Karnataka High Court
Mrs U Anitha Reddy vs State Of Karnataka on 28 October, 2024
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 21.10.2024
Pronounced on : 28.10.2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF OCTOBER, 2024
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
CRIMINAL PETITION No.13613 OF 2023
BETWEEN:
1 . MRS.U.ANITHA REDDY
W/O MR.U.YESHWARDHAN REDDY,
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS,
HAVING OFFICE AT:
BIG BANYAN ROOTS,
CARMELARAM ROAD,
DODDAKANNELLI,
BENGALURU - 560 035.
2 . MR.U.YESHWARDHAN REDDY
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS,
S/O LATE UL REDDY,
HAVING OFFICE AT:
BIG BANYAN ROOTS,
NO.1102, 11TH FLOOR,
CARMELARAM ROAD,
DODDAKKANNELLI,
BENGALURU - 560 102.
3 . MRS. PALLAVI REDDY
AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS,
W/O M.RAJENDRA REDDY,
RESIDING AT T-401,
2
RED WOOD APARTMENT,
HARLUR ROAD,
SARJAPUR ROAD,
BENGALURU - 560 102.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI AJAY SHANKAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1 . STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY SARJAPURA POLICE STATION,
SARJAPURA,
REPRESENTED BY SPP
HIGH COURT OF BUILDING
BENGALURU - 560 001.
2 . PRABHAKAR NAIK
AGED ABOUT 63 YEARS,
S/O LATE GAGNADHAR NAIK,
RESIDING AT NO.3211,
PRESTIGE WEST WOOD
GOPALAPURA
BENGALURU CITY.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R-1;
SRI PRABHAKAR NAIK, R-2 PARTY-IN-PERSON)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF
CR.P.C., PRAYING TO A. QUASH THE FIR REGISTERED BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 IN THE HONBLE PRINCIPAL CIVIL JUDGE (Jr.
Dn.) AND JMFC COURT, ANEKAL IN SARJAPURA POLICE STATION
BEARING CRIME NO.420/2023 AT ANNEXURE A; B. RESTRAIN THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 FROM PROCEEDINGS WITH ANY
INVESTIGATION INTO THE SAID FIR INC R.NO.420/2023.
3
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 21.10.2024, COMING ON FOR
PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners/accused 4, 5 and 6 are before this Court
calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.420 of 2023
registered for offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC and
pending before the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division) & JMFC,
Anekal.
2. Heard Sri Ajay Shankar, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Sri B.N.Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public
Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri Prabhakar Naik,
respondent No.2 in person.
3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows:-
The petitioners are the owners of 31 guntas of land in
Sy.No.36/6 and 36/7 of Chembanahalli Village, Sarjapur Hobli,
Anekal Taluk. They entered into a Joint Development Agreement
4
('JDA' for short) with the developer who is the other accused in the
subject crime. In terms of law, plan sanction was obtained and the
developer bifurcated the apartments that fell into the share of the
land owners and the developers in terms of sharing agreement
executed between the parties. Eight years thereafter, it appears the
developer abandoned the project without completing it. The
petitioners, against the developer, invoking arbitration clause
issued notice and have also filed a petition under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking appointment of an
Arbitrator. The petition so filed under Section 11 is still pending
consideration at the hands of this Court. Meanwhile, the Association
of Home owners of the apartment complex filed a petition before
the Karnataka Real Estate Regulatory Authority ('RERA' for short)
seeking substitution of the builder and in terms thereof, the
Association has taken the onus of construction of the project and
completing the same. After all these happenings, the 2nd
respondent, a home buyer who is said to have paid a sum of
`33,76,000/- to the developer registers a crime in Crime No.420 of
2023 for the aforesaid offence. The registration of crime is what has
driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.
5
4. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
take this Court through the JDA to demonstrate that 38% of the
built up area was retained by the petitioners and the remaining
area was with the developer. The 2nd respondent/complainant has
no contract with the petitioners, as he is the one who has invested
with the developer's share of property. The developer commits
default in the project. In spite thereof, the petitioners are drawn
into the web of crime. After the developer defaulting in the project,
RERA has permitted the Association of Home Buyers to complete
the project. Therefore, the petitioners are nowhere in the picture
qua the 2nd respondent/complainant. The ingredients of Section
420 of the IPC against these petitioners cannot be imagined to be
met is the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners.
5. Per contra, the 2nd respondent in person would vehemently
refute the submissions to contend that he has entered into contract
with the developer, which does not mean that the petitioners are
not aware of anything. 38% of the land share is even now not
6
identified. Owners share could not be clearly defined even in the
JDA and General Power of Attorney was issued by the petitioners in
favour of the developer and the new developer has been brought in
without the consent of home buyers. On these points, the
respondent in person seeks dismissal of the petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and the 2nd
respondent in person.
7. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute as they are all
borne out of records. The petitioners/accused 4 to 6 are the
owners of the land as afore-described. They enter into a JDA on
25-09-2013 with M/s Viijcon Properties. The developer's share was
to be transferred in terms of the JDA. Relevant portion of clause 8
of the JDA, which is germane, reads as follows:
"VIII. TRANSFER OF DEVELOPERS SHARE:
a. The owners herein irrevocably appoint the Developer to
sell 62% (sixty two per cent) of Developer's share of
saleable undivided right title and interest in the Schedule
Property together and including the total super built up
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area either in whole or in parts or in portions as the
developer may deem fit.
b. The Owners also authorize the Developer to connect the
money receivable on sale of the undivided share in the
property together with total super built up area in respect
of the 62% (sixty two per cent) of Developer share;
c. Any excess or shortfall in the price of the sale of the
undivided share and interest to the extent of the
Developer share shall be the profit or loss of the
Developer and the Owners shall not be responsible for the
same likewise any excess or shortfall in the price of the
sale of the undivided share or interest to the extent of the
owners share shall be profit or loss of the Owners and the
Developer shall not be responsible for the same;
d. The owners shall not be responsible for any dispute
between the Developer and the prospective buyers arising
between them;
e. To allot various apartments/car parking area to be
constructed in the Schedule Property (other than the
Owners share) to such persons and in such manner as the
Developer may deem fit, to the extent of the Developers
share, however, the Developer shall be entitled to sell the
last remaining 5% (five percent) of their share, after
completion of the entire Project falling to the share of
Developer. The term completion means and includes
completion of entire internal and external infrastructure,
as specified in this agreement and the Project should be
deemed to be habitable by humans;
f. The Owners shall execute a Power of Attorney to enable
the Developer to enter into the agreement of sale and to
execute sale deeds in respect of the saleable undivided
right, title and interest in the Schedule Property together
with total super built up area with various buyers to the
extent of Developers 62% (six two percent) share and
Power of Attorney shall be in force till the completion of
the project and its sale;"
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The owners irrevocably appoint the developer to sell sixty two
percent of developer's share of saleable undivided right, title and
interest and the remaining 38 percent remain with the owners.
After execution of the JDA, the petitioners execute a General Power
of Attorney on the same day in favour of the developer. All these
happen in the year 2013. Construction begins. Several home
buyers register their interest in the apartment complex by paying
certain amounts as was demanded. The 2nd respondent/
complainant has also paid a sum of Rs.33,76,000/- to the developer
and not to the petitioners. Not a single rupee has passed on to the
petitioners from the hands of the complainant. This is an admitted
fact. The developer defaults in completion of the project and
abandons it half way.
8. In terms of the aforesaid JDA, the petitioners have invoked
resolution of the dispute by way of arbitration and the said petition
seeking appointment of an Arbitrator is said to be pending
consideration before this Court. The flat owners who had formed an
Association knocked at the doors of RERA. RERA on 17-07-2023
grants an interim order. It reads as follows:
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"INTERIM ORDER
a. The Respondent No.1 shall remit all the sale proceeds
from sale of newly sanctioned flats under modified
sanction plan bearing No.CC460/2014-16 dated
09.01.2023, bearing Number A.001, A 002, A003, A 004,
A 005, B 701, B 702, B 703, B 704 and B 705 to any
prospective purchasers, only in the escrow account jointly
opened by the Complainant and Respondent No.1.
b. The authorized representative of the Complainant
Association should be a confirming party/consenting
witness in all the sale deeds executed by the Respondent
No.1.
c. The President of the Complainant Association should be
the signatory for withdrawal of the amount from the
escrow account along with one of the partner of
Respondent No.1.
d. The request made by the complainant Association for
extension of the project for one more year will be
considered in view of the MOU between Respondent No.1
and the Complainant submitted before this Authority.
e. As this project remains with Respondent No.1, after the
extension is given, the actual promoter will be the
complainant Association for the amounts additionally
invested by the allottee and also the additional amounts
received from the sale of the 10 apartments. The
authority u/s 7(3) allowed this registration to continue till
30-06-2024 without payment of the fee to RERA for
extension. The Respondent No.1 promoter to ensure that
the President of the Association is signatory for the
cheques to draw from ESCROW account. However, the
other statutory requirements of the RERA i.e., submission
of Quarterly Updates, Annual Audit Reports and such
other compliances should be complied jointly by both the
parties."
10
The Association is now in-charge of completion of construction of
the building. Likewise, the daughter of the complainant who was
the initial investor had also knocked at the doors of RERA in which
the developer and the petitioners were the respondents. In
Complaint No.00239 of 2023, RERA on 01-12-2023 has passed the
following order:
"ORDER
"In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 31 of
the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, the
complaint bearing No.00239 of 2023 is hereby allowed.
1. The respondents are hereby directed to pay the amount
of Rs.60,91,329/- (Rupees sixty lakh ninety one thousand
three hundred and twenty nine only) with interest at the
rate of 9% p.a. from 11-05-2025 till 30-04-2017.
2. Further, the respondents are directed to pay the amount
of Rs.60,91,329/- (Rupees sixty lakh ninety one thousand
three hundred and twenty nine only) with interest at the
rate of SBI MCLR+2% from 01.05.2017 to till the date of
entire realisation.
