Delhi District Court
Campus Activewear Limited vs Redcon International on 4 December, 2025
CS (Comm.) No.709/2022: Campus Activewear Limited V/s M/s Recon International:
DOD: 04.12.2025
IN THE COURT OF VINOD YADAV:
DISTRICT JUDGE (COMMERCIAL COURT)-02:
NORTH-WEST DISTRICT: ROHINI COURTS: NEW DELHI
CNR No.DLNW01-008646-2022
Civil Suit (Comm.) No.709/2022
In the matter of:
CAMPUS ACTIVEWEAR LIMITED,
Address At: D-1, Udyog Nagar,
Main Rohtak Road, Delhi-110041.
Through Its Authorized Signatory Ms.Archana Maini,
E.Mail: [email protected]
Mobile No.9650730575
.....Plaintiff
(Through Shri Tushar A. John, Advocate)
Versus
M/s REDCON INTERNATIONAL,
Address At: A-77, Phase-II, Industrial Area,
Mangolpuri, West Delhi, Delhi-110034.
Also At: A-86, Phase-II, Industrial Area,
Mangolpuri, West Delhi, Delhi-110034.
Also At: A-89, Phase-II, Industrial Area,
Mangolpuri, West Delhi, Delhi-110034.
.....Defendant
(Through Shri Manoj Rana, Advocate)
Date of Institution of Suit : 30.08.2022
Date of transfer to this Court : 31.07.2023
Date of hearing arguments on application : 26.11.2025
U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC
Date of judgment : 04.12.2025
Digitally signed
VINOD by VINOD
YADAV
YADAV 2025.12.04
Date:
16:54:07 +0530
Decreed U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC: Page 1 of 27
CS (Comm.) No.709/2022: Campus Activewear Limited V/s M/s Recon International:
DOD: 04.12.2025
SUIT UNDER SECTION 27 TO 29, 134 AND 135 OF THE TRADE MARKS
ACT, 1999 FOR PERMANENT INJUNCTION, RESTRAINING
INFRINGEMENT OF TRADEMARK, SECTION 55 & 62 OF COPYRIGHT
ACT, 1957 FOR PASSING OFF, UNFAIR COMPETITION, DILUTION,
RENDITION OF ACCOUNTS, DAMAGES, DELIVERY-UP ETC.
04.12.2025
JUDGMENT UNDER ORDER VIII RULE 10 CPC
1. This is a suit for permanent injunction, restraining
infringement of trademark(s), copyright, passing off, damages, rendition of
accounts, delivery up etc., filed by plaintiff against the defendant.
2. (i) The facts of the case in brief, as borne out from the record are
that plaintiff is a company, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956
and engaged in the business of manufacturing, sale and marketing of a
wide variety of footwear.
(ii) It has been stated that in the year 1984, plaintiff's predecessor-
in-title, i.e M/s API Polymers (India) Pvt. Ltd., was incorporated, which
became a Public Company on 10.10.1988, i.e API Polymers (India) Ltd.
and "Action Shoes" is claimed to be the most widely known business of
the group.
(iii) It has been further stated that later API Polymers (India) Ltd.
was renamed to API Polymers (India) Pvt. Ltd. On 08.01.2003 and then to
Action Shoes Pvt. Ltd. On 15.10.2012.
Decreed U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC: Page 2 of 27
CS (Comm.) No.709/2022: Campus Activewear Limited V/s M/s Recon International:
DOD: 04.12.2025
3. It has been averred that meanwhile in order to cater to the
youth of the country, the erstwhile API Polymers (India) Ltd. also launched
a new brand of shoes under the trade mark and trading style of 'CAMPUS'
and adopted the distinctive logos
/
for its CAMPUS branded shoes in the year 1997. Further, to separate
the management of the CAMPUS branded shoes, the business under the
brand name of 'CAMPUS' was assigned to Action's Group company i.e.
the plaintiff Campus Activewear Pvt. Ltd. (presently known as Campus
Activewear Limited), which was incorporated originally in the name of
Action Renewable Energy Pvt. Ltd. on September 24, 2008. Thereafter,
the name of the plaintiff company was changed from Action Renewable
Energy Pvt. Ltd. to Campus Activewear Pvt. Ltd. On 02.12.2015.
Thereafter, in November, 2021, plaintiff was converted to a Public
Company and the name was changed to Campus Activewear Limited
and a Fresh Certificate of Incorporation dated 22.11.2021 was issued by
the Registrar of Companies, Delhi.
4. It has been claimed that plaintiff company offers a wide
variety of products such as casual shoes, sports shoes, sandals, school
shoes, caps etc. in 25 sub-brands.
Decreed U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC: Page 3 of 27
CS (Comm.) No.709/2022: Campus Activewear Limited V/s M/s Recon International:
DOD: 04.12.2025
5. (i) It has been further stated that in order obtain statutory rights in
its adopted trade mark CAMPUS, plaintiff's predecessors-in-interest, i.e.,
API Polymer (India) Ltd. and API Polymer (India) Pvt. Ltd., applied and
obtained registration of mark CAMPUS and its variations thereof in India,
details whereof is furnished hereunder:
S. No. Application/ Trade Mark Class Date
Registration
No.
