Tripura High Court
The Tripura State Electricity ... vs Smt. Dipika Dasgupta(Deb) on 6 June, 2018
Equivalent citations: AIRONLINE 2018 TRI 248
Author: Arindam Lodh
Bench: Arindam Lodh
Page 1 of 19
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RFA 5 OF 2016
1. The Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.
Represented by the Chairman-Cum-Managing
Director, Bidyut Bhaban, Banamalipur,
Agartala, West Tripura.
2. The Senior Manager(Electrical)
Electrical Sub-Division, Kalyanpur,
P.O.& P.S.- Kalyanpur,
Dist. Khowai, Tripura.
----Defendant-appellant(s)
Versus
1. Smt. Dipika Dasgupta(Deb)
W/o Lt. Tapash Deb.
2. Smt. Diya Deb,
D/o Lt. Tapash Deb.
3. Smt. Subha Rani Deb,
M/o Lt. Tapash Deb,
W/o Lt. Dhirendra Deb.
All are the residents of Vill-Dwarikapur, P.O. Kalyanpur,
P.S. Kalyanpur, Dist.-Khowai,, Tripura.
[The plaintiff-respondent no.2, being a minor represented by
her natural guardian mother Smt. Dipika Dasgupta (Deb), the plaintiff-respondent No.1]
----Plaintiff-respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, Adv.
Date of hearing : 14.05.2018
Date of delivery of
Judgment and order : 06.06.2018
Whether fit for reporting: Yes
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARINDAM LODH
JUDGMENT & ORDER
This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 01.02.2016 and 15.02.2016 respectively passed Page 2 of 19 by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in Money Suit No. 16/2014 decreeing the suit in favour of the defendant-appellants.
2. The facts giving rise to this appeal, as projected by the claimant-respondents, may be referred to briefly at the outset. The respondents being the plaintiffs had instituted a suit under Section 1(A) of the Fatal Accidents Act,1855 for granting damages and compensation on account of the death of Tapas Deb, who died by electrocution on 20.10.2012, at about 9-30 a.m. at Dwarikapur under Kalyanpur Police Station. Said Tapas Deb, now deceased, was going to the newly constructed house from his old house and at the time when he suddenly came in contact with the live electric wire lying on the pathway which was detached from the electric pole, he died by electrocution. The people of the nearby locality had rushed to the spot and he was taken to the Kalyanpur Primary Health Centre where the attending doctors declared him dead. Postmortem was done accordingly. The matter was reported to the Electric Office and the staff of the Electric Office came to the spot and investigated over the incident.
3. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the death of Tapas Deb was caused due to gross negligence of the Electric Department, the appellants herein, and accordingly, they claimed Rs.8,30,000/- as compensation along with interest. Page 3 of 19
4. In view of the said accident, an U.D. Case vide Kalyanpur P.S. Case No.16/2012, under Section 174 of Cr.P.C. was registered and the police after investigation submitted Final Report stating that the police examined the wife and brother of the deceased and available witnesses wherefrom it has been found that the deceased Tapas Deb was spreading water to his newly constructed building operating an electric water motor and at that time he received electric shock. So, according to the appellants' case, the deceased was electrocuted by internal electric line as installed with the electric water motor and hence, the appellant- defendants-corporation are not liable for the alleged death and for payment of any compensation.
5. On the pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed the following issues:-
I. Is the suit maintainable in its present form and nature?
II. Whether there is any cause of action for this suit?
III. Whether deceased Tapas Deb died on 20-10- 2012 at about 9.30 a.m. due to electrocution? If so, whether the death of Tapas Deb was caused due to negligence on the part of the defendants?
IV. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to damages as prayed for? If so, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get interest thereon?Page 4 of 19
V. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to decree as prayed for?
VI. To what relief/reliefs the parties to this suit are entitled?
6. The plaintiff-respondents adduced two witnesses including the wife of the deceased and exhibited some documents including the police Final Report.
On the other hand, defendant-appellants also adduced one witness and submitted the documents including the accident report by the Manager, Kalyanpur Electrical Sub- Division.
7. After hearing the parties in the suit and considering the evidence on record, the learned trial Court decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff-respondents. Hence, this appeal.
