Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Chain Singh vs Rajasthan State Road Transport ... on 6 March, 1998
Equivalent citations: 1998(1)WLN516
JUDGMENT Arun Madan, J.
1. Since identical questions of law have been raised by the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions and since they have been heard together, they are being disposed of finally by this single common order. For the sake of convenience and ready reference. I deem it appropriate to refer to the facts stated in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/1989 titled Chainsingh v. R.S.R.T.C. treating it as the main case.
2. The petitioner in this writ petition was initially appointed on daily wage basis on the post of Conductor in Dungarpur Depot of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). The respondent-corporation is a statutory body and being creature of the statute is obviously covered within the ambit of Article 12 of the Constitution of India and is discharging its duties as an instrumentality of the State.
3. The grievance which has been raised by the petitioner in this writ petition as well as by others in the connected writ petitions is: (a) as to whether petitioners who were appointed on daily wage basis by the respondent-corporation are justified in raising a genuine and bonafide demand earlier before the corporation and now before this court in respect of their reinstatement and regularization in services consequent upon their unlawful termination/retrenchment from services of the corporation on the principle of 'last come first go' as enshrined in Section 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act) burden of which is heavily on the employer which has to be discharged by him in accordance with law unless there is a specific agreement in writing duly executed between the parties or on the basis of the appointment order itself justifying such termination or retrenchment of the workman on the justifiable grounds subject to reasons to be recorded? (b) whether in absence of issuance of seniority list of the conductors working in different Depots of the corporation in Rajasthan, the corporation was justified in terminating their services by declaring them as surplus employees instead of preparing depotwise seniority list for the purposes of extending promotional benefits to the petitioners on the next higher grade, i.e., Asstt. Traffic Inspectors and above? (c) Whether the Corporation was justified in not following the ratio of the decisions of this court in D.B.C.W. Petition No. 2369/87-Ramuram v. Asstt. Engineer P.W.D., Sub Division, Sikar and Anr. and No. 1661/88 Pooran Mal v. Asstt. Engineer P.W.D. Sub Division Sikar and Ors. decided by a single common order dated 17.1.1989 wherein the learned Division Bench of this Court while dealing with the case of daily wagers came to the conclusion that they cannot be retrenched or thrown away by an instrumentality of the State once they have been appointed in service and a person appointed on daily wage basis is equally a civil servant and cannot be thrown away out of the employment without any reason particularly when Article 21 of the Constitution should come to their aid & rescue, their livelihood being at stake and hence can be applied for the welfare of such persons? Learned Division Bench of this court in the afore-said writ petition taking note of the ratio of other decisions of the Apex Court including the case of Bandhuva Mukti Morcha v. Union of India where their lordships held that Article 21 assures the right to live with human dignity free from exploitation and the State is under a Constitutional obligation to see that there is no violation of the fundamental rights of any person particularly when he belongs to the weaker section of the community and is unable to wage a battle against a strong and powerful opponent who is exploiting him; their Lordships were of the view that the Labour Laws enacted by the Parliament for the purpose of securing the workman a life of basic human dignity in compliance with the directive principles of State policy, the Apex Court directed that the government is bound to ensure the implementation of the various social, welfare and labour laws enacted by the Parliament? (d) Whether it is not enjoined upon the court to discharge its duties in compliance with various constitutional provisions as well as the rights conferred on an employee by virtue of social, welfare legislation, i.e. Industrial Disputes Act. 1947 to examine the administrative actions of the employees representing various corporate bodies who are heading and running various instrumentalities of the State i.e. R.S.R.T.C. on the principle of accountability in the event of violation of any of the Rules which they are bound to follow and obey in the realm of administrative activity in their day to day actions reflected through various orders passed viz. a viz. their employees which affect their rights protected by various welfare legislations of the State? (e) Whether the Administrative functionaries of various State Instrumentalities e.g. the R.S.R.T.C. are not bound to ensure that their actions or decisions give effect to the policy of the welfare and they are bound by the legislative mandate as enshrined in the preamble to the Constitution of India which stipulates as under:
We, the people of india, having solemnly resolved to constitute India in to a sovereign sicialist secular democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens:
Justice, social economic and political;
Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship;
Equality of status and of opportunity;
and to promote among them all Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation;
In our constituent assembly this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do heleby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this constitutin.