1 2054271 25 16-11-2010
2 2054270 18 16-11-2010
3 3582682 25 July 01, 2017
4 3582683 35 July 01, 2017
5 3582686 35 July 01, 2017
6 3582693 25 July 01, 2017
7 3593313 25 July 17, 2017
8 3593314 35 July 17, 2017
Decreed U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC: Page 4 of 27
(ii) It has been claimed that p laintiff also filed and obtained registrations of
the CAMPUS trademarks which are as under:
S. No. Application/ Trade Mark Class Date
Registration
No.
1. 539806 CAMPUS 25 November 12,
1990
2. 886225 CAMPUS THE YOUTH 25 November 11,
PARTY 1999
3. 887092 CAMPUS 25 November 17,
1999
4. 887094 CAMPUS 18 Nov 17, 1999
5. 1038267 CAMPUS 18 August 20, 2001
6. 1960479 18 May 04, 2010
7. 1960480 25 May 04, 2010
8. 1960481 28 May 04, 2010
9. 1960482 35 May 04, 2010
10. 1960478 CPS 28 May 04, 2010
11. 3011370 CAMPUS KA SCHOOL TIME 25 July 17, 2015
12. 3248858 CAMPUS 26 May 03, 2016
13. 3248859 CAMPUS 21 May 03, 2016
14. 3248861 CAMPUS 03 May 03, 2016
15. 3254359 CAMPUS- PLATINA 25 May 09, 2016
16. 3254360 CAMPUS -DURA + 25 May 09, 2016
17. 3254361 CAMPUS- TRENDZ 25 May 09, 2016
Decreed U/o VIII Rule 10 CPC: Page 5 of 27
18. 3582680 25 July 01, 2017
19. 3582681 35 July 01, 2017
20. 3681178 Campus Mega Cushion 25 July 17, 2017
21. 3681179 Campus Pure Bounce 25 July 17, 2017
22. 3681180 Campus Xtreme Comfort 25 July 17, 2017
23. 3681181 Campus Ever Run 25 July 17, 2017
24. 3681182 Campus Antiskid 25 November 17,
2017
25. 3681183 Campus X-cushion 25 November 17,
2017
26. 3681184 Campus Soft Rubber 25 November 17,
Technology 2017
27. 3681185 Campus Memory Tech Foam 25 November 17,
2017
28. 3681186 Campus Fuze Frame 25 November 17,
2017
29. 3681187 Campus Nano Web 25 November 17,
2017
30. 3681188 Campus Hydro Fuze 25 November 17,
2017
31. 3780093 25, 35 March 16, 2018
32. 4171779 CAMPUS BUBBLE FOAM 25 May 09, 2019
33. 4171780 CAMPUS KINETIC RUBBER 25 May 09, 2019
34. 4171782 CAMPUS JUMP 25 May 09, 2019
35. 4962414 CAMPUS REE-FLECT 25 May 01, 2021
36. 4962415 CAMPUS REE-FLECT 35 May 01, 2021
37. 4962416 25 May 01, 2021
38. 4962417 35 May 01, 2021
39. 4981917 35 May 24, 2021
40. 4981918 21 May 24, 2021
41. 4981919 18 May 24, 2021
42. 4981920 03 May 24, 2021
43. 4998268 CAMPUS NITROFLY 25 June 08, 2021
(iii) It has been emphasized that the said registrations are valid and subsisting
in favour of plaintiff.
6. It has been contended that over a period of time, plaintiff has adopted and
used its CAMPUS logo in different colour combinations and placements on the shoes,
packaging and promotional material such i.e. ,
, , , ,
etc..
(ii) The plaintiff also claims to be owner of copyright in the artistic work '
', ' ' and ' ' as well its packaging material
and trade dress.
7. (i) It has been further stated that plaintiff has a dedicated and
interactivewebsite www.campusshoes.com and www.campusactivewear.com which is
accessible to people across India and abroad displaying huge variety of CAMPUS
branded shoes for people of all ages and also provide a store locator.
(ii) It is claimed that CAMPUS branded shoes are also sold by the plaintiff
directly as well as by its dealers and retailers on various marketplaces such as
www.amazon.in, www.myntra.com, www.snapdeal.com, www.flipkart.com,
www.ajio.com, www.paytmmall.com, www.nykaafashion .com, www.tatacliq.com,
www.ebay.in, www.shopperstop .com, www.fynd.com etc.
8. It is stated that on account of its good quality and standards of
manufacturing and untiring efforts in advertising and marketing, the products of the
plaintiff have acquired enviable reputation and goodwill across the world including
India. Further, plaintiff spends huge amount of money in advertising and promotion of
its products under the said trade marks/ logos in India and around the world, due to
which the products of plaintiff under the said trade marks/ logos enjoy huge goodwill
and reputation in business community and public in general in India and across the
world. It is averred that plaintiff company has a huge turnover against sale of its
products worldwide.
