Delhi District Court
Sh. M. L. Gohri vs Sh. A. K. Aggarwal on 6 July, 2011
IN THE COURT OF SH. HARJYOT SINGH BHALLA :
CIVIL JUDGE1 ,SOUTH DISTRICT ,NEW DELHI
Suit No. 194/2010
Case ID No.02403C0994192008.
Sh. M. L. Gohri,
S/o Late Sh. Mool Raj,
R/o A1/107, Janak Puri,
New Delhi110058. .................plaintiff
Versus
1 Sh. A. K. Aggarwal,
(Public Information Officer),
N.S.I.C. Ltd, NSIC Bhawan,
Okhla Industrial Estate,
New Delhi110020.
2 Union of India,
Ministry of Micro, Small & Medium Enterprises,
through its Secretary,
Udyog Bhawan,
New Delhi110001. ...............defendants
Date of Institution : 12.11.2008
Date of reserving the Order : 28.05.2011
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Date of pronouncement : 06.07.2011
JUDGMENT:
1 By this judgment I shall dispose off the present suit filed by the plaintiff seeking damages for defamation alleged to have been caused by the Defendants.
2 Case of the plaintiff is that the plaintiff is a highly qualified person having diploma in Cooperation and Industrial Finance, and C.A.I.I.B. Plaintiff claims to have served with the Reserve Bank of India in various capacities up to his retirement in the year 1989, as Assistant Chief Officer. During his entire service career, the plaintiff was always praised by the superiors for efficient performance in service.
3 As per the Plaint, the plaintiff is enjoying good respect and status in society at large as well as in the eyes of friends and relatives.
4 It is further averred that in course of social activities, the plaintiff filed an application under the Right to Information Act, 2005 before defendant no. 1, seeking information regarding Sh. S. N. Padamnabhan, Ex. Public Information Officer of National Small Industries Corporation as the plaintiff had information that said Sh. S. M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 2 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 N. Padamnabhan was not working properly and misusing his official capacity for personal gains. The Defendant No. 1 was in collusion with said Sh. S. N. Padamnabhan and dismissed the application filed by the plaintiff without giving any cogent reason. 5 It is further averred that in the proceedings before Central Information Commission, the defendant no. 1 filed an affidavit verified on 4.6.2008, in which the defendant no. 1 levelled false, frivolous, insulting and contemptuous allegations against the plaintiff and used the expressions CANTANKEROUS and HABITUAL LITIGANT for the plaintiff without any proof. 6 The case of the Plaintiff is that above said false allegations and insulting terms/words used by the defendant no. 1 deeply hurt feelings of the plaintiff and damaged reputation/prestige greatly and the defendant no. 1 intentionally and deliberately defamed and insulted the plaintiff, in the eyes of Government Officials, esteemed Organization like Central Information Commission, which caused defamation to the plaintiff.
7 It is further averred that the defendant no. 2 is employer of the defendant no.1 having supervisory powers and Administrative Control and is liable for the acts and deeds committed by the M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 3 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 defendant no. 1 during course of employment and both the defendants are jointly and severally liable to pay the compensation to the plaintiff.
8 It is further averred that the plaintiff has also served registered AD/UPC notice U/s 80 of CPC, dated 21.08.2008, upon the defendants. Instead of paying compensation to the plaintiff, defendants gave a false and frivolous reply to the plaintiff's notice. That parties to the suit reside and work for gain at Delhi and cause of action arose in Delhi i. e. within territorial jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court, hence this Hon'ble Court has jurisdiction to try and entertain the present suit. The plaintiff is claiming a sum of Rs.three lacs as damages for the defamation caused.
9 The defendant entered appearance and WS was filed on behalf of both the defendants. The stand of the defendants is that the case is covered by the well recognised exception of 'absolute privilege' of speech and expression in judicial proceedings and pleadings . The allegations in the plaint, except that the pleadings did contain the words as alleged, have been denied. The defendant has thus admitted that in the counter affidavit the words CANTANKEROUS and HABITUAL LITIGANT were in fact used.
