Customs, Excise and Gold Tribunal - Mumbai
Larsen And Toubro Ltd. vs Commissioner Of C. Ex. on 13 December, 2002
Equivalent citations: 2003(159)ELT395(TRI-MUMBAI)
ORDER
K.K. Usha, J. (President)
1. Challenge in this appeal at the instance of the assessee is against the order passed by the Commissioner of Central Excise, Surat dated 28-8-97. The issue involved is whether denial of the credit of duty paid by the appellant on "Inner Assembly for End Shield" intended to be used in the manufacture of End Shield (final product) on the ground that neither the input nor the final product is specifically declared in the declaration filed under Rule 57G of the Central Excise Rules is justified. The credit was taken by the appellant on 12-7-91 and the show cause notice was issued on 17-6-96. The appellant contends that the demand is unsustainable on the ground of limitation also. As required under Rule 57G the appellant filed a declaration on 23-6-86 indicating therein the description of the inputs intended to be used in or in relation to the final product and obtained a dated acknowledgement from the office of the jurisdictional Assistant Collector of Central Excise. The appellant in the said declaration indicated the description of the final product and the inputs separately along with Chapter Heading and sub-heading under which the final product and the inputs are assessed to central excise duty. On the basis of the above declaration they were allowed to avail the credit of duty paid on the inputs intended to be used in or in relation to the said final product. Appellant submitted a further declaration on 17-1-89 indicating therein the description of the final product and the inputs intended to be used in or in relation to the manufacture thereof together with chapter heading and sub-heading under which the declared final product and the inputs are assessed to central excise duty. There also the description of the inputs as appearing in the Tariff and the final product as mentioned in the classification list was submitted. Pursuant to a visit made by the Assistant Collector, Central Excise, to the factory of the appellant the appellant sent a letter dated 12-6-90 giving details as desired by the Assistant Collector in the proforma suggested by him. Appellant contends that they had broadly shown the description of the inputs as "Machines and Mechanical appliances having individual functions, not specified or included elsewhere in this chapter". The input has been shown to have been classified under sub-heading 8479.00 and final product has been shown to be falling under sub-heading 8479 and described as "Nuclear, Power Plant "Machinery and Parts". It is further contended that the product they manufactured was "End Shield" which is used for capping/covering the Reactor of the Nuclear Power Plants and that though they have not specifically mentioned the term "End Shield", this is covered by the broad description given by them in the classification list. The appellant would contend that in view of such broad description Modvat credit cannot be denied on the ground that the detailed description of the inputs was not filed/mentioned. Learned Counsel for the assessee placed reliance on the decision of this Tribunal in Eicher Motors Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Indore - 1997 (95) E.L.T. 433 in support of the above contention. In the above decision this Tribunal has taken the view that detailed description of every input is not required. A generic description of the inputs which are clearly identifiable as coming under a specific heading or sub-heading is sufficient. In the present case also we find that the appellant has given necessary details which would satisfy the requirement under law. Therefore, denial of Modvat credit on the ground that detailed description of the inputs was not given cannot be justified.
2. On the ground of limitation also the demand under challenge is not sustainable. The show cause notice dated 17-6-96 has been issued in respect of credit availed on 11/12-7-91. Period of limitation prescribed under Section 11A has to be applied. The limitation would run from the date of taking credit as the period involved is before the amendment to Rule 51A made on 6-3-95. In order to reject the contention raised by the appellant on the ground of limitation reliance was placed by the original authority on a letter dated 14/19-6-89 alleged to have been sent to the appellant calling for more details. It is the case of the appellant that no such letter was received by it. The Revenue had no material to show that the letter had been received by the appellant. On the other hand, the stand taken by the appellant that it had not received the letter was disbelieved by the original authority for the reason that in respect of certain matters covered by the letter the appellant had given reply vide letter dated 12-6-90. Therefore it was to be taken that they had received the letter dated 14/19-6-89. The appellant had specifically contended before the authority that the letter dated 12-6-90 was happened to be sent in respect of certain information sought by the Assistant Collector of Central Excise on his visit to the factory. A reading of the above letter would clearly show that reference is made to the visit of the Assistant Collector and along with the letter information in the proforma suggested by the Assistant Collector was sent. This aspect was overlooked by the lower authority. It is also contended by the appellant that it will not be benefited by withholding information. Taking into consideration all these aspects we are of the view that there was no suppression on the part of the assessee with intent to evade duty. Therefore, on the ground of limitation also we find that the demand is not sustainable.
3. Learned Counsel for the assessee brought to our notice an order passed by the Commissioner (Appeals) dated 31-8-98 taking similar view in favour of the assessee in an appeal filed by it challenging an Order-in-Original dated 6-4-95 disallowing credit of duty on "Inner Assembly for End Shield" taken by the appellant on 25-2-92 for the same reason.
4. We therefore set aside the order impugned and allow the appeal.