9. It is further stated that in view of the plaintiff's proprietary rights both
under statutory and common law in its said trademarks, its goodwill & reputation, and
its copyrights, it has the exclusive right to the use thereof and nobody can be permitted
to use the same or any other deceptively similar trademark/label in any manner
whatsoever in relation to any specification of goods without the leave and license of the
plaintiff.
10. (i) Defendant is stated to be engaged in the business of manufacturing,
marketing and trading of footwears and other accessories. It is the case of plaintiff
that in the second week of June' 2022 it came across the defendant's products under a
device/ logo deceptively similar/identical to plaintiff's trademark CAMPUS, "
" being manufactured, packed and sold in the markets of NCT of Delhi, NCR and
other States.
(ii) It is alleged that the defendant by adopting a device identical to trademark
CAMPUS, and in respect of identical goods has attempted to
derive unfair advantage and cause misrepresentation. It has been averred that by
doing so, the defendant is not only damaging the reputation and goodwill of the
plaintiff company by passing off his substandard products as that of the plaintiff
company but is also causing financial loss to the plaintiff company by reaping unfair
advantage of the repute and distinctive character of the trademark of the plaintiff
company.
11. (i) It is worthwhile to note that alongwith the instant suit, plaintiff company
had also filed application U/o XXXIX Rule 1 & 2 CPC, inter alia seeking ex-parte ad-
interim injunction against the defendant as well as application U/o XXVI Rule 9 CPC
seeking appointment of Local Commissioner(s) for seizure of impugned goods from
the premises of defendant.
(ii) Vide detailed order dated 14.09.2022, passed by this Court, both the
aforesaid applications moved by the plaintiff were allowed. Consequently, till further
orders, the defendant and all acting on his behalf were restrained from using registered
trademarks/logos CAMPUS of the plaintiff in any form and manner which is/are
identical and/or confusingly or deceptively similar to said trademarks/logos of the
plaintiff on any goods and accessories, thereby infringing plaintiff's registered
trademarks and copyright; and passing off its goods and business as that of the goods
and business of plaintiff.
(iii) Even the Local Commissioners were appointed in the matter with the
directions to visit the premises of defendant and seize the impugned goods. The
learned Local Commissioners accordingly executed the commission and consequently
seized counterfeited goods therefrom.
12. (i) After being served, defendant entered appearance and filed written
statement, inter alia taking preliminary objections to the effect that present suit is
nothing but a ploy adopted by the plaintiff to extort money from the defendant; prior to
filing the present suit plaintiff has failed to issue any cease and desist notice against the
defendant; the instant suit is violative of the trite principle of trademark jurisdiction of
"imperfect recollection".
(ii) On merits, it has been categorically denied that defendant has
infringed/copied the plaintiff's registered trademark CAMPUS (logo). It has been
stated that defendant has been doing fair business since the year 2018 and have an
apparent market value.
13. (i) It is pertinent to mention here that the written statement filed by the
defendant was not in compliance of the requisite provisions of Commercial Courts Act,
2015 in as much as the Verification Column and column of Statement of Truth were left
blank by the defendant. Accordingly, vide order dated 30.11.2022, passed by my
learned Predecessor, the written statement was directed to be taken off the record. Even
after pointing out the aforesaid defects in the written statement, defendant failed to take
any corrective steps to make good the aforesaid defects in the written statement within
the stipulated period. Accordingly, vide order dated 22.05.2023, passed by my learned
Predecessor, the opportunity of the defendant to file written statement was closed.
(ii) Be that as it may, thereafter, the defendant preferred an application under
Section 151 CPC, inter alia praying for recalling of the orders dated 30.11.2022 and
22.05.2023. Vide detailed order dated 12.11.2025, the said application of the defendant
was dismissed and the matter was notified for arguments under Order VIII Rule 10
CPC. The learned counsel for the plaintiff submitted that there is no need for leading
evidence in the matter in the view of law laid down by Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in
case reported as, "CS (OS) No.1213/2011", titled as, "Satya Infrastructure Ltd. & Ors.
V/s Satya Infra & Estates Pvt. Ltd.". (DOD: 07.02.2013) and the matter can be
disposed off on the basis of material on record.
14. I have heard Shri Tushar A John, Advocate, learned counsel for the
plaintiff and Shri Manoj Rana, Advocate, learned counsel for the defendant and gone
through the entire material on record.
15. The scope of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC in commercial suits particularly
under the New Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate
Division of the High Court Act, 2015 has been examined by Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in case reported as, "235(2016)DLT 354", titled as, "Nirog Pharma Pvt. Ltd. V/s
Umesh Gupta & Anr.", whereby the Hon'ble High Court has been pleased to lay down
as under:
xxxxx
"11. Order VIII Rule 10 has been inserted by the legislature to
expedite the process of justice. The courts can invoke its
provisions to curb dilatory tactic, often resorted to by
defendants, by not filing the written statement by pronouncing
judgment against it. At the same time, the courts must be
cautious and judge the contents of the plaint and documents on
record as being of an unimpeachable character, not requiring any
evidence to be led to prove its contents.
