Jharkhand High Court
Ashok Kumar Singh vs Adityapur Industrial Development on 28 June, 2022
Author: Kailash Prasad Deo
Bench: Kailash Prasad Deo
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
(Civil Writ Jurisdiction)
W.P.(C) No. 4742 of 2008
........
Ashok Kumar Singh ..... Petitioner
Versus
Adityapur Industrial Development
Authority, Jamshedpur & Ors. ..... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KAILASH PRASAD DEO
............
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sahay Gaurav Piyush, Advocate.
For the respondent s/AIADA : Mr. V. P. Singh, Sr. Advocate.
: Mr. C. G.A. Bardhan, Advocate.
For the respondents/State : Mr. Ashish Anshuman, A.C. to
Mr. Suresh Kumar, S.C.(L&C)-II
..........
10/28.06.2022.
Heard, learned counsel for the parties.
2. Learned counsel, Mr. Sahay Gaurav Piyush on the instruction of learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. A. K. Das has submitted, that petitioner- Ashok Kumar Singh, S/o Yadvendra Kumar Singh, being the Secretary of Civil Courts Employees Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., a society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act bearing registration No.13 dated 13.06.1986 has preferred this writ petition before this Hon'ble Court on 16.09.2008 for issuance of an appropriate writ, order or direction on the concerned respondents to immediately and forthwith allocate the land in favour of the Civil Courts Employees Co- operative Housing Society Ltd. for the purpose of construction of residential colony for the members of the Co-operative Society, as the requisite amount pursuant to the offer made by respondent-authority has already been deposited by the Co-operative Society and the Co-operative Society of the petitioner is ready and willing to comply with the terms and conditions as is required or may be required for allocation of the land.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that the Respondent No.1- Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority hereinafter be referred as AIADA has taken a policy decision to allocate the land for residential purposes, as they have been allocated 75 Hectares of land and had started inviting applications for allocation of land. The respondents- authorities have made several categories of allottees and had made special provision for allocation of group residential area and made separate 2 provision for allocation of land to the Housing Co-operative Society for the purpose of allocation of the land to its members for construction of their houses and the said policy of the AIADA has been brought on record as Annexure-2 to the writ petition.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that condition has been imposed on the respondents, that lease will be granted for 99 years and apart from the premium of the lease, a small amount of annual rent shall also be taken. The petitioner applied in the prescribed format on behalf of the Society and after duly processing the same, the respondents- authorities vide letter dated 13.03.1989, assured the petitioner to allocate 2200 sq. meters of land on tentative cost of Rs.3.52 lacs, further directed the petitioner to deposit 20% of the entire cost i.e. Rs.70,400/- with the respondents authorities i.e. AIADA and the same has been brought on record as Annexure-3 to the writ petition.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that on receipt of said letter the petitioner deposited the said requisite amount of Rs.70,400/- through cheque with the respondent-authorities and pursuant thereto on being demanded, the petitioner had further deposited Rs.1500/- to the respondents authorities towards processing fee for which a receipt was duly issued by the respondents-authorities, bearing Receipt No.4577 and copy of the same has been brought on record as Annexure-5 to the Writ Petition. Learned counsel has further submitted, that the Deputy Development Officer, AIADA has issued a letter on 23.01.1989, directing the petitioner to deposit the copy of the by-laws and registration certificate by 31.01.1989, which was duly honoured by the petitioner by depositing the same on 28.01.1989 and the same has been brought on record as Annexure-6 & 7 to the writ petition.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court towards the contents of letter issued by the then Managing Director, B. K. Halder, I.A.S. addressed to the Secretary, Civil Court Employees Sahkari Grih Nirman Samity Ltd. on 13.03.1989 vide reference No. H/168/ ADA, that the assurance of allotment of Group Housing Areas measuring 2200 square meters of land meant for distribution amongst the members of the Co-operative, who are eligible according to the AIADA, Adityapur, criteria on tentative cost of Rs.3.52 lacs and 20% of which Rs.70,400/- will have to deposit by demand draft in favour of Adityapur Industrial 3 Area Development Authority, (Housing)" payable on Bank of India, Adityapur Branch, as an earnest money, within 30 days from the date of the issuance of the aforesaid letter, failing which, it may be presumed that the petitioner/samiti is no longer interested in such transaction.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that same amount has been deposited with respondent(s) within 30 days of issuance of the aforesaid letter vide demand draft issued from the Singhbhum District Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Chaibasa vide No. CA No.336284 dated 28.04.1989, which has been brought on record as Annexure-4 to the writ petition.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that counter affidavit on behalf of respondent Nos.2 &3 has been filed on 07.01.2009, sworn by Dilip Kumar Sinha, son of Sri Hari Prasad, stating therein the relevant fact at para-4 which may be quoted hereunder:-
"4. That a parcel of land measuring 236.78 acres was handed over by the Forest Department in 1978 to the respondent no.1 i.e. AIDA as per the handing over-taking over document for the purpose of setting up of a housing colony for entrepreneurs and others. Applications were invited from the interested parties by the respondent No.1 for allotment of plotted lands to the applicants, respondent No.1 further planned to develop the land with construction of infrastructure like Roads, drains, culverts, electrical power supply, water supply lines and common amenities for residential colony and divide the land into allotable plots for allotment to the applicants.
Although applications were received for allotment of plots from the public the land could not be developed with infrastructures like Roads, drains, electrical power, water supply and other amenities as the project failed to take off due to lack of allocation of funds for the project. To overcome the fund crisis, a decision was taken to execute the project on Public Private Participation (PPP) format with investments from the private parties. Agreement was signed by the respondent No.1 with a project development consultant to develop the project on PPP format.
Meanwhile a part of this land was earmarked for construction of approach road to the proposed road toll bridge on Kharkai River. When Forest Department officials were approached by the respondent No.1 with the layout plan of the approach road to the bridge, the Forest Department officials mentioned that this land cannot be used for non forest activities as the land ownership is still lying with the Forest Department because this land has not been denotified in favour of AIADA in the forest department land records although this land was officially handed over to AIADA by Forest Department, respondent No.1 approached the Forest Department officially to denotify this land and give no objection to use it for non forest activities. Under the aforesaid circumstances, the ownership of this land does not belong to the respondent No.1. Hence, respondent No.1 neither can develop this land with basic infrastructures and plots for allotment nor can it allot plot to any applicant.
Since this project is lying in a statement condition for decades respondent No.1 is planning to refund the application money to all applicants."
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that the stand taken by the AIADA is with regard to lack of fund and thus, they have subsequently entered into PPP [Public Private Participation] mode format 4 for development of the infrastructures. The AIADA has also taken stand that, the some part of the land was not de-notified by the Forest Department, but this statement in paragraph at least suggests that the land was available before the AIADA and it was because of inaction on part of the AIADA officials, the land was never been allotted to the petitioner for a long period.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that in paragraph-6 of the counter affidavit dated 07.01.2009, that they have taken a stand that AIADA is still taking various actions to materialize this project at different juncture of time but is unable to proceed due to absence of clearance for use of the land from Department of Forest and Environment.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that statement made in counter affidavit at para-6 is vacuous statement as subsequently the land has been de-notified by the Forest Department. The department of Forest has filed a counter affidavit after being impleaded as respondent No.4 and their counter affidavit has been filed on 02.09.2009 duly sworn by District Forest Officer, whereby they have categorically stated the relevant fact at paras-7, 8 and 9 which may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"7. That the D.F.O., Seraikella Forest Division, AIADA has informed vide their letter No.756/ dated 18.05.2009 that the said land is a part of the 923.12 acre of forest land that is under the process of de-notification.
8. That as per recommendation of the Central Empowered Committee, Ministry of Environment & Forest Government of India vide letter No.11-9/2007-FC dated 03.10.2008 has directed the State Government to denotify the 923.12 acre of Forest land, which were transferred prior to 25.10.1980 in favour of AIADA.
9. That as per direction of Ministry of Environment and Forest Government of India, Government of Jharkhand, Forest and Environment Department issued the notification No. Van Bhumi-47/2006-1910 dated 01.07.2009 thereby allowing the deviation of forest land for non forest purpose."
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that pursuant to such notification, which has been issued on 01.07.2009, all the legal impediments of the AIADA were removed and thus, it was incumbent upon the AIADA and its officials to allow the 2200 sq. meters of the land in the name of the petitioner, for which petitioner has already complied the part of the condition by depositing Rs.70,400/- and thus petitioner has a legal expectation over the said land.
13. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that from perusal of the counter affidavit filed by the respondents authorities, it 5 appears that they have not done anything in this regard even after taking money and in the 107th meeting of the Board of Directors of Adityapur Industrial Area held on 16.08.2014, they have categorized the land, which may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"vkfnR;iqj vkS/kksfxd {ks= fodkl izkf/kdkj] vkfnR;iqj] ljk;dsyk&[kjlkoka cSBd dh frfFk % 16-08-2014 cSBd la0&1074 Mh0 izLrko la0 % 02 i`"B la[;k % 12 izLrko % m|eh vkoklh; dkyksuh ifj;kstuk ds fy, vftZr Hkwfe 254-50 ,dM+ dk Productive mi;ksx djus ,oa m|ksx yxkus gsrq funs'kd i"kZn dk vuqeksnuA lays[k ljdkj ds lfpo] m|ksx ,oa izkoSf?kdh f'k{kk foHkkx] fcgkj iVuk ds Kki la0 204 fnukad 08-05-1973 ds funs'k ds vkyksd esa Jh bUnzukFk Bkdqj] rRdkfyu izcU/k funs'kd] vk;Mk ds }kjk dk;kZy; i=kad 4554 fnukad 11-12-1973 }kjk eq[; ou laj{kd] NksVkukxiqj izeMy] jkWaph dks 236- 78 ,dM+ ou Hkwfe dk foHkkxh; gLrkukUrj.k izLrko Hkstk x;kA blds vfrfjDr 6-60 ,dM+ ljdkjh Hkwfe vk;Mk dks gLrkukUrfjr gqbZ ,oa 11-12 ,dM+ jS;rh tehu vk;Mk gsrq vftZr dh x;hA bl izdkj fcgkj ljdkj ds vkns'k ds vkyksd esa m|fe;ksa rFkk e/;;e ,oa fuEuoxhZ; dkexkjksa (lqijokbZtj lfgr) ds fy, vkoklh; dkWyksuh fuekZ.k gsrq dqy 254-50 ,dM+ tehu vk;Mk dks gLrkukUrfjr dh x;hA ou foHkkx ds }kjk 236-78 ,dM+ Hkwfe izkf/kdkj dks fnukad 18-07-1978 dks n[ky dCtk fn;k x;k rFkk Ik;kZoj.k ,oa ou foHkkx dh vf/klwpuk la[;k 47@2006&1910 fnukad 01-07-2009 } kjk bl Hkw[kM dks xSjokfudh mi;ksx gsrq vi;kstu dh Lohd`fr iznku dh x;hA vapy vf/kdkjh] xEgfj;k ds }kjk 6-60 ,dM+ ljdkjh Hkwfe ij izkf/kdkj dks fnukad 13-07- 1984 dks n[ky dCtk fn;k x;kA m|ksx foHkkx] fcgkj ljdkj] iVuk ds i=kad 4359 fnukad 25-03-1986 ds vuqlkj bl izkf/kdkj ds varxZr 254-50 ,dM+ vftZr Hkwfe ij m|eh vkoklh; dkyksuh ifj;kstuk dh Lohd`fr nh xbZ Fkh ,o amDr vkns'k esa of.kZr fu/kkZfjr 'krksZ @ekinaMksa ds vyksd esa ifj;kstuk izkjaHk dh x;hA (Nk;k izfr layXu) A bl vftZr Hkwfe esa 21-12 ,dM+ tehu funs'kd i"kZn ds fofHkUu vkns'kksa ds rgr fofHkUu ifj;kstuk ds fy, d.kkZfdr fd, x, ,o 'ks"k 233-38 ,dM+ Hkwfe cph gqbZ gSA mi;qZDr i=kuqlkj m|ksx foHkkx }kjk ;kstuk dh Lohd`fr gqMdks ls 244-31 yk[k :i;s ds _.k izkIr djus rFkk izkf/kdkj dks jk"Vzh;d`r cSad ls viuh xkjaVh ij xkajVh izkIr djus dh Lohd`fr dfri; 'krksZ ij nh x;hA mi;qZDr i= ds vkyksd esa o"kZ 1986 esa vkoklh; Hkwfe vkaoVu gsrw vkosnu i= dh ekax dh x;hA QyLo:i dqy 7131 vkosnd izkIr gq, ysfdu dqy 120 m|fe;ksa }kjk dqy :0 14]33]600- 00 rFkk 19 dkWijsfVo lkslkbZVh }kjk :0 30]20]800-00 izkf/kdkj esa tek fd;k x;kA dkykUrj esa 7 m|eh }kjk :0 88]100-00 rFkk 3 dkWijsfVo lkslkbZVh }kjk :0 14]78]400-00 izkf/kdkj ls okil ys fy;k x;kA orZeku eas 113 m|eh ,oa 15 dkWijsfVo lkslkbZVh dk dqy :0 28]87]900-00 izkf/kdkj esa tek gSA bl tek jkf'k dk dksbZ ykHk ysus dk m|s'; izkf/kdkj dks ugha gS rFkk bl jkf'k ij izkIr lwn lfgr m|eh ,oa dkWijsfVo lkslkbZVh dks okil dj fn;k tk;sxkA 243-38 ,dM+ (jS;rh Hkwfe 11-12 ,dM+ dks NksM+dj) tehu dk ys&vkmV IykWu uxj fuos'kd&lg&okLrqdkj] uxj foHkkx] fcgkj ljdkj }kjk rSs;kj fd;k x;k Fkk ftldh Lohd`fr funs'kd i"kZn dh cSBd la0 57 fnukad 24-09-1991 }kjk nh x;hA ys&vkmV Iyku ds vuqlkj Hkwfe dk mi;ks;x fuEu izdkj izLrkfor gS %& vkoklh; 66-65 ,dM+ 'kS{kf.kd laLFkku 1-00 ,dM+ O;olkf;d 14-50 ,dM+ lkoZtfud m|ksxksa ds fy, 10-31 ,dM+ lM+d] ukys] dYoVZ bR;kfn ds fy, 48-46 ,dM+ [kqyh txg 76-46 ,dM+ vU; ,tsafl;ksa ds fy, 16-00 ,dM+ dqy 243-38 ,dM vkoklh; Hkw[kaMksa esa fuEu 5 izdkj ds Hkw[kaMksa dk fuekZ.k fd;k x;k Fkk %& dz Js.kh {ks=Qy oxZehVj Hkw[kaMksa dh la[;k ek esa d 1 mPp vk;Zox 300 oxZehVj 275 2 mPp e/;;e vk;oxZ 200 oxZehVj 66 3 Ek/;e oxZ 128 oxZehVj 212 4 fuEu vk;oxZ 90 oxZehVj 502 6 5 vkfFkZd n`f"V ls detksj 63 oxZehVj 113 mijksDr of.kZr 5 izdkj ds Hkw[k.Mksa ds vfrfjDr xzqi gkmflax ds fy, 4 x4 Q~ySVl vFkkZr~ ,d Hkw[kaM esa pkj rYyk (dze'k% 45 oxZehVj] 103 oxZehVj] 60 oxZehVj ) ,oa izR;sd rYyksa ij pkj Q~ySVl dk fuekZ.k djkus dk fu.kZ; fy;k x;k FkkA m|eh vkoklh; dkWyksuh esa fuEufyf[kr fodkl ;kstuk,Wa izLrkfor gS %& lM+d] iqfy;k] ukys bR;kfn ds fuekZ.k ij 657-00 yk[k tykiwfrZ 372-00 yk[k fctyh vkiwfrZ 289-00 yk[k Hkwfe fodkl 50-00 yk[k ey fujlj.k iz.kkyh 400-00 yk[k Hkw&ewY; 244-00 yk[k dqy 2012-00 yk[k mDr ifj;kstuk dks nks o"kksZ esa iwjk djus dk izLrko FkkA ewY; o`f)] DokfyVh daVzksy ,oa vkdfLed [kpZ ysdj dqy vuqekfur ykxr 2286-00 yk[k :i;s fu/kkZfjr dh x;h Fkh ftlesa 1429 yk[k :i;s gqMdks ls _.k ysus dk izko/kku FkkA bl laca/k esa ljdkj ls Lohd`frr izkIr gSA ijUrq gqMdks ls vk;Mk us bl ;kstuk gsrq dksbZ _.k izkIr ugha fd;k gSA flfoy dksVZ bEiykbZt lgdkjh x`g fuekZ.k lfefr fy0] te'ksniqj ds v/;{k }kjk bl ;kstuk ds vUrxZr Hkwfe vkoafVr ugha gksus ds dkj.k ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky;] jkaph esa WP(c) No. 4742/2008 nk;j fd;k x;k gSA bl okn esa fnukad 3@20-03-2009 dks ekuuh; mPp U;k;ky; us lfpo] ou ,oa I;kZoj.k foHkkx] >kj[k.Ma] jkaph dks Hkh izfroknh cukus dks funs'k fn;kA ;g okn vHkh rd U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gS rFkk blesa fdlh izdkj dk LFkxu vkns'k izkIr ugha gSA"
14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted, that in the aforesaid board meeting dated 16.08.2014, 66.65 acres of land has been kept for residential purpose, but they have not granted such land to the petitioner and even aforesaid facts have been admitted by the Board of Directors, then what prompted the authority not to consider the case of the petitioner? If writ petition is pending before the High Court, it does not debar the respondent authorities to redress the grievances, rather the respondent-authorities ought to have redressed the grievances on the basis of admitted fact available before them, as such, it is high-handedness of the officer concerned for not considered the same.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that in the 107th meeting dated 16.08.2014, they have taken a decision on the issue that the money deposited by 113 industrialists and 15 Cooperative Societies to the tune of Rs.28,87,900/- shall be returned, but to the best of the knowledge to the petitioner, the respondents have not complied with the same and it was an eye-wash as they have never issued any letter to refund the said amount and thus, they are delaying the process for their own satisfaction and high-handedness.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that pursuant to the resolution taken in the Board meeting, the Government of Jharkhand, Department of Industry, Mines and Geology has issued a resolution dated 05.10.2017, whereby, they have kept the land for Multi- Specialty Hospital, for which they have issued notification instead of 7 allotting the land to the petitioner though the petitioner has already deposited the money.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd. and Ors. Vs. The Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and Ors. reported in (1970) 1 SCC 582. Paras-10 to 14 may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"10. There is undoubtedly a clear distinction between a represen`tation of an existing fact and a representation that something will be done in future. The former may, if it amounts to a representation as to some fact alleged -at the time to be actually in existence, raise an estoppel, if another person alters his position relying upon that representation. A representation that something will be done in the future may result in a contract, if another person to whom it is addressed acts upon it. A representation that something will be done in future is not a representation that it is true when made. But between a representation of a fact which is untrue and a representation-express or implied-to do something in future, there is no clear antithesis. A representation that sotmething will be done in future may involve an existing intention to act in future in the manner represented. If the representation is acted upon by another person it may, unless the statute governing the person mak- ing the representation provides otherwise, result in an agreement enforceable at law; if the statute requires that the agreement shall be in a certain form, no contract may result from the representation and acting thereupon but the law is not powerless to raise in appropriate cases an equity against him to compel performance of the obligation arising out of his representation.
