Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Kanti Lal vs Smt. Shanti Devi And Ors. on 28 May, 1997
Equivalent citations: AIR1997RAJ230, 1998(3)WLC490, 1997(1)WLN448
Author: R.R. Yadav
Bench: R.R. Yadav
JUDGMENT R.R. Yadav, J.
1. The present appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 1-7-1980 passed by learned Additional District Judge, Sirohi in Original Civil Suit No. 3/75 whereby he dismissed the plaintiff's suit for declaration, recovery of possession after ejectment of the defendant-respondents and mesne profits of Rs. 820/- for use and occupation of the disputed premises up to the date of filing of the suit with further mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month from the date of filing of the suit till recovery of possession from the defendant-respondents.
2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the present appeal are that the plaintiff-appellant purchased a 'Parkota' (land closed with boundary wall) affixed with a wooden door from Shri Makna Ji through registered sale-deed Ex. 2 on 17-11-65. It is averred in the plaint that Shri Makna Ji was in possession of the land in dispute for the last 41 years from the date of purchase from Jodhpur Darbar in auction for Rs. 1507- in the year 1923. It is further averred that the possession of disputed 'Parkota' was given to the plaintiff-appellant on the date of sale-deed.
3. It is also averred in the plaint by the plaintiff-appellant that Shri Himmat Mal telephonically informed to plaintiff at Bombay in the first week of May, 1973 that his lock had been broken by defendant No. 2 Narain Lal and defendant No. 3 Babu Lal and they were making construction over his Parkota in question. The plaintiff sent his father from Bombay to Sumerpur. His father came to Sumerpur and made efforts to stop the defendants from raising construction over the disputed land but they refused to yield. Plaintiff's father came with a photographer to have photograph of the land in dispute but defendants Nos. 2 and 3 threatened to heat them. Plaintiff's father then filed a criminal complaint under Sections 107/145, Cr.P.C. which was registered under Sections 107/145. Cr.P.C. and the same was dropped after expiry of six months. Later on he came to know that defendant No. 3 Babu Lal had executed a sale-deed in favour of defendant No. 1 Smt. Shanti Devi wife of defendant No. 2 Narain Lal. Resultantly. the plaintiff-appellant filed the present suit which was presented before the learned trial Court on 13-1 -75 and was registered as Original Civil Suit No. 3 of 1975 on 16-1-75.
4. Defendants Nos. 1 and 3 filed joint written statement whereas a separate written statement was also filed by defendant No. 2 Narain Lal.
5. It is averred by defendants Nos. 1 and 3 in their written statement that description of the disputed land is not given correctly in the plaint. Title and actual possession of the plaintiff as well as the predecessor in title was denied. Existence of Parkota of the plaintiff-appellant and his predecessor in title was also denied. It is pertinent to note that it is specifically alleged in the written statement that defendant No. 3 Babu Lal took plot on lease from Gram Panchayat. Sumerpur in the year 1956 at the rent of Re. 1/-. Defendant No. 1 Smt. Shanti Devi purchased this house through registered sale-deed from Babu Lal (defendant No. 3) on 27-2-73. In additional pleas it is slated that defendant No. 3 Babu Lal remained tenant of the disputed land throughout from the date of lease up to execution of the sale-deed on 27-2-73.
6. Defendant No. 2, husband of defendant No. 1 Shanti Devi in his separate written statement averred that he has no concern with the suit land. He also reiterated about the execution of sale-deed by defendant No. 3 Babulal in favour of his wife Smt. Shanti Devi on 27-2-73.
7. On the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, learned trial Court framed as may as seven issues focusing the attention of the parties to adduce evidence in support of their respective claims.
8. In support of his claim plaintiff examined Veerchand as PW 1, Bhabhutmal as PW 2. Faujmal as PW 3. Magraj as PW 4 and Faujmal s/o Ami Chand Jain as PW 5. Plaintiff also filed power of attorney executed by him in favour of his father Veer Chand as Ex. 1, regislered sale deed executed in his favour by Maknaji on 17-11 -65 as Ex. 2, receipt given by Jodhpur Darbar erstwhile Ruler of Jodhpur in acknowledgment of payment of Rs. 150/- by Maknaji in the year 1923 as Ex. 3, regislered sale deed executed by Panchayat Samiti, Sumcrpur in favour of Magraj, PW 4 on 22-2-68 as Ex. 4 and statement given by Narain Lal defendant No. 2 as Ex. 5.
9. The defendants in support of their claim examined defendant No. 3 Babulal as D.W. 1, Narain Lal, defendant No. 2, as DW 2, Mohanraj as DW 3, Ibrahim as DW 4 and Manchharam as DW 5. They have also filed alleged rent receipt purported to have been issued by Panchayat Samiti. Sumerpur to defendant No. 3 Babulal on 24-10-56 as Ex. A 1 letter of permission dated 11-5-72 purported to have been given by Panchayat Samiti. Sumcrpur to defendant No. 3, Babulal about the land in question as Ex. A 2, Power of Attorney executed by Smt. Shanti Devi in favour of her husband Narain Lal as Ex. A 3, Registered sale-deed purported to have been executed by defendant No. 3 in favour of defendant No. 1 on 27-2-73 as Ex. A 4 receipt of house lax as Ex. A 5. receipt purported to have been given by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in favour of Babu Lal on 24-10-1956 for a period from 1-4-56 to 31 -3-57 as Ex. A 6, and two maps disclosing boundary as Ex. A/7 and Ex. A/8.
