1998 ANDHRA PRADESH 130, (1998) 1 ANDHLD 212 (1998) 1 ANDH LT 309, (1998) 1 ANDH LT 309
ORDER P.S. Mishra, C.J.
1. These appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the Court from a common judgment in the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India raise the question whether Osmania and Kakatiya Universities in the State of Andhra Pradesh are under obligation to hold external examinations as were being conducted until the University Grants Commission (for short UGC) decided that no such external examinations be conducted by any of the Universities in the State.
2. It is not in dispute that apart from holding regular courses of formal studies there has been a system of non-formal examinations for B.A, B.Com, B.Sc.; and M.A., M.Com., M.Sc. Maths in vogue. Candidates in the non-formal system of studies were taken through external examinations for the aforementioned courses without undergoing regular classes in the colleges recognised or run by the Universities. They could prepare in their homes and appear for the examination by paying necessary fees. For the purpose of appearing in the examination they were, however, required to register their names and once registered they could appear in the examination within a period of five years. Universities issued prospectus every year calling upon the candidates to register their names for appearing in the examinations which normally held once in a year separately for under-graduate and post-graduate examinations. The eligibility criteria for appearing in the external examinations was apass in the pre-university examination or equivalent examination. Graduate level examinations were conducted in Part-I and Part-II. A candidate could appear in any such examination after a gap of two years between Intermediate and Part-I examination and after a gap of three years in Part-II examination. Candidates could appear for three years degree course in Part I and Part II simultaneously. In respect of post graduate degree examination two year's gap from the graduation was required. Universities, however, which conducted such examinations for more than two decades did not publish any programme for the year 1996 although one of the Universities, Kakatiya, in fact issued prospectus inviting applications from the candidates for registration of their names for appearing in the examination for undergraduate courses. Since Universities did not publish the programme for the external examinations for the year 1996, such persons who were beneficiaries of the non-formal education system mainly who are women and other weaker sections of the people and those who were in employment but were seeking improvement in their qualifications, thus, found themselves ignored and when wanted to know why such a thing was done by the Universities they learned that the UGC was opposed to any such non-formal system of education. Thus, aggrieved, the petitioners have moved this Court.
3. According to the respondents the distant education scheme was introduced by the Universities at the instances of the UGC with the primary object to help the candidates who were not in a position to prosecute higher studies in the regular colleges. Number of students who had appeared in such examinations through-out the country, thus, are deprived by the attitude of the UGC which has prevailed upon the Universities to give up the non-formal system of education although no notification in this behalf has either been issued by the UGC or the respective Universities. In the counter affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent-Universities and the UGC it is stated that the system of distant or non-formal education is not altogether given up but it is decided that the same would be continued after introducing some modifications. The candidates would he registered for non-formal course of instruction and they would appear for the first examination at the end of two (2) years and at the end of three (3) years they would appear for the second examination from the date of registration, and the registration of the candidates would be valid for a total period of six years. These modifications have been worked out with a view to maintaining academic excellence. The petitioners and any other person like any one of them can slill take the advantage of the distant education or non formal education facilities. The U6C in particular was not in favour of conducting examinations on the existing pattern and decided upon discontinuance of the external examinations with immediate effect and permit students who wanted to take advantage of the distant/non-formal education system only in the new format and new pattern. According to the counter-affidavit of the UGC, the matter regarding obtaining the degree in one sitting was under the consideration of the Commission since July 1994 and it was referred to a Committee for report with reference to the Academic soundness of private appearance in the examinations. The Committee headed by Mr.RG. Takwale, Vice Chancellor, Indira Gandhi National Open University made recommendations laying down the minimum standard of instructions for the grant of first degree through non-formal/distant education for the faculties of Arts, Humanity, Fine Arts, Music, Social Sciences, Commerce and Science regulations and stated that science regulations which were introduced in the year 1985 were made mandatory and they should be given effect to. The Committee also stated that awarding first degree within one sitting by private appearance was not in consonance with the regulations as there was no teaching-learning process in the Universities in non-formal distant education. On 20-2-1996 the Commission decided as under :
"1. According to the UGC regulations of minimum standards, both the formal and non-formal degree course must be of three year duration.