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10 On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, following
issues were framed on 1.5.2009 by my Ld. Predecessor.
1. Whether defendant no. 1 intentionally defamed the plaintiff publically? OPP.
2. Whether plaintiff suffered a loss of prestige due to defamation caused by the defendant no. 1 computed in monetary terms up to the extent of Rs.3 lakh?OPP.
3. Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable? OPD.
4. Whether plaintiff is entitled for any relief, if so, what relief?
11 Plaintiff led his evidence and examined two witnesses. He himself entered the witness box and also examined the Dy. Manager of NSIC Limited. The plaintiff was cross examined. The defendant has not led any evidence despite opportunity. 12 Counsel for both the parties advanced oral arguments. Counsel for Plaintiff has emphasized that the use of the words CONTANKEROUS and HABITUAL LITIGANT are exfacie defamatory. He submits that the Defendant has not even challenged the evidence led by the Plaintiff and has not led any evidence to show M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 5 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 otherwise.
13 Counsel for the Defendant has on the other hand argued that the occasion on which the statement was made was absolutely privileged. He has relied upon an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Ali Mohammad vs Manna Lal AIR 1929 All 972 wherein the Court held that allegations of being a member of a gang led by a "great forgerer, liar and a clever man" and being "responsible for producing manu forged pronotes" and filing "many false suits" made in the WS of previous litigation were covered by the exception of Absolute Privilege and not actionable.
14 The Counsel for the Plaintiff in rebuttal submitted that the occasion was not of absolute Privilege as proceedings before Central Information Commissioner cannot be equated with proceedings before a Court and the same is not a Court but a Tribunal. No other decisions have been cited before me except the one cited by the Defendant.
15 My issue wise findings are recorded hereinafter. 16 Issue Nos. 3: Whether suit of the plaintiff is not maintainable? The onus of proving this issue was on the Defendant. Defendant has not lead any evidence. However, Counsel for the M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 6 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 Defendant has argued that the occasion on which the statement was made was "absolutely privileged". He has relied upon the decision in Ali Mohammad (supra). According to the Defendant in view of the defence of Absolute Privilege of the occasion the suit is not maintainable.
17 In Bira Gareri v. Dulhin Somaria and others. AIR 1962 PATNA 229 it was observed that:
It is well settled that in India the criminal liability for defamation is codified and embodied in section 499 of the Penal Code and differs from the law in England in that regard. The Civil liability for defamation to pay damages, however, is not governed by any statute law but is determined with reference to the principles of justice, equity and good conscience, which generally have been imported in this country from the English principles. There seems to be little scope for an appreciable difference between the Indian and the English law on this subject. (Emphasis supplied)
18 Briefly stated the law pertaining to the Absolute Privilege as a defense in an action for damages for a tort of defamation committed during legal proceedings has been dealt with and spelled out by the courts in various judicial pronouncements. In Rajindra Kishore Sahi v. Durga Sahi, AIR 1967 ALL 476 it was observed and I M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 7 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 quote:
Under the English Law the following statements are absolutely privileged, so that no action will lie in respect of them, however false, defamatory and malicious they may be :
1. Any statement made in the course of and with reference to judicial proceedings made by any Judge, Jury man, party, witness, or advocate. (It is not necessary for me to consider the other classes of privileged statements).
19 The question whether the doctrine of absolute privilege should be applied to statements made in judicial proceedings in India was answered in a Full Bench of five judges of Allahabad High Court in Chunni Lal v. Narsingh Das 16 All. L.J. 360 : (AIR 1918 All. 69 F.B.). It was held that there was nothing in the circumstances and society of this country that would make it improper or inadvisable to apply to India the English rule of privilege, which is well established in England. The case before the Bench arose out of a petition presented to a criminal court by a party.