..........
28. The present suit is also a commercial suit within the definition of the Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 and it was the clear intention of the legislature that such cases should be decided expeditiously and should not be allowed to linger on. Accordingly, if the defendant fails to pursue his case or does so in a lackadaisical manner by not filing his written statement, the courts should invoke the provisions of Order VIII Rule 10 to decree such cases."
xxxxx
16. (i) Further the power and authority of the Courts to straightway decree a suit on the basis of averments made in plaint in terms of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, in the absence of a written statement filed by the defendant is well settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case reported as, "(1999) 8 SCC 396", titled as, "Balraj Taneja V/s Sunil Madan".
(ii) Furthermore, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.618/2019", titled as, "Parsvnath Developers Limited V/s Vikram Khosla"
(DOD: 03.03.2021), has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
9. Having heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff, it is noted that the defendant has not cared to appear before this Court and was proceeded ex-parte. The law with regard to Order VIII Rule 10 CPC is clear, which stipulates that where any party from whom a written statement is required under Rule 1 or Rule 9, fails to present the same within time permitted or fixed by the Court as the case may be, the Court shall pronounce judgment or make such orders in relation to the suit as it thinks fit and on the pronouncement of same, the decree sheet shall be drawn up.
Accordingly, in view of the provisions of order VIII Rule 10 CPC, I proceed to decide the present suit. Further, I am in agreement with the judgments of the Coordinate Benches of this Court as relied upon by the plaintiff in paragraph 8 on the issue that in ex-parte matters no purpose would be served if evidence is directed to be led. There being no written statement filed, the averments in the Plaint being unrebutted, the same are deemed to be correct.
xxxxx
(iii) Recently, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.72/2022", titled as, "Kleenoil Filtration India Pvt. Ltd. V/s Udit Khatri & Ors." (DOO: 05.01.2023) has been pleased to clear the air regarding power and authority of Court to straightway decree the suit under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC.
17. Further, on the aspect of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, I am also duly conscious of the observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case reported as, "Civil Appeal No.9695/2013", titled as, "Asma Lateef & Anr. V/s Shabbir Ahmad & Ors." (DOD: 12.01.2024), whereby the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to categorically observe that a Court is not supposed to pass a mechanical judgment invoking Rule 10 of Order VIII CPC, merely on the basis of plaint, upon the failure of defendant to file a written statement. I am further conscious of the fact that a judgment, if pronounced by a Court under Rule 10 of Order VIII CPC, must satisfy the requirements of Rule 4(2) or Order XX CPC and thereby conform to its definition provided in Section 2(9) thereof.
18. Further in case reported as, "CS (OS) No.559/2010", titled as, "Indian Performing Rights Society Limited V/s Gauhati Town Club" (DOD: 30.01.2013), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe that where the defendant is "ex-parte" and the material before the Court is sufficient to allow the claim of the plaintiff, then the time of the Court should not be wasted in directing ex-parte evidence to be recorded and which mostly is nothing, but a repetition of the contents of the plaint.
19. In the realm of subjective analysis, Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act introduces three more concepts to guide in assessment viz. "deceptively similar", "likely to cause confusion" and "likely to have an association". The three concepts can be usefully synopsized as under:
(i) Deceptive similarity: This entails an "intent to deceive"; requires that facts presented by parties be sifted to arrive at a conclusion that defendant adopted a very similar mark to deceive consumers; and is defined under Section 2(h) of the Act as "near resemblance likely to deceive or cause confusion";
(ii) Confusion: 'Confusion' is a state of mind which obliterates the distinction of elements presented before a person.
(iii) Association: 'Association' involves a mental connection between related ideas.
20. Now, coming back to the facts of instant case. It is evident that trademark registrations (as depicted in para No.5 hereinabove) with respect to CAMPUS (with logo) are valid and subsisting in favour of plaintiff till date. Further, from the material produced on record, it is also clearly evident that the defendant has been infringing the plaintiff's registered trademark " " by using the deceptively similar/identical trademark of the plaintiff, thereby causing confusion and deception amongst the unwary purchasing public and traders by making them believe that the origin of those goods is the plaintiff company. For ready reference, the goods of the plaintiff and that of the defendant are re-produced hereunder for comparison:-
PLAINTIFF's ORIGINAL DEFENDANT's IMPUGNED
PRODUCTS PRODUCTS
PLAINTIFF's REGISTERED DEFENDANTS IMPUGNED TRADEMARK/LABEL MARK/LABEL CAMPUS COMPASS (word) (word)
21. The above comparative images of the defendant's product with that of the plaintiff's product and defendant's impugned mark/label with the plaintiff's registered Trademark/Label categorically reflects that the defendant has copied the plaintiff's well-known trademark CAMPUS, and device in entirety. The above comparative images further reflects that the defendant has derived the device from the plaintiff's well known trademarks CAMPUS, and by copying the most essential component ' ' from the p laintiff's registered Trademarks. As such, I find substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff that the act of defendant amounts to infringement of the plaintiff's trademarks and copyright which vests in it. I further find substance in the submissions of learned counsel for the plaintiff that adoption of a logo/trademark deceptively similar/identical to plaintiff's well-
known trademark CAMPUS, and by the defendant is mala fide and cannot be a matter of coincidence and the same is a deliberate and a calculated move of the defendant aimed at causing misrepresentation and making illegal profits by associating itself with the plaintiff.