3. The complainant is at liberty to enforce the said order in
accordance with law if the respondents fail to comply with
the above order.
No order as to costs."
The RERA directs the respondents therein to pay `60,91,329/- to
the daughter of the complainant/2nd respondent along with interest
from 01-05-2017 till the date of payment. The complainant does
11
not get that order executed but seeks to register a complaint before
the jurisdictional Police for offence punishable under Section 420 of
the IPC.
9. The issue now would be, whether an amount of
`60,91,329/- as ordered by RERA or `33,76,000/- which the
complainant had transferred to the Developer, could be recovered
through criminal law being set into motion. The issue need not
detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter.
Interpreting the very provision of law i.e., Section 420 of the IPC in
an identical circumstance this Court in the case of PATEL
ENGINEERING LIMITED v. STATE OF KARNATAKA1 has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
13. As observed in the course of the order, there are
several proceedings pending between the parties. It was always
open to the complainant to initiate civil proceedings in a manner
known to law and not set the criminal law into motion on breach
of agreements, on the specious plea that he is unlettered. On
the said the score, permitting further investigation even, in the
case at hand, would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court
1
Criminal Petition No.6513 of 2024 decided on 06-08-2024
12
in the case of VIJAY KUMAR GHAI v. STATE OF WEST
BENGAL2 where in it is held as follows:
"27. Section 405 IPC defines "criminal breach of trust" which
reads as under:
"405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being
in any manner entrusted with property, or with any
dominion over property, dishonestly
misappropriates or converts to his own use that
property, or dishonestly uses or disposes of that
property in violation of any direction of law
prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or
implied, which he has made touching the discharge
of such trust, or wilfully suffers any other person
so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust"."
The essential ingredients of the offence of criminal breach of
trust are:
(1) The accused must be entrusted with the property or
with dominion over it,
(2) The person so entrusted must use that property, or;
(3) The accused must dishonestly use or dispose of that
property or wilfully suffer any other person to do so
in violation,
(a) of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which such
trust is to be discharged, or;
(b) of any legal contract made touching the discharge of such
trust.
28. "Entrustment" of property under Section 405
of the Penal Code, 1860 is pivotal to constitute an
offence under this. The words used are, "in any manner
entrusted with property". So, it extends to
entrustments of all kinds whether to clerks, servants,
business partners or other persons, provided they are
holding a position of "trust". A person who dishonestly
misappropriates property entrusted to them contrary to
the terms of an obligation imposed is liable for a
2
(2022) 7 SCC 124
13
criminal breach of trust and is punished under Section
406 of the Penal Code.
29. The definition in the section does not restrict
the property to movables or immovables alone. This
Court in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn. [R.K.
Dalmia v. Delhi Admn., (1963) 1 SCR 253 : AIR 1962 SC
1821] held that the word "property" is used in the Code
in a much wider sense than the expression "movable
property". There is no good reason to restrict the
meaning of the word "property" to movable property
only when it is used without any qualification in
Section 405.
30. In Sudhir Shantilal Mehta v. CBI [Sudhir Shantilal
Mehta v. CBI, (2009) 8 SCC 1: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 646] it was
observed that the act of criminal breach of trust would, inter
alia mean using or disposing of the property by a person who
is entrusted with or has otherwise dominion thereover. Such
an act must not only be done dishonestly but also in violation
of any direction of law or any contract express or implied
relating to carrying out the trust.
31. Section 415 IPC defines "cheating" which
reads as under:
"415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any
person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the
person so deceived to deliver any property to any
person, or to consent that any person shall retain
any property, or intentionally induces the person so
deceived to do or omit to do anything which he
would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and
which act or omission causes or is likely to cause
damage or harm to that person in body, mind,
reputation or property, is said to "cheat"."
The essential ingredients of the offence of cheating
are:
1. Deception of any person
2.(a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that
person--
(i) to deliver any property to any person; or
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(ii) to consent that any person shall retain any
property; or
(b) intentionally inducing that person to do or
omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he
were no so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is
likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body,
mind, reputation or property.
32. A fraudulent or dishonest inducement is an
essential ingredient of the offence. A person who
dishonestly induces another person to deliver any
property is liable for the offence of cheating.
33. Section 420 IPC defines "cheating and
dishonestly inducing delivery of property" which reads
as under:
"420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing
delivery of property.--Whoever cheats and
thereby dishonestly induces the person deceived to
deliver any property to any person, or to make,
alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable
security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and
which is capable of being converted into a valuable
security, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
34. Section 420 IPC is a serious form of
cheating that includes inducement (to lead or
move someone to happen) in terms of delivery of
property as well as valuable securities. This
section is also applicable to matters where the
destruction of the property is caused by the way
of cheating or inducement. Punishment for
cheating is provided under this section which may
extend to 7 years and also makes the person liable
to fine.
35. To establish the offence of cheating in
inducing the delivery of property, the following
ingredients need to be proved:
15
(i) The representation made by the person
was false.