10. On the basis of the aforesaid evidence adduced by the plaintiff and defendants, learned trial Court while deciding issue No. 1 arrived at a finding that the plaintiff failed to prove his title and possession. On issue No. 2, it is held by the learned trial Court that the plaintiff has also failed to prove that defendants Nos. 2 and 3 arc in possession of the land in question after breaking open his lock. The learned trial Court arrived, at a conclusion on issue No. 3 that the plaintiff is not entitled for mesne profits as claimed by him. Learned trial Court thought it proper to decide issues Nos. 4 and 5 together and it is held that neither the plaintiff nor his predecessor in title were in actual possession within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit, hence, the suit was barred by limitation. Learned trial Court decided issue No. 6 against the defendants holding that'll is not established by them that they suffer special cost, therefore, it is held that they are not entitled for special cost as envisaged under Section 35A. C.P.C. While dealing issue No. 7 regarding relief it is held by the learned trial Court that in view of the findings recorded by it on issues Nos. 1 to 6, the suit filed by the plaintiff is liable to be dismissed.
11. The present appeal was posted for hearing on 27-2-97. List was revised. Shri D. R. Bhandari learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant was present but neither respondents nor their counsel were present, therefore, the Court had no alternative except to proceed ex pane against the defendant-respondents as envisaged under Sub-rule (2) of Rule 17 of Order-41 C.P.C.
12. Arguments on behalf of the plaintiff appellant were heard and judgment was reserved. Learned counsel for the defendant-respondents got full knowledge about the order passed and signed to proceed ex parte against the defendant-respondents on 27-2-97 itself from which it is easily deducible that the defendant-respondents arc interested to stall the final decision of this appeal. The defendant-respondents have no vested right to delay the decision of this appeal which is pending before this Court from 17 years without seeking adjournment on valid ground. It would be counter productive to the present justice system people in general and litigant public in particular start thinking to the effect that suits relating to recovery of possession where possession of the plaintiffs arc alleged to have been violently invaded by the defendants and had been taken over by force or fraud by them continued to remain pending in the Courts of law from one generation to another generation.
13. On hearing the learned counsel for the appellant, I am satisfied that this appeal must succeed.
13A. In the present appeal, the following points for determination arc involved :--
(i) WHETHER registered sale-deed Ex. 4 executed by Panchayat Samiti, Sumcrpur in favour of PW 4 on 22-2-1968 admitting the existence of disputed land belonging to the plaintiff's father prior to dispute arose between the parties is admissible in evidence, if so its effect?
(ii) WHETHER a suit for eviction to recover possession can be filed by a plaintiff against violent invasion of his possession on the basis of his possessory title, if so its effect?
(iii) WHETHER a person in possession of a piece of land in assumed character of ownership and exercising peacefully the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the true owner, if so its effect?
(iv) WHETHER proof of possession varies with the nature of property and it can be proved by oral evidence, if so its effect ?
(v) WHETHER in a suit for recovery of possession based upon the plaintiff's possessory title, the onus of proof is on the plaintiff to prove his possession within 12 years and once it is established then onus to prove shift on the defendant to show that he or she is entitled to retain possession ?
(vi) WHETHER in the present case, the sale-deed executed by Makna Ji in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on 17-11 -65 passed valid title on him ?
(vii) WHETHER the plaintiff-appellant in the present case proves continuous 41 years' possession and ownership of his predecessor in title over the disputed land closed with boundary wall and affixed with wooden doors up to the date of execution of the sale-deed dated 17-11-65 in his favour and thereafter his own possession up to first week of May 1973 on which date the defendant-respondents started to make violent invasion of his possession if so its effect?'
(viii) WHETHER the Panchayat Samiti. Sumerpur has jurisdiction and legal authority to let out the disputed Abadi land in favour of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 in the year 1956 under the Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules. 1961 ?
(ix) WHETHER Exs. A/1. A/2. A/5 and A/6 purported to have been issued from the office of Panchayat Samiti. Sumcrpur had been forged by Shri Narain Lal, employee of Panchayat Samiti (defendant No. 2) in favour of Babu Lal (defendant No. 3) in collusion of Mohan Raj. the then Sarpanch DW 3 and Manchha Ram, the then Secretary of Gram Panchayat. Sumcrpur DW 5 to grab the land in dispute of the plaintiff-appellant through his wife, if so its effect ?
(x) WHETHER the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to recover Rs. 820/- as mesne profits from the defendant-respondents up to the date of filing of the suit and thereafter further entitled to recover mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month up to recovery of possession from them ?
(xi) WHETHER the suit was filed within limitation and finding contrary to it recorded by the learned trial Court is perverse ?
14. This Court with anguish takes judicial notice of the fact that now days 30 to 40 per cent cases are being" filed in Courts of law on the averments of violent invasion of possession by the defendants. This Court is flooded with such kind of appeals where violent invasion of possession is alleged by the plaintiff-appellants and denied by the defendant-respondents. In the present value system, the act of land grabbing is gaining grounds without sickly feeling of conscience. Upburst of such kind of litigations of land grabbing is not sudden. But now days, it is increasing in an organised form and even the Government lands of public utility, public roads, public streets and public lanes are not being spared by land-grabbers.