8. Mrs. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel appearing on behalf the appellants-Electricity Corporation, has drawn my attention to the "accidental report" prepared by one Er. Paritosh Roy, Manager, Electrical Sub-Division, Kalyanpur on 21.10.2012 which has been marked as Exbt. A. The said accidental report is reproduced hereunder:
"TRIPURA STATE ELECTRICITY CORPORATION LIMITED OFFICE OF THE SENIOR MANAGER ELECTRICAL SUB-DIVISION KALYANPUR Accidental Report On dated 20/10/2012 at about 8.45 AM an information has been received from the local people about the electrocution of one person namely Tapas Deb of Dwarikapur. On receiving the said information, I being the Manager of Kalyanpur Electrical Sub-Division, went to the Page 5 of 19 spot with our Line staff. During enquiry it is learnt from the local people as well as inmates of Tapas Deb that the deceased was watering in his newly constructed building through a motor water pump and then he was electrocuted.
It is also learnt that the pump was connected through a flexible wire by which he was electrocuted. I have also verified the Electric Line in the house of the deceased and the main switch was found off condition. For checking, our staff switched on the main switch and Electric connection found ok, in the house of the deceased.
We also visited the surrounding area and no torn wire was found.
(Er. Paritosh Roy) Manager, Electrical Sub-Division Kalyanpur"
9. I have also heard learned Mr. Raju Datta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-plaintiffs.
10. At this stage, I deem it fit to iterate the settled proposition of law that admitted facts need not be proved. In the case at hand, it is seen that the parties in the suit have admitted that the deceased died out of electrocution. The only issue left for decision is to the place of occurrence. The appellant-defendants have relied upon some documents in proof of denuding the claim of the respondent-plaintiffs in regard to the place of occurrence of accident. It leads me to test the evidentiary value of these documents in the light of established principle of legal position necessary to prove a document.
(emphasis supplied)
11. Again, it is necessary to make it clear that a suit filed under Section 1(A) of the Fatal Accidents Act is not a summary procedure. It is registered as a regular civil suit, and Page 6 of 19 in the nature of money suit for recovery of damages from any wrong-doer on account of his wrongful act, neglect or default. The prescribed court fee is required to be paid on the quantum of compensation one claims for and it is adjudicated in a civil court of appropriate jurisdiction. So, standard of proof requires the same standard as is followed or required in other civil or criminal cases. This is a kind of a suit where the court is not to follow summary procedure as specifically contained in Section 168 of the M.V.Act, 1988.
12. On query by this Court, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) learned counsel has stated that original copy of the said report was not furnished before the trial Court. She further has stated that the Scribe who typed this report has not been produced as witness to support the contents. Even, Er. Paritosh Roy, the Manager on whose instruction the report was prepared and typed, has not been produced to confirm the contents of the report as well as his signature in the said document, though he was very much available.
13. It is settled proposition of law that mere marking of a document as exhibit cannot be the formal proof of the true execution of the said document. The Apex Court in Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal reported in (2003) 8 SCC 745 observed at Para 16 as follows:-
"16. The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible Page 7 of 19 evidence, that is, by the 'evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue'."
14. To prove this document the original one ought to have been produced. Again to prove it, Er. Paritosh Roy as well as the Scribe also ought to have been deposed before the trial Court. Hence, the said report has no evidentiary value in deciding the case. Moreover, none of the local people, who witnessed the said incident according to Er. Paritosh Roy or to say, more appropriately, the defendant-appellants were not produced before the trial Court in support of the contention that the local people had informed Er. Paritosh Roy that the deceased was watering in a newly constructed building by a water motor pump when he was electrocuted. Even during his deposition, D.W.1 has not stated that Exbt.A, the "accidental report" is the photocopy of the original. He simply has stated that he has submitted the copy of the enquiry report that was available in his office records. The learned court below has committed serious error to mark the document as Exbt.A on the basis of such statement of D.W.1 without any formal proof.
15. In the case of Kunti Devi & Ors. Vrs. Radhe Shyam reported in AIR 1978 All 185, it has been held that -there were some papers which were forthcoming from the Government department and also happened to bear the seal impression of the said department, and merely for such reasons it could not be said such documents would not require Page 8 of 19 formal proof in the court of law. The said documents were certainly not public documents and as such it needed to be formally proved. Further, the photocopy of a document itself is inadmissible in evidence.