20 In Purshottam Lal Sayal (supra) the Allahabad High Court pointed out that the Absolute Privilege available in proceedings before a Court was not available before an Administrative Tribunal.
M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 8 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 The relevant extract is reproduced herein below:
"Mr. Ansari next contended that the appellant is not liable as the occasion was one of absolute privilege. He pointed out that the appellant was giving evidence in an inquiry and his position as a witness conferred on him an absolute privilege giving complete immunity front liability for anything said by him before the Inquiry Officer. I cannot agree. Privilege under the law of defamation is of the two kinds, absolute and qualified...".
"Absolute privilege was originally confined to proceedings in a Court of justice, but subsequently extended to tribunals which had the attributes and functions of a Court of law, though not the status. In Dawkins v. Lord Rokeby (1873) 8 QB 255 : LR 7 HL 744, it was extended to a military Court of enquiry. But absolute privilege has never been extended to tribunals discharging administrative functions with a duty to act judicially. As observed by Fry, L.J. in Royal Acquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society, Ltd. v. Parkinson (1892) 1 QB 431 at p. 447 as follows:
"It is to be borne in mind that there is a great difference between the constitution of bodies of the kind to which I have referred and most Courts. Courts are, for the most part, controlled and presided over by some person selected as specially qualified for the purpose; and they have generally a fixed and dignified course of procedure, which tends to minimise the risks that M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 9 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 might flow from this absolute immunity. These considerations do not apply to bodies such as I have mentioned."
10. The Courts in England have consistently refused to extend absolute privilege to various classes of administrative tribunals which were required to act in a quasijudicial (sic). Smith v. National Meter Co. Ltd. (1945) 2 All ER 35; Addis v. Crocker (1961) 1 QB 11; O'Comior v. Waldron, 1935 AC 76.
11. In this case the enquiry was held by a superior officer of the Bank into the conduct of a Bank Manager of a Branch. This was a purely an administrative inquiry, though the Officer in fairness gave an opportunity to the parties to produce witnesses. In my opinion, the doctrine of absolute privilege does not extend to such an enquiry and the appellant's statements were not, absolutely privileged. His privilege was qualified, which meant that his statement was protected only if made bona fide in the discharge of his duties....". (Emphasis supplied) 21 Similar view has been expressed in Pandey Surendra Nath Sinha and another v. Bageshwari Pd. AIR 1961 PATNA 164 in the following words:
"29. We are concerned here with Judicial Privilege. This privilege extends to all Courts, superior or inferior, civil or revenue or military. It applies not only to all kinds of M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 10 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 Courts of justice, but also to other tribunals recognised by law and acting judicially. The privilege, although it extends to tribunals acting in a manner similar to Courts of Justice, does not, however, apply to tribunals which merely discharge administrative functions, or to officials possessing merely administrative as opposed to genuinte judicial functions, and it makes no difference that in the performance of these administrative functions they exercise a judicial discretion."
22 I may now refer to a decision of a Ld. Single Judge of the Hon'ble Delhi High Court on the subject. In Ram Jethmalani vs. Subramaniam Swamy AIR 2006 DELHI 300, his Lordship Hon'ble Justice Pradeep Nandrajog observed and I quote:
"60. The origin of the rule of absolute privilege could easily be traced to judicial proceedings in a Court of law. .....On grounds of public policy, absolute immunity from liability was conceived of for Judges, counsel and witnesses for the reason it was felt that during judicial proceedings in Court, every participative player must be free from the fear of being harassed by an action or allegation, whether true or false that he acted with malice.
...