2. The under-graduate programme has been generally accepted as three year programme in most of the Universities. However, It was noted that in some states, the Universities offer a two-year degree course after plus 2. However, such students are not eligible for admission to the Master's degree programme.
3. It was desired that the UGC regulations of minimum standards for formal as well as non-formal education be circulated to the Universities for compliance.
4. It was decided that the UGC requirement for a three year degree course should also be notified.
5. No private candidate should be permitted to appear for examination.'' Pursuant to the above decision of the Commission, a communication was issued to all the Universities to implement the regulations. When the UGC, however, received representations that some students had already registered their candidature for one sitting graduate courses, the matter was considered on 10-9-1996 and once again it was decided as follows :
"In view of the 1985 regulations for the minimum requirements for the first degree, no University is allowed to enrol candidates for one sitting B.A. degree course from the year 1996-97 onwards. Representations were received from many candidates. It was decided that the candidates already enrolled should complete their degree by the year 1998-99. The Universities violating this decision may be debarred from receiving plan assistance from the Commissioa The degrees of the candidates enrolled for the one time Bachelor's degree programme, up to the year 1995-96 may be treated as valid. The degree of the candidates declared valid may be treated on par with other degrees of the same University for all purposes, including admission to higher degrees and employment"
The case of the Commission, thus, before the Court is that the regulations framed under Section 26(1)(f) of the University Grants Commission Act clearly stipulate that no student would be eligible for award of first degree unless he successfully completed three years degree course. Regulations which are published in Gazette and are effective from June, 1986, however, are observed in breach by many Universities. The Committee in its meeting 10-9-1996 took a firm stand as above only to achieve the aim of keeping the standard of education under control and for achieving excellence.
4. Since we are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge in most part of the judgment we do not propose to traverse all the issues that were raised before the learned single Judge. It is no longer in doubt that right to education is a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, unless the economic capacity and development of the Slate prohibits enforcement of the same. Imparting education is a public duty imposed by the Conslitution and hence it can be enforced by a writ of mandamus if the authorities fail to discharge the public duty or act in an illegal or perfunctory manner in the sense that there is in fact no performance. Regulations framed by the UGC are in the nature of guidelines and are not binding on the Universities. It is not necessary for the Universities to meticulously obey the directions issued by the UGC. Learned single Judge has rightly held that there is no provision either in the Andhra Pradesh Universities Act, 1981 or in the UGC Act under which the regulation framed under Clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the latter can be held to be binding upon the Universities, yet for the purpose of maintaining the uniformity in the educational system through out the country the UGC can issue such instructions and being a funding agency decide upon granting funds to the Universities upon their complying with the standards laid down in the guidelines. Universities, thus, can always decide on their own whether to follow the guidelines. But once they decide to follow the guidelines and modify their own system unless the modified system in any manner is found to defeat the fundamental right of education for any reason other than the economic capacity and the development of the State it would be difficult to find any defect or fault so as to give rise to a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or any other writ order or direction by the Court to the Universities. We are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned single Judge that Universities de horse guidelines issued by the UGC have power to modify the system. But if they bring the system in conformity with the guidelines which are issued by the UGC it cannot be said that they have done anything wrong or not warranted by any law of the land. Policy decisions of the academic and expert bodies are normally not susceptible for interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless they fall under the Article 14 or under any other fundamental right such as one in Article 21 thereof Learned single Judge has rightly held that the rule of promissory estoppel is not attracted on the facts of the case. It is now well settled that writ of mandamus will not issue to enforce a contract against the State which has not been made in exercise of statutory power but writ may issue to enforce a promise made by the State relying on which the petitioners have altered their position to their prejudice, in such a case the rules of promissory estoppel may apply and appropriate relief can be granted in proper cases under Article 226 of the Constitution of India In the instant case, however, by virtue of the scheme introduced by the Universities, external examination system was introduced but there was no promise that the system would be continued for ever. Petitioner-respondents cannot be said to have altered their position to their prejudice relying on the promise made by the Universities. Learned single Judge has, however, decided to give a direction for making one lime exception in favour of the examinees of the year 1996-97 stating that petitioners' legitimate expectations have been denied by the appellants and that fair-play requires that the aspirants of the existing system should have been put on notice by giving sufficient time. He has done so for the reason, inter alia, that the system was in vogue for the last more than two decades.