16. It is unnecessary, in view of this settled propounded legal postulation to multiply authorities on this point. More so, if the said report by way of communication is believed, then it is found that maker of this report has written "I have also verified the Electric line in the house of the deceased and the main switch was found off condition. For checking, our staff switched on the main switch and Electric connection found ok, in the house of the deceased."
The report amply proves that the electric line of the house of the deceased was having no fault, leads me to arrive at a finding that the deceased Tapas did not die due to electrocution in his newly constructed house.
17. The appellant-defendants also had placed on record the copy of the complaint in the form of FIR addressed to the Officer-in-Charge, Kalyanpur P.S., Kalyanpur, Khowai, Tripura West. This letter has been exhibited during the course of trial as Exbt.B. It is also a photocopy of the letter and Debasish Das who happens to be the Sr. Manager, Electrical Sub- Division, Kalyanpur, Khowai also did not adduce any evidence. The appellants also did neither require the deposition of the Officer-in-Charge of the P.S. nor Sri Debashish Das. This Page 9 of 19 Court is not inclined to take cognizance of the said letter dated 21.10.2012 due to absence of formal proof of his document.
18. One Mrinal Kanti Das has been examined as D.W.1 on behalf of the appellant-corporation. He has stated in his deposition that on the date of incident he was not posted as Sr. Manager at Kalyanpur Electrical Sub-Division and he had no personal knowledge about the incident. Whatever he has deposed he gathered afterwards from the records lying in his office. In his examination-in-chief he has stated that the Electric department was not negligent and there was no live electric wire lying on the pathway and accident did not occur due to the latches of the Corporation, the appellants herein.
19. Mrs. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel for the appellants with all her efforts to convince this Court has laid much emphasis to the statement of P.W.1, the wife of deceased who in her cross examination has admitted a document under the caption "Final Report of the Reported case of Unnatural death sent to the Magistrate under Section 174, Cr.P.Code," which is marked as Exbt.3 submitted by police dated 26.11.2012. Laying emphasis in this, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel has submitted that P.W.1, one of the plaintiffs herein has admitted the contents which was written by one Shiba Prasad Sur, ASI of Police,Kalyanpur P.S. that the deceased Tapas Deb while "giving water to his newly constructed building by Page 10 of 19 electric water motor at that time he received electric shock and fell down in the earth."
20. I have scrutinized the evidentiary value of the said document. I find Exbt.3 is a communication between the police and Magistrate concerned. It is undisputed that the death of the deceased was unnatural which also was mentioned in the plaint as well as written statement. If, we scrutinize evidence of P.W.1 meticulously in its entirety, then, it would be evident that P.W.1 wanted to admit that she had submitted the final report submitted by the police, the conclusion which I have arrived at is further fortified from her reply to a suggestion put to her when she said that "It is not a fact that my husband did not die due to electrocution after touching with an electric torn wire fell on the pathway. It is not a fact that my husband died due to electrocution while he was spreading water on the newly constructed building through an electric pump."
As such, the doubts which the defendant intended to create by putting a vague question were well clarified by P.W.1 that heer husband died due to electrocution in the pathway.
In my opinion, evidence of a witness is to be read and understood after considering the statement in its entirety and not in isolation.
21. If I agree to the submission of Mrs. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel, then it would be fallacious. According to me, Page 11 of 19 firstly, the said document is not a public document; secondly there is no formal proof of the said document and thirdly, by mere admitting the submission of the said document "Final Report of a Reported Case of Unnatural death sent to the Magistrate Under Section 174, Cr. P. Code." in the Court does not mean the contents of the said documents has been admitted, while she was put to cross-examination. Furthermore, she was not specifically cross examined to any of the statements contained in the said document (Exbt.3).
22. The document (Exbt.3) is the photocopy of the original one which means the said copy is derived from the original one by way of mechanical process, falls within the purview of definition of Section 63 of the Evidence Act dealing with "secondary evidence". For convenience, Section 63 of the Evidence Act is reproduced hereunder:
"63. Secondary evidence.--Secondary evidence means and includes--
(1) Certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter contained;
(2) Copies made from the original by mechanical processes which in themselves insure the accuracy of the copy, and copies compared with such copies; (3) Copies made from or compared with the original; (4) Counterparts of documents as against the parties who did not execute them;
(5) Oral accounts of the contents of a document given by some person who has himself seen it."
