Punjab-Haryana High Court
Jaggu Son Of Diwan Singh Son Of Sohan ... vs State Of Punjab on 26 August, 2008
Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB & HARYANA, CHANDIGARH
Crl. Appeal No.621-SB of 1999
Date of decision, August 26, 2008
Jaggu son of Diwan Singh son of Sohan Singh, resident of
Ganda,Police Station Rattia,District Hisar(Haryana)
....... Appellant/accused
Versus
State of Punjab
........ Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHAM SUNDER
Present: Mr. S.K.Laddi,Advocate
for the appellant.
Mr. S. S. Bhullar, DAG, Punjab
for the respondent.
_____
Sham Sunder, J.
This appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence dated 1.6.1999, rendered by the Judge, Special Court, Mansa, vide which it convicted the accused/appellant for the offence, punishable under Section 15 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter called as 'the Act' only) and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment, for a period of ten years , and to pay a fine of Rs.1 lac , and in default of payment of the same, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for another period of one year .
2. The facts, in brief, are that on 5.11.1996, Inspector Ravinder Singh along with other police officials, was present at bus stand of village Fatta Malooka. At that time, a secret information was received that Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 2 accused, Jaggu, was sitting at a particular place and was selling the poppy husk, by keeping the bags of poppy husk there, and if a raid was conducted, he could be apprehended with incriminating material. On receipt of this information, a wireless message was sent to D.S.P. Sardulgarh, to come to the spot. From the bus stand, Fatta Malooka, one Birbal Dass son of Sita Ram Pandit, resident of village Makhewala was also joined, with the Police party, and the Police party then proceeded towards village Jhanduke. The accused was found present at the disclosed place. He was sitting on one side of the Zhiri under the trees on the bags of poppy husk. He was also having a scooter with him, which was bearing registration No.HNK-1247 make LML-Vespa. One bag of the poppy husk was also found lying on the pillion of the scooter. The accused was apprehended and he disclosed his name as Jaggu son of Wariam Singh, resident of village Ganda, Police Station Rattia,District Hisar. Suspecting some incriminating material in the bags, he was asked, whether he wanted the search of the same before a Gazetted Officer or before a Magistrate and the accused disclosed that he wanted the search before a Gazetted Officer. In the meanwhile, DSP Iqbal Singh also reached the spot. In his presence, and under his directions, search of the bags was conducted , on which he was found sitting. The bags were found seven in number. Each bag was found containing 30 kgs poppy husk. Search of one bag, lying on the pillion of the scooter, was also conducted, which was found containing 28 kgs poppy husk. A Sample of 100 grams, from each of the bags ,was taken out. The remaining poppy husk, was put into the same bags. The samples and the bags were converted into parcels, duly sealed, and taken into possession, vide separate recovery memo. The scooter was also taken into possession. Ruqa was sent to the Police Station, on the basis whereof, FIR was registered. Rough site plan was prepared. The accused was arrested. After the completion of investigation, Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 3 the accused was challaned.
3. On his appearance, in the Court, the copies of documents, relied upon by the prosecution, were supplied to the accused. Charge under Section 15 of the Act, was framed against him, to which he pleaded not guilty, and claimed judicial trial.
4. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined DSP Iqbal Singh,PW1, a witness to the recovery, Inspector Ravinder Singh, PW2, the Investigating Officer and Constable Amrik Singh PW3. Thereafter, the Additional Public Prosecutor for the State, closed the prosecution evidence.
5. The statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C., was recorded, and he was put all the incriminating circumstances, appearing against him, in the prosecution evidence. He pleaded innocence. He,however, did not lead any evidence in defence.
6. After hearing the Public Prosecutor for the State, the Counsel for the accused, and, on going through the evidence, on record, the trial Court, convicted and sentenced the accused, as stated above.
7. Feeling aggrieved, against the judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, the instant appeal, was filed by the accused/appellant.
8. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and have gone through the evidence and record of the case, carefully.