62. This status was, however, denied to tribunals not being at par with Courts. Proceedings before tribunals M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 11 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 which had all the trapping of a Court were alone held eligible to be entitled for absolute privilege. (See 1960 (2) All ER 629, Addis v. Crocker)." (Emphasis supplied)
23 The Ld. Single Judge was dealing with proceedings before the Jain Commission constituted under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 having powers of a Civil Court in view of Section 4 of the Act. The Ld. Single judge made the following observations:
"64. Decisions reported as AIR 1958 SC 538, Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, AIR 1969 SC 215, P. V. Jagannath Rao v. State of Orissa, 1988 (4) SCC 419 (AIR 1988 SC 2267), Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray v. Justice B. Lentin, have held that proceedings before a Commission of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952, notwithstanding having powers of a Civil Court by virtue of Section 4 of the Act, cannot be equated with judicial proceedings in a Court of law.
65. A Commission under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 is appointed by the appropriate Government for the information of the mind of the Government in order for it to decide the course of action to be followed. It is a fact finding body and is not required to adjudicate upon the rights of the parties and has no adjudicatory power. The Government is not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings. Mere fact that the procedure M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 12 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 adopted by it is akin to a procedure at a civil trial and it has the power to administer oath would not impart the commission with the status of a Court.
66. Way back in the year 1935, in the decision reported as AIR 1935 PC 3, William Francis O'Conor. v. Gordon Waldron, Lord Atkin held that notwithstanding the fact that a Commissioner appointed under the Combines Investigation Act had attributes similar to those of a Court of justice, proceedings before it cannot be equated as judicial proceedings in a Court of law.
24 The Ld. Single Judge laid down that the Defence of Absolute Privilege was available only in proceedings before a Tribunal having the "Trappings of a Court". In order to decide whether a Tribunal satisfied the said requirement the following tests were impliedly laid down:
1. Whether the Tribunal was only "a fact finding body"?
2. Whether the Tribunal could or couldn't "adjudicate upon the rights of the parties" and had any "adjudicatory power"?;
3. Whether it was only an advisory body and the Government was "not bound to accept its recommendations or act upon its findings"?
Unless the above tests were satisfied the fact that the tribunal M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 13 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 functioned like a Civil Court procedurally was held insufficient to extend the immunity.
25 In order to understand the meaning of the expression a "tribunal vested with the trappings of a court" it may be relevant to refer to some of the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sundar Jhunjhunwala AIR 1961 SUPREME COURT 1669 it was observed that:
"By "Courts" is meant Courts of Civil Judicature and by "tribunals", those bodies of men who are appointed to decide controversies arising under certain special laws. Among the powers of the State is included the power to decide such controversies. This is undoubtedly one of the attributes of the State, and is aptly called the judicial power of the State. In the exercise of this power, a clear division is thus noticeable. Broadly speaking, certain special matters go before tribunals, and the residue goes before the ordinary Courts of Civil Judicature. Their procedures may differ, but the functions are not essentially different. What distinguishes them has never been successfully established. Lord Stamp said that the real distinction is that Courts have "an air of detachment". But this is more a matter of age and tradition and is not of the essence. Many tribunals, is recent years, have acquitted themselves so well and with such detachment as to make this test insufficient. Lord Sankey, L. C. in Shell Co. of Australia v. Federal M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 14 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 Commissioner of Taxation, (1931) A. C. 275 (296) observed:
"The authorities are clear to show that there are tribunals with many of the trappings of a Court, which, nevertheless, are not Courts in the strict sense of exercising judicial power..... In that connection it may be useful to enumerate some negative propositions on this subject: 1. A tribunal is not necessarily a Court in this strict sense because it gives a final decision. 2. Nor because it hears witnesses on oath. 3. Nor because two or more contending parties appear before it between whom it has to decide. 4. Nor because it gives decisions which affect the rights of subjects. 5. Nor because there is an appeal to a Court. 6. Nor because it is a body to which a matter is referred by another body. See Rex v. Electricity Commrs., (1924) 1 K. B. 171. (Emphasis supplied)
26 In Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P. N. Sharma AIR 1965 SC 1595 it was observed that:
"Judicial functions and judicial powers are one of the essential attributes of a sovereign State, and on considerations of policy, the State transfers its judicial functions and powers mainly to the Courts established by the Constitution; but that does not affect the competence of the State, by appropriate measures, to transfer a part M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 15 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 of its judicial powers and functions to tribunals by entrusting to them the task of adjudicating upon special matters and disputes between parties.