11. Public bodies are as much bound as private individuals to carry out representations of -facts and promises made by them, relying on which other persons have -altered their position to their prejudice. The obligation arising against an individual out of his representation amounting to a promise may be enforced ex contractu by a person who acts upon the promise : when the law requires that a contract enforceable at law against a public body shall be in certain form or be executed in the manner prescribed by statute, the obligation may be if the contract be not in that form be enforced against it in appropriate cases in equity. 'In Union of India & Ors. v. Mls. IndoAfghan Agencies Ltd.(1) this Court held that the Government is not exempt from the equity arising out of the acts done by citizens to their prejudice, relying upon the representations as to its future conduct made by the Government. This Court held that the following observations made by Denning, J., in Robertson v. Minister of Pensions(1) applied in India "The Crown cannot escape by saying that estoppe ls do not bind the Crown for that doctrin e has long been exploded. Nor can the Crown escape by praying in aid the doctrin e of executi ve necessi ty, that is, the doctrin e that the Crown cannot bind itself so as to fetter its future executive action.
12. We are in this case not concerned to deal with the question whether Denning, L.J., was right in extending the rule to a different class of cases as in Falmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd. v. Howell(1) where he observed.
"Whenever Government officers in their dealings with a subject take on themselves to assume authority in a matter with which the subject is concerned, he is entitled to rely on their having the authority which they assume. He does not know, and cannot be expected to ]mow, the limits of their authority, and he ought not to suffer if they exceed it. "
13. It may be sufficient to observe that in appeal from that judgment (Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction do. Ltd.) Lord Simonds observed after referring to the observations of Denning, L.J. "The illegality of an act is the same whether the action has been misled by an assumption of authority on the part of a government officer however- high or low in the hierarchy........... The question is whether the character of an act done in force of a statutory prohibition is affected by the fact that it had been 8 induced by a misleading assumption of authority. In my opinion the answer is clearly : No."
14. If our nascent democracy is to thrive different standards of conduct for the people and the public bodies cannot ordinarily be permitted. A public body is, in our judgment, not exempt from liability to carry out its obligation arising out of representations made by it relying upon which a citizen has altered his position to his prejudice."
Learned counsel for the petitioner in support of his submission has further relied upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd vs. The State of U.P. and others reported in AIR 1979 SC 621. Paras-8, 10, 19, 24 and 33, which are profitably quoted hereunder:-
"8. This principle of equity laid down by Lord Cairns made sporadic appearances in stray cases now and then but it was only in 1947 that it was disinterred and restated as a recognised doctrine by Mr. Justice Denning, as he then was, in the High Trees case. The facts in that case were as follows. The plaintiff leased to the defendants, a subsidiary of the plaintiffs, in 1937 a block of flats for 99 years at a rent of £ 2500/- a year. Early in 1940 and because of the war, the defendants were unable to find sub-tenants for the flats and unable in consequence to pay the rent. The plaintiffs agreed at the request of the defendants to reduce the rent of £ 1250/- from the beginning of the term. By the beginning of 1945 the conditions had improved and tenants had been found for all the flats and the plaintiffs, therefore, claimed the full rent of the premises from the middle of that year. The claim was allowed because the court took the view that the period for which the full rent was claimed fell outside the representation, but Mr. Justice Denning, as he then was, considered Obiter whether the plaintiffs could have recovered the covenanted rent for the whole period of the lease and observed that in equity the plaintiffs could not have been allowed to act inconsistently with their promise on which the defendants had acted. It was pressed upon the Court that according to the well settled law as laid down in Jorden v. Money (1854) 5 HLC 185 no estoppel could be raised against the plaintiffs since the doctrine of estoppel by representation is applicable only to representations as to some state of facts alleged to be at the time actually in existance and not to promises de futuro which, if binding at all, must be binding only as contracts and here there was no representation of an existing state of facts by the plaintiffs but it was merely a promise or representation of intention to act in a particular manner in the future.
Mr. Justice Denning, however, pointed out:
"The law has not been standing still since Jorden v. Money. There has been a series of decisions over the last fifty years which, although they are said to be cases of estoppel are not really such. They are cases in which a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made, and which was in fact so acted on. In such cases the courts have said that the promise must be honoured."
The principle formulated by Mr. Justice Denning was, to quote his own words, "that a promise intended to be binding, intended to be acted on and in fact acted on, is binding so far as its terms properly apply." Now Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co. (supra) and Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North Western Rly. Co. (supra), the two decisions from which Mr. Justice Denning drew inspiration for evolving this new equitable principle, were clearly cases where the principle was applied as between parties who were already bound contractually one to the other. In Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co. (supra) the plaintiff and the defendant were already bound in contract and the general principle stated by Lord Cairns, L. C. was :
"if parties who have entered into definite and distinct terms involving certain legal results afterwards .....enter upon a course of negotiations."
Ten years later Bowen, L. J. also used the same terminology in 9 Birmingham and District Land Co. v. London and North Western Rly. Co. (supra) that :
"if persons who have contractual rights against others induce by their conduct those against whom they have such rights to believe......"
These two decisions might, therefore, seem to suggest that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is limited in its operation to cases where the parties are already contractually bound and one of the parties induces the other to believe that the strict rights under the contract would not be enforced. But we do not think any such limitation can justifiably be introduced to curtail the width and amplitude of this doctrine. We fail to see why it should be necessary to the applicability of this doctrine that there should be some contractual relationship between the parties. In fact Donaldson, J. pointed in Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Jackson (Michael) (Fancy Goods) Ltd. (1968) 2 All ER 987.
"Lord Cairns in his enunciation of the principle assumed a pre- existing contractual relationship between the parties, but this does not seem to me to be essential, provided that there is a preexisting legal relationship which could in certain circumstances give rise to liabilities and penalties."
But even this limitation suggested by Donaldson, J. that there should be a pre-existing legal relationship which could in certain circumstances give rise to liabilities and penalties is not warranted and it is significant that the statement of the doctrine by Mr. Justice Denning in the High Trees case does not contain any such limitation. The leanred Judge has consistently refused to introduce any such limitation in the doctrine and while sitting in the Court of Appeal, he said in so many terms, in Evenden v. Guildford City Association Football Club Ltd. (1975) 3 All ER 269 :
"Counsel for the appellant refereed us, however, to the second edition of Spencer Bower's book on Estoppel by Representation ((1966) pp. 340-342) by Sir Alexander Turner, a Judge of the New Zealand Court of Appeal. He suggests the promissory estoppel is limited to cases where parties are already bound contractually one to the other. I do not think it is so limited :
see Durham Fancy Goods Ltd. v. Jackson Michael (Fancy Goods) Ltd. It applies whenever a representation is made, whether of fact or law, present or future, which is intended to be binding, intended to induce a person to act on it and he does act on it."