22. It is further clearly apparent from the material produced on record that adoption of plaintiff's registered trademark CAMPUS and by the defendant is dishonest and motivated by a desire to usurp the vast reputation and goodwill which is enjoyed by the plaintiff not only in India but also overseas and the same is causing loss and injury to the plaintiff's reputation and business and dilute the distinctiveness of its trademark CAMPUS and branded products.
23. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while dwelling upon the issue of protection of well known trademark in terms of Section 2(1)(zg) of The Trade Marks Act, 1999 has been pleased to lay down in case reported as, "FAO (Comm.) No.201/2021", titled as, "Tata Sia Airlines Limited V/s Vistara Home Appliances Private Limited & Ors." (DOD: 31.05.2023) as under:
xxxxx
23. Non-adoption and non-usage of the impugned mark VISTARA in the same Class and for the same goods as that of the appellant are of no essence to the present proceedings as Class discrimination and/ or Class distinction are of no consequence when the adoption of the mark by a party like the respondent no.1 is itself deceitful and tainted under suspicious circumstances and without any palpable reasons. What is required to be valued more is the intention of the adopter, particularly when it is the case of a subsequent adopter like the respondent no.1, de hors the same mark in a different Class. Admittedly, it is undisputed that appellant is both a prior adopter and a prior user of the trademark "VISTARA‟ and the adoption and usage by respondents is all subsequent in point of time. As such, simply because the competing marks are used and registered in a different Class is immaterial, more so, when the adoption per se is sans clarity from the respondents. TM Act does not recognize the wrongful adoption of the mark by any party, much less, a third party as any such adoption will run contra to Section 29 of the Act. The learned Trial Court, ignoring the bona fide adoption and continuous usage of the trademark "VISTARA‟ by appellant has instead taken the Class/ products for which it was/ is being used into account, ignoring the settled principles of law and facts.
24. Further, while considering the registered trademark "VISTARA" of the appellant to be a "well-known mark‟, the learned Trial Court neglected to give due weightage to its association, existence and popularity with the appellant as those are certainly relevant factors worthy of consideration for any mark to be declared as such, more so, when the legislature in its wisdom has knowingly recognized and accorded a better protection than to an already existing registered trademark. That services and products are available/ being used under numerous common existing words found in the dictionary and further that they have been duly registered from time to time itself shows that a common dictionary word, per-se, is entitled for its qualification and registration as a trademark over the passage of time leading to an entity acquiring monopoly over it, provided it is adopted and used for particular services or products falling in a particular Class with which it has no direct reference, connection or connotation and also if it has over time not only acquired distinctiveness but also has a secondary meaning attached to it. It is reiterated that once a trademark is registered it is well and truly entitled to all the statutory protection recognized and available under the TM Act.
This is why, as per the Statute (TM Act) when a word is adopted under Section 2(m) as a "mark" under the TM Act it can not only qualify to become a trade mark as per Section 2(p) of TM Act but can also, with the passage of the time, certainly progress and qualify to become a "well-known mark‟ as per Section 2(zg) of TM Act. The status of the mark is ever-evolving and changing from time to time and is never static. Regardless of that, in the present factual matrix, the trademark "VISTARA" of the appellant is a coined and invented word with no direct reference or meaning found in the dictionary or the common parlance. This Court finds no reference qua the above in the impugned order.
xxxxx
24. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in case reported as, "CS (OS) No.394/2012", titled as, "The Indian Hotels Company Limited V/s Ashwajeet Garg And Ors.: (DOO: 16.05.2014), while deliberating upon trademark infringement has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
14. Under section 28 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as "The Act"), the registration of a mark gives the registered proprietor the exclusive right to use the registered mark and the use of an "identical" or "deceptively similar" mark by another without any permission/authority amounts to infringement of the registered mark under Section 29 of the Act.
.........
25. In an action for infringement, the Plaintiff must make out that the use of the Defendant's mark is likely to deceive. Where the similarity between the Plaintiff's and the Defendant's mark is so close either visually, phonetically or otherwise and the court reaches the conclusion that there is an imitation, no further evidence is required to establish that the Plaintiff's rights are violated. If the essential features of the trade mark of the Plaintiff have been adopted by the Defendant, the fact that the get-up, packing and other writing or marks on the goods or on the packets in which he offers his goods for sale show marked differences, or indicate clearly a trade origin different from that of the registered proprietor of the mark would be immaterial.