(ii) The accused had prior knowledge that
the representation he made was false.
(iii) The accused made false representation
with dishonest intention in order to
deceive the person to whom it was
made.
(iv) The act where the accused induced the
person to deliver the property or to
perform or to abstain from any act which
the person would have not done or had
otherwise committed.
36. As observed and held by this Court in R.K.
Vijayasarathy v. Sudha Seetharam [R.K. Vijayasarathy
v. Sudha Seetharam, (2019) 16 SCC 739 : (2020) 2
SCC (Cri) 454] , the ingredients to constitute an offence
under Section 420 are as follows:
(i) a person must commit the offence of cheating
under Section 415; and
(ii) the person cheated must be dishonestly induced
to:
(a) deliver property to any person; or
b) make, alter or destroy valuable security or
anything signed or sealed and capable of being
converted into valuable security. Thus, cheating
is an essential ingredient for an act to constitute
an offence under Section 420 IPC.
37. The following observation made by this Court
in Uma Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar [Uma
Shankar Gopalika v. State of Bihar, (2005) 10 SCC 336
: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 49] with almost similar facts and
circumstances may be relevant to note at this stage :
(SCC pp. 338-39, paras 6-7)
16
"6. Now the question to be examined by us is
as to whether on the facts disclosed in the petition of
the complaint any criminal offence whatsoever is
made out much less offences under Sections
420/120-BIPC. The only allegation in the complaint
petition against the accused persons is that they
assured the complainant that when they receive the
insurance claim amounting to Rs 4,20,000, they
would pay a sum of Rs 2,60,000 to the complainant
out of that but the same has never been paid. ... It
was pointed out on behalf of the complainant that
the accused fraudulently persuaded the complainant
to agree so that the accused persons may take steps
for moving the consumer forum in relation to the
claim of Rs 4,20,000. It is well settled that every
breach of contract would not give rise to an offence
of cheating and only in those cases breach of
contract would amount to cheating where there was
any deception played at the very inception. If the
intention to cheat has developed later on, the same
cannot amount to cheating. In the present case, it
has nowhere been stated that at the very inception
that there was intention on behalf of the accused
persons to cheat which is a condition precedent for
an offence under Section 420IPC.
7. In our view petition of complaint does not
disclose any criminal offence at all much less any
offence either under Section 420 or Section 120-
BIPC and the present case is a case of purely civil
dispute between the parties for which remedy lies
before a civil court by filing a properly constituted
suit. In our opinion, in view of these facts allowing
the police investigation to continue would amount to
an abuse of the process of court and to prevent the
same it was just and expedient for the High Court to
quash the same by exercising the powers under
Section 482CrPC which it has erroneously refused."
38. There can be no doubt that a mere
breach of contract is not in itself a criminal
offence and gives rise to the civil liability of
damages. However, as held by this Court
in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of
Bihar, (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] ,
17
the distinction between mere breach of contract
and cheating, which is criminal offence, is a fine
one. While breach of contract cannot give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating, fraudulent or
dishonest intention is the basis of the offence of
cheating. In the case at hand, complaint filed by
Respondent 2 does not disclose dishonest or
fraudulent intention of the appellants."
(Emphasis supplied)
Later, the Apex Court in the case of MITESH KUMAR
J.SHA v. STATE OF KARNATAKA3 has held as follows:
"Issues
24. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions
made by the appellants and the respondents herein in our
considered opinion, the following three key issues require
determination in the instant case:
(i) Whether the necessary ingredients of
the offences punishable under Sections 406, 419
and 420 are prima facie made out?
(ii) Whether sale of excess flats, even if
made, amounts to a mere breach of contract or
constitutes an offence of cheating?
(iii) Whether the dispute is one of entirely
civil nature and therefore liable to be quashed?
Whether the necessary ingredients of offences
punishable under Sections 406, 419 and 420 are prima
facie made out?
25. In order to ascertain the veracity of contentions made
by the parties herein, it is imperative to firstly examine whether
the relevant ingredients of offences which the appellants herein
had been charged with, are prima facie made out. The relevant
sections read as follows:
3
(2022)14 SCC 572
18
"405. Criminal breach of trust.--Whoever, being in any
manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property,
dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use that property,
or dishonestly uses or disposes of that property in violation of any
direction of law prescribing the mode in which such trust is to be
discharged, or of any legal contract, express or implied, which he has
made touching the discharge of such trust, or willfully suffers any
other person so to do, commits "criminal breach of trust".
Explanation 1.--A person, being an employer of an
establishment whether exempted under Section 17 of the Employees'
Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952),
or not who deducts the employee's contribution from the wages
payable to the employee for credit to a Provident Fund or Family
Pension Fund established by any law for the time being in force, shall
be deemed to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution
so deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such
contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said law, shall be
deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution
in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.