This observation of Lord Denning Clearly suggests that the parties need not be in any kind of legal relationship before the transaction from which the promissory estoppel takes its origin. The doctrine would seem to apply even where there is no pre-existing legal relationship between the parties, but the promise is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship which will arise in future. Vide Halsbury's Law of England 4th ed. P. 1018, Note 2 to para 1514. Of course it must be pointed out in fairness to Lord Denning that he made it clear in the High Trees case that the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot found a cause of action in itself, since it can never do away with the necessity of consideration in the formation of contract, but he totally repudiated in Evenderis' case the necessity of a pre-existing relationship between the parties and pointed out in Crabb v. Arun District Council, (1975) 3 All ER 865 that equity will in a given case where justice and fairness demand, prevent a person from insisting on strict legal rights even where they arise not under any contract, but on his own title deeds or under statute. The true principle of promissory estoppel, therefore, seems to be that where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is in fact so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties, and this would be so irrespective whether there is any pre- existing relationship between the parties or not.
10. It may be noted that even Lord Denning recognised in Crabb v. Arun District Council (1975) 3 All ER 865 (supra) that "there are stoppels and estoppels. Some do give rise to a cause of action. Some don't" and added that "in the species of estoppel called 'proprietary estoppel', it does give rise to 10 a cause of action". The learned Law Lord, after quoting what he had said in Moorgate Mercantile Co. Ltd. v. Twitchings (1975) 3 WLR 286 namely that the effect of estoppel on the true owner may be that :
"his own title to the property, be it land or goods, has been held to be limited or extinguished, and new rights and interests have been created therein. And this operates by reason of his conduct - what he has led the other to believe - even though he never intended it." proceeded to observe that "the new rights and interests, so created by estoppel, in or over land, will be protected by the courts and in this way give rise to a cause of action." The Court of Appeal in this case allowed Crabby a declaration of "a right of access at point B over the verge on to Mill Park Road and a right of way along that road to Hook Lane" on the basis of an equity arising out of the conduct of the Arun District Council. Of course, Spencer Bower and Turner,, in their Treatise on "The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation' have explained this decision on the basis that it is an instance of the application of the doctrine of estoppel by encouragement or acquiescence or what has now come to be known as proprietary estoppel which, according to the learned authors, forms an exception to the rule that estoppel cannot found a cause of action. But if we look at the judgments of Lord Denning and Sacramen, L. J., it is apparent that they did not base their decision on any distinctive feature of proprietary estoppel but proceeded on the assumption that there was no distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel so far as the problem before them was concerned. Both the leanred Law Lord and the learned Lord Justice applied the principle of promissory estoppel in giving relief to Crabb. Lord Denning, referring to what Lord Cairns had said in Hughes v. Metropolitan Rly. Co., (1877) 2 AC 439 at p. 448 a decision from which inspiration was drawn by him for evolving the doctrine of promissory estoppel in the High Trees' case (1956-1 All ER 256) observed that "..... it is the first principle on which all courts of equity proceed ........ that it will prevent a person from insisting on his strict legal rights - whether arising under a contract, or on his title deeds, or by statute - when it would be inequitable for him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the parties". The decision in the High Trees' case was also referred to by the learned Law Lord and so also other cases supporting the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Scarman, L. J. also observed that in pursuing the inquiry as to whether there was an equity in favour of Crabb, he did not find helpful "the distinction between promissory and proprietary estoppel". He added that this "distinction may indeed be valuable to those who have to teach or expound the law, but I do not think that, in solving the particular problem raised by a particular case, putting the law into categories is of the slightest assistance." It does appear to us that this was a case decided on the principle of promissory estoppel. The representative of the Arun District Council clearly gave assurance to Crabb that they would give him access to the new road at point B to serve the southern portion of his land and the Arun District Council in fact constructed a gate at point B, and in the belief induced by this representation that he would have right of access to the new road at point B, Crabb agreed to sell the northern portion of his land without reserving for himself as owner of the southern portion any right of way over the northern portion for the purpose of access to the new road. This was the reason why the Court raised an equity in favour of Crabb and held that the equity would be satisfied by giving Crabb 'the right of access at point B free of charge without paying anything for it." Arun District Council was held bound by its promise to provide Crabb access to the new road at point B and this promise was enforced against Arun District Council at the instance of Crabb. The case was one which fell within the category of promissory estoppel and it may be regarded as supporting the view that promissory estoppel can be the basis of cause of action. It is possible that the case also came within the rule of proprietary estoppel enunciated by Lord Kingsdown in Ramsden v. Dyson (1866) 1 HL 129 :
"The rule of law applicable to the case appears to me to be this : If a man, under a verbal agreement with a land lord for a certain interest in land, or what amounts to the same thing, under an expectatin, created or encouraged by the landlord that he shall have a certain interest, takes possession of such land, with the consent of the landlord, and upon the faith of 11 such promise or expectation, with the knowledge of the landlord, and without objection by him, lays out money upon the land, a Court of equity wil compel the landlord to give effect to such promise or expectation."
and Spencer Bower andTurner may be right in observing that that was perhaps the reason why it was held that the promise made by Arun District Council gave rise to a cause of action in favour of Crabhb. But, on what principle, one may ask, is the distinction to be sustained between promissory estoppel and proprietary estoppel in the matter of enforcement by action. If proprietary estoppel can furnish a cause of action, why should promissory estoppel not? There is no qualitative difference between the two. Both are the offsprings of equity and if equity is flexible enought to permit proprietary estoppel to be used as a cause of action, there is no reason in logic or principle why promissory estoppel should also not be available as a cause of action, if necessary to satisfy the equity.
19. When we turn to the Indian law on the subject it is heartening to find that in India not only has the doctrine of promissory estoppel been adopted in its fullness but it has been recognized as affording a cause of action to the person to whom the promise is made. The requirement of consideration has not been allowed to stand in the way of enforcement of such promise. The doctrine of promissory estoppel has also been applied against the Government and the defence based on executive necessity has been categorically negatived. It is remarkable that as far back as 1880, long before the doctrine of promissory estoppel was formulated by Denning, J., in England, a Division Bench of two English Judges in the Calcutta High Court applied the doctrine of promissory estoppel and recognised a cause of action founded upon it in the Ganges Mfg. C. V. Sourujumull, (1880) ILR 5 Cal 669. The doctrine of promissory estoppel was also applied against the Government in a case subsequently decided by the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Bombay v. Secy. of State, (1905) ILR 29 Bom 580.
24. This Court finally, after referring to the decisions in the Ganges Mfg. O. v. Surujmull (1880) ILR 5 Cal 669 (supra), Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Secy. of State for India (1905) ILR 29 Bom 580 (supra) and Collector of Bombay, AIR 1951 SC 469 (supra), summed up the position as follows :
"Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an exparte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen."
The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision, that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Govt. would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Govt. at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Art. 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned : the former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel? Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith"? Why should the Government not be held to a high "standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens"? There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations, but, let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case (AIR 1968 SC 718) and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this 12 Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. The law cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the society and the constant endeavour of the Courts and the legislatures must, therefore, be to close the gap between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promiseee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not required that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts which have transpired since the making of the promise, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and alter his position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J., pointed out in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise "on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency", nor can be Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it "on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances". If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the subsequent events on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether those events are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability, the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, that overriding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government actiong otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insists on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such overriding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice, which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If, however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise could become final and irrevocable.
13Vide Ajayi v. Birscoe (1964) 3 All ER 556.
33. The State, however, contended that the doctrine of promissory estoppel had no application in the present case because the appellant did not suffer any detriment by acting on the representation made by the Government; the vanaspati factory set up by the appellant was quite a profitable concern and there was no prejudice caused to the appellant. This contention of the State is clearly unsustainable and must be rejected. We do not think it is, necessary, in order to attract the applicability of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, that the promisee, acting in reliance on the promise, should suffer any detriment. What is necessary is only that the promisee should have altered his position in reliance on the promise. This position was impliedly accepted by Denning, J., in the High Trees Case when the learned Judge pointed out that the promise must be one "which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact acted on." (emphasis supplied).