15. The Courts of law being upholders of value system in society are called upon to evolve new dimension of dispensation of justice by deciding cases as early as possible to check menace of land grabbing by peeling away the varnish and un-covering the truth hidden in the evidence adduced by the parties dispassionately in an objective manner. Obligation to uncover hidden truth from the evidence adduced by the parties with profound sense of law and justice is call of the hour of the day. This can be made possible only if the trial Courts and first appellate Courts develop a trend to marshall, weigh and adjudicate the lis between the parties by deeper understanding as early as possible.
16. It is true that is not necessary to reproduce evidence of each of the witnesses in the judgment but what is necessary, is that evidence must be carefully analysed with reference to the salient points of law and facts arising in such cases and then weighed in an intelligent and intelligible manner. The fact that the entire material and evidence on record have been so grapsed and vyeighed must appear from the judgment itself. I am of the view that if the judgment under appeal is put on the anvil of the aforesaid test it is found to be lacking in all material particulars as discussed here-in-below.
17. With the aforesaid introspection, I would |like to critically underpin the judgment of the learned trial Court where it is pinching on the question of law and facts. The duty of this Court in the present case becomes onerous as the Court is deprived of the assistance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the defendant-respondents.
18. POINT NO. (i):
A close scrutiny of the judgment rendered by the learned trial Court reveals that it has altogether ignored important document produced by the plaintiff-appellant Ex. 4 which was a sale-deed executed by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in favour of Laxmi Chand Megh Raj (PW 4) on 22-2-68. The aforesaid sale-deed Ex. 4, leads towards an irresistible conclusion that 'Parkota' (disputed land closed with boundary wall and affixed with wooden doors of the plaintiff-appellant in dispute exists South of the plot sold to Laxmi Chand Megh Raj (PW 4)). Thus, in the present case, the existence of Parkota in dispute of the plaintiff-appellant has been admitted by the Panchayat Samiti, Sumerpur itself acknowledging the ownership of the plaintiff-appellant on 22-2-68.
19. A basic question which this Court is called upon to decide at present would be whether the aforesaid registered sale-deed Ex. 4 executed by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in favour of PW 4 Laxmi Chand Megh Raj is admissible in evidence. Suffice is to say in this regard that sale-deed Ex. 4 executed by the Panchayat Samiti, Sumerpur in favour of PW 4 Laxmi Chand Megh Raj on 22-2-68 admitting the existence of plot in question is receivable in evidence as contemplated under Section 13(a) of the Indian Evidence Act, which provides that any transaction by which the right or custom in question was created, claimed, modified, asserted, recognized or denied or which was inconsistent with its existence, is admissible in evidence. The aforesaid document Ex. 4 is also admissible under Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act which envisages that facts not otherwise relevant become relevant if they are inconsistent with any fact in issue or relevant fact or if by themselves or in connection with other facts they make the existence or non-existence of any fact in issue highly probable or improbable; As a matter of fact, it appears to me that Section 11 of the Indian Evidence Act is a residuary Section which makes the document Ex. 4 admissible and receivable in evidence in the eye of law in the present case.
20. It is to be remembered that sale-deed Ex. 4 in the present case is not conclusive about the fact stated therein about the existence of land belonging to the plaintiff's father but this document Ex. 4 is held to be admissible in evidence whereas its evidentiary value will be assessed and determined with due care and caution with other evidence adduced by the parties a little later in this judgment at appropriate place,
21. POINTS NOS. (ii) AND (iii) : Since both these points for determination are inter-linked, therefore, propriety demands to discuss these points together with reference to few land-mark judgments of the Courts of record as well as opinion of some of eminent jurists on the subject.
22. It is to be imbibed that according to historical development of human civilization, the conceptualization of ownership originated in possession. The concept of possession according to Sir Thomas Erkine Holland has two essential elements; firstly corpus and secondly, animus The concept of possession has been summed up by Sir Thomas Erkine Holland in his book "The Element of Jurisprudence" (Thirteenth Edition) at pages 194 and 195 in the following words :--
"A moment's reflection must show that 'possession' in any sense of the term, must imply, first, some actual power over the object possessed, and, secondly, some amount of will to avail oneself of that power. Neither the mere wish to catch a bird which is out of my reach, nor the mere power which I have, without the least notion of exercising it, to seize a horse which I find standing at a shop door, will suffice to put me in possession of the bird or the horse. The Romans, by whom this topic was treated with great fulness and subtlety, describe these essential elements of possession by the terms 'corpus' and 'animus' respectively."
23. The connotation "Corpus" has been described in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. XX at page 235 in a very lucid intelligible manner, which is reproduced hereinbelow for ready reference :--
"The word (Corpus) occurs frequently in the Civil law in the sense of a substantial or positive fact as distinguished from what is equivocal and ambiguous; a corporeal act of any kind, as distinguished from animus or mere intention, on the part of him who wishes to acquire a thing; whereby he obtains the physical ability to exercise his power over it whenever he pleases."