(f) Whether the respondent-Corporation was justified in terminating the services of the petitioner and other similarly placed employees who were initially appointed as daily wager conductors and subsequently placed on probation for a period of one year which they had successfully completed and thereafter instead of regularizing their services in accordance with the rules having completed more than 240 days of service by giving them breaks in service at regular short intervals, had unlawfully terminated their services on the ground of having been declared as surplus employees of the corporation by declaring mass scale retrenchment of such employees and throwing them on the road by having resort to the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?
4. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/89 the petitioner discharged his duties as conductor to the Corporation for considerably long spell of time pursuant to his appointment on the said post vide order dated 18.06.1987 on daily wage basis @ Rs. 20/- per day subject to the conditions as stipulated in the appointment order itself. From perusal of appointment order dated 18.6.1987 (Ex. 1), it is apparent that no time limit as regards the duration of service of the petitioner as daily wager has been specified by the corporation. Since the petitioner fulfilled the requisite conditions as specified in the appointment order itself, he joined duties as conductor on daily wage basis w.e.f. 18.6.1987. His work performance was considered to be satisfactory and his case was recommended by the competent authority for being appointed on probation in the regular pay scale of Rs. 880-1680 excluding usual allowances as admissible to him in accordance with the rules. The probation period of service was initially fixed for one year which is apparent from the order, dated 20.1.1988 vide (Ex. 2). Thereafter the petitioner continued to discharge his duties and successfully completed the probationary period as fixed in terms of the aforesaid order, and as such he became a regular employee of the corporation since his services were not dispensed with by the corporation during the period of probation and hence a lawful right to claim continuity and regularization in services of the corporation had legitimately come to be vested in him. However all of sudden vide impugned order, dated. 9.3.1989 his services were terminated by the competent authority on the ground that he had become a surplus employee of the corporation and hence in view of the policy decision of high powered committee he was no longer required to continue. This fact is borne out from the perusal of the termination order, dated 9.3.1989 itself from which it is apparent that since the corporation had made recruitments of conductors at mass scale for and in excess of the sanctioned strength, for which it had become necessary for the corporation to do short listing of the conductors and consequently it had no option but to retrench the service of those conductors who were appointed in the services of the corporation earlier in point of time so as to make room for other conductors, who had subsequently been recruited and appointed as daily wagers i.e., the new appointees who were to be accommodated by the corporation on the said posts and for which it started with the indiscriminate policy of mass scale retrenchments not warranted by any provisions of the Act or the Rules governing the same not only with a view to accommodate the fresh recruitees but also to safeguard its position as an instrumentality of the state with a view to cover up the wrong doings of its own functionaries who were responsible for taking such policy decision of mass scale retrenchments as a face saking device to accommodate the new appointees on the said posts. Hence this modus operandi was adopted by the corporation resulting in its arbitrary decision of affecting mass scale retrenchment of the petitioners which had given rise to the filing of the aforesaid writ petitions in this Court.
5. In S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2848/89 Bhanwar Lal Suwalkha v. R.S.R.T.C. the petitioner was appointed initially in services of the Corporation on 11.09.1986 in the office of Divisional Manager Bhilwara Depot. He was removed from service on 03.12.1985 without holding any departmental enquiry and no reason was mentioned in the dismissal order which simply stated that the services were no longer required. Thereafter the petitioner was again given fresh appointment as Conductor by Divisional Manager, Ajmer vide order dated 13.10.1986 in Beawar Depot and the petitioner joined the services on 27.10.1987 as extension was granted to him for joining the same upto 31.01.1987. He resumed duties in pursuance of the said order and was regularized and placed on probation vide order dated 16.01.1988 of Divisional Manager and joined duties as regular conductor w.e.f. 20.01.1988, thereafter he was retrenched vide order dated 21.06.1988, since a number of conductor had increased due to return of many conductors pursuant to the court orders. The petitioner challenged his retrenchment by way of his writ petition in which he succeeded and was re-instated in services of the corporation with all consequential benefits. Thereafter he was again retrenched from service w.e.f. 22.04.1989 in pursuance of a general policy of the Corporation. The cut of date for retrenchment of conductors who were appointed in service of the corporation whether regular on or daily wage basis was fixed as 01.04.1987. Thereafter again as a matter of general policy when conductors were required due to rescheduling of past services and review of sectioned strength, the petitioner was again offered fresh appointment as conductor in 1993 but he refused on the ground that he should be given regular appointment. Likewise the other petitioners in aforesaid connected writ petitions were appointed as conductors on daily wage basis and thereafter placed on probation for one year in regular pay scale and subsequently terminated and then re-appointed and again retrenched by the impugned orders passed by the Divisional Managers of respective depots of the corporation in unlawful manner from time to time. In this manner the Policy of 'hiring and firing of conductors' continued 'unabted' by the respondent R.S.R.T.C. while the petitioners and other similarly placed employees of the corporation continued to suffer and were subjected time and again to termination of their services at short intervals and being subjected to vagaries of fresh selection.