Thus, wherever the court dealing with defence of Absolute Privilege qua proceedings before Tribunals finds that the Tribunal is exercising a Judicial Function as distinguished from an administrative function the test laid down in Purshottam Lal Sayal (supra) shall stand satisfied.
27 In my view the proceedings before the Central Information Commissioner (CIC) are not purely administrative proceedings and the decision of the CIC is definitely quasi - judicial if not purely judicial. The defence of Absolute Privilege shall thus be available to a party qua anything stated by it in pleadings filed before the CIC in any proceedings of appeal initiated under the Right to Information Act.
28 The only question left to be answered is whether the defamatory statement / words were relevant to the inquiry before the Tribunal. In Ram Jethmalani (supra) it was observed :
"The decision brings out that absolute privilege is not absolute in the context of being infinite. Even when the occasion is privileged one gets no licence to utter M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 16 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 irrelevant and scandalous things unrelated to the proceedings. If what is stated is necessary or relevant to the proceedings, immunity would be absolute."
(Emphasis supplied) 29 The above observation is in consonance with similar view expressed by the Allahabad High Court in Rajindra Kishore Sahi (supra) while quoting a few authorities on the subject, in the following words:
But it is important to note that the statement to be privileged must be made in the course of and with reference to judicial proceedings. If the offending statement has no connection with the proceedings, and is made wantonly and without reference to these proceedings, the person making them cannot claim privilege. This qualification is explained by Salmond as follows :
"The statement, in order to be privileged, need not be relevant, in the sense of having a material bearing upon the matter in issue in the case. Thus, the statement of a witness is privileged, even though inadmissible as evidence, and even though so immaterial that no prosecution for perjury would be possible in respect of it. Nevertheless the statement, though it need not be relevant in this sense, must, it would seem, be made in the course of and with reference to the case in hand. A judge M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 17 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 who from the bench makes a defamatory observation in respect of some entirely extraneous matter would no longer be speaking in his capacity as a judge, and would have no privilege" Salmond on Torts, 11th Edition page 461.
Winfield explains the limits of absolute privilege as regards statements made in judicial proceedings thus :
"The statement is not privileged if it has no reference to the inquiry which is proceeding. This is generously interpreted and the privilege of a witness is not limited to statements for which, if untrue, he might be indicted for perjury. But it would not extend to an entirely irrelevant answer unprovoked by any question put to him..."
30 Thus the defence of absolute priviledge is not infinite and cannot be used as a cloak to recklessly level wanton defamatory allegations or hurl insults which have no relevance or reference to the case in hand. At this juncture reference may be made to a few judicial pronouncements on the Right to Information Act, 2005 wherein the ground for refusal of information have been enumerated. In these judicial prouncements it has been categorically held that only the grounds provided in the Section 3 and Section 8 of the Act itself can be availed for refusing the disclosure of information sought. As a necessary corollary, in any appeal before the CIC, the information M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 18 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 officer arrayed as a respondent may only have recourse to one of these grounds. In Secretary General, Supereme Court of India Vs. Subhash Chandra Agarwal AIR 2010 Del 159(FB) it was observed that :
44.The preamble to the Act says that the Act is passed because 'democracy' requires an informed citizenry and transparency of information which are vital to its functioning and also to contain corruption and hold Goverments and their instrumentalities accountable to the governed'. The Act restricts the right to information to citizens (Section 3). An applicant seeking information does not have to give any reasons why he/she needs such information except such details as may be necessary for contacting him/her. Thus, there is no requirement of locus standi for seeking information [Section6(2)].