9. The Counsel for the appellant, at the very outset, submitted that though a secret information was received, yet the same was not reduced into writing, nor sent to the superior officers, as a result whereof, there was violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act. He further submitted that on account of non-compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act, the trial,conviction and sentence stood vitiated. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. As soon as the secret information was Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 4 received in this case, a wireless message was sent to the D.S.P. Sardulgarh to reach the spot. The D.S.P. was apprised of the fact and circumstances of the case. Even otherwise, the mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act were not applicable to the instant case, as the recovery was not effected from a building, or any enclosed place, or from a vehicle parked in an enclosed place. The recovery, in this case, was effected from a public place and from the pillion of the scooter, aforesaid parked at the public place. The provisions of Section 43 of the Act were applicable to this case. With a view to properly deal with the argument of the Counsel for the appellants, it would be appropriate to notice the provisions of Sections 42 and 43 of the Act, which read as under :-
"42. Power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorization - (1) Any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the departments of central excise, narcotics, customs, revenue, intelligence or any other department of the Central Government or of the Border Security Force as is empowered in this behalf by general or special order by the Central Government or any such officer (being an officer superior in rank to a peon, sepoy or constable) of the revenue, drugs control, excise, police or any other department of a State Government, if he has reasons to believe from personal knowledge or information given by any person and taken down in writing, that any narcotic drug, or psychotropic substance, in respect of which an offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed or any document or other article which may furnish evidence of the commission of such offence is kept or concealed in any building, conveyance or enclosed place, may, between sunrise and sunset, Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 5
(a) enter into an search any such building, conveyance or place;
(b) in case of resistance, break open any door and remove any which any obstacle to such entry;
(c) seize such drug or substance and all materials used in the manufacture thereof and any other article and any animal or conveyance which has reason to believe to be liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of offence under Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance : and
(d) detain and search, and, if he thinks proper, arrest any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed any offence punishable under Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance:
Provided that if such officer has reason to believe that a search warrant or authorization cannot be obtained without affording opportunity for the concealment of evidence or facility for the escape of an offender, he may enter and search such building, conveyance or enclosed place at any time between sunset and sunrise after recording the grounds of his belief.
(2) Where an offence takes down any information in writing under sub-Section (1) or records grounds for his belief under the proviso thereto he shall forthwith send a copy thereof to Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 6 his immediate official superior."
"43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place. -- Any officer of any of the department mentioned in Section 42 may
--
(a) seize, in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in respect of which he has reason to believe an offence punishable under Chapter IV has been committed, and, along with such drug or substance, any animal or conveyance article liable to confiscation under this Act and any document or other article which he has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the commission of an offence punishable under Chapter IV relating to such drug or substance;
(b) detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under Chapter IV, and if such person has any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance in his possession and such possession appears to him to be useful, arrest him and any other person in his company.
10. A conjoint reading of Sections 42 and 43 of the Act, shows that these sections are independent of each other. Section 43 authorises any Officer of the departments, mentioned in Section 42, for search, seizure, arrest and detention in any public place, or in transit, in respect of any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance, in respect of which he has reason to believe that an offence punishable under Chapter IV has been Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 7 committed, whereas Section 42 of the Act empowers the officer for search and seizure and arrest in a building, conveyance or enclosed place. When the information is with regard to concealment of some narcotic, in a vehicle, in transit, then provisions of Section 43 of the Act are applicable. The word 'public place' has been explained for the purpose of Section 43 of the Act, which includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop or other places intended for use or accessible to the public.
11. A Division Bench of this Court in Dharminder Kumar Vs. State of Punjab, 2002(4) RCR (Crl.)278 has held as under :-
"Thus it is evident that if seizure is made from any animal, conveyance or article in a public place or in transit then Section43 of the Act would be applicable. Section 43 and Section 42 of the Act operate in different spheres. Since the conveyance has been specifically included in Section 43 of the Act also, therefore, the conveyance which is found in a public place or in transit would be covered under the provisions of Section 43 of the Act whereas conveyance used in Section 42 of the Act has to be read as conveyance which is other than a public place. This interpretation is the only harmonious interpretation of Sections 42 and 43 of the Act."
12. It is well settled principle of law that the provisions of a Statute are to be construed, in harmonious manner so that none of the same is rendered nugatory. By harmonious construing the provisions Sections 42 and 43 of the Act, it can be safely concluded that if a conveyance is intercepted or apprehended at a public place, or in transit, then the provisions of Section 42 of the Act would not be applicable.
13. It was held in State of Haryana Vs. Jarnail Singh and others 2004(2) RCR (Crl.) 960 (SC) as under :-
"7. Section 43 of the NDPS Act provides that any officer of any Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 8 of the departments mentioned in Section 42 may seize in any public place or in transit any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance etc. in respect of which he has reason to believe that an offence punishable under the Act has been committed. He is also authorized to detain and search any person whom he has reason to believe to have committed an offence punishable under the Act. Explanation to Section 43 lays down that for the purposes of this section, the expression "public place" includes any public conveyance, hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible to the public.