26. When the question whether the mark causes or is likely to cause deception or confusion arises before a Court, the standard applied is not that of a vigilant consumer or a trader, but standard of an unwary normal customer of the said product. The Court has to consider and examine whether a consumer of the product is likely to be deceived or confused after examining broad and dominant features of the two marks and whether there is overall similarity that is likely to mislead a purchaser. Both the marks have to be considered as a whole.
xxxxx
25. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case reported as, "AIR 1965 SC 980", titled as, "Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma V/s Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories" has been pleased to observe that if essential features of the trademark of plaintiff had been adopted by defendant, the fact that the getup or the packaging showed marked differences or indicated a different trade origin, would be immaterial in a case of infringement as opposed to in a case of passing off.
26. The defendant cannot be allowed to piggy bag upon the reputation of plaintiff. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a case involving somewhat similar facts, i.e in case reported as, "1992 SCC Online Del 122", titled as, "The Tata Iron & Steel Company Ltd. V/s Mahavir Steels & Ors." (DOD: 25.02.1992), has been pleased to hold as under:
xxxxx
14. .........An imitation remains an imitation whether it is done by one or by many. It acquires no legitimacy. A wrong is not righted by the following it musters. Infringement of trade mark by a trader cannot be justified on the ground that there are others like him who are doing the same. There is a growing tendency to copy the trade marks to cash upon some one else's business reputation .
The pirates of trade marks are like parasites clinging to others for their growth. Imitators of trade marks have the sole object of diverting the business of others. This tendency must be curbed in the interest of the trade and the consumers.
xxxxx
27. Further in case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.126/2022", titled as, "M.L Brother LLP V/s Mahesh Kumar Bhuralal Tanna" (DOD: 12.05.2022), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down that Local Commissioner's report can be read in evidence in terms of Order XXVI Rule 10(2) CPC. For ready reference, the said observations are re-produced as under:
xxxxx
10. Order 26 Rule 10 (2) CPC stipulates that the report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by the Commissioner shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record. The said provision reads as under:
10. Procedure of Commissioner.-- (1) The Commissioner, after such local inspection as he deems necessary and after reducing to writing the evidence taken by him, shall return such evidence, together with his report in writing signed by him, to the Court.
(2) Report and depositions to be evidence in suit. Commissioner may be examined in person.--The report of the Commissioner and the evidence taken by him (but not the evidence without the report) shall be evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record; but the Court or, with the permission of the Court, any of the parties to the suit may examine the Commissioner personally in open Court touching any of the matters referred to him or mentioned in his report, or as to his report, or as to the manner in which he has made the investigation."
11. In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Rajesh Agarwal 2018 IAD (Delhi) 622, this Court examined the said provision and held that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report, it becomes evidence in the suit itself. Under Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC it is not mandatory to examine the Commissioner to admit the report of the Commissioner as evidence in the suit. The relevant observations are as under:
8. The Local Commissioner is in fact a representative of the Court itself and it is for this reason that Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC clearly provides that once the Commissioner has filed the evidence along with his report the same shall be treated as evidence in the suit and shall form part of the record.
xxx xxx xxxx
10. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner along with the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court. Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report. In the present case, a perusal of the written statement filed by the Defendant clearly reveals that the Defendant does not challenge the Commissioner's report. Para of the written statement is set out below..."
12. This position of law has been reiterated by this Court in Vinod Goel v. Mahesh Yadav [RFA 598/2016 decided on 23rd May, 2018] wherein the Court observed as under:
"7. It is the settled proposition in law that when a Commissioner is appointed, he acts as the officer of the Court and it is not necessary for the Commissioner to be examined. This is clearly laid down by the Supreme Court in Misrilal Ramratan & Ors. Mansukhlal & Ors. v. A.S. Shaik Fathimal & Ors., 1995 Supp (4) SCC 600, wherein the Court held as under:
"It is now settled law that the report of the Commissioner is part of the record and that therefore the report cannot be overlooked or rejected on spacious plea of non- examination of the Commissioner as a witness since it is part of the record of the case."
8. Even this Court, recently in Levis Strauss v. Rajesh Agarwal [RFA 127/2007 decision dated 3rd January, 2018], held as under
"11. The rationale behind Order 26 Rule 10 (2) of CPC is clear i.e. the Commissioner is appointed as a representative of the Court and evidence collected by the Commissioner alongwith the report of the Commissioner would be evidence in the suit, subject to any objection raised by any party. If any party has any objection to Commissioner's report or to the evidence, such party has an option to examine the Commissioner personally in open Court. Such examination is however, neither compulsory nor required especially in cases where the party does not challenge the report."
9. Mr. Prag Chawla clearly concedes that there may be no requirement to examine the Local Commissioner once the Commissioner is appointed by a Court.
10. Under these circumstances, since the Commissioner had visited the suit property and had submitted the report, it is deemed appropriate that the matter is remanded back to the Trial Court to decide the matter afresh after taking into consideration the report of the Local Commissioner, Mr. Y.D. Nagar dated 5th January, 2000 in Suit No.2198/1999.
