Allahabad High Court
Sobran Singh vs Prakash Chandra Gupta Son Of Late Gaya ... on 23 July, 1996
Equivalent citations: AIR1997ALL36, AIR 1997 ALLAHABAD 36, 1996 ALL. L. J. 1876, 1996 (2) ALL RENTCAS 440, 1997 (1) RENCJ 302, 1996 (28) ALL LR 542
Author: S.K. Phaujdar
Bench: S.K. Phaujdar
ORDER
1. This is a revision under Section 25 of the Small Causes Court at Ihe instance of Ihe defendant-revisionist impugning the judgment and decree dated 26-4-1996 passed by the 3rd Addl. District Judge, Aligarh, holding the small causes powers in SCC Suit No. 9 of 1993.
2. The suit was filed by the present opposite-party, Prakash Chandra Gupta, alleging that the defendant-revisionist,Sobran Singh, was a tenant under him in the suit premises and he had defaulted in payment of rent and was, thus, liable to be evicted. The notice demanding arrears of rent, terminating the tenancy and claim for the possession of the premises was served on the defendant. The demands were not fulfilled and the suit was filed.
3. It was the case of the defendant that he was not in default in payment of rent. Rent was tendered to the landlord personal but it was not accepted. The rent was. thereafter, sent by money order. The same was also refused. Thereafter, the tenant made deposits in Court under Section 30 of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972. When the suit was filed, on the first date of hearing, he deposited in Court all the sum that was required to be deposited under Section 20(4) of the said Act after adjusting the sum of Rs. 1050/- which was deposited in terms of Section 30 of Ihe Act. The defendant claimed protection from eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent.
4. The Court below engaged itself to determine between the parties only on one point and a question was framed as follows :
(1) Whether the defendant had, on the first date of hearing, deposited the total sum under demand as per law, and (2) Whether he was entitled to the benefit of Section 20(4) of U P. Act No. 13 of 1972 ?
The trial Court found on fact that the notice of terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent was to be deemed service as the same was refused by the defendant on 8-2-1993. He further found that the Munsif was approached under Section 30 of the Act on 8-2-1993 itself and the prayer for making deposits of rent in Court was allowed by the Munsif on 10-2-1993. The trial Court was of the view that this deposit purporting to be under Section 30 of the Act was made after the service of the notice and, accordingly, the deposit could not have been adjusted under Section 20(4) of the Act. Under this logic, the trial Court held that the sum required to be deposited under Section 20(4) was not deposited and the tenant was not entitled to get the protection under Section 30(4) of the Act against eviction on the ground of default. The trial Court had relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Chunni Lal v. Ramesh Chandra, as reported in 1993 Allahabad Civil Journal, page 1030.
5. The learned counsels, during the hearing of the present revision, advanced on behalf of the revisionist their arguments on the validity or otherwise of the deposit of Rs. 1050/- purportedly made under Section 30 of the Act. This seclion entitles the tenant to make adeposil in Court only after the refusal by the landlord to accept the rent and further requires that the deposits would be made till the landlord by notice indicates his willingness to accept the rent. In other words, a deposit would not be valid unless the first condition of refusal by the landlord is proved and, secondly, it would not be valid again after the landlord had intimated by notice his intention to aecept the rent. So far as the first part of Ihe conditions is concerned, there is no dispute that there was a refusal by the landlord to accept rent which prompted the tenant to lake recourse to Section 30. The only question that remains for decision whether there was any notice by the landlord notifying his intention to receive rent.
6. The case-law that has been relied upon by the trial Court (Chunni Lal v. Ramesh Ch) was one in which the landlord had issued a notice on 2nd March, 1976, communicating his willingness to accept rent from the tenant and forbidding him to make any deposit in Section 30. This willingness to accept the rent was reiterated in a subsequenl notice dated 6-1-1979 which was not a composite notice of terminating the tenancy demanding arrears of rent and there was a further specific indication of showing willingness to accept the rent. The Court found on fact that the notice undoubtedly signified the landlord's willingness to accept the rent. There was a clear finding of fact that the tenanl had made deposits even after the notice dated 2-3-1978 as aforesaid. It was held that the tenant was not liable to adjust such deposits as having been made after the notice and the decree of eviction was upheld.
7. A similar view was taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Lal Mohd., as reported in 1992 All CJ 124. In fact, this was a decision arrived at after the decision of Chunni Lal'scase and reference was made to that decision. Herein in this case, also there was service of notice of willingness on the part of the landlord to accept the rent. The rent was deposited under Section 30 after such notice. It was held that such deposit was not a valid one for being deposited under the provisions of Section 20(4) of the Act.
8. In the judgment now impugned there is no, finding of fact as to the contents of the notice. As a revisional Court it would not be proper to go into the contents of the notice to give a finding of fact. The learned counsel for the revision has relied on adecision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Kachera v. Jagdish Prasad to say lhat the willingness of the landlord lo accept Ihe rent as thought of under Section 30(1) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 should be specific and unambiguous and in Ihe absence of such a specification continuance of deposit by the tenant even before the notice was not illegal. The High Court had held that the landlord has to signify in writing his willingness and readiness to accept the renrand it is then only that the tenanl can be held to be a defaulter if he deposits the rent under Section 30 of the Act and not otherwise. Reliance was placed by the Court on a decision of the High Court as reported in 1987 (1) ARC 1 : (AIR 1987 SC 178), (Kamleshwar-Singh Srivastava v. IVth Addl. Distt. Judge, Lucknow). The learned counsel for the revisionist further relied on an earlier decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Krishna Dhawan, as reported in 1984 All LJ 124. It was held herein that in relieving the tenant against his liability for eviction it is the duty of the Court to construe the provisions of Section 20(4) of the U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 liberally and in favour of the tenant. It was contended that even if there by any illegality in making deposits, still the amount under deposit could have been deposited under Section 20(4) of the Act. On this point, again, a decision was relied as reported in 1985 (2) ARC 188. It was held in this case that even after the deposits were illegal, the same were adjuslible and the tenant was entitled to claim the benefit thereof.
9. In this case, the learned Court below gave a decision against the tenant simply because the deposit under Section 30 was made after the service of the composite notice of demand, termination and vacation. As observed above, there is no finding of fact if the language of demand of rent was open to be interpreted as signifying the willingness of the landlord to accept the rent. In view of the decision quoted above, the notice thought of under Section 30(1) of the Act should be unambiguous. It is desirable, therefore, that the trial Court should examine the notice that was deemed to have been served on the tenant to find if it could be read as one under Section 30(1) of the Act. In the absence of such finding the refusal to adjust the deposit made by the tenant cannot be sustained.
10. The present revision is accordingly allowed. The decree by the Court is set aside and the case is remanded back to the trial Court for a decision on the point as indicated in the judgment without taking any further evidence from the parties. The Court may, however, hear the parties as to how the notice could be interpreted and will consider any case-law on this point that may be submitted before him. The parties are directed to appear before the Court below on 5-8-1996.
11. A copy of the present order be communicated to the Court below immediately, for a decision within 3 months.
12. Revision allowed.