Learned single Judge has slated in the judgment, there is no legal right to the intending persons to appear for the external examinations. It is only a privilege of benefit that is conferred on them to enable them to appear for such examinations. He has, however, proceeded to add, "At the same time it has to be seen that the very purpose of external examination system is to help the weaker sections women and other employed persons who cannot afford to go to regular colleges and it must be said that the scheme was introduced in public interest. When such a scheme is sought to be taken away and substituted by another modified scheme, in all fairness, the respondents ought to follow the principle of fairplay in action and should have given sufficient notice to the public before switching over to modified method to enable the aspirants to work out their respective alternative modes. An administrative order involving civil consequences must be made consistenlly with the rule expressed in the Latin Maxim audi alteram partem. Even in purely administrative decisions duty is enjoined upon the State to act fairly consistent wilh the rule of natural justice. When such decisions affect one's personal right, property rights or the loss of or prejudicially affect something which would juridically called at least a privilege. (See: Neelima Mishra v. Harinder Kaur Paintal, . By dispensing with external examination system and bringing into effect the modified scheme all of a sudden, in my considered view, the respondents have denied the legitimate expectations of the petitioners. Though the convention or practice which is in existence for the last several years, it cannot take the shape of legal right, but, yet the law requires that the action of the State should not be arbitrary, unreasonable or unfair. Therefore, dispensing the system abruptly with the academic year, 1996 without giving sufficient time appears to be unreasonable. The fact that the UGC itself has brought into effect the revised regulations in 1985 and the same were not implemented through out the country for nearly a decade, itself shows that the authorities were not inclined to switch over to new system. In case of Kakatiya University, even the notification was published and abruptly the process was stopped. Though the benefit of the existing system was extended to the persons, who have already registered, yet fair-play requires that the aspirants to the existing system should have also been put on notice by giving sufficient time."
"Legitimate" in legal parlance means that which is lawful, legally recognised by law or according to law. "Expectation" means the act or the instance of expecting or looking forward something expected or hoped for probability of an event and "expectation" is most often relatable to one's prospects. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume-I (I) 151 "legitimate expectations" finds mention of the following :
"A person may have a legitimate expectation of being treated in a certain way of an administrative authority even though he has no legal right in private law to receive such treatment The expectation may arise either from a representation or promise made by the authority, including an implied representation, or from consistent past practice. The existence of a legitimate expectation may have a number of different consequences; it may give locus standi to seek leave to apply for judicial review; it may mean that the authority ought not to act so as to defeat the expectation without some overriding reason of public policy to justify its doing so; or it may mean that, if the authority proposes to defeat person's legitimate expectation, it must afford him an opportunity to make representations on the matter. The Courts also distinguish, for example in licensing cases, between original applications, applications to renew and revocations; a party who has been granted a licence may have a legitimate expectation that it will be renewed unless there is some good reason not to do so, and may therefore be entitled to greater procedural protection than a mere applicant for a grant."
The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, has pointed out that concept of legitimate expectation first stepped into the English Law in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, (1969) 2 Ch 149, where it was observed that an alien who had been given leave to enter the United Kingdom for a limited period had a legitimate expectation of being allowed to stay for the permitted time and if that permission was revoked before the time expires, that alien ought to be given an opportunity of making representations. Thereafter the concepthas been considered in a number of cases. In A.G. of HongKong v. Ng Yuen Shiu, (1983) 2 AC 629, Lord Fraser said that "the principle that a public authority is bound by its undertakings as to the procedure it will follow, provided Ihey do not conflict with its duty, is applicable to the undertaking given by the Government of Hong Kong to the respondent that each case would be considered on its merits." In Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, (1984) 3 All.ER 935, a question arose whether the decision of the Minister withdrawing the right to Trade Union membership without consulting the staff which according to the appellant was his legitimate expectation arising from the existence of a regular practice of consultation, was valid. It was contended that the Minister had a duty to consult the staff as per the existing practice and that though the employee did not have a legal right, he had a legitimate expectation that the existing practice would be followed. On behalf of the Minister on the basis of the evidence produced, it was contended that the decision not to consult was taken for reasons of national security. The Court held as under :
"An aggrieved person was entitled to invoke judicial review if he showed that a decision of a public authority affected him by 'depriving him of some benefit or advantage which in the past he had been permitted to enjoy and which he could legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to enjoy either until he was given reasons for its withdrawal and the opportunity to comment on those reasons or because he had received an assurance that it would not be withdrawn before he had been given the opportunity of making representations against the withdrawal."