13. In view of Order 26 Rule 10(2) CPC and the judgments discussed above, the settled legal position that emerges is that the report of the Local Commissioner can be treated as evidence in the suit where it is not challenged by any party. Accordingly, in the present case the report of the Local Commissioner and the contents therein can be relied upon by the Court as evidence as the same is unchallenged.
xxxxx (underlining which is mine emphasized)
28. Further, on the settled position that Local Commissioner's report can be read in evidence, I also reminded of the following judgments:
(a) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1203/2018", titled as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO & Ors. V/s Gyan Singh & Anr." (DOD:
25.04.2023);
(b) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.478/2019", titled as, "Sandisk LLC V/s Amit & Ors." (DOD: 01.03.2023);
(c) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.564/2020", titled as, "Imagine Marketing Private Ltd. V/s M/s Green Accessories Through Its Proprietor & Anr." (DOD: 21.03.2022);
(d) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.675/2019", titled as, "Dhani Loans And Services Limited & Anr. V/s WWW.Dhanifinance.Com & Ors." (DOD:
12.10.2022);
(e) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.929/2018", titled as, "Sanofi & Anr. V/s Faisal Mushtaq & Ors." (DOD: 16.11.2018);
(f) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.413/2021", titled as, "LT Foods Limited V/s Saraswati Trading Company" (DOD: 11.11.2022);
(g) Case reported as, "CS (Comm.) No.1219/2018", titled as, "Shri Ved Prakash Garg Trading As M/s Parul Food Products V/s M/s Gurudev Industries" (DOD: 20.12.2018) and;
(h) Case reported as, "CS (OS) No.3466/2012", titled as, "Disney Enterprises Inc. & Anr. V/s Balraj Muttneja & Ors." (DOD: 20.02.2014).
29. In case reported as, "AKTIEBOLAGET VOLVO" (supra), the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to observe as under:
xxxxx
10. At the hearing on 19thApril, 2023, the counsels for the defendants on instructions submitted that the defendants were agreeable to a decree of permanent injunction being passed against the defendants. Counsel for the plaintiffs also pressed for costs and damages of Rs.10,00,000/- to be apportioned between the defendants.
xxxxx xxxxx
17. I am of the opinion that no purpose would be served by directing the plaintiffs to lead evidence by filing examination-in- chief by way of affidavit. The defendants have no reasonable prospect of succeeding in the present suit. Therefore, in my opinion, this is a fit case where a Summary Judgment in terms of Order XIII-A of the CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes of a specified value, read with Rule 27 of the IPD Rules, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants.
xxxxx
30. The Hon' ble High Court, thereafter in paragraphs No.22 and 23 of the aforesaid judgment has been pleased to lay down as under:
xxxxx
22. Clearly, the customers are being misled by the defendants and the entire effort is deliberate and dishonest. This amounts to dilution of the reputation and goodwill of the plaintiffs' marks and causing loss to the plaintiffs in business and reputation. The members of the public are bound to confuse bicycles manufactured and sold by the defendants under the mark VOLVO as emanating from the plaintiffs. The defendants have been making unlawful gains at the expense of the plaintiffs. I am convinced that this is nota case of innocent adoption by the defendants. The Court cannot ignore such flagrant misuse of the plaintiffs' marks by the defendants. Even though the claim of the plaintiffs for damages, based on the recoveries made at the premises of the defendant no.2 and the invoices placed on record, is close to Rs.20,00,000/-, I deem it appropriate to award a sum of Rs.10,00,000/-towards damages and costs to the plaintiffs.
23. Taking into account that the defendants no. 3 and 4 are the manufacturers and suppliers of the aforesaid goods and the defendants no.1and 2 were selling the goods supplied by the defendants no.3 and 4, out of the aforesaid amount, the defendants no.3 and 4 shall be liable to pay Rs.6,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs and the defendants no.1 and 2 shall be liable to pay Rs.3,50,000/- in favour of the plaintiffs.
xxxxx
31. (i) After considering the facts and circumstances of the case in totality, I am of the considered opinion that there is no real prospect of defendant succeeding in proving its defence, as vide order dated 22.05.2023, the opportunity of the defendant to file written statement was closed. For ready reference, the operative part of order dated 22.05.2023 is re-produced hereunder:
xxxxx 22.05.2023 At this stage, it is pointed out that vide order dated 30.11.2022, written statement was taken off the record as it was not filed as per provision of the Act and thereafter written statement has not been filed till date. Therefore, time of filing written statement is already over. Consequently, the opportunity of defendant for filing written statement is closed.
xxxxx
(ii) It is further worth noticing that even there is no opposition to the report of learned Local Commissioner. Thus, no useful purpose would be served by allowing the proceedings to meander mindlessly in Court and to clog the justice delivery system. Therefore, in my opinion, present is a fit case where the Summary Judgment in terms of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC, as applicable to commercial disputes, deserves to be passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant.
32. Considering the present case on the touchstone of the law laid down in the above referred judgments, I find that no useful purpose would be served, firstly by framing the issue with regard to grant of damages & cost and then asking the plaintiff to lead evidence in the matter. I am further of the considered opinion that there is no defence available on record on part of defendant which debars the plaintiff from claiming decree in the matter, as there is no real prospect of the defendant successfully defending his claim.