8. Sections 42 and 43, therefore, contemplate two difference situations. Section 42 contemplates entry into and search of any building, conveyance or enclosed place, while Section 43 contemplates a seizure made in any public place or in transit. If seizure is made under Section 42 between sunset and sunrise, the requirement of the proviso thereto has to be complied with. There is no such proviso in Section 43 of the Act and, therefore, it is obvious that if a public conveyance is searched in a public place, the officer making the search is not required to record his satisfaction as contemplated by the proviso to Section 42 of the NDPS Act for searching the vehicle between sunset and the sunrise."
In view of above, the provisions of Section 42 of the Act, were not applicable and, on the other hand, the provisions of Section 43 of the Act were applicable. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail and the same stands rejected.
14. The Counsel for the appellant,however, placed reliance on State of Punjab V. Surjit Singh 2008(1) RCR(Criminal) 266 in support of his contention that the provisions of Section 42 of the Act were applicable to Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 9 the facts of the instant case. The fact of State of Punjab's case (supra) are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In that case, the appellant was acquitted on the ground that the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the Act had not been complied with; the statement of an independent witness under Section 161 Cr.P.C. had not been recorded; an eye-witness to the recovery was not examined by the prosecution and given up as won over; the sample was not sent to the Chemical Examiner within 72 hours and there was no evidence on the record to prove that none tampered with the same until the same reached the Laboratory and that the mandatory provisions of Section 42 of the Act were not complied with. No help,therefore, can be drawn by the Counsel for the appellant from the aforesaid authority. Even otherwise in view of the principle of law laid down in State of Haryana Vs. Jarnail Singh's case (supra), decided by the Apex Court, that if the recovery is effected from a public place, or from a vehicle at a public place , then the provisions of Section 42 of the Act were not applicable, even if the secret information had been received, any principle to the contrary, on the same point, laid down in the State of Punjab's case (supra) decided by this Court, shall not hold the field. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
15. It was next contended by the Counsel for the appellant that the mandatory provisions of Section 50 of the Act were not complied with, as a result whereof, the investigation and the subsequent proceedings, stood vitiated. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. In the instant case, the contraband was not recovered from the personal search of the accused but from a public place as also from the pillion of the scooter. Under these circumstances, the mandatory provisions of Section 50 were not applicable, to the facts of the instant case. Had the recovery been effected, from the search of the Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 10 person of the accused, it would have been said that there was some force, in the argument, advanced by the Counsel for the accused. In State of Punjab Vs. Baldev Singh, 1999(6) S.C.C. 172, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court, settled beyond doubt, that the language of Section 50, was implicitly clear, that the search had to be in relation to a person, and not in relation to the premises, vehicles, or articles. Similar view, was taken in Smt. Krishna Kanwar Thakuraeen Vs. State of Rajasthan, JT 2004(1) S.C. 597. In these circumstances, it can be said that the consistent, and particularly the view of the larger Bench of the Supreme Court, appears to be that the search, must relate to the person, and not vehicles, other luggage and articles, and then alone the provisions of Section 50 would be attracted. Since, in view of the principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authorities, the provisions of Section 50 were not applicable, to the search in the instant case, the submission of the Counsel for the appellant deserves rejection. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
16. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that there was a delay of 10 days, in sending the samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner, but no explanation, was furnished by the prosecution witnesses, and, as such, the possibility of tampering with the same (samples), until the same reached the office of the Laboratory, could not be ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. It is, no doubt, true that there was a delay of 10 days, in sending the samples to the office of the Chemical Examiner. Mere delay in sending the samples, to the office of the Chemical Examiner, in itself, was not sufficient, to come to the conclusion, that the same were tampered with, until the same were deposited in the office of the Laboratory. In the instant case, from the evidence of the prosecution Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 11 witnesses, which has been found to be cogent, convincing, reliable, and trustworthy, it was proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that none tampered with the sample parcels, until the same were deposited, in the office of the Chemical Examiner. Above all, there is report of the Chemical Examiner, Ex.PH, which is admissible into evidence, in its entirety, as per the provisions of Section 293 Cr.P.C. It is evident from Ex.PH, report of the Chemical Examiner, that the sample parcels, were received, with seals intact, on arrival, and the seals on the same, tallied with the sample seal. In the face of such cogent and convincing evidence, produced, on record, the trial Court, in my opinion, was right in coming to the conclusion, that none tampered with the sample parcels, until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner. Had no other evidence, been produced, by the prosecution, to prove that the sample parcels, remained untampered with, until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner, the matter would have been different. In State of Orissa V. Kanduri Sahoo 2004(1) R.C.R. (Crl.) 196 (S.C.), it was held that mere delay in sending the sample to the Laboratory is not fatal, where there is evidence that the seized articles remained in safe custody. In Narinder Singh @ Nindi Vs. State of Punjab 2005(3) RCR (Criminal) 343, which was a case, relating to the recovery of 4 Kgs. of opium, the samples were sent to the office of the Chemical Examiner, after 23 days. All the samples were intact. In these circumstances, it was held that, in the face of other cogent, convincing, reliable, and trustworthy evidence, produced by the prosecution, to prove the completion of link evidence, it could not be held that the possibility of tampering with the samples, could not be ruled out. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the instant case. Therefore, in the instant case, unexplained delay of 10 days, in sending the samples, to the office of the Chemical Examiner, did not at all matter much. In this view of the matter, the submission of the Counsel Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 12 for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
17. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that Birbal Dass, independent witness, was joined, but he was not produced by the prosecution, as a result whereof, it could be said that the prosecution withheld, the best evidence, in its possession. He further submitted that an adverse inference could be drawn that, had he been examined, he would not have supported its case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. No doubt, Birbal Dass, independent witness, was joined, by the Investigating Officer, at the time of effecting the recovery, yet he joined hands with the accused, during the trial of the case, and, as such, was given up as won over by the Addl. Public Prosecutor for the State. In Masalti Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1965 (S.C.) 202, it was held that it is, undoubtedly, the duty of the prosecution to lay before the Court, all material witnesses, available to it, whose evidence is necessary for unfolding its case, but it would be unsound to lay down it, as a general rule, that every witness, must be examined, even though his evidence, may not be very material or, even if, it is known that he has been won over or terrorized. In Roop Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1996 (1) RCR 146, a Division Bench of this Court, held that no adverse inference can be drawn, when the only independent witness, was given up by the prosecution, as won over by the accused. It was further held, in the said authority, that the panch witnesses, being human beings, are quite exposed and vulnerable to human feelings of yielding, browbeating, threats and inducements and giving up of the public witnesses, as won over, is fully justified, in the present day situation prevailing in the society. In Karnail Singh Vs. State of Punjab 1983 Criminal Law Journal, 1218 (DB), it was held that where the independent witness was won over by the accused, and only the officials witnesses Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 13 were examined, who were considered to be not interested persons, their evidence cannot be doubted, on the ground of their official status. The principle of law, laid down, in the said authorities, is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. In this view of the matter, the trial Court was, thus, right in recording conviction and awarding sentence, to the accused. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
18. The Counsel for the appellant has,however, placed reliance on State of Punjab V. Surjit Singh 2008(1) R.C.R.(Criminal) to contend that even if Birbal Dass had been won over by the accused, it was obligatory upon the prosecution to examine him and, in case, he had resiled from his earlier statement, put him such questions, as are put during the course of cross-examination. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. In Masalti 's case (supra) decided by a four Judge Bench of the Apex Court, it was held that it is, undoubtedly, the duty of the prosecution to lay before the Court, all material witnesses, available to it, whose evidence is necessary for unfolding its case, but it would be unsound to lay down it, as a general rule, that every witness, must be examined, even though his evidence, may not be very material or, even if, it is known that he has been won over or terrorized. In this view of the matter, the principle of law laid in Masalti"s case (Supra) decided by the Apex Court, on the same point, overrides the principle of law, to the contrary, on the same point, laid down in State of Punjab's case supra decided by this Court. Therefore, State of Punjab's case (supra) does not render any help, to the case of the appellant. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
19. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that the case property was not deposited in the Malkhana, and kept by the SHO Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 14 with him, and as such, possibility of tampering with the same at any point of time could not be ruled out. It is evident, from the statement of Ravinder Singh, Inspector, PW2, the Investigating Officer, that on return to the Police Station, the accused was lodged in the police lock up, and the case property was kept in his custody. It was further stated by him that on the next day he produced the case property, the accused, sample parcels and impression of the seal before the Ilaqa Magistrate, vide memo Ex.PG. He further stated that the Ilaqa Magistrate passed order Ex.PG/1 on it. He further further stated that on 15.11.1996, he sent eight sample parcels to Amrik Singh, for depositing the same, in the office of the Chemical Examiner along with the sample impression of the seal, who after depositing the same handed over the receipt to him. The report Ex.PH of the Chemical Examiner clearly goes to show that eight sample parcels, duly sealed were received on 15.11.1996. The seals were intact and agreed with the sample seal impression. The mere fact that the case property was retained by the by the Investigating Officer, with him, did not mean that the same was tampered with, at any point of time. This also did not cast any doubt, on the prosecution story. In this view of the matter,The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
20. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the seal after use was handed over by Ravinder Singh, Inspector PW2, to Mohinder Singh,ASI who returned the same to him 2/3 days after the date of recovery,whereas, sample parcels were sent on 15.11.1996 to the Chemical Examiner. He further submitted that since the seal and the sample parcels, remained with the same person, the possibility of tampering with the same, could not be ruled out. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, does not appear to be correct. Sufficient evidence was produced by the prosecution, which has been held Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 15 to be reliable,cogent, convincing and trust-worthy to prove that none tampered with the sample parcels, until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner. Even otherwise, there is no requirement of law that the seal after use should be handed over to the independent witness. In Piara Singh Vs. The State of Punjab 1982 C.L.R. (2) 447, a case decided by a Full Bench of this Court, the seal, on the sample of illicit liquor, recovered from the accused, was not entrusted to an independent person forthwith. Similarly, the independent person, though entrusted with the seal by the Investigating Officer, later on, was not produced as a witness. In these circumstances, it was held that this fact alone, was not sufficient to affect the merits of the trial, and the prosecution case, could not be thrown out, on that score alone. It was further held, in this case, that it was not incumbent upon the Police Officer, to hand over the seal to a third person forthwith, and even, in cases, where he had done so, it was not obligatory for him, to produce such person, as a witness, during trial, as there was no statutory requirement, whatsoever, to this effect. The principle of law, laid down, in the aforesaid authority, is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. Entrustment of seal to Mohinder Singh, ASI, by Ravinder Singh, Inspector,PW2 in view of the cogent, convincing, reliable, and trustworthy evidence, produced by the prosecution, regarding the completion of link evidence, did not at all affect the merits of the case. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
21. The Counsel for the appellant,however, placed reliance on Gurjant Singh,State of Punjab 2007(4) C.C.R. (Criminal) 226, a case decide by a Single Judge, of this Court, to contend that if the seal after use is not given to the independent witness, despite the fact that he was present, with the police party, the chances of tampering with the case property could not be ruled out. In view of the evidence, which has been Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 16 discussed above, despite the fact that the seal was not handed over to the independent witness after use, by Ravinder Singh,Inspector, it was proved that the parcels were not tampered, with at any stage. On the other hand, the chances of tampering with the sample parcels at any point of time until the same reached the office of the Chemical Examiner were completely ruled out, from the evidence produced by the prosecution. The court is required to act on the basis of the evidence produced by the prosecution and not on mere conjectures and surmises. The submission of the Counsel for the appellant is based on conjectures and surmises. In these circumstances, no help can be drawn, by the Counsel, for the appellant from the aforesaid authority. In these circumstances, the submission of the Counsel for the appellant, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
22. It was next submitted by the Counsel for the appellant, that the Investigating Officer did not make any effort to ascertain the ownership of the Scooter. It is, no doubt, true that the Investigating Officer did not make any effort to ascertain the ownership of the scooter, yet that fact alone, did not, in any way, cast any doubt, on the prosecution story. Had the ownership of the scooter been ascertained by the Investigating Officer, the owner thereof would also have been challaned under Section 25 of the Act. However, non-ascertainment of the ownership of the Scooter did not, at all, affect the merits of the case. Since, the accused was found in conscious possession of 8 bags containing poppy husk, he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 15 of the Act. If the Investigating Officer committed any irregularity or illegality during the course of investigation, the benefit of doubt, thereof, is not required to be given to the accused. If such an irregularity/illegality is given any weight, then every Investigating Officer shall commit such irregularity / illegality so as to create an escape route, for the accused. The merits of the case of the Criminal Appeal No.621-SB of 1999 17 prosecution were not at all effected on account of such irregularity, having been committed, by the Investigating Officer. In this view of the matter,the submission of the Counsel for the appellants, in this regard, being without merit, must fail, and the same stands rejected.
23. No other point was urged by the Counsel for the parties.
24. In view of the above discussion, it is held that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence, rendered by the trial Court, are based on the correct appreciation of evidence, and law, on the point. The same do not warrant any interference, and are liable to be upheld.
25. For the reasons recorded, hereinbefore, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment of conviction, and the order of sentence dated 1.6.1999, are upheld. If the accused/appellant is on bail, then his bail bonds, shall stand cancelled. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mansa, shall take necessary steps, to comply with the judgment, with due promptitude, keeping in view the applicability of the provisions of Section 428 of the Cr.P.C. , and submit compliance report within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of a copy of the same.
26. No order was passed, by the trial Court,regarding the confiscation of Scooter, in question. The trial Court, is directed to initiate proceedings, regarding the confiscation of scooter, in question, if already not initiated, by resorting to the procedure, in accordance with law, and submit compliance report, within a period of three months, from the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.
August 26 ,2008 ( Sham Sunder ) sks Judge