6 It is significant to mention that the common grievance which all the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions have raised before this court is the challenge to the unlawful terminations of their services in the manner in which it has been done by the corporation and in most of these cases the modus operandi adopted by the corporation was to initially appoint all these' conductors as daily wagers and subsequently placed them on probation for a period of one year and after the expiry of their probationary period allowed them to continue in service by virtue of temporary breaks in service so that may not claim continuity in service nor they may claim regularization of service notwithstanding having completed more than 240 days in one go which would obviously entitle them to claim regularization in service which the corporation intended to avoid with a view to escape legal consequences under the Act and Rules by which they are governed.
7. During the course of hearing Shri S.R. Surana learned Counsel for the petitioner contended at the bar that as a matter of fact, the petitioners in the aforesaid writ petitions had successfully completed the probationary period as fixed by different orders of appointment issued by the corporation from time to time and since nothing adverse was reported or communicated to them as regards their integrity, conduct and efficiency, they had become regular employees of the corporation on successfully completion of their probationary period, but notwithstanding this vide impugned orders of termination passed on different occasions the services of the petitioners were unlawfully terminated by the corporation. The pertinent question which emerges at the outset for consideration of this court in the context of above scenario is as to what was the object of the corporation for issuing such impugned orders of termination of services of the petitioners and what public purpose would have been served earlier by appointing them as daily wagers and thereafter placing them on probation for a fixed period of one year and after its successful completion again placing the said employees to a great peril of loosing their jobs by suddenly terminating their services without giving them any chance or occasion of being heard and without serving any prior show cause notice explaining reasons for their retrenchment and suddenly passing retrenchment orders so that they may be thrown out of their jobs and left to the mercy of Almighty to fend themselves with their families to starvation.
8. In reply to show cause notice served on the respondent-corporation it has not controverted the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners as regards their appointment on probation and their subsequent extensions in service given from time to time with temporary breaks. As regards the case of the petitioner Chain Singh in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/89 it has been stated that there was a remark in the service record of the petitioner regarding incomplete way-bill books. With regard to the sanctioned strength of Conductors it has been contended that there were 5737 total sanctioned posts of conductors with the corporation as against which 7052 persons were working as conductors for and in excess of sanctioned strength. With a view to rationalise the things and in order to over-come financial loss, a policy decision was taken by the management vide order, dated 9.3.1989 to retrench the person who were appointed after 1.4.1997. As regards the fixation of the said cut of date, it has been contended that the same was upheld by this court in various decisions including Devilal and 35 others v. R.S.R.T.C. It has further been submitted that the date shown in the orders dated 4.8.1990 and 4.3.1991 is the date of respective appointments of the petitioners as they were placed on probation and not the date of their initial appointment. It has further been stated that the said dates are when the petitioners were initially appointed on daily wage basis prior to 1.4.1987 and thus they cannot be said to be junior to the petitioners by any stretch of imagination. On merits, it has been contended that the Executive Director (Traffic) vide its order, dated 24.3.1993 sent a panel of retrenched persons for re-appointment as conductors and the name of the petitioners had also appeared in the said order in pursuance of which the Chief Manager, Dungarpur Division vide its orders dated 30.4.1993 and 21.5.1993 had called the petitioner Chain Singh with all the relevant documents for re-appointment and on 15.3.1993, the petitioner submitted an affidavit to the effect that no case against the retrenchment is pending in any court of law against the respondent-corporation and had also specifically mentioned that he waives all his claims regarding the period of retrenchment. Consequently on 25.9.1993 after adopting all other safeguards as referred to above, the corporation re-appointed the petitioner as conductor and likewise other similarly placed conductors who have moved this court by way of aforesaid connected writ petitions as referred to above, similar orders of reinstatement of the said retrenched employees were passed by the corporation. As regards the applicability of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 or Standing Order of 1965, it has been contended that the contentions of the petitioners are misconceived and they are not applicable to the cases of the petitioners.