33. As regards the damages claimed for by the plaintiff, it is noted that The Delhi High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022 provide guidance on the manner in which the damages could be calculated in such cases. Rule 20 of the IPD Rules, 2022 is set out below:
xxxxx "20. Damages/Account of profits: A party seeking damages/account of profits, shall give a reasonable estimate of the amounts claimed and the foundational facts/account statements in respect thereof along with any evidence, documentary and/or oral led by the parties to support such a claim. In addition, the Court shall consider the following factors while determining the quantum of damages:
(i) Lost profits suffered by the injured party;
(ii) Profits earned by the infringing party;
(iii) Quantum of income which the injured party may have earned through royalties/license fees, had the use of the subject IPR been duly authorized;
(iv) The duration of the infringement;
(v) Degree of intention/neglect underlying the infringement;
(vi) Conduct of the infringing party to mitigate the damages being incurred by the injured party; In the computation of damages, the Court may take the assistance of an expert as provided for under Rule 31 of these Rules.
xxxxx
34. Further, on the aspect of damages, in case reported as, "2019:DHC:2185", tilted as, "Koninlijke Philips and Ors. V/s Amazestore & Ors.", the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi has been pleased to lay down certain standards for grant of damages in following terms:
xxxxx "41. Keeping in view the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that the rule of thumb that should be followed while granting damages can be summarized in a chart as under:--
# Degree of malafide conduct Proportionate award
(i) First time innocent infringer Injunction
(ii) First-time knowing infringer Injunction + partial costs
(iii) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs + partial causes minor impact to the plaintiff damages
(iv) Repeated knowing infringer which Injunction + costs+ causes major impact to the plaintiff compensatory damages
(v) Infringement which was deliberate Injunction + Costs + and calculated Aggravated damages (gangster/scam/mafia) + wilfful (compensatory + additional contempt of Court damages)
42. It is clarified that the above chart is illustrative and is not to be read as a statutory provision. The Courts are free to deviate from the same for good reason."
xxxxx
35. It is a matter of record that during the inspection carried out by three learned Local Commissioner(s) at the premises of defendant, following infringed material was recovered:
Infringed goods/material seized by Shri (a) One white plastic bag containing 35 single shoes of Shatrughan Singh, Advocate, Local one design and 16 single shoes of different designs Commissioner (b) 08 white plastic bags containing 25 upper unstitched for sandals Infringed goods/material seized by Shri (a) Three carton boxes containing 82 pair of shoes and Yogesh Kumar Solanki, Advocate, Local one single shoe; Commissioner (b) One plastic bag containing 300 pieces of unstitched upper; and
(c) 52 plastic bags containing 5264 pieces of unstitched upper.
Infringed goods/material seized by Shri (a) 17 white plastic bags containing 1390 pairs of shoes Piyush Mittal, Advocate, Local Commissioner
36. In my considered opinion, this is a fit case where it can be held that defendants have no defence and a summary judgment in terms of Order VIII Rule 10 CPC can be passed. I order accordingly.
37. Accordingly, suit of the plaintiff is decreed as under:
(i) A decree of permanent injunction is hereby passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant and the defendant, its servants, agents, stockist are hereby restrained from manufacturing, trading, selling, marketing, printing, offering for sale or dealing in any other way, any goods including footwears and other accessories etc and/or any other goods under the mark CAMPUS and , either together or in isolation to each other as their trademark or trade name or any other mark/ logo which is deceptively similar to the plaintiff's trademark CAMPUS and , including COMPASS, , , thereby infringing plaintiff's registered trade marks and copyright;
and passing off its goods and business as that of the goods and business of the plaintiff.
(ii) A decree in the sum of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs Only) on account of damages sustained by the plaintiff due to loss of sale, reputation and goodwill as well as dilution of plaintiff's trademark is passed in favour of plaintiff and against the defendant, subject to payment of requisite Court fees thereupon by the plaintiff;
(iii) It is a matter of record that the seized/infringed goods were handed over by learned Local Commissioner(s) to the defendant on superdari. The defendant is accordingly directed to destroy the seized/infringed goods which are lying under his custody on superdari. Needless to say, the aforesaid exercise be carried out by the defendant in presence of learned counsel for the plaintiff or any representative of plaintiff;
(iv) Plaintiff is also entitled to cost of the proceedings, which will include actual cost incurred by the plaintiff, cost incurred towards execution of Local Commission as also the counsel's fee which is quantified as Rs.1,00,000/-, subject to payment of appropriate tax to the authorities.
38. Decree Sheet be prepared accordingly.
39. File be consigned to Record Room after completion of necessary formalities.
Digitally signedVINOD by VINOD YADAV YADAV Date:
2025.12.04 16:54:16 +0530 Dictated & Announced in the (Vinod Yadav) open Court on 04.12.2025 District Judge (Commercial Court)-02 North-West/Rohini Courts