Explanation 2.--A person, being an employer, who deducts the
employees' contribution from the wages payable to the employee for
credit to the Employees' State Insurance Fund held and administered
by the Employees' State Insurance Corporation established under the
Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 (34 of 1948), shall be deemed
to have been entrusted with the amount of the contribution so
deducted by him and if he makes default in the payment of such
contribution to the said Fund in violation of the said Act, shall be
deemed to have dishonestly used the amount of the said contribution
in violation of a direction of law as aforesaid.
***
406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.--Whoever
commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or
with fine, or with both.
***
419. Punishment for cheating by personation.--Whoever
cheats by personation shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine,
or with both.
420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of
property.-- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the
person deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make,
alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or
19
anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being
converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine."
26. In the instant case, the complaint levelled
against the appellants herein is one which involves
commission of offences of criminal breach of trust and
cheating. While a criminal breach of trust as postulated
under Section 405 of the Penal Code, 1860, entails
misappropriation or conversion of another's property for
one's own use, with a dishonest intention, cheating too
on the other hand as an offence defined under Section
415 of the Penal Code, 1860, involves an ingredient of
having a dishonest or fraudulent intention which is aimed
at inducing the other party to deliver any property to a
specific person. Both the sections clearly prescribed
"dishonest intention", as a precondition for even prima
facie establishing the commission of the said offences.
Thus, in order to assess the relevant contentions made by
the parties herein, the question whether actions of the
appellants were committed in furtherance of a dishonest
or fraudulent scheme is one which requires scrutiny.
27. Coming to the facts of the case at hands, the
contested contention between the parties is that the builder
company had sold four excess flats beyond its share, in terms of
the JDA and supplementary agreement entered into between
the parties. Respondent 2 contends that builder company which
was entitled to sell only 9 flats in its favour, has instead
executed sale deed for 13 flats in total. Thus, the company
simply could not have sold the flats beyond 9 flats for which it
was authorised and resultantly cannot evade criminal liability on
a mere premise that a civil dispute is already pending between
the parties.
28. The appellants on the other hand contend that in
terms of a subsequent MoU dated 19-2-2015, it was mutually
agreed between the parties, that partial payment for a loan
amount borrowed by Respondent 2 from Religare Finvest Ltd.,
would be paid out from the sale proceeds of the said
development project undertaken by both the parties. Pursuant
20
to this MoU, the appellants had agreed to get an NOC for 15
flats by making payment of Rs 40,00,000 for each flat.
29. The key contention, and also the central point of
dispute, made by the appellants is that, it was specifically
agreed between the parties that the appellants would be entitled
to sell additional flats beyond their share, as adjustments for
payment made to Religare Finvest Ltd. on behalf of Respondent
2. It is further contended that Respondent 2 had also agreed to
execute a ratification deed to the JDA and GPA eventually, which
would have formally authorised the appellants to sell additional
apartments.
30. Nonetheless, the ratification deed was never made
and Respondent 2 subsequently even revoked the GPA
unilaterally, contending that the terms of JDA were not followed.
It was only after revocation of GPA that the company filed an
application for arbitration seeking interim orders to restrain
Respondent 2 from alienating the disputed property.
Simultaneously, while this dispute was pending adjudication
before the arbitrator Respondent 2 filed a criminal complaint
against the appellants.
31. At this juncture, it further becomes pertinent to
mention that eventually though both the parties partly
succeeded before the arbitrator, in terms of their
respective claims, the arbitrator observed that GPA
indeed could not have been revoked unilaterally at the
instance of Respondent 2. Aggrieved, Respondent 2
thereafter even preferred a challenge to the award
passed by the arbitrator. Moreover, pending arbitration
proceedings issue regarding selling of excess flats at the
instance of the appellants, was also withdrawn by
Respondent 2 seeking liberty to pursue his claim with
regard to selling of four excess flats in pending civil
proceedings.
32. Upon a careful assessment of such facts, by no
stretch can it be concluded that the appellants herein have
deceptively or intentionally tried to sell excess flats if any, as
contended by Respondent 2. Here, it must also be borne in mind
that subsequent to the revocation of GPA, it was the appellants
herein who had first resorted to arbitration proceedings on 2-3-
21
2016 for redressal of dispute between the parties, to which
Respondent 2 had accordingly filed his statement of objections
dated 9-3-2016. It was only on 29-3-2016 that Respondent 2
had filed the FIR in question bearing Crime No. 185/2016
against the appellants. Moreover, it was Respondent 2 who had
withdrawn his prayer with respect to selling of four excess flats
by the appellants, only to pursue the same in civil proceedings.
33. At this stage, by placing reliance on the judgment of
this Court in Priti Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi) [Priti
Saraf v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2021) 16 SCC 142 : 2021 SCC
OnLine SC 206] and Sri Krishna Agencies v. State of A.P. [Sri
Krishna Agencies v. State of A.P., (2009) 1 SCC 69 : (2009) 1
SCC (Civ) 18 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , it has been further
submitted by Respondent 2 that the appellants cannot evade a
criminal case by merely contending that the person whose
property has been sold has filed a civil suit for recovery of the
property, or that the dispute had been referred to arbitration.