23. During his deposition the D.W.1 even has not said that it is the photocopy of the original. He simply has stated that he has submitted copy of the Enquiry Report. The learned court below has committed serious error to mark the Page 12 of 19 document as Exbt.A on the basis of the said statement of D.W.1. Further, Section 63(3) of the Evidence Act speaks about a copy, merely as a piece of paper. It is not clear as to whether Exbt.3 is a copy transcripted from another copy. A copy, merely as a piece of paper has no standing as evidence. In order even to be termed "copy" it must have the support of the witness qualified to say that it represents the contents of the original document.
24. In Kalyan Singh Vrs. Smt. Chhoti, reported in AIR 1990 SC 396, 404, the Apex Court has held that "even an ordinary copy (not a certified copy) of a sale-deed cannot be considered as secondary evidence." According to me, the person party who made the copy can swear to its being a true copy. Before its admission, it must be proved that it is a true copy and has been compared with the original by one who can give such evidence.
25. Illustration (c) of Section 63 of the Evidence Act lays down that copy transcripted from a copy but afterwards compared with the original, is secondary evidence because on account of its comparison with the original it becomes itself and immediate copy; but if it is not compared with the original it is not a secondary evidence although the document from which it was copied was compared with the original. Such a copy of a copy i.e. after second copy not compared with the original is not evidence because mistakes may have crept up Page 13 of 19 in a second transcription; even there is the same possibility in respect of the past copy.
26. In Raja Mahadeva Royal Vrs. Raja Virabasava, reported in AIR 1948, PC 114, it is held that a copy of a copy of the original not having been satisfactorily accounted for, is inadmissible in evidence.
27. Furthermore, the Scribe of the said document (Exbt.3) i.e. Shiba Prasad Sur, ASI of Police, Kalyanpur P.S. was not produced by the defendant-corporation to prove the contents of the said document in compliance with Section 65 of the Evidence Act. The Apex Court in Roman Catholic Mission Vrs. State of Madras, reported in AIR 1966 SC 1457 interpreting Section 65 of the Evidence Act observed that where no original document was produced, no foundation was laid to establish the right to give secondary evidence.
All the documents in the present case are in the form of xerox copy. The cardinal question is to the accuracy of such copies. There can be manipulations in preparation of xerox copy of a document, hence it is unsafe to rely/act upon xerox copy of a document.
Such documents being the xerox copies and as such, secondary evidence, the Courts should be very cautious in relying upon those documents.
28. The way the evidence was led in the case in hand reflects that it was a summary trial, but a case of fatal accident in the nature of money suit and fixed court fee is Page 14 of 19 paid against the value of compensation claimed in the suit. As such, it is not summary trial and standard of proof is like any other civil suit as it is in the nature of a money suit and all provisions of the Evidence Act relevant in the case must be complied with.
29. I have also taken note of the provision of Section 59 of the Evidence Act which says that all facts, except the contents of documents or electronic records, may be proved by oral evidence.
At this juncture, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. Vr. Premlata Shukla & Ors., reported in (2007) 13 SCC 476 wherein at Para 13 it is held that -once a part of the contents of the document is admitted in evidence, the party bringing the same on record cannot be permitted to turn round and contend that the other contents contained in the rest part thereof had not been proved.
30. There is no dispute with regard to the said legal proposition. According to me, this decision is quite distinguishable to the facts of the case in hand. In the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. (supra), the Apex court held that once a part of the contents of a document is admitted in evidence, the said party cannot deny the rest part of the content of the said document. In the case in hand, P.W.1 in her cross examination nowhere has admitted any part of the Page 15 of 19 contents of the said document (Exbt.3). As such, the decision relied upon by learned counsel, Mrs. Deb(Gupta) has no relevance in the context of the present case.
31. In support of her contention, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel has placed reliance upon another decision of the Gauhati High Court in Jeypore Timber and Veneer Mills (P) Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner of Income Tax, reported in 1981 Legal Eagle 163.