31 In Board of Management of the Bombay Properties of Indian Institute of Science, Mumbai v. Central Information Commission, New Delhi AIR 2011 Bom. 53 it was observed that:
7.....Subsection (2) of Section 6 of the Act states that an applicant making request for information shall not be required to give any reason for requesting the information or any other personal details except those that may be necessary for contacting him. It is thus clear that while entertaining an application for information made under the Act, the locus standi or the M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 19 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 intention of the applicant cannot be questioned and is required to furnish all the information sought by him except what has been exempted under Section 8 therein.
32 The stand in the counter affidavit to the extent it referred to the plaintiff herein as "cantankerous" was clearly irrelevant for the decision in the appeal before the CIC. The word "cantankerous" neither had nor it could have had any reference to the case before the CIC nor was it even remotely relevant for disposal of the appeal. The temprament or behaviour of the plaintiff herein was completely irrelevant for the inquiry. The fact that such language was used by an official of the standing of the defendant no. 1 herein cannot also be lost sight of. A senior official discharging the functions of a Public Information Officer must not forget that he is dealing, with an applicant, in his capacity of bearer of such an office and not in a private individual capacity. It is expected that such an official would not become too personal visavis an applicant while defending their decision, refusing information, before the appellate authority. In my view the remark that the plaintiff was "cantankerous" was defamatory and also irrelevant to the appeal before the CIC. I accordingly hold that use of such a word, when irrelevant to the legal proceedings in M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 20 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 which it is used, would not be covered by the exception under the head "absolute priviledge" carved out to avoid liability in cases of defamation.
33 I accordingly decide issue no. 3 in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
34 Issue Nos. 1:Whether defendant no. 1 intentionally defamed the plaintiff publically? Onus of proving both these issues was on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff got himself examined as a witness. He categorically stated on oath in his evidence by way of affidavit Ex.PW1/A that the allegations made against him in the Counter Affidavit Ex.PW1/2 were false, frivilous, insulting and contemptuous and had been made without proof. He proved his Legal Notice dated 21.8.2008 Ex.PW1/3 and the reply of the Defendants to the legal notice Ex.PW1/4 wherein they took various defences such as fair comment and absolute privilege while repeating their stand stated in the counter affidavit. The letter dated 25.6.2008 Mark "A" was admitted by the counsel for Defendant at the stage of admission denial and also stands duly proved.
35 During cross examination of the Plaintiff he admitted that
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Defendant No.1 was not known to him and stated that he could not say whether Defendant No.1 had any grudge against him. However, no suggestion was put to the witness nor his statement that the allegations made against him were false were probed except to the extent that he had made several applications under the RTI to EDCIL. Thus, his testimony that the contents of the counter affidavit were false, frivilous, insulting and contemptuous and had been made without proof has gone unrebutted, more so, when the Defendant has not lead any evidence. Thus, on preponderance of probability it can be concluded that the statement made was so made consciously and intentionally.
36 The next question whether the stand in the Counter affidavit was defamatory can also be answered in the affirmative. To call a man CANTANKEROUS and HABITUAL LITIGANT would not only insult and annoy him but would also lower him in the estimation of those who get to read the allegations made against him. The word Cantankerous means difficult and irritating to deal with as per Merriumwebster dictionary. The synonyms associated with the word are "bloodyminded", "stubborn", "illminded", argumentative as per thesaurus and dictionaries. The effect on Chief Information M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 22 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 Officer would also be no different and the yardstick of a reasonable man would yield no different results.