9. In order to appreciate the contentions advanced by learned Counsel for the petitioners during the course of hearing of the aforesaid writ petitions, it shall be appropriate to refer to the relevant Rules known as the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulations which were framed in exercise of powers vested under Section 45 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950 (for short 'the Regulations') which came into force w.e.f. 15.8.1965 Regulation 120 and 121 of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Employees Service Regulation, 1965 read as under:
120(a) An employee who is appointed by direct recruitment shall be placed on probation for a period of one year calculated from the date of his provisionally a substantive appointment.
(b) If it appears to the appointing authority at any time during or at the end of the period of probation that a probationer has failed to give satisfaction, the appointing authority may revert him to the post held substantively by him immediate proceeding his appointment on probation, provided he holds a lien thereon, on in other cases may remove him from service.
Provided that the appointing authority may extend the period of probation by a specified time not exceeding one year.
(c) No compensation shall be granted by the corporation to a probationer who is reverted or removed from service during or at the end of the period of probation under sub-regularisation (b) above.
121. A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation if the appointing authority is satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and he is otherwise fit for confirmation.
10. The relevant provisions of Rule 7 of the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers and Workshop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 which came into force w.e.f. 17.8.1965 read as under:
Classification of Motor Transport Worker 7-A Motor Transport Worker shall be classified as under the shall be provided with a card indicating the status held by him from time to
(i) probationer
(ii) permanent
(iii) Temporary
(iv) Apprentice:
'Recruitment of probationer 8 (i) A probationer worker shall be appointed in the manner prescribed by the Corporation to fill a permanent-vacancy in a post;
Period of probation
(ii) The period of probation shall normally be six months unless the Corporation otherwise determines a different period of probation for a Post or class of posts, or unless it is extended by a specified time not exceeding six months. Breaks due to sickness, accident, leave, lock-out, strikes (not being illegal strikes) or involuntary closure of the establishment shall be included in the period of probation.
Confirmation
(iii) A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation if he has successfully passed the prescribed trade test or prescribed departmental examination and if the appointing authority is satisfied that his integrity is unquestionable and he is otherwise fit for confirmation.
(iv) No compensation shall be granted to a probationer who is removed during or at the end of the probation, if he has failed to give satisfaction to the appointing authority or if he has failed to pass the prescribed trade test or the prescribed departmental examination" Permanent Motor Transport Worker 9-(i) A Worker shall acquire the status of a permanent Worker from the date of his confirmation and appointment substantively.
(ii) On substantive appointment to a permanent post a worker shall acquire a lien on that post.
11. In support of his contention advanced at the bar, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the following decisions:
R.S. Rawed v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: 1993 (1) WLC (Raj.) 79, Ayurved Chikitsak Welfare Association Jaipur v. State of Rajasthan, 1994 (4) WLR 530, Lokesh Kumar Pareek and Anr. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1992 (1) RLW 578, Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. 1986 (2) SLR 345, Smt. Santosh Kumari and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. WLR 1991 (S) SC 1, Shri Om Prakash Goel v. The Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. Shimla and Anr., 1991 (2) UJ (SC) 176. Bhagwti Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation etc., 1992 (8) SLR 784. Ganpathi P. Hegde v. General Manager (FPU) Karnataka, 1995 (3) SLR 174, D.K. Yadav v. M/s. J.M.A. Industries Ltd., 1993 (2) UJ (SC) 348 and Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. .
12. Learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance upon the following citations:
Goptial Teli v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1995 (2) WLC 1, Robert D'Souza v. The Executive Engineer, Southern Railway and Anr. AIR 1982 (SC) 854, M. Venugopal v. The Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. 1994 (68) IF & LR 443, Dhakshnamoorthy v. Kancheepuram Central Co-operative Bank and Ors. 1996 (1) LLN 244 and The Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation and Ors. v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee .
13. In the matter of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. (supra) the following questions of law had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court in Special Leaves granted by the Court which was dealt with & decide with the following observations:
(1) Whether a Government Company as defined in Section 617 of the Companies Act 1956, is "the State" within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution?
(2) Whether an unconscionable term in a contract of employment is void under Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, as being opposed to public policy and, when such a term is contained in a contract of employment entered into with a Government Company, is also void as infringing Article 14 of the Constitution in case a Government Company is "the State" under Article 12 of the Constitution?