If a promise is "acted on", "such action, in law as in physics, must necessarily result in an alteration of position." This was again reiterated by Lord Denning in W. J. Alan and Co. Ltd. v. El Nasr Export and Import Co. (1972) 2 All ER 127 at p. 140 where the learned Law Lord made it clear that alteration of position "only means that he (the promisee) must have been led to act differently from what he would otherwise have done. And, if you study the cases in which the doctrine has been applied, you will see that all that is required is that the one should have acted on the belief induced by the other party." Viscount Simonds also observed in Tool Metal Mfg. Co. Limited v. Tungsten Electric Co. Ltd. (1955) 2 All ER 657 that "......... the gist of the equity lies in the fact that one party has by his conduct led the other to alter his position." The judgment of Lord Tucker in the same case would be found to depend likewise on a fundamental finding of alteration of position, and the same may be said of that of Lord Cohen. Then again in Ajayi v. Briscoe (1964) 3 All ER 556 (supra) Lord Hodson said : "This equity is, however, subject to qualifications (a) that the other party has altered his position." The same requirement was also emphasised by Lord Diplock in Kammin's Ballrooms Ltd. V. Zenith Investments (Torguay) Ltd. (1970) 2 All ER 871. What is necessary, therefore, is no more than that there should be alteration of position on the part of the promisee. The alteration of position need not involve any detriment to the promisee. If detriment were a necessary element, there would be no need for the doctrine of promissory estoppel because, in that event, in quite a few cases, the detriment would form the consideration and the promise would be binding as a contract. There is in fact not a single case in England where detriment is insisted upon as a necessary ingredient of promissory estoppel. In fact, in W. J. Alan and Co. Ltd. V. El Nasr Export and Import Co. (supra), Lord Denning expressly rejected detriment as an essential ingredient of promissory estoppel, saying :
"A seller may accept a less sum for his goods than the contracted price, thus inducing (his buyer) to believe that he will not enforce payment of the balance: see Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Ltd. (1956) 1 All ER 256 and D. and C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees (1965) 3 All ER 337). In none of these cases does the party who acts on the belief suffer any detriment. It is not a detriment, but a benefit to him to have an extension of time or to pay less, or as the case may be. Nevertheless, he has conducted his affairs on the basis that he has had that benefit and it would not be equitable now to deprive him of it."
We do not think that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is necessary for the promisee to show that he suffered detriment as a result of acting in reliance on the promise. But we may make it clear that if by detriment we mean injustice to the promisee which would result if the promissory were to recede from his promise, then detriment would certainly come in as a necessary ingredient. The detriment in such a case is not some prejudice suffered by the promisee by actiong on the promise, but the prejudice which would be caused to the promisee, if the promisor were allowed to go back on the promise. The classic exposition of detriment in this sense is to be found in the following passage from the judgment of Dixon, J. in the Australian case of Grundt v. Great Boulder Pty. Gold Mines Ltd., (1938) 59 14 CLR 641 :
"........... It is often said simply that the party asserting the estoppel must have been induced to act to his detriment. Although substantially such a statement is correct and leads to no misunderstanding, it does not bring out clearly the basal purpose of the doctrine. That purpose is to avoid or prevent a detriment to the party asserting the estoppel by compelling the opposite party to adhere to the assumption upon which the former acted or abstained from acting. This means that the real detriment or harm from which the law seeks to give protection is that which would flow from the change of position if the assumption were deserted that led to it. So long as the assumption is adhered to, the party who altered his situation upon the faith of it cannot complain. His complaint is that when afterwards the other party makes a different state of affairs the basis of an assertion of right against him then, if it is allowed, his own proginal change of position will operate as a detriment. His action or inaction must be such that, if the assumption upon which he proceeded were shown to be wrong, and an inconsistent state of affairs were accepted as the foundation of the rights and duties of himself and the opposite party, the consequence would be to make his original act or failure to act a source of prejudice."
If this is the kind of detriment contemplated, it would necessarily be present in every case of promisor estoppel, because it is on account of such detriment which the promisee would suffer if the promissory were to act differently from his promise, that the Court would consider it inequitable to allow the promissory to go back upon his promise. It would, therefore, be correct to say that in order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel it is enough to show that the promisee has, actiong in reliance on the promise, altered his position and it is not necessary for him to further show that he has acted to his detriment. Here, the appellant clearly altered its position by borrowing moneys from various financial institutions, purchasing plant and machinery from M/s. De Smet (India) Pvt. Ltd., Bombay and setting up a vanaspati plant, in the belief induced by the representation of the Government that sales tax exemption would be granted for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production. The Government was, therefore, bound on the principle of promissory estoppel to make good the representation made by it. Of course, it may be pointed out that if the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 did not contain a provision enabling the Government to grant exemption, it would not be possible to enforce the representation against the Government, because the Government cannot be compelled to act contrary to the statute, but since Section 4 of the U. P. Sales Tax Act, 1948 confers power on the Government to grant exemption from sales tax, the Government can legitimately be held bound by its promise to exempt the appellant from payment of sales tax. It is true that taxation is a sovereign or governmental function, but, for reasons which we have already discussed, no distinction can be made between the exercise of a sovereign or governmental function and a trading or business activity of the Government, so far as the doctrine of promissory estoppel is concerned. Whatever be the nature of the function which the Government is discharging, the Government is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of this rule are satisfied, the Government can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it. We are, therefore, of the view that in the present case the Government was bound to exempt the appellant from payment of sales tax in respect of sales of vanaspati effected by it in the State of Uttar Pradesh for a period of three years from the date of commencement of the production and was not entitled to recover such sales tax from the appellant."
18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has thus submitted, that under the promissory estoppel, once the money has been deposited by the petitioner to the respondents authorities, the respondents-authorities are duty bound to discharge the part of their onus.
19. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that the initial 15 stand taken by the AIADA, that there was lack of money for infrastructures development and subsequently that they have no clearance from the Forest Department and now they are taking stand with regard to certain resolution, which has been made in the years 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 by not honouring their own promises made to the petitioner. Learned counsel has further submitted, that this fact has been dealt by the Hon'ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh in the case of Aeronautics Employees Co- op. Housing Society Ltd. Vs. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad and Ors., reported in AIR 1990 AP 331, whereby the High Court has held at paras-11 and 12, which may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"11. Had the Government told the management of the H.A.L. in the beginning itself in 1981 when vast tracts of land was readily available for construction purposes, the management would have explored alternative arrangements to provide housing accommodation to their employees. Because of the promise made by the State Government, the management, thinking that the promise would be acted upon, did not explore other possibililies. It is the promise of the Government that had altered the position of the petitioner-society. The doctrine of Promissory estoppel also applies against the Government. It is no defence for the Government to say that because of executive necessity, it need not keep up its promise. In M. P. Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., , the Supreme Court held (at P. 643 of AIR):
"Where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promisee, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Art. 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Every one is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter. The Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promisee acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual."
12. It is true that if there is overriding public interest, it is always open to the Government to resile from the promise. In the present case, the file containing allotment of the land in favour of Karshaka Parishad has not been placed before me. The constitutional validity of the Act by which the Karshaka Parishad was brought into being was questioned and a Division Bench of this Court on 1-9-1988 had struck down part of the Act and also set aside the appointment of the Chairman. The reappointment made subsequently was also struck down by this Court. No final decision was taken about the setting, up of Karshaka Parishad. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed before me a copy of Telugu daily 'Eenadu' dated 15-4-1990 which contained a 16 statement of the Hon'ble Minister for Agriculture that the Karshaka Parishat exists only on paper. Even if Karshaka Parishad comes into existence, it cannot be said that the entire extent of Ac.645-16 guntas would be required for Krishak Nagar. In any event, having made a promise as far back as 1982 to the petitioner-society it is inequitable on the part of the Government not to act upon that promise. The extent of the land promised to the petitioner is only Ac.89-31 guntas out of the Ac.645-16 guntas covered by S.No. 64 of Madhavapur village. Apart from the principle of Promissory estoppel, in the interests of good government the commitment made to the management of the H.A.L. should be honoured. The employees of any Central Government public sector undertaking, after having been promised assignment of land, should not be subjected to disappointment on the ground of the policy of the Government that the State Government employees should be given preference in the matter of assignment of house sites. Apart from the legality of the governmental action, its legitimacy also is involved in a situation of the present type."
20. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that Board has not honoured its earlier decision, which is not in public interest and it was under the promissory estoppel, that the respondents-authorities ought to have granted land to the petitioner for which, the part of the money as directed has been deposited, but instead of granting the land, in question, to the petitioner, the land was granted to other persons/ organization from the year 2017 to 2022, in support a photocopy of status of Plot near- Phase VII, Adityapur Industrial Area has been produced to the Court, which may be kept on record.
21. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that AIADA is still silent over the other lands vacant in phase I to VI and they have not come up with the clean hand to assist this Court with regard to the vacant available land with the AIADA and thus, they are defying their own promise made and it amounts to forgery committed by the Government Officials against the employees.
22. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that if such stand has been taken by the Board on 16.08.2014 in its 107th meeting, as such, it was incumbent upon the respondents/officials to return the amount or at least wrote a letter to the petitioner, but it is only an eye-wash as these money have been embezzled by the Officials of AIADA for other purposes and they were not inclined to return the same and even after Board's decision, they were not ready to give the land as promised earlier by the Board of Directors of the AIADA in the year 1986 and pursuant thereto, the petitioner has deposited the money in the year 1989 and the Forest clearance was made in the year 2009 also, as such, this Court may direct the respondents/AIADA not to allot any land to an new allottee till the allotment is made in favour of the petitioner as the 17 respondents/AIADA is not coming with clean hands before this Court by providing all the documents with regard to Phase I to VI, as such, this Court may pass necessary order.
23. Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Sahay Gaurav Piyush has submitted, that in the 2nd counter-affidavit filed on 27.06.2022 it is apparent that total area of Adityapur Industrial Area is 4763.86 acres, out of which 2200 square meters i.e. around of ½ acre of the land is to be allocated to the petitioner-society, though respondent/AIADA has never disclosed before this Court, that when such land has been allotted to the industries, name of the industries with date of allotment and its date of commission of industries rather the land remained unutilized for approximately 40 years because of the lackadaisical attitude of the Board of Director of the AIADA who has nothing to loose as they are playing with the public property and fund of poor people.
24. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further submitted, that in the counter affidavit dated 13.06.2022 filed by the AIADA, it appears that respondents-authorities have not taken any decision during intermediary period with regard to the claim of the petitioner, for which, the petitioner has already deposited the money and not acted upon the Board's decision dated 16.08.2014 to return the money with a letter. The respondent- authorities have recently allotted some of the land in the Phase-VII without disclosing that the lands in the other phase are still available for allotment to the petitioner, as such, the stand taken by respondent/AIADA is fit to be dismissed.
25. Learned senior counsel for the respondent/AIADA, Mr. V. P. Singh assisted by learned counsel, Mr. C. G. A. Bardhan has opposed, the prayer and submitted, that the letter of allotment, which has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the writ petition, though assured of allotment of the land, but from perusal of the said letter, as it has also been quoted in subsequent page-2 of the said letter may be quoted hereunder :-
"That a formal letter of allotment of specific plot and area of land for the period and purposes specified will be issued to at your address as furnished by you, after already fulfilled the conditions that finally. If the Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority decides not to issue such order of allotment in your favour (with an intimation to you) for its own reasons and considerations, you will be allowed to withdraw the above said earnest money without any interest.
That this letter be deemed as to have been issued only for the limited purposes as a letter of assurance only and that too subject to reservations as above and not as an instrument or document meant for the specific performance of contract and / or for such other collateral or incidental 18 purposes." [Emphasis supplied]
26. Learned Senior counsel for the respondents/AIADA has further submitted, that in the counter affidavit dated 07.01.2009 the AIADA has taken stand in relevant part of para-5 of the counter-affidavit, which may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"5. The letter No.H/168/ADA dated 13th March 1989 from the respondent No.1 to the petitioner indicated that the plot will be assured for the petitioner on payment of the security Deposit. Petitioner would be allowed to withdraw the said earnest money without any interest if the Authority (respondent) decides not to issue order for allotment of Plot in favour of petitioner for respondent's own reasons and considerations."
27. Learned senior counsel for the respondent/AIADA has submitted, that in the recent counter affidavit filed on 13.06.2022 by Anil Kumar, son of Late Kameshwar Prasad, In-charge Regional Deputy Director-cum- Project Manager, JIADA, Adityapur Region, Seraikella- Kharsawan, whereby, this issue has been dealt properly at paras-6 to 16 of the counter- affidavit, which may profitably be quoted hereunder:-
"6. That earlier on 06/01/2009 Answering Respondent NOs.,1 to 3 have filed counter affidavit in the instant case and in paragraphs 4 of the said counter affidavit answering respondent Nos.1 to 3 has stated that a parcel of land measuring 236.78 Acres was handed over by the Forest Department in 1978 to the Respondent No.1 as per the handing over taking over document for the purpose of setting up of a housing colony for entrepreneurs and others. Applications were invited from the interested parties by the Respondent No.1 for allotment of allotted lands to the applicants, respondent No.1 further have planned to develop the land with construction of infrastructure like roads, drains, culverts, electrical power supply, water supply lines and common amenities for residential colony and divided the land into allotable plots for allotment to the applicants.
Although applications were received for allotment of plots from the public, the land could not be developed with infrastructures like roads, drains, electrical power, water supply and other amenities as the project failed to take off due to lack of allocation of funds for the project. To overcome the fund crisis, a decision was taken to execute the project on Public Private - participation (PPP) format with investments from the private parties. Agreement was signed by the Respondent No.1 with a project development consultant to develop the project on PPP format.
Meanwhile a part of this land was earmarked for construction of approach road to the proposed road toll bridge on Karkai River. When forest Department officials were approached by the Respondent No.1 with layout plan of the approach road to the bridge, the Forest Department Officials mentioned that this land cannot be used for non forest activity as the land ownership is still lying with the Forest Department because this land has not been denotified in favour of AIADA in the forest department land records although this land was officials handed over to AIADA by Forest Department, Respondent No.1 approached the forest department officially to de-notify this land and give no objection to use it for non forest activities.
Under the present circumstances the ownership of this land does not belong to the Respondent No.1. Hence Respondent No.1 neither can develop this land with basic infrastructures and plots for allotment nor can it allot plot to any applicant. Since project is lying in a statement condition for decades Respondent No. 1 is planning to refund the application money to all applicants. In paragraph 5 of the said counter affidavit answering Respondent Nos.1 to 3 has stated that in view of the uncertainty of the project as explained against 19 point 1(a) above at this juncture Respondent No.1 is planning to return the application money to the applicants for plots. Letter No. H/168/ADA dated 13/03/1989 (Annexure-3 of the writ petition) from the Respondent No.1 to the petitioner indicated that the plot will be assured for the petitioner on payment of the security Deposit. Petitioner would be allowed to withdraw the said earnest money without any interest if the Authority (Respondent) decides not to issue order for allotment of plot in favour of petitioner for respondent's own reasons and considerations and in Paragraph 7 of the said counter affidavit answering Respondent Nos.1 to 3 has stated that the petitioner is entitled to withdraw their earnest money.
7. That vide letter No. H/168/ADA dated 13/03/1989 (Annexure-3 of the writ petition) Respondent No.1 has given assurance (para(i) of the said letter) to the petitioner to allocate 2200 square meters of land meant for distribution amongst members of co-operative who are eligible according to the criteria as per lists submitted for the above mentioned purposes on its tentative cost of Rs.3.52 lacs and 20% of which Rs.70,400/= you will have to deposit by demand draft in favour of Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority, later on s per Annexure-4 of the writ petition the petitioner had deposited the said money and processing fee of Rs.1,500/- was paid (Annexure-5 of the writ petition).
It is further stated that vide letter No.H/168/ ADA dated 13/03/1989 (Anneuxre-3 of the writ petition) Respondent No.1 in her letter has stated in para(ii) of the said letter that if Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority decides not to issue such order of allotment in your favour (with an intimation to you) for its own reason and consideration, you will be allowed to withdraw the above said earnest money without any interest. It is further stated in para(iii) of the said letter that this letter be deemed as to have been issued only for the limited purposes as a letter of assurance only and that too subject to reservations as above and not as an instrument or document meant for the specific performance of contract and / or for such other collateral or incidental purposes.
8. That as per direction of Ministry of Environmental and Forest, Government of India, Government of Jharkhand Department of Forest and Environmental issued Notification vide Memo -Van Bhumi 47/2009-1910 dated 01./07/2009 for de-notification of the forest land.
9. That Respondent No.1 vide letter No.1496/ADA dated 02/09/2009 requested the Secretary, the Department of Industries, Government of Jharkhand to utilize the land for Industrial purposes which was the earlier transferred land for residential colony as because seeing the social and economical condition of that time the project for residential colony was made in the year 1980. In the year 1986 cost of the land was @ Rs.5,26,283/= per acres for each applicant but now the cost of land has increased to Rs.1,25,000,00/= (2014-2015) per acres. For the last three decades the land was not utilized for residential purposes and during this period a lot of flats and residential building were constructed in the city after the construction of the Adityapur Toll Bridge. At present a lot of industrialist had requested the Authority for allotment of land for industrial purposes but due to lack of land Authority was not in a position to consider their applications. On 21/09/2013 in the 106th Board of Director's meeting of the Authority is was decided to send the detailed proposal to the Department of Industries, Government of Jharkhand as because it was desirable to use the said land for productive use of industries. In addition to that it was decided for assistance of establishment of industries in Electronics System Design manufacturing (ESDM) area as per National Policy in electronics of Union of India. In the meeting held on 07/10/2013 the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand as a Chairman of the said meeting decide that the land which was not used by AIADA, should be utilized for construction of IT park and SEZ (Special Economic Zone) and for that proposal should be sent. In the meeting held on 25/03/2014 the Development Commissioner, Government of Jharkhand as a Chairman of the said meeting decide to send the issue to the State of Jharkhand for approval of Cabinet after taking the approval of the same in the Board of Director's meeting of the Authority. It was further proposed to return the amount with interest to the applicants who have deposited the amount for residential purposes. The said proposal of 20 Respondent No.1 was placed in the 107 th Board of Director's meeting of the Authority held on 16/08/204 and thereafter it was approved.