Noticing, however, "Of late the doctrine of legitimate expectation is being pressed into service in many cases particularly in contractual sphere while canvassing the implications underlying the administrative law,"
the Supreme Court has proceeded to add, "since we have not come across any pronouncement of this Court on this subject explaining the meaning and scope of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, we would like to examine the same a little more elaborately at this stage.'' and put the questions, "who is the expectant and what is the nature of the expectation ? When does such an expectation become a legitimate one and what is the foundation for the same ? What are the duties of the administrative authorities while taking a decision in cases attracting the doctrine of legitimate expectation.
The Supreme Court has thereafter answered the above as follows :
"28. Time is a three-fold present : the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense."
"29. It has to be noticed that the concept of legitimate expectation in administrative law has now, undoubtedly, gained sufficient importance. It is stated that "Legitimate expectation'' is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action and this creation takes its place beside such principles as the rules of natural justice, unreasonableness, the fiduciary duty of local authorities and "in future, perhaps, the principle of proportionately.'' A passage in Administrative Law, Sixth Edition by H.W.R. Wade page 424 reads thus :
"These are revealing decisions. They show that the Courts now expect Government departments to honour their published statements or else to treat the citizen with the fullest personal consideration. Unfairness in the form of unreasonableness here comes close to unfairness in the form of violation of natural justice, and the doctrine of legitimate expectation can operate in both contexts. It is obvious, furthermore, that this principle of substantive, as opposed to procedural, fairness may undermine some of the established rules about estoppel and misleading advice, which lend to operate unfairly. Lord Scarman has stated emphatically that unfairness in the purported exercise of a power can amount to an abuse or excess of power, and this seems likely to develop into an important general doctrine."
Another passage at Page 522 in the above book reads thus :
It was in fact for the purpose of restricting the right to be heard that "legitimate expectation" was introduced into the law. It made its first appearance in a case where alien studenls of 'scientology' were refused extension of their entry permits as an act of policy by the Home Secretary, who had announced that no discretionary benefits would be granted to this sect. The Court of Appeal held that they had no legitimate expectation of extension beyond the permitted time and so no right to a hearing, though revocation of their permits within that time would have been contrary to legitimate expectation. Official statements of policy, therefore, may cancel legitimate expectation, just as they may create it, as seen above. In a different context, where car-hire drivers had habitually offended against Airport Bye-laws, with many convictions and unpaid fines, it was held that they had no legitimate expectation of being heard before being banned by the Airport authority.
There is some ambiguity in the dicta about legitimate expectation, which may mean either expectation of a fair hearing or expectation of the licence or other benefit which is being sought. But the result is the same in either case; absence of legitimate expectation will absolve the public authority from affording a hearing."
"30. In some cases a question arose whether the concept of legitimate expectation is an impact only on the procedure or whether it also can have a substantive impact and if so to what extent. Attorney General for New South Wales v. Quin, (1990) 64 Australian Law Journal Reports 327 is a case from Australia in / which this aspect is dealt with. In that case the Local Courts Act abolished Courts of Petty Sessions and replaced them by Local Courts. Section 12 of the Act empowered the Governor to appoint any qualified person to be a Magistrate in the new Court system. Mr. Quin, who had been a Stipendiary Magistrate in charge of a Court of Petty Sessions under the old system applied for, but was refused, an appointment under the new System. That was challenged. The challenge was upheld by the appellate Court on the ground that' the Selection Committee had taken into account on adverse report on him without giving a notice to him of the contents of the same. In the appeal by the Attorney General against that order before the High Court, it was argued on behalf of Mr. Quin that he had a legitimate expectation that he would be treated in the same way as his former colleagues considering his application on its own merits. Coming to the nature of the substantive impact of the doctrine, Brennan, J observed that the doctrine of legitimate expectations ought not to "unlock the gate which shuts the Court out of review on the merits." and that the Courts should not trespass "into the forbidden field of the merits" by striking down administrative acts or decisions which failed to fulfil the expectations. In the same case Mason, C.J., was of the view that if substantive protection is to be accorded to legitimate expectations that would encounter the objection of entailing "crucial interference with administrative decisions on the merits by precluding the decision-maker from ultimately making the decision which he or she considers most appropriate in the circumstances."