24. The expression "Animus" means--
interition to possess. The highest degree of intention deserves to be examined by the Courts while examining concept of possession. Juridical possession means denial of right of any other person than the possessor himself. A person in possession in juridical sense will have no regard to any other's right than his own. : :
25. An other facet of concept of possession has been summed up by "Salmond on Torts'' (13th Edition) at page 172 in the following words where Salmond makes exception to the concept of possession and he states thus :--
"Probably, if the defendant's possession is wrongful as against the plaintiff, the plaintiff may succeed though he cannot show a good title Doe d. Hughes v. Dyeball (1829) 3 C and P 610 : Davison v. Gent (1857) 1 H and N 744. But possession is prima facie evidence is not displaced by proof of title in a third person the plaintiff with prior possession will recover. So in (1865) 1 QB 1 where a man inclosed waste land and died without having had 20 years' possession, the heir of his devisee was held entitled to recover it against a person who entered upon it without any title. This decision, although long, doubtful, may now be regarded as authoritative in consequence of its express recognition of the Judicial Committee in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73."
26. Thus, the concept of juridical possession commonly known as legal possession, pre-supposes existence of two essential elements of possession i.e. Corpus and Animus. Both these, elements are required to co-exist in a suit based on possessory title. In other words, it can be said that for commencement of juridical possession which is also termed as legal possession means possibility of physical control, super-added with a will to exercise such control provided such possession has not originated either by force or by fraud. A person's possession which Has originated without force or fraud only, shall be deemed to be in juridical possession so long he has power to bring the property for his enjoyment whenever he likes.
27. In my humble opinion, the concept of English Law to the effect that possession is good title against all except the true owner and authorised a possessor to file a suit for ejectment against violent invasion of possession got statutory recognition under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act raising presumption about ownership in favour of possessor. The proposition of law on these two points arose before the Privy Council in case of Perry v. Clissold reported in 1907 AC 73. where their Lordships of Privy Council summed up proposition of law. which reads thus :--
"It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land in the assumed character of owner and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitations applicable to the case his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title."
28. The correctness of the aforesaid proposition of law rendered by Privy Council in case of Perry (1907 AC 73) (supra) came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in case of Nair Service Society Limited v. K. C. Alexander reported in AIR 1968 SC 1165 where their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paragraph 22 of said judgment had approved the aforesaid principle of law enunciated in Perry's case (supra).
29. The Supreme Court, after quoting with approval the dictum of Perry's case (supra) in case of Nair Service Society Limited (supra) and also after exhaustive survey of the relevant Indian Law on the subject ruled that the provisions of Sections 8 and 9 of the Specific Relief Act are not mutually exclusive, so. after period of six months is over it cannot be said that a suit based on prior possession alone, is not maintainable. The correct position as ruled by the Supreme Court in case of Nair Service Society Limited (supra) is that if a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act is filed within six months the plaintiff need not prove his title but he would be entitled to obtain decree for possession provided it is established by him that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law within six months from the date of filing of the suit. However after expiry of six months period if a plaintiff files a suit for recovery of possession questions of title can be raised by the defendant and in such a suit the plaintiff is to establish that he has been dispossessed within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit by the defendant.
30. In case of violent invasion of possession an aggrieved person has two options. He can file a suit for recovery of his possession within six months from the date of violent invasion of his possession under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. In a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. he is not required to prove his title. He can succeed merely on the basis of his prior possession after establishing that he has been dispossessed otherwise than in accordance with law within six months from the date of filing of the suit. If he fails to exercise his first option by filing a suit under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act within six months from the date of his dispossession, he has liberty to file a suit to recover his possession within 12 years on the basis of his prior possession and can succeed provided the defendant fails to establish that he is entitled to retain possession. In such a regular suit for recovery of possession, a person's possession over the land in question in assumed character of ownership and exercising peacefully the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his title by process of law within the period prescribed by the provisions of the Statute of Limitation applicable to the case. his right is for ever extinguished and the possessory owner acquires an absolute title.
31. In view of the aforesaid premises of law discussed in the preceding paragraphs, points Nos. (ii) and (iii) are answered in affirmative.
32. POINT NO. (iv):
In ancient society, it was only actual physical possession which was given recognition and respect by the people but latter on due to influx of time, social advancement took place and many facets of possession came into existence by intellectual exercise of eminent jurists and judicial pronouncements by Courts to suit the needs and opinion of the day having nexus with the social morality. It seems to me that there can be no two opinions that the development of concept of possession from ancient time uptil date is influenced by social morality to bridge the gap within the parameter of equity, good conscience and principles of natural justice. Now days, there are different kinds of possession such as juridical possession commonly known as legal possession constructive possession, symbolic possession, possession of part as evidence of whole, co-owners possession, lessee's possession, servants' or agents' possession, mortgagee's possession, shebaits possession tagging successive possession of trespasser having jural relationship and adverse possession. To my mind, the concept of possession is still in process of evolution to suit the needs and opinion of today having nexus with social morality to bridge the gap between the parameters of principles of natural justice, good conscience and equity.
33. Here in the present case since the question of juridical possession is involved which is commonly known as legal possession, hence, in order to maintain brevity the discussion is confined with respect to legal possession only and rest of the kinds of possession arc left open to be decided in appropriate cases.