10. That on 19/09/2017 the above proposal was passed by the Cabinet of State of Jharkhand and for that Resolution was issue vide Memo No.3573 dated 06/10/2017. Jharkhand Infrastructural Development Corporation (JINFRA) identified the said 233.38 Acres of land of different heads as For Electronic Manufacturing Cluster (EMC) 82.49 Acres, For Industrial usage 66.64 Acres, For STPI (Software Technology Parks of India) 3.50 Acres, For IT Park 15.48 Acres, For Multi -Specialty Hospital 6.01 Acres, Peripheral Roads 24.90 Acres, Transportation facility 2.16 Acres, Green and open space 4.24 Acres, Utilities 10.98 Acres and Institutional /commercial 16.98 Acres.
11. That the present status of different area earmarked in the Master Plan is as follows:
Electronic Manufacturing: Cluster (EMC) : (82.49 Acres) :
The EMC is a special category of Industrial Park which is developed as per the EMC Scheme of the Central Government with the help of the Central Grant. The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) of Government of India together with the Government of Jharkhand is developing a greenfield Industrial Cluster (EMC) which ts almost complete. MeitY, Government of India has sanctioned a capital grant of Rs. 41.48 Crs vide its letter No. 36(7)/2015 IPHW(Vol.II) dated 22nd September 2015.
12. That the area of 82.49 acres greenfield project of EMC was divided as follows:
# For 51 Units manufacturing Electronic Items -- 48.88 acres. # For development of Core Infrastructures - 33.61 acres. (including 5 acres for Flatted Factory)
----------------
82.49acres
----------------
Major Part of Core Infrastructures have already been completed, Roads, Flatted Factory, Water Tank, Drainage Line, Storm drainage system, Water Lines, Truck Parking, Warehouse, Trade Pavilion, Administration Office etc have already been built and are in place.
Out of area (48.88 acres) earmarked for Units manufacturing Electronic Items, land aggregating to 27.310 acres to 35 Units have already been allotted. All the Units are under construction stage and some Units will come into production shortly.
The allotment process of balance Land aggregating to 21.570 acres is carried out under the provisions of the Jharkhand Industrial Area development Authority Regulations, 2016 and it is a continuous process where land is allotted to the entrepreneur who will manufacture only Electronic Items as per the guidelines of the MeitY, GOI.
The Flatted Factory is a block of 4 Buildings which has 92 ready Units (of sizes between 1000 SFT to 2050 SFT) for manufacturing electronic items in a small scale in Plug and Play mode. 2 Units have already been allotted in the Flatted Factory. An amount of more than 120 Crores have already been spent on development of EMC, A grant of Rs. 20.74 Crores has already been received from the MeitY, Government of India for development of EMC.
13. That the status of area of 66.64 acres earmarked for General Industries is as follows:
The area earmarked for set up of Industries of general nature has fully been allotted to 29 Units having an aggregate area of 53.78 acres. (Balance land used in Internal Roads and drainage system)
14. That the status of area of 25.00 acres earmarked for Information and Technology Park is as follows:
The area of 25 acres has further been divided in following segments:
For Software Technology Park (STPI) - 3.50 Acres For Hospital - 6.01 Acres For I.T. Park - 15.49 Acres
STPI: This is a Central Government Project under which AIADA had allotted 3.50 acres land.
Hospital: The area of 6.01 has been allotted to the Hospital as per decision taken in the Board Meeting of JIADA.
21I.T. Park: Out of 15.49 acres of land available for the Units of I.T. Park, Land aggregating to 0.89 has been transferred for units of Institute & Commercial category by the Board of JIADA. Out of Balance 14.60 acres of Land, 14.20 acres of Land has been allotted to 10 Units.
15. That the status of area of 10.98 acres earmarked for Utilities is as follows:
Out of 10.98 acres of Land, 1.07 acres of Land of Utilities has been transferred for units of Institute & Commercial category by the Board of JIADA. From the Balance Land available, 1.96 acres has been allotted for establishing Power Sub Stations.
The balance land has been kept for development of STP (Sewerage Treatment Plant) and other infrastructures of utilities, like sewerage Lines, Storm Drainage Lines, etc.
16. That the status of area of 16.98 acres earmarked for Institutional and Commercial is as follows:
Area Originally earmarked - 16.98 Acres
Add: Area transferred from LT. Park - 0.89 Acres
Add: Area Transferred from Utilities - 1.07 Acres
Add: Unused area of Road - 0.44 Acres
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19.38 Acres
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Area aggregating to 19.23 Acres have been allotted to 3 Units for establishment of Higher Educational Institutes.
28. Learned senior counsel for the respondent/AIADA has thus submitted, that AIADA has now changed its project and thus, they are not inclined to provide the land to the petitioner for residential purposes as the same has also been affirmed by the Government of Jharkhand, Department of Industry, Mines and Geology that such land shall be used for other purposes, as such, petitioner cannot claim the land.
Learned senior counsel for the respondent/AIADA in support of his submission has referred the subject mentioned in the resolution of the Department of Industry, Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand (Annexure-D), which reads as follows:-
>kj[k.M ljdkj m|ksx] [kku ,oa HkwrRo foHkkxA ladYi fo"k; % vkfnR;iqj vkS|ksfxd {ks= ds 7osa Qst esa Integrated Industrial Estate 233.38 ,dM+ (nks lkS rSarhl ,dM+ vM+rhl fMflehy) {ks= esa fodflr djus ,oa mlesa 82-49 (,dM+ cs;klh ,dM+ mUupkl fMlehy) Electronic Manufacturing Cluster (EMC) dh LFkkiuk djus gsrq dqy :0 185-59 djksM+ (,d lkS ipklh djksM+ mulB yk[k :i;s) ek= ds ;kstuk dh Lohd`fr ds lkFk :0 59-99 djksM (mulB djksM fuU;kUos yk[k :i;s) ek= jkT;ka'k vuqnku dh Lohd`frA Hkkjr ljdkj ds lapkj lwpuk vkSj izkS|ksfxdh ea=ky;] bysDVzksf udh vkSj lwpuk izkS|ksfxdh foHkkx ds i=kad 36(7)/2015-1PHW (Vol-II) fnukad 22-09-2015 ds vkyksd esa ljk;dsyk&[kjlkaok vUrxZr vkfnR;iqj vkS|ksfxd {ks= ds Qst&7 esa Integrated Industrial Estate 233-38 ,dM+ {ks= esa fodflr djus ,oa mlesa 82-49 ,dM+ {ks= esa Make in Jharkhand iz;kl dks izksRlkfgr djus gsrq Electronic Manufacturing Cluster (EMC) dh LFkkiuk dh Lohd`fr iznku dh tkrh gSA Jharkhand Infrastuctural Development Corporation (JINFRA) }kjk rS;kj ekLVj Iyku ds vuqlkj lkesfdr vkS|ksfxd bLVsV ds fofHkUu dk;Zdykiksa ds fy, fuEu fooj.kh ds vuqlkj Hkwfe fpfgUgr d;k x;k gS %& Sl.N Nature Area (in acre) Present Status of Area o. of Industries/Cluster/Infrastructure 1 For Electronic Manufacturing Cluster 82.49 Under the EMC Scheme of GOI, the 22 (EMC) Deity of GOPI sanctioned Rs. 41.48 Crs. SPV formed and tender for development of internal infrastructure as per GOI sanction already issued 2 Industrial Usage 66.64 Notification for allotment of land in three stages aggregating to 52.90 acres issued.
3 For STPI 3.5 Allotted 4 For I.T. Park 15.48 Approved by AIADA Board.
Notification issued 5 For Multi Speciali9ty Hospital 6.01 Notification issued 6 Peripheral Roads 24.9 Tender for External Infrastructure ready 7 Transportation Facilities 2.16 Tender for External infrastructure ready 8 Green & Open S[ace 4.24 -
9 Utilities 10.98 Power Substation, water severor, WTP
& ETP
10 Institutional/Commercial 16.98 Notification to be issued
Total 233.38
(nks lkS rSra hl ,dM+ vM+rhl fMlfey)
29. Learned senior counsel for the respondents/AIADA has submitted, that there is no land for allotment to the petitioner.
Learned senior counsel for the respondents/AIADA has also placed second counter affidavit dated 27.06.2022 sworn by Anil Kumar, son of Late Kameshwar Prasad, In-Charge Regional Deputy Director-cum- Project Manager, JIADA, Adityapur Region, Seraikella- Kharsawan, stating therein, that Adityapur Industrial Area has total acquired land of 4763.86 acres and for infrastructures development 346.84 acres have been used leaving behind 3144.25 acres for different industrial units, which have been allotted are as follows:-
Total allotted industrial units 1491
Working industrial units 1260
Close industrial units 78
Under construction industrial units 133
Cancelled units 20
30. Learned counsel for the respondent/State, Mr. Ashish Anshuman, A.C. to Mr. Suresh Kumar, S.C.(L&C)-II has submitted, that dispute is between the AIADA and the petitioner, as such, State is a formal party. However, if the AIADA has to take a decision, the AIADA may place resolution before the State Government.