14. As regards responsibility of the Corporation which is an instrumentality of the State and a Government Undertaking in Public Sector, it was observed by the Apex Court that the activities of the Corporation are of more importance of public interest, concern and welfare and are the activities of the nature carried on by a modern State and particularly a modern Welfare State which is subject to constitutional limitations and its actions are State actions and must be judged in the light of fundamental rights guaranteed by Part-III of the Constitution of India and its actions must therefore be in conformity with Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is always open for the Court to lift the corporate veil with a view to investigate and find out as to whether the impugned actions which are under challenge by way of writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution before the Court satisfy the requirements and are in conformity with the rules, and principles of natural justice etc. If its actions are unconscionable on the grounds which render an agreement void and unforceable, it is always upon to the Court to quash and set-aside the same.
15. In the matter of Smt. Santosh Kumari and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. (supra) the appointment of the petitioner was affected for a period of 89 days only against regular and clear cut vacancy and in pursuance of the said order she had joined the services of the concerned department of the State of Punjab. She challenged her termination by way of a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Apex Court. It was observed by the Apex Court, as under:
There are clear vacancies in the ministerial posts against which petitioners have been appointed. This fact is not disputed. When there are regular vacancies, it is difficult to understand how appointments should be made effective for 89 days only. This Court had already interfered with such appointment/orders in the State of Punjab and has directed that regular appointments should be made either on temporary or permanent basis, so that regular and clear vacancies in existence would be filled up. The respondents are directed to give effect to this order and not terminate the employment of the petitioners on the basis of that they have already served for 89 days. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.
16. In the matter of D.K. Yadav v. M/s. J.M.A. Industries Limited (supra), the services of the appellants-workmen were terminated by the management of M/s. J.M.A. Industries Limited Faridabad. The same was challenged by the workmen before the Labour Court which uphelp the termination as illegal and invalid. Being aggrieved, the appellant challenged the impugned-award of the Labour Court before the Apex Court. The principle question which had arisen for consideration of the Apex Court was as to whether the impugned action of the employer is violative of principle of natural justice with reference to the relevant rule on the subject? The Apex Court while allowing the appeal of the workman was of the view that it is a fundamental rule of law that no decision must be taken which will effect right of any person without first being informed of the case and without giving him/her an opportunity of putting forward his/her case. Any order passed by the employer involving civil consequences must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice. Placing reliance upon its earlier decision in the matter of Mahendra Singh Gill and Anr. v. The Chief Election Commissioner and Ors. F wherein, the Constitution Bench held that "civil consequence" covers infraction of not merely property or personal right but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotion every thing that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edition, page 1487 defined civil rights are such as belonging to every citizen of the State or country...they include...rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action.... In State of Orissa v. Dr. (Miss) Binapani Devi and Ors. (13), this court held that even an administrative order which involved civil consequences must be made inconsistently with the rules of natural justice. The person concerned must be informed of the case the evidence in support thereof supplied and must be given a fair opportunity to meet the case before an adverse decision is taken. Since no such opportunity was given it was held that superannuation was in violation of principles of natural justice."
17. It was further observed, as under:
It is thus well settled law that right to life enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution would include right to livelihood. The order of termination of the service of an employee/workman visits with civil consequences of jeopardising not only his/her livelihood but also career and livelihood of dependents. Therefore, before taking any action putting an end to the tenure of an employee/workman fair play requires that a reasonable opportunity to put forth his case is given and domestic enquiry conducted complying with the principles of natural justice. In D.T.C. v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress and Ors. (supra) the constitution bench, per majority, held that termination of the service of a workman giving one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof without enquiry offended Article 14. The order terminating the service of the employees was set aside.
18. In the matter of Ganpathi P. Hegde v. General Manager (FPU) Karnataka (supra) the Karnataka High Court in the case of temporary appointment of an employee which was challenged by way of writ petition No. 8941/94 decided on 2.12.1994 observed, as under:
This Court has come across a large number of instances where the pernicious practice of appointing persons temporarily or on a contract basis or in the case of members of the teaching profession, by giving them several breaks under the guise of reappointing them. These are down right wrong and dishonest practices and in all instances where it demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Court that the post existed, that the person was duly qualified and that an attempt has been made to deliberately harass and deprive the employee of just dues, benefits and security of tenure, the Court is obliged to set the record right.