37 It may be pertinent to note a few judicial pronouncements on this aspect at this juncture. In Purshottam Lal Sayal v. Prem Shanker AIR 1966 ALL 377 the court while examining the allegations made by a witness observed and I quote:
"Learned counsel first contended that the statement made by the appellant were not defamatory in law though they might be regarded as insulting or even abusive. The plaintiff's statement's may be divided into three parts. The first part, relating to the indebtedness of the plaintiff and the amount of income tax paid by him, was quite legitimate and neither insulting nor defamatory. The second contains the statements that the plaintiff had amassed wealth by sucking the blood of the poor. This remark was insulting and abusive, but not defamatory in law. Such remarks are the usual stock in trade of a certain class of persons claiming to be the representatives of the working class whose vanity and ego are fed by abusing others and who regard abusive language as a fashionable means of gaining notoriety. The third part consisted of a remark that the plaintiff was the type of a man who was willing to give evidence on payment of ten or twenty rupees, and a question to the plaintiff inquiring how many times he had given evidence on being paid Rs. 180. This part was clearly M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 23 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 defamatory as the defendant implied that the plaintiff was a sort of professional witness whose evidence could be purchased. The fourth part consisted of a sarcastic remark that the plaintiff had indulged in black marketing all over the world. This was also defamatory. To say of a business man that he had engaged in black marketing on an extensive scale cannot but lower him in the eyes of others. I think the view of the lower Court is correct."
38 Judged from the above yard stick of the background of the person making the statement and the person about whom the statement was made the conclusion invariably is that the statement is Defamatory. Even otherwise the Defendant has neither rebutted the evidence led by the Plaintiff nor urged that the words "Cantankerous" and "Habitual Litigant" were used unintentionally. 39 This issue is decided against the Defendant and in favour of the Plaintiff.
40 Issue Nos. 2 and 4:Whether plaintiff suffered a loss of prestige due to defamation caused by the defendant no. 1 computed in monetary terms up to the extent of Rs.3 lakh? And Whether plaintiff is entitled for any relief, if so, what relief?
41 As per a division bench of the Bombay High Court
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reported as R. K. Karanjia v. K. M. D. Thackersey AIR 1970 BOMBAY 424, in an action for recovery of damages for defamation the following are admissible as heads of damages:
"42. What are then the injuries for which the plaintiff should be compensated? That is explained by Lord Justice Diplock in that same case at page 959 as follows:
"In an action for defamation, the wrongful act is damage to the plaintiff's reputation. The injuries that he sustains may be classified under two heads: (i) the consequences of the attitude adopted to him by other persons as a result of the diminution of the esteem in which they hold him because of the defamatory statement; and (ii) the grief or annoyance caused by the defamatory statement to the plaintiff himself. It is damages under this second head which may be aggravated by the manner in which, or the motives with which, the statement was made or persisted in."
42 On the aspect of aggraved damages it was observed in the said decision and I quote:
There is no room hereafter for importing the concept of exemplary or punitive damages except in two well defined categories of cases. The first category is of those cases where the plaintiff is injured by the oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the executive or the servants of the Government. The M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 25 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 second category is comprised of those cases in which the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff. Except in these two types of cases, there is no departure from the ordinary compensatory principle for all torts, including libel.
43 In my view the plaintiff has failed to lead evidence on the basis of which damages could be quantified and awarded in favour of the plaintiff. Plaintiff has not adduced evidence of his friends or associates to show to what extent he is avoided by friends or shunned by his associates in social acivities carried out by him, nor has he shown the extent of diminution in the esteem in which he was held. There is no special damage alleged or proved. As to grief or annoyance caused to him, the plaintiff has not helped the court in making any accurate estimate by his evidence. The only fact of which this court can take notice is the sensitive nature of the plaintiff. The plaintiff who retired as far back as in 1989 and is a senior citizen has been pursuing the case diligently for windication of his reputation. He has appeared in almost all hearings and on every date fixed by the court since the grievance is against the action of an employer in a M. L. Gohri Vs A.K. Aggarwal etc 26 of 27 Suit no. 194/2010 government undertaking the test laid down for grant of aggravated damages in R K Karanjia (supra) stands satisfied. Thus I deem it fit to award damages of Rs.5000/ to the plaintiff and against the defendant no.1 along with costs of litigation. 44 Decree sheet be drawn accordingly.
45 File be consigned to record room.
Announced in the open Court Harjyot Singh Bhalla, dated 06.07.2011 Civil Judge1, South District, New Delhi.
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