31. Learned counsel for the respondent/State has further submitted, that in the counter affidavit dated 02.09.2009, they have taken a stand in para-6 of the counter-affidavit that AIADA has never intimated Divisional Forest 23 Officer, Seraikella/Conservator of Forests, Singhbhum State Trading Circle, Jamshedpur about the particulars of any plot, that has been earmarked by them (AIADA) for Civil Court Employees Co-operative Society (petitioner), as such, the AIADA is the contesting party in writ petition and they have never informed the State Government about the same.
32. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials brought on record It appears that vide memo no.808 dated 03.05.2016 Jharkhand Industrial Area Development Authority came into existance in place of all the four authorities i.e. RIADA, AIADA, BIADA and SPIADA. The Resolution Memo No. 3025 dated 16.08.2017 by which all the offices of the authorities shall be converted into Regional Offices i.e., JIADA, Ranchi Region, JIADA, Adityapur Region, JIADA, Bokaro Region and JIADA, Santhal Pargana, Deoghar Region and heads shall be their respective Regional Directors.
33. The powers conferred by section 15 of the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974 as adopted by the Government of Jharkhand vide Notification No. 339 dated 02.03.2001 issued by the Department of Science, Information Technology and Industries, Ranchi, Jharkhand Industrial Area Development Authority, with the approval of the State of Government of Jharkhand, makes the regulation to carry out the purposes of the Jharkhand Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 2001.
34. It appears that, the counter-affidavit filed on 13.06.2022 by respondent- AIADA, whereby, it has been stated, that a piece of land measuring 236.78 Acres was handed-over by the Forest Department in 1978 to the Respondent No.1-AIADA as per handing over and taking over, the document for the purpose of setting up of a housing colony for entrepreneurs and others. The applications were invited from the interested parties by the Respondent No.1-AIADA for allotment of lands to the applicants and Respondent No.1-AIADA further have planned to develop the land with construction of infrastructure like roads, drains, culverts, electrical power supply, water supply lines and common amenities for the residential colony and divided the land into residential 24 plots for allotment to the applicants. The land could not be developed with infrastructures like roads, drains, electrical power, water supply and other amenities, as the project failed to take off due to lack of allocation of funds. To overcome the fund crisis, a decision was taken to execute the project on Public Private -participation (PPP) format for investments from the private parties. The agreement was signed by the Respondent No.1- AIADA with a project development consultant to develop the project on PPP format.
35. Meanwhile, the Respondent No.1-AIADA has invited applications for allocation of land as they have already allocated 75 hectares of land for these purposes in different categories of the residential quarters. Pursuant thereto the petitioner has applied and their candidature was also accepted, as such, they were asked to deposit 20% of the tentative cost i.e., Rs.70,400/- which was deposited by the petitioner through the cheque and the same was also acknowledged by the respondent No.1- AIADA. The AIADA has also assured them for allocation of land. The objection has been taken by the AIADA before this Court, that it was a tentative letter subject to the conditions, that if the Respondent No.1-AIADA decides not to issue such order of allotment in favour of the petitioner, then an intimation to such for its own reason and consideration will be issued and then the person will be allowed to withdraw the above said earnest money without any interest.
36. From perusal of the said document and after hearing the parties, particularly the AIADA and perusing the entire materials on record including the counter-affidavit, it appears that AIADA has not complied the terms and conditions to cancel the assurance given by the Managing Director vide Letter dated 13.03.1989 which has been annexed as Annexure-3 to the Writ Petition. As such, this Court has no reason to disbelieve that Respondent No.1-AIADA has accepted the money and has never cancelled the assurance letter issued in favour of the petitioner.
37. It also appears to this Court that Respondent No.1-AIADA has seven phases of the land, total land is more than 4763.86 Acres. The Respondent No.1-AIADA has not given categorical statement with regard to the allotment of land prior to the candidature of the petitioner and after accepting the earnest money of Rs.70,400/-, rather from one sheet which has been handed-over to the Court, during the argument, the same relates 25 to the Phase 7, is only with respect to the allotment made after 2017 to 2022, meaning thereby that the AIADA had land, but the AIADA was adamant not to honour its own promise.
38. This Court has also examined the document that even after taking resolution in 107th Meeting dated 16.08.2014 by the Board of Directors, nothing has been done by the AIADA to intimate the petitioner, that they are not going to give any land and they are returning the earnest money deposited by the petitioner. To defy the claim of the petitioner, such various unreasonable stand has been taken by the Respondent No.1- AIADA, as it appears to this Court, that officials of the AIADA has no respect for their own circular nor they have respect for the law of the land. The decision taken by their own Board of Directors in its meeting dated 16.08.2014 has not been honoured and even then no action has been taken against the erring officer(s), rather they have only dragged the litigation since the year 1989 till today and now they are taking the stand, that land, in question is not available without furnishing the detail information of the plots. At this juncture it will not be out of place to discuss the scope of promissory estoppel in light of contention as made by petitioner. The doctrine of promissory estoppel means, when an individual with an intention of forming a relationship which is lawful, makes a clear promise to another individual and the latter individual acts on it, that promise became an obligation for that individual, who made such promise. The most important thing is that the promisee must have change the position independence of the promise or assurance.
39. From the above discussion it appears that the promissory estoppel works on the principle of equity, fairness and moral conscience. The above said doctrine of promissory estoppel founds its complete explanation from the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Anglo Afghan Agency Pvt. Ltd. reported in (1968) 2 SCR 306 relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are quoted hereunder: -
"..........It is not right to contended that the executive necessity releases the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which citizens have acted to their detriment. Under our constitutional set-up no person may be deprived of his fight or liberty except in due course of and by authority of law: if a member of the executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right or liberty otherwise than in exercise of power derived from the law-common or statute--the Courts will be competent to and indeed would be bound to, protect the rights of the aggrieved citizen.............
.............The Court observed that the Court was competent to grant relief in appropriate cases, if, contrary to the Scheme, the authority declined to grant a licence or import certificate or the authority acted arbitrarily. Therefore, even assuming that the provisions relating to the issue of Trade Notices offering inducement to. the 26 prospective exporters are in character executive, the Union Government and its officers are, on the authorities of tiffs Court, not entitled at their mere whim to ignore the promises made by the Government. We cannot therefore accept the plea that the Textile Commissioner is the sole judge of the quantum of import licence to be granted to an exporter, and that the Courts are powerless to grant relief, if the promised import licence is not given to an exporter who has acted to his prejudice relying upon the representation. To. concede to the Departmental authorities that power would be to. strike at the very root of the rule of law...........
..............Even though the case, does not fall within the terms of Section 115 of the Evidence Act, it is still open to, a party who has acted on a representation made by the Government to claim that the Government shall be bound to. carry out the promise made by it, even though the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution................"
40. In the considered view of the judgment rendered in Anglo Afghan Agency (supra), the promissory estoppel became applicable against the Government and the State agencies also. However, for complete application of promissory estoppel, there must be lawful relationship between the parties and there is assurance also on behalf of promisor. It appears to this Court from the perusal of the materials brought on record, that there exist all the components present for invocation of promissory estoppel against the respondent No.1 AIADA.
41. This Court has also examined the judgment passed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Aeronautics Employees Co-op. Housing Society Ltd. (supra), wherein the Hon'ble High Court has categorically held in paras-11 and 12 of the judgment, that the doctrine of promissory estoppel may equally applies against the State Government and State Government cannot take defence, that due to executive necessity that promise which was made by the State cannot be fulfilled. The State is duty bound to explore the other ways to fulfill the promises, which has been earlier made by the State. As such, in the light of aforesaid finding it appears, that the claim of the petitioner is sustainable because the promise made by the State Government or its instrumentality as AIADA is an statutory body, the promise would be acted upon. Since the Management has not acted upon and did not explore, the other possibilities for settlement of the issue, this Court has found that AIADA is duty bound to obey the promise made to the petitioner.
42. From the judgment passed by Apex Court particularly in the case of Gujarat State Financial Corporation (supra), as referred above, this Court has found, that principle of promissory estoppel would certainly estoppel the AIADA from backing out of its obligation arising from a solemn promise made by AIADA to the petitioner. The Apex Court has also taken note of the judgment passed in the case of R. D. Shetty vs. The International Airports Authority of India & Ors. reported in (1979) 3 27 SCC 489 has held, that the rule inhibiting arbitrary action by the Government would equally apply where such corporation dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, it cannot act arbitrarily and its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test of reason and relevance. Thus, this Court is of the opinion that the action of the respondent-authorities i.e., AIADA, in not allotting the land in question, is not in accordance with promise made to the petitioner in view of the facts and judgment(s), discussed above.
43. Accordingly, the instant Writ Petition is allowed.
44. The Respondent- Authorities are hereby directed to allot the land, in question to the petitioner forthwith within a period of three months.
45. Till the allotment of land is made to the petitioner, no further allotment of land shall be made to any one.
(Kailash Prasad Deo, J.) sandeep-Jay