I have perused the said decision which relates to the transaction of the assessee with the bank where the ITO treated the income as income of the assessee from undisclosed source under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. In that case, their Lordships of Gauhati High Court have held that - it is settled law that when a cash entry appears in the assessee's books of account in an accounting year, the assessee has a legal obligation to explain the nature and source of such credit, when asked for. Under the situation of the said case, the assessee has failed to explain the nature and source of the entries which he should have explained. The assessee in the said case has demanded to dispose of his case by the Tribunal on the basis of the documents produced by the assessee when the Tribunal has made an order for detailed inquiry by the appropriate authority. It is also held by their Lordships that it is not a case of "mere proof of a document or examination of a witness which might have been made by the Tribunal."
Page 16 of 19
According to me, this decision has no relevance to the facts of the present case in hand. Hence, it does not appeal to me.
32. The P.W.1 being the wife of the deceased in her examination-in-chief has categorically stated that the appellant-defendants are guilty of negligence as they did not take due care and caution for the maintenance of the electric live wire for supply of electricity and it is the duty of the Electric Department to control and supervise the electric connections. P.W.1 has stated in her deposition that on the fateful date, her husband Tapas Deb (deceased) was going to his newly constructed house through the village pathway. From the evidence it is also found that there are paddy fields around the said pathway. Mrs. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel has found contradiction in the statement of P.W.1 when she has stated that her husband Tapas Deb was going towards paddy fields. I am not at all convinced with the submission of learned counsel, Mrs. Deb (Gupta).
33. In her cross examination P.W.1 has categorically stated that her husband died due to electrocution after touching with an electric torn wire fell on the pathway. She denied that her husband died due to electrocution while he was spreading water on the newly constructed house through an electric water pump.
Page 17 of 19
34. One Sri Bijoy Das has deposed before the trial Court as P.W.2 and in Para 4 of his examination-in-chief he has categorically stated that at the time of incident he was present at the place of occurrence and saw the incident and after the incident, local people rushed to the spot and with the help of local people the deceased Tapas Deb was sent to Kalyanpur Primary Health Centre where he was declared dead. The matter was also reported to the local Electrical Sub- Division and the staff of that Electrical Sub-Division rushed to the place of occurrence. His evidence could not be shaken in his cross examination by the appellant-defendants. He also stated that he gave statement to the police. He flatly denied the suggestion that Tapas died due to electrocution in his newly constructed building. He further denied the suggestion put forth to him by the appellant-defendants that Tapas did not die after touching with live torn electric wire discharged from the electric pole lying on the pathway while he was returning to his newly constructed building from his old house.
35. Travelling through the entire evidence on record and the documents therein, I am convinced that the plaintiff- respondents have been able to prove their case that the deceased Tapas Deb died due to electrocution in the pathway where the live wire was lying from the electric pole and the appellant-defendants have failed to discharge their duties and found to be negligent in the maintenance of electricity connections laid over the said pathway.
Page 18 of 19
36. It is undisputed that the deceased Tapas Deb died out of electrocution but the only dispute is the place of his death. Whether it was on the pathway en route to his newly constructed house or inside his house. As I already have held that the documents submitted by the parties have no evidentiary value, I have considered the oral evidence led by the parties. In the light of discussions aforestated and being fortified by Section 59 of the Evidence Act as well as following the principles of res ipsa loquitur, I am of the opinion that from the oral evidence led by the plaintiffs before the court below, it has been proved that the deceased died out of electrocution on the pathway en route to his newly constructed house.
37. For the reasons stated above, I am not inclined to interfere with the judgment dated 01.02.2016, passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Court No.2, West Tripura, Agartala in M.S. 16 of 2014 and accordingly, it is confirmed and upheld.
38. Mrs. Deb(Gupta), learned counsel for the appellants has not submitted anything controverting the claim of the plaintiff-respondents that at the time of death Tapas Deb was earning Rs.5000/- per month. However, I have gone through the findings of the learned trial Court. The learned trial Court has taken into consideration the income of the deceased @ Page 19 of 19 Rs.3000/- per month and consequently, he calculated the quantum of compensation at Rs.5,70,000/- and held that the plaintiff-respondents are entitled to the decreetal amount to this extent considering all factors. I find no illegalities committed by learned Court below in determining the quantum of compensation. As such, the said finding of the learned trial Court does not call for any interference.
39. With the aforesaid observations and discussions, the appeal stands dismissed. However, there is no order as to costs.
40. Send back the L.C.Rs along with a copy of this judgment.
JUDGE