34. Although, there is perhaps not even an iota of doubt
that a singular factual premise can give rise to a dispute which
is both, of a civil as well as criminal nature, each of which could
be pursued regardless of the other. In the instant case, the
actual question which requires consideration is not whether a
criminal case could be pursued in the presence of a civil suit,
but whether the relevant ingredients for a criminal case are
even prima facie made out. Relying on the facts as discussed in
previous paragraphs, clearly no cogent case regarding a criminal
breach of trust or cheating is made out.
35. The dispute between the parties, could at best be
termed as one involving a mere breach of contract. Now,
whether and what, is the difference between a mere breach of
contract and an offence of cheating has been discussed in the
ensuing paragraphs.
Whether sale of excess flats even if made amounts
to a mere breach of contract?
36. This Court in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State
of Bihar [Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, (2000)
4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] , has observed : (SCC p. 177,
para 15)
22
"15. ... that the distinction between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It
depends upon the intention of the accused at the time to
inducement which may be judged by his subsequent
conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test.
Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal
prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest
intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction,
that is the time when the offence is said to have been
committed. Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of
the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is
necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest
intention at the time of making the promise."
37. Applying this dictum to the instant factual matrix
where the key ingredient of having a dishonest or fraudulent
intent under Sections 405, 419 and 420 is not made out, the
case at hand, in our considered opinion is a suitable case
necessitating intervention of this Court.
Whether the dispute is one of entirely civil nature
and therefore liable to be quashed?
38. Having considered the relevant arguments of
the parties and decisions of this Court we are of the
considered view that existence of dishonest or fraudulent
intention has not been made out against the appellants.
Though the instant dispute certainly involves
determination of issues which are of civil nature,
pursuant to which Respondent 2 has even instituted
multiple civil suits, one can by no means stretch the
dispute to an extent, so as to impart it a criminal colour.
As has been rightly emphasised upon by this Court, by
way of an observation rendered in Indian Oil
Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] , as
under : (SCC p. 749, para 14)
"14. While no one with a legitimate cause or
grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies
available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or
persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the
criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies
23
only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the
end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in
accordance with law."
39. It was also observed : (Indian Oil Corpn. case [Indian
Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC
(Cri) 188] , SCC pp. 748-49, para 13)
"13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take
notice of a growing tendency in business circles to
convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This
is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that
civil law remedies are time consuming and do not
adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors.
... There is also an impression that if a person could
somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution,
there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. Any
effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not
involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure
though criminal prosecution should be deprecated
and discouraged."
40. On an earlier occasion, in G. Sagar Suri v. State of
U.P. [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 513] , this Court has also observed : (SCC p. 643,
para 8)
"8. Jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code
has to be exercised with great care. In exercise of its
jurisdiction the High Court is not to examine the
matter superficially. It is to be seen if a matter, which
is essentially of civil nature, has been given a cloak of
criminal offence. Criminal proceedings are not a short
cut of other remedies available in law. Before issuing
process a criminal court has to exercise a great deal
of caution. For the accused it is a serious matter. This
Court has laid certain principles on the basis of which
the High Court is to exercise its jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction under this
section has to be exercised to prevent abuse of the
process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
of justice."
41. Furthermore, in the landmark judgment of State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992
Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] regarding exercise of
24
inherent powers under Section 482CrPC, this Court has laid
down the following categories of instances wherein inherent
powers of the Court can be exercised in order to secure the
ends of justice. These are : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)
"102. ... (1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report
and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do
not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)
of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate
within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the
FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a
police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis
of which no prudent person can ever reach a just
conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any
of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned
(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to
the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
25
maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge."
42. Applying this dictum to the instant factual
matrix, it can be safely concluded that the present case
clearly falls within the ambit of first, third and fifth
category of the seven categories enlisted in the
abovesaid judgment. The case therefore warrants
intervention by this Court, and the High Court has erred
in dismissing the petition filed by the appellants under
Section 482CrPC. We find that there has been attempt to
stretch the contours of a civil dispute and thereby
essentially impart a criminal colour to it."
(Emphasis supplied)
Following the aforesaid judgments, the Apex Court in the
case of KUNTI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH4 has held
as follows:
".... .... ....
6. Vide the impugned judgment dated 18-10-2019
[Kunti v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 7183], the learned
Single Judge dismissed the application under Section 482CrPC,
not accepting the argument on the part of the appellant, that
the present Respondent 2 had an alternative remedy in the
nature of a civil suit for the execution of the sale agreement.
Relying on, in V. Ravi Kumar v. State [V. Ravi Kumar v. State,
(2019) 14 SCC 568: (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 401] , the prayer for
quashing has been refused.
7. It has been urged by way of this appeal arising out of
SLP, that the agreement to sell was void ab initio, in light of
Section 157-A, Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition & Land
Reforms Act, 1950, whereby a person belonging to a Scheduled
Caste cannot transfer property to any person not of a Scheduled
Caste without prior permission of the Collector or District
Magistrate concerned. Further it has been urged that the instant
FIR has been lodged four years after the slated date of the
execution of the sale deed. It is also submitted that the present
4
(2023) 6 SCC 109
26
agreement to sell is forged and in respect thereof, a report to
the Senior Superintendent of Police stands filed.