19. In the matter of Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress and Ors. (supra), the Corporation had terminated the services some of its permanent employees without holding domestic enquiry in accordance with law which was contrary to the regulations and the relevant provisions of the act on the subject. In appeal against the decision of the Delhi High Court to the Apex Court it was observed by the Apex Court, as under:
The employment under the public undertakings is a public employment and a public property. It is not only the undertakings but also the society which has a stake in their proper and efficient working. Both discipline and devotion are necessary for efficiency. To ensure both, the service conditions of those who work for them must be encouraging, certain and secured, and not vague and whimsical. With capricious service conditions, both discipline and devotion are endangered, and efficiency is impaired.... The right to life includes right to livelihood. The right to livelihood therefore cannot hang on to the fancies of individuals in authority. The employment is not a bounty from them nor can its survival be at their mercy. Income is the foundation of many fundamental rights and when work is the sole source of income, the right to work becomes as much fundamental. Fundamental rights can ill-afford to be consigned to the limbo of underfined premises and uncertain applications. That will be a mockery of them.
Both the society and the individual employees, therefore, have an anxious interest in service conditions being well defined and explicit to the extent possible. The arbitrary rules which are also sometimes described as Henry VIII Rules, can have no place in any service conditions.
Beyond the sell-deluding and self asserting righteous presumption, there is nothing to support the so called "high authority" theory. This theory undoubtedly weighed with some authorities for some time in the past. But its unrealistic pretensions were soon noticed and it was buried without even so much as an ode to it.
20. In my view the ratio of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court as well decisions of other High Courts as referred to above are attracted to the above noted writ petitions preferred by the petitioners against the respondent R.S.R.T.C. and the ratio decidendi of the same has been grossly violated and not followed by the corporation, thereby, jeopardising the service career of the petitioners.
21. As regards the ratio of the decisions cited at the bar by the learned Counsel for the respondents, I am of the view that the same are not attracted to the aforesaid writ petitions since the petitioners had all served the respondent Corporation for more than requisite period of 240 days with temporary breaks given by the corporation frequently at short intervals and hence are entitled to claim regularisation of their services and the Corporation was not justified in terminating their services on the ground that with a view to overcome financial losses a policy decision was taken by the Management vide order dated 9.3.1989 to retrench the services of the petitioners who were appointed after 1.4.1987 for which, in my view there is absolutely no rational justification. I am further of the view that Corporation had taken a very arbitrary stand in the same breath by observing that the Executive Director (Traffic) had, vide its order dated 24.3.1993 recommended the case of retrenched employees/conductors for their reappointment and the names of the petitioners had also appeared in the said order, though in this context the Corporation had adopted sufficient safeguards for itself by taking affidavits from the petitioners to the effect that no case against retrenchment was pending against the Corporation in any court of law and that specific statement from the petitioners that they have waived all their claims regarding the period of retrenchment. If this is so then what was the justification in firstly directing the retrenchment of the petitioners from the services of the Corporation and thereafter the Corporation had become wise after realizing its mistake and it is basically with a view to overcome the hurdles which may not come in its way if its arbitrary decisions of retrenchment are challenged in a court of law that the Corporation had devised its novel method to recommend the names of the petitioners for reinstatement in service subject to observance of conditions as aforesaid.
22. As a result of above discussion, I am of the view that the petitioners deserve to succeed and the impugned orders of retrenchment dated 12.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5120/1989 (Chain Singh v. R.S.R.T.C), dated 12.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2848/1989 (Bhanwer Lal v. R.S.R.T.C.), dated 12.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No, 1981/1989 (Desh Raj Singh v. R.S.R.T.C), dated 12.4.1987 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3476/1989 (Munshi Lal v. R.S.R.T.C), dated 12.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4193/1989 (Dayanand Yadav v. R.S.R.T.C), dated 7.9.1987 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3452/89 (Durga Shankar Sharma v. R.S.R.T.C & another), dated 9.3.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3250/89 (Prakash Chandra Choudhry v. R.S.R.T.C), dated 15.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3406/89 (Naresh Kumar Mudgal v. R.S.R.T.C. & another) & dated 7.4.1989 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3533/89 (Brij Mohan v. R.S.R.T.C. Jaipur) are all quashed and set aside. Consequently, the aforesaid writ petitions are allowed with the direction to the respondent Corporation to reinstate the petitioners by issuing suitable orders in this regard within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. The respondent Corporation is further directed to fix the petitioners in suitable pay scales treating them as regular employees of the corporation as per their entitlement in accordance with the Rules and shall further be entitled to all consequential benefits.
23. There will be no order as to costs.