34. The expression "possession" is a legal term and its proof varies with the nature of property under the scrutiny of the courts and it can be proved by credible oral evidence as well. The expression "Evidence" has been defined under Section 3 of the Evidence Act which means and includes all statements which Courts permit or require to be made before it by witnesses in relation to matters of fact under inquiry such statements are called oral evidence. The oral evidence to prove possession is also a mode of proof provided under the Evidence Act. The testimony of a reliable witnesses about the possession cannot be brushed aside by giving superficial treatment or by ignoring it. The Courts are required to weigh to the oral testimony adduced by the parties and its ignorance would be treated to be fatal. In abundant caution, it is held that Courts while analysing oral statements of the witnesses arc required to keep in view the statements of those witnesses who had deposed the acts of possession leading to an inference about possession of a party according to the nature of the property under consideration in preference to the statements of the witnesses who had stated only about possession simplicitcr without stating any act of possession in favour of one party or other.
34A. It would be impermissible for the Courts to insist upon the actual physical possession of the parties under all circumstances in utter disregard about the nature of the property from which the plaintiff has been dispossessed by violent invasion of his possession. An aggrieved person may cease to be in possession of his land because he is incapable to enjoy his right of possession as land is under water. In such situation, his possession is not dis-continucd but he will be deemed to be in legal possession when the land is under water. Similarly, in jungle land cutting on preserving of woods, collecting fruits from trees in the jungle land will always be treated to be sufficient possession of jungle lands. Similarly in case of waste land or vacant abadi land possession of the plaintiff can be proved by constructing boundary wall, affixing gate for egress and ingress over the disputed land covered with boundary wall, putting lock on the gale of the boundary, putting upboundary marks or fences or earmarking the land or by fixing stones on the four corners of the land in dispute or by establishing other acts of possession would be sufficient to succeed in a suit for eviction based on possessory title against the violent invasion of his possession by a trespasser originating cither in force or fraud or in both.
35. The expression "ownership" came up for consideration before Full Bench of Delhi High Court in case of Puran Chand & Co. v. Ganeshi Lal Tara Chand, reported in AIR 1988 Delhi 1. The learned Judges constituting Full Bench held that ownership denotes the relation between & person and the property forming subject-matter of ownership. Ownership has the characteristic of being indeterminate in duration. It consists of a complex of rights such as right of possession. right of exclusive use and enjoyment, right of destruction and alienation. These rights are conceived not as separately existing but as merged in one general right of ownership. Nevertheless these rights arc divisible to sonic extent. One or more of the fasciculus of rights consisting ownership may be detached in the facts and circumstances of a case before a Court of law.
36. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it is held that possession for a long series of years is one of the best evidence of title having statutory presumption and recognition under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act. I am of the view that a suit for eviction to recover possession is maintainable by a plaintiff against violent invasion of his possession on the basis of possessory title, I am also of the view that where a person is found in possession of a piece of land or property in assumed character of ownership and exercising peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly good title against all world but the rightful owner.
37. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I answer Point No. (iv) in affirmative.
38. POINT NO. (v):
In my opinion, Part III of Chapter VII of the Indian Evidence Act comprising of Sections 101 to 114 A makes a distinction between 'burden of proof as a matter of law and 'burden of proof as a matter of adducing evidence. To my mind, the former is inflexible whereas latter shifts from time to time with regard to the evidence adduced by the plaintiff or defendant or presumption of fact or law raised in favour of either of parties as ruled by the Apex Court in case of Kundan Lal V. Ralla Ram v. Custodian, Evacuee Property, Bombay, reported in AIR 1961 SC 131,6 after purveying the previous decisions on the subject. In a suit for recovery of possession based on plaintiffs possessory title, onus of proof to prove his legal possession within 12 years from the date of violent invasion of his possession by the defendant lies on him. But once it is established by the plaintiff by adducing oral or documentary evidence or both that he has brought the .suit within 12 years from the date of violent invasion of his possession, the onus of proof immediately shifts on the defendant to establish that he or she is entitled to retain possession of the land or property in dispute on the basis of his or her better title and possession which has neither originated by force nor by fraud nor by mixture of both.
39. I am of the view that irrespective of presumption under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, the onus is on the plaintiff to prove that in such suits based on possessory title when he gets knowledge within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit that his land or property which he is seeking to recover possession was violently invaded by defendant. The reasons are not far to seek. In such suits filed on the basis of possessory title, according to Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act, prior possession of the plaintiff itself would be prima facie evidence of his title against the whole world except the true owner. In other words, a plaintiff has to prove only when he obtained knowledge about violent invasion of his legal possession within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit in order to calculate 12 years limitation under Article 64 of the Indian Limitation Act. Once the plaintiff proves this as stated above, then defendant would be called upon to prove the fact that the land or property was in his possession became known to the plaintiff more than 12 years prior to the suit and he is entitled to retain possession on the basis of his better title.
40. On the basis of the aforesaid discussion, Point No. (v) is also answered in affirmative.
41. POINTS NOS. (vi). (vii). (viii). (ix) AND (xi):
It would be convenient to discuss Points Nos. (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix) and(xi) with reference to the evidence adduced by both the parties, hence, these points are dealt with together.