8. We notice that the agreement to sell had been
duly registered at the office of the Deputy Registrar, 1st,
Office at Bulandshahr, and the complaint filed by the
appellant, purporting that the same was forged, was filed
on 11-5-2012, which is, incidentally, the same as the date
of the reply to the legal notice sent by Respondent 2
herein, dated 8-5-2012, and is also four years from the
date of the agreement.
9. However, we do not find the need to engage with
the grounds as urged, because a perusal of the record in
no uncertain terms reflects the dispute as being of a civil
nature. This Court recently, in Sarabjit Kaur v. State of
Punjab [Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC
360] , observed that : (SCC p. 363, para 13)
"13. A breach of contract does not give rise to
criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the
transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep up
promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings."
10. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in ARCI v. Nimra
Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. [ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P)
Ltd., (2016) 1 SCC 348 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 269] , while
deliberating upon the difference between mere breach of
contract and the offence of cheating, observed that the
distinction depends upon the intention of the accused at the
time of the alleged incident. If dishonest intention on the part of
the accused can be established at the time of entering into the
transaction with the complainant, then criminal liability would be
attached.
11. In Vijay Kumar Ghai v. State of W.B. [Vijay Kumar
Ghai v. State of W.B., (2022) 7 SCC 124 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri)
787] , one of us, (Krishna Murari J.) observed in reference to
earlier decisions as under : (SCC pp. 139-40, paras 24-25)
27
"24. This Court in G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [G.
Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC
(Cri) 513] observed that it is the duty and obligation of the
criminal court to exercise a great deal of caution in issuing
the process, particularly when matters are essentially of
civil nature.
25. This Court has time and again cautioned about
converting purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This
Court in Indian Oil Corpn. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India
Ltd., (2006) 6 SCC 736 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] noticed
the prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time
consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of
lenders/creditors. The Court further observed that : (Indian
Oil Corpn. [Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd., (2006) 6
SCC 736: (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 188] , SCC p. 749, para 13)
'13. ... Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims,
which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying
pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated
and discouraged.' "
12. Having regard to the above well-established
principles and also noting that the present dispute is
entirely with respect to property and more particularly
buying and selling thereof, it cannot be doubted that a
criminal hue has been unjustifiably lent to a civil natured
issue.
13. In view of the above, the impugned judgment and
order dated 18-10-2019 [Kunti v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC
OnLine All 7183] passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad, refusing to quash the FIR in question and Case No.
6695 of 2012 arising out of Case Crime No. 421 of 2012 under
Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 417 and 418IPC bearing No.
32337 of 2013 is set aside. The appeal is allowed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court in the case of VIJAY KUMAR GHAI (supra) has
held that breach of agreement can never be a subject matter of
criminal law set into motion, as such cases would be
unjustifiably of a civil nature. In the light of the facts obtaining
in the case at hand, as narrated hereinabove and the judgments
28
rendered by the Apex Court quoted supra, if further proceedings
are permitted to continue, it would undoubtedly become an
abuse of the process of law and result in miscarriage of justice.
The issue would be whether a FIR without permitting
investigation could be quashed in such cases. This is also
answered by the Apex Court in the case of MITESH KUMAR
J.SHA (supra) holding that where the dispute is one of entirely
civil nature, the crime should not be permitted to be
investigated even.
14. In the aforesaid facts, it becomes germane to notice
the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MAHMOOD ALI
v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH5 wherein the Apex Court has
held as follows:
".... .... ....
13. At this stage, we would like to observe something
important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court
invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR
or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground
that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or
instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance,
then in such circumstances the Court owes a duty to look into
the FIR with care and a little more closely. We say so because
once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused
with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc.,
then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well
drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant
would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint
are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to
constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just
enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the
FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether
the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are
disclosed or not. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the
Court owes a duty to look into many other attending
circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and
above the averments and, if need be, with due care and
circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court
while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of
5
2023 SCC OnLine SC 950
29
the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict
itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into
account the overall circumstances leading to the
initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials
collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the
case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period
of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the
registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby
attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or
personal grudge as alleged.
14. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Golconda Linga
Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, a two-Judge Bench of this Court
elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to
quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration
of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such
evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the
accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing an FIR. The Court
held:--
"5. ...Authority of the court exists for advancement of
justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority
so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent
such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the
court to allow any action which would result in injustice and
prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers
court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds
that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the
process of court or quashing of these proceedings would
otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is
disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the
question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be
quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to
assess what the complainant has alleged and whether
any offence is made out even if the allegations are
accepted in toto.
6. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 866 : 1960 Cri
LJ 1239, this Court summarised some categories of cases where
inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings
: (AIR p. 869, para 6)
(i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar
against the institution or continuance e.g. want of
sanction;
30
(ii) where the allegations in the first information report or
complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their
entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;
(iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but
there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence
adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the
charge.