"31. In R.v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Ruddock, (1987) 2 All ER 518, Taylor, J after referring to the ratio laid down in some of the above cases held thus :
"On these authorities I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesis there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise or understanding given by a Minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty or his duty, as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of Counsel for the Secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion. By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it would be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his dufies. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrained from doing so. Had he even decided to keep the criteria but depart from them in this single case for national security reasons, no doubt those reasons would have afforded him a defence to judicial review as in the GCHQ case.'' "In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union, (1971) 2 Queen Bench Division 175, Lord Denning observed as under :
"If a man seeks a privilege to which he has no particular claim--such as an appointment to some post or other-then he can be turned away without a word. He need not be heard. No explanation need be given; see the cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affaira, (1969) 2 Ch 149, 170-171. Built if he is a man whose properly is at stake, or who is being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons should be given why he is being turned down, and he should be given a chance to be heard. I go further. If he is a man who has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation of which it would not be fair to deprive him without a hearing, or reasons given, then these should be afforded him, according as the case may demand."
5. Coming to the scope of judicial review when a challenge is made on the basis . of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, after referring to several judgments of the Courts in England, the Supreme Court pointed out, the doctrine of legitimate expectation does not give scope to claim relief straightway from the administrative authorities as no crystallised right as such is involved. The protection of such legitimate expectation does not require the fulfilment of the expectation where an overriding public interest requires otherwise. In other words where a person's legitimate expectation is not fulfilled by taking a particular decision then decision-maker should justify the denial of such expectation by showing some overriding public interest. Therefore even if substantive protection of such expectation is contemplated that does not grant an absolute right to a particular person. It simply ensures the circumstances in which that expectation may be denied or reslricted. A case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. A person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, must satisfy that there is a foundation and thus has locus standi to make such a claim. In considering the same several factors which give rise to such legitimate expectation must be present. The decision taken by the authority must be found to be arbitraiy, unreasonable and not taken in public interest. If it is a question of policy, even by way of change of old policy, the Courts cannot interfere with a decision. In a given case whether there are such facts and circumstances giving rise to a legitimate expectation, it would primarily be a question of fact. If these tests are satisfied and if the Court is satisfied that a case of legitimate expectation is made out then the next question would be whether failure to give an opportunity of hearing before the decision affecting such legitimate expectation is taken, has resulted, in failure of justice and whether on that ground the decision should be quashed. If that be so then what should be the relief is again a matter which depends on several factors. The judgment has proceeded to consider in some details and there is clear emphasis that to lie within the limits of judicial power, the notion of "legitimate expectation" must be restricted to the illumination of what is the legal limitation on the exercise of administrative power in a particular case and if the Courts were to define the content of legitimate expectations as something less than a legal right and were to protect what would be thus defined by striking down administrative acts or decisions which failed to fulfil the expectations, the Courts would be truncating the powers which are naturally apt to affect those expectations. To strike down the exercise of administrative power solely on the ground of avoiding the disappointment of the legitimate expectations of an individual would be to set the Courts adrift on a future less sea of pragmatism. Moreover the notion of a legitimate expectation falling short of a legal right is too nebulous to form a basis for invalidating the exercise of a power when its exercise otherwise accords with law. The authority of the Courts and their salutary capacity judicially to review the exercise of administrative power depend in the last analysis on their fidelity to the rule of law exhibited by the articulation of general principles. The Supreme Court in the said judgment has quoted from Schmidt's case 1969 (2) Ch 149:
". ...the notion of legitimate expectation is not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not unlock the gate which shuts the Court out of review on the merits."