42. Let us apply the principles of law discussed on Points Nos. (i) to (v) in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment to, the facts of the present suit for recovery of possession filed by the plaintiff-appellant regarding disputed land closed with boundary wall affixed by doors for egress and ingress over the land in question on the basis of assumed character of ownership accompanied with peaceful enjoyment of possession for series of years which is averred in the plaint to have violently invaded by the defendant-respondents in the first week of May, 1973 and denied by the defendant-respondent in their written statements alleging therein that possession of Babu Lal defendant No. 3 originated on basis of lease granted by Gram Panchayat Sumerpur in the year 1956 in favour of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 who in turn alleged to have executed the sale-deed in favourof Smt. Shanti Devi defendant-respondent No. 1 wife of Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2 on 27-2-73 (Ex.A/4). They claimed to be entitled to retain possession of the disputed land in the light of the evidence oral and documentary adduced by both the parties In this case, the Court is also called upon to examine whether possession of the defendant-respondents has originated with force or fraud or with both.
43. In view of the proposition of -law discussed on Point No. (v) initial burden of proof lies on the plaintiff to establish that he and his predecessor in title namely Shri Maknaji were in possession for a long series of years within the meaning of Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act and after execution of sale-deed by him in his favour on 17-11-65 Ex. 2 he was in peaceful enjoyment of land in question within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit as envisaged under Article 64 of the Indian Evidence Act. The plaintiff-appellant is further required to prove that his possession was violently invaded by the defendant-respondents in the first week of May 1973 only then burden of proof would shift on the defendant-respondents to establish a better title and to prove that they are entitled to retain possession of the land in dispute.
44. In view of the aforesaid principle of law, let us begin with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant in support of his aforesaid claim. In this regard, suffice is to say that full details of oral and documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant has been disclosed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, therefore, in order to avoid repetition and to maintain brevity, it would be expedient to straightway analyse the same.
45. PW-1 father of plaintiff Veer Chand has proved Ex. 1 Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff Kanti Lal his son in his favour. It is deposed by PW 1 Veer Chand that he and his son Kanti Lal are living jointly and he is 'Karta' of his family. He stated on oath that the sale-deed was executed in favour of the plaintiff on 17-11-65 vide Ex. 2 and possession was delivered by transferor on the date of purchase. The 'Parkota' was already built affixed with wooden doors by the transferor. He also deposed that receipt dated 11-11-23 (Ex. 3) was handed-over by the transferor at the time of execution of the sale-deed. He deposed that length of Parkota was of 52 feet and its breadth was 48 feet whereas its height was 7 feet. Length and breadth of Chabutra on the western side of the land in dispute has also been deposed by PW 1 Veer Chand. It is stated by him that he made enquiry from transferor Maknaji about his title, who informed him that he purchased the land in auction from Jodhpur Darbar on 11-11-1923 on payment of Rs. 150/-. The receipt dated 11-11-1923 (Ex. 3) which was handed-over to Maknaji in acknowledgment of payment of Rs. 150/- by Hawaldar of Jodhpur Darbar was handed over to PW 1 Veer Chand on 17-11 -65 at the time of execution of sale-deed as proof of his title. He has deposed that in plaint, 41 years' possession over the land in dispute of Maknaji transferor was averred on the basis of information received from Maknaji transferor. PW 1 Veer Chand has given graphic description of plot in question in his statement on oath. He has also stated on oath that in the month of Holi 1973 when he came from Bombay went to his plot and up to that time, there was no invasion of his possession by any one but thereafter he went to Bombay. He received a telephonic message from Himmat Mal on 6-5-73 to the effect that possession of his plot has been taken over by defendant-respondent Narain Lal. He was informed to come immediately to see himself the construction going on over his plot in dispute. It is further stated by PW 1 Veer Chand that he came from Bombay to Sumerpuron 10-5-73 and online same day, he went on his plot in dispute and found that boundary wall was in process of being demolished by defendant-respondent No. 2. He was making construction over the land in question. He deposed that he asked from Narainlal (defendant-respondent No. 2) that how he was making construction over his land in question. Narain Lal did not pay any heed to his query. He again came over the disputed land on 11-5-73 along with a photographer of Lata Studio and made an attempt to have photographs of the disputed land and Parkota which was in process of demolition but Narain Lal did not allow him to do so and started to use intemperate language against him and the photographer. He also stated on oath that due to violent invasion of his possession by defendant-respondent No. 2 Narain Lal, he suffered a loss of Rs. 40/- per month.
46. PW 1 Veer Chand has also stated on oath that in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, he has no alternative except, to make a complaint under Sections 107 and 145, Cr.P.C. before the appropriate authorities, which was registered under Section 107, Cr.P.C. It was dropped after statutory period of six months When he came to know that Babulal had executed a sale-deed in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi wife of Shri Narain Lal, he filed the present suit.
47. On behalf of the defendant-respondents, a searching cross-examination was done to PW 1 Veer Chand but nothing has been brought out in his cross-examination, which may discredit his sworn testimony.