7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in
mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence
or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the
accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on
appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When
exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court
would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in
question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of
it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial
Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression,
or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in
exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into
consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the
hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person
needlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to
an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death....."
(Emphasis supplied)
15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.
The impugned order passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from
FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated 04.06.2022 registered at Police Station
Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed."
(Emphasis supplied)
The Apex Court holds that when petitions are filed under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., or under Article 226 of the
Constitution to get the FIR quashed, essentially on the ground
that it is either frivolous, vexatious or instituted with ulterior
motives to wreak vengeance or civil disputes or commercial
transactions are projected to be a crime, the Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Article 482 of the Cr.P.C., should
not restrict itself only to such of the cases, but is empowered to
take into account overall circumstances and answer whether the
crime should be permitted to be investigated into or not.
31
15. In the light of the afore-elucidated law by the Apex
Court, I deem it appropriate to exercise the jurisdiction under
Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. and obliterate the Damocles sword
that hangs on the head of these petitioners, in the light of the
fact that a pure commercial transaction or breach of an
agreement between the parties is sought to be given a colour of
crime; added to the fact that the signatory to all the documents,
the 2nd petitioner is no more."
It becomes apposite to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of NARESH KUMAR v. STATE OF KARNATAKA6 wherein
it is held as follows:
".... .... ....
5. Under these circumstances, we are of the considered
view that this is a case where the inherent powers should have
been exercised by the High Court under Section 482 of
the Criminal Procedure Code as the powers are there to stop the
abuse of the process and to secure the ends of justice.
6. In the case of Paramjeet Batra v. State of
Uttarakhand, (2013) 11 SCC 673, this Court recognized that
although the inherent powers of a High Court under
Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be
exercised sparingly, yet the High Court must not hesitate in
quashing such criminal proceedings which are essentially of a
civil nature. This is what was held:
"12. While exercising its jurisdiction under Section
482 of the Code the High Court has to be cautious. This
power is to be used sparingly and only for the purpose of
preventing abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
secure ends of justice. Whether a complaint discloses a
criminal offence or not depends upon the nature of facts
alleged therein. Whether essential ingredients of criminal
offence are present or not has to be judged by the High
Court. A complaint disclosing civil transactions may
6
2024 SCC OnLine SC 268
32
also have a criminal texture. But the High Court must
see whether a dispute which is essentially of a civil
nature is given a cloak of criminal offence. In such a
situation, if a civil remedy is available and is, in fact,
adopted as has happened in this case, the High Court
should not hesitate to quash the criminal proceedings
to prevent abuse of process of the court."
(emphasis supplied)
7. Relying upon the decision in Paramjeet Batra (supra),
this Court in Randheer Singh v. State of U.P., (2021) 14 SCC
626, observed that criminal proceedings cannot be taken
recourse to as a weapon of harassment. In Usha
Chakraborty v. State of West Bengal, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 90,
relying upon Paramjeet Batra (supra) it was again held that
where a dispute which is essentially of a civil nature, is given a
cloak of a criminal offence, then such disputes can be quashed,
by exercising the inherent powers under Section 482 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.
8. Essentially, the present dispute between the parties
relates to a breach of contract. A mere breach of contract, by
one of the parties, would not attract prosecution for criminal
offence in every case, as held by this Court in Sarabjit
Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2023) 5 SCC 360. Similarly, dealing
with the distinction between the offence of cheating and a mere
breach of contractual obligations, this Court, in Vesa Holdings
(P) Ltd. v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, has held that
every breach of contract would not give rise to the offence of
cheating, and it is required to be shown that the accused had
fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the
promise.
9. In the case at hand, the dispute between the parties
was not only essentially of a civil nature but in this case the
dispute itself stood settled later as we have already discussed
above. We see no criminal element here and consequently the
case here is nothing but an abuse of the process. We therefore
allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court dated
02.12.2020. The criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 113
of 2017 will hereby stand quashed."
33
The Apex Court holds that criminal law cannot be set into motion
for the purpose of recovery of money or breach of contract and
such breach of contract cannot be given a colour of crime
particularly of the offence punishable under Section 420 of the IPC.
10. If the elucidation of the Apex Court is pitted against the
facts obtaining in the case at hand, it would unmistakably emerge
that the daughter of the complainant has knocked at the doors of
RERA and secured an order of refund of `60,91,329/-. It was the
duty of the complainant to get the order executed. Refund orders
cannot be executed by setting the criminal law into motion. For an
offence under Section 420 of the IPC, the dishonest intention of the
accused must be writ large right from the inception. These are
agreements between the parties. Therefore, there can be no
question of dishonest intention to cheat the victim.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) Criminal petition is allowed. 34
(ii) FIR in Crime No.420 of 2023 registered by Sarjapur Police and pending before the Principal Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.) & JMFC, Anekal stands quashed.
(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the case at hand are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the same would not bind or influence any proceedings pending between the parties or any other accused in the same crime.
Sd/-
(M. NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