The Supreme Court has also pointed out in the said judgment, "...... If a denial of legitimate expectation in a given case amounts to denial of rights guaranteed or is arbitrary, discriminatory, unfair or biased, gross abuse or violation of principles of natural justice, the same can be questioned on the well-known grounds attracting Article 14 but a claim based on mere legitimate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles. It can be one of the ground to consider but the Court must lift the veil and see whether the decision is violalive of these principles warranting interference. It depends very much on the facts and the recognised general principles of administrative law applicable to such facts and the concept of legitimate expectation which is the latest recruit to a long list of concepts fashioned by the Courts for the review of administrative action, must be restricted to the general legal limitations applicable and binding the manner of the future exercise of administrative power in a particular case. It follows that the concept of legitimate expectation is "not the key which unlocks the treasury of natural justice and it ought not to unlock the gates which shuts the Court out of review on the merits, "particularly when the element of speculation and uncertainty is inherent in that very concept. As cautioned in Attorney General for New South Wales' case the Courts should restrain themselves and restrict such claims duly to the legal limitations. It is a well-meant caution. Otherwise a resourceful litigant having vested interests in contracts, licences etc., can successfully indulge in getting welfare activities mandated by a directive principles thwarted to further his own interests. The caution, particularly in the changing scenario, becomes all the more important."
6. We have, thus, noted limitations of judicial review in entertaining a petition by the Court on the solitary doctrine of legitimate expectation. True, a case of legitimate expectation would arise when a body by representation or by past practice aroused expectalion which it would be within its powers to fulfil. The protection is limited to that extent and a judicial review can be within those limits. Unless we find that the decision taken by the appellants for changing the policy and the procedure of distanl/non-formal education is arbitrary, unreasonable and not taken in public interest, on the sole ground of the alleged expectation of the petitioner-respondents of taking the non-formal/distant education and the external examinations, the Court be not justified in issuing any order in favour of the petitioner-respondents. Courts ordinarily do not interfere in policy matters. The Supreme Court has said in the aforementioned judgment, ".... if it is a question of policy even by way of change of sole policy the Courts cannot interfere with the decision'' We have given our anxious consideration, thus, whether making one time exception as learned single Judge has done for granting relief to the petitioner-respondents is justified on the facts of the case and solely on the ground of legitimate expectations. We are not able to persuade ourselves to agree with the view of the learned single Judge as there are no such reasons or grounds on which we could hold that decision has been taken so suddenly and in such a manner that it has dashed the hopes and the expectations of the petitioner-respondents altogether and, thus, visited the petitioner-respondents with civil consequences. The petitioner-respondents are entitled to go through the modified system of non-formal education and appear in the examinations. They may not be able to do so within the same period of lime as it was in the old system but they can definitely do so if they are desirous of improving their educational qualifications by taking themselves through the course of education as modified. Policy change, obviously, is in public interest. UGC has intended to maintain the standard of education and policy change in its view is to ensure excellence in education. Petitioner-respondents though are suddenly affected by the policy change but it has not come so easily and so suddenly as the petitioner-respondents have chosen to suggest. Many Universities were continuing such courses of studies which UGC was not in a position to comment. It wanted uniformity and also standardisation. Decision-making process took its own time and implementation had its own difficulties. Appellant-Universities have chosen to fall in line with the guidelines issued by the UGC. Since Appellant-Universities have chosen to fall in line with the guidelines of the UGC, it is indeed an act intended to improve the standard of distant/non-formal education. Fundamental right of education is not just the right to enter into any institution, appear in any examination and obtaining a degree. It means truly educating oneself to acquire knowledge or skill and not just getting a degree. There is no encroachment upon the fundamental right of education under Article 21 of the Constitution of India by the policy change and there is no arbitrariness so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. There has been no promise as held by the learned single Judge by the Universities and/or the UGC which has been dropped. There has not been any such representation even by conduct by the Universities that there would be no change in the pattern of non-fonnal/distant education. Thus the cry of the petitioner-respondents that legitimate expectations are thwarted is not genuine.. State has a duty no doubt to see that all sections of people particularly weak and poor and women in particular are educated. Policy which would deny access to education to any such section of the people can be found to be undesirable and unreasonable but as we have noticed above there is no such denial of right to education to any section of the people except that they are required to conform to a certain modified pattern of examinations. Since we have reasons to disagree with the view of the learned single Judge we unhesitatingly conclude that the directions issued by the learned single Judge as in the impugned judgment are not sustainable.
7. For the reasons aforementioned the appeals are allowed. Impugned judgment is set aside. Writ petitions are dismissed.