48. In support of his aforesaid claim, the plaintiff-appellant; has also examined PW 2 Bhabhut Mal. who is son of Maknaji transferor of the land in dispute. PW 2 Bhabhut Mal has supported the statement of PW 1 Veer Chand on all material points. He deposed long series of possession of 41 years of the transferor from 1923 to 1965 and thereafter peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellant. PW 2 Bhabhut Mal proved Ex. 2 sale-deed executed by Maknaji in favour of plaintiff-appellant on 17-11-65 as one of the attesting witnesses, who identified and proved signatures of Maknaji on Ex. 2 as well as his own signature. It is categorically stated by PW 2 that possession of the disputed land was given in the morning of 17-11-65 to the plaintiff-appellant and prior to handing-over possession. it was in possession of the transferor Maknaji from the date of auction. He stated on oath that at the time of sale-deed, there was Parkota already built by him which was of 7 feet in height! wherein a wooden door was also fixed which remained locked. He disclosed the names of Poonam Chand. Sua Ji Luhar. Vardhi Chand and Maknaji Luhar. who built the Parkota over the land in dispute. It is stated that both of them arc dead. It is also stated on oath that he spent approximately Rs. 1300/- or Rs. 1400/- in constructing boundary wall (Parkota) and fixing wooden door over the land in question. PW 2 has given vivid description of construction of Parkota. Chabutra and fixing of wooden door for egress and ingress over the land in dispute. He has also staled that foundation of Parkota was 2 feet under ground whereas its height above the foundation was 7 feet. It is further deposed by PW 2 that plot in question was purchased by Maknaji from Jodhpur Durbar on payment of Rs. 150/- on 11-11-23 by his father and in acknowledgment of payment of Rs. 150/- receipt Ex. 3 was handed over by Hawaldar of Jodhpur Darbar. In cross-examination nothing has been brought out which may discredit the veracity of PW 2.
49. PW 3 Fauj Mal supported the statements of PW 1 Veer Chand and PW 2 Bhabhut Mal giving a graphic statement about purchase of the land in dispute by Maknaji transferor of the plaintiff-appellant and raising construction of Parkota over the disputed land. It is deposed by PW 3 Fauj Mal that he was present on the date of auction purchase made by Maknaji from Jodhpur Darbar on 11 -11 -1923. The plot in question was purchased in auction by Maknaji in his presence.
It is further stated on oath by PW 3 Fauj Mal that while Parkota and Chabutri was under construction. Maknaji along with his son PW 2 Bhabhut Mal were staying with him at his residence. It is also stated by PW 3 that payment to the labourers who were engaged by them Reconstructing Parkota. Chabutri and fixing of wooden door over the disputed land were usually made by Maknaji at his shop in presence of PW 2 B'habhut Mal.
50. The plaintiff-appellant also examined PW 4 Mag Raj one of the neighbours who stated on oath that plot in dispute was purchased by Maknaji in the year 1923 in auction and since then, he was in continuous possession of the disputed plot before execution of the sale-deed dated 17-11 -65 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant.
Mag Raj also stated that Ex. 4 is a sale-deed executed by Gram Panchayat. Sumerpur in his favour wherein existence of plot in question is shown towards South of his plot which he purchased from Gram Panchayat Sumcrpur on 22-2-68.
51. PW 5 Fauj Mal is another neighbour of plot in question examined by the plaintiff-
appellant before the learned trial Court who has also supported the statement of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 on all material points. It is stated by PW 5 that he has not constructed Parkota over his adjoining land as his three neighbours had already constructed Parkota overtheir land hence his plot was automatically covered by boundary wall from three sides. He has categorically stated that Shri Maknaji has constructed the Parkota.
Chabutri and affixed a wooden door before execution of the sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff-appellant.
52. From the statements of the aforesaid witnesses, it is clear that they arc not the witnesses who had come and swear that the land was in possession of Maknaji and thereafter it was in possession of the plaintiff-appellant up to the date of violent invasion of his possession in the first week of May 1973 but they have staled different acts of possession of Maknaji and the plaintiff-appellant giving rise to the inference about long series of possession of about 41 years of Maknaji transferor and thereafter possession of the plaintiff-appellant. The statements on oath of the aforesaid witnesses conclusively prove about peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellant over the land in question after execution of the sale-deed upto the date of violent invasion of his possession in the first week of May 1973. The statements of these witnesses inspire my confidence that Shri Maknaji was dealing with the land in question as exclusive owner with the right of exclusive enjoyment coupled with the right of construction and destruction. Shri Maknaji in exercise of his right of alienation executed the sale-deed Ex. 2 in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on 17-11-65.
53. A close scrutiny of the judgment given by the learned trial Court reveals that it has misunderstood the concept of "juridical possession", proof of which varies from the nature of the property which has been discussed in detail in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment. In fact, the defendant-respondents in their written statements have not denied legal possession of the plaintiff-appellant but averred that the plaintiff-appellant was not in actual possession of the land in dispute prior to 12 years from the date of filing of the suit. Learned trial Court with wrong conceptual notion about legal possession insisted in its judgment that the plaintiff-appellant failed to prove his actual physical possession within 12 years from the date of filing of the suit. In the present case, looking into the nature of the land in question, the plaintiff-appellant is not required to prove his feet on the land in dispute day in and day out to prove his possession but it would be enough if two elements of possession i.e. Corpus and Animus are proved by him. The oral statements of the witnesses, named above, are also a mode of proof to prove legal possession of the plaintiff-appellant provided the witnesses had stated about various acts of possession leading to the inference of possession to him. Test about proof of possession in a suit for recovery of possession involving title based on assumed character of ownership and exercising peacefully the ordinary rights of ownership varies according to the nature of the property and a conclusion contrary to it insisting upon actual physical. possession in such a suit arrived at by the learned trial Court while analysing the testimonial value of these witnesses, is not sustainable in the eye of law.
54. Learned trial Court has declined to believe oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant due to its wrong notion of law regarding legal possession which is not sustainable. The learned trial Court has disbelieved the oral statement adduced by the plaintiff-appellant by pointing out inconsequential contradictions in their statements, which have no bearing on the truthfulness of statements of the witnesses to prove legal possession of the plaintiff-appellant. The oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant in the present case to prove his legal possession inspires my confidence and the learned trial Court has committed error of judgment in disbelieving the oral evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant. Nothing has been brought out in cross-examination of these witnesses, which may make veracity of these witnesses questionable. As a matter of fact, these witnesses have truthfully given statements on oath which conclusively prove long series of 41 years possession of Maknaji and thereafter peaceful enjoyment of legal possession over the land in dispute of the plaintiff-appellant upto first week of May 1973 when the defendant-respondents made violent invasion of his possession.
55. Learned trial Court has disbelieved the long series of 41 years of possession of predecessor in title of the plaintiff-appellant and thereafter his legal possession upto first week of May 1973 when his possession was invaded violently by the defendant-respondents on the superflous ground that the plaintiff-appellant did not muster courage to appear in the witness box to prove his possession. Suffice it to say in this regard that PW 1 Veer Chand is father of the plaintiff-appellant and both of them are members of Hindu Undivided Family which has come in the statement of PW 1. It is further stated by PW 1 on oath that he is 'Karta' of Hindu Undivided Family and both, he and his son are living in the state of jointness. It goes without saying that among the Hindus, there is presumption of jointness and learned trial Court has committed error in its judgment in raising presumption contrary to it. At the top of it, in the present case, Ex. 1 Power of Attorney has been filed and has been duly proved. In the Power of Attorney dated 10-5-73 (Ex 1) it is clearly written that the plaintiff-appellant owns a plot of land with structure at Sumerpur, Tehsil Bali, District Pali over which a dispute has arisen but he is unable to attend the dispute hence he appointed his father Veer Chand PW 1 to be his true and legal Attorney to all or any one of the acts, deeds and things enumerated in Ex. 1.
56. A close scrutiny of the deed of attorney Ex. 1 reveals that the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 Veer Chand to perform seven acts, deeds, and things on his behalf. At S. No. 3 in the deed of attorney Ex. 1, the plaintiff-appellant has clearly authorised his father PW 1 Veer Chand to file necessary suit or application for possession or for declaration of his right to the said plot and structure. Again at S. No. 4 of Ex. 1, the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 to represent him in any other revenue Court or Civil Court to give evidence on his behalf, to file application or Darkhast for possession. Again at S. No. 5, the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 -Veer Chand to engage a pleader or Mukhtiyar or Advocate to do pairvi on his behalf. At S. No. 6 the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 to settle or compromise the said disputes on his behalf. At S. No. 7 the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 to receive any money from the Court or from any other person on his behalf and in the concluding part of Ex. 1, the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 to do all acts expedient or necessary on his behalf.
57. In the teeth of Ex. 1 deed of attorney wherein the plaintiff-appellant has authorised his father PW 1 to do every thing on his behalf the learned trial Court has committed serious illegality in disbelieving the evidence of possession and title of the plaintiff-appellant by drawing adverse inference against him because he did not appear in the witness box.
58. The learned trial Court has also illegally drawn adverse inference against the plaintiff appellant in not producing the photographer of Lata Studio who accompanied with PW 1 Veer Chand on 11 -5-73 over the land in question when the boundary wall of the plot was being demolished and construction was being raised by defendant-respondent No. 2 Narain Lal. As a matter of fact, it is clearly stated by PW 1 Veer Chand that defendant-respondent No. 2 Narain Lal did not allow the photographer to have a photograph of the site. Hence, the plaintiff-appellant was not required to produce photographer of Lata Studio in the witness box to prove a negative thing.
59. Similarly, the Statement on oath given by PW 1 to the effect that after getting information on telephone from Himmat Mal on 6-5-73, he immediately proceeded from Bombay to Sumerpur and reached to Sumerpur on 10-5-73 inspire my confidence after analysing the evidence in totality. Therefore, in the present case, the learned trial Court was not again justified to draw an adverse inference because the plaintiff-appellant did not produce Himmat, Mal as a witness. The statement of PW 1 Veer Chand to the effect that when his attempt to stop demolition of Parkota and construction by Narain Lal resulted into fiasco then he was compelled to initiate criminal proceedings under Sections 107 and 145, Cr.P.C. which were ultimately registered under Sections 107 arid 116, Cr.P.C. in quick succession within a short span of time which are admitted by the defendant-respondents themselves in their written statement lead to a conclusion that the defendant-respondents invaded violently peaceful possession of the plaintiff-appellant in the first week of May 1973 and the finding contrary to it arrived at by the learned trial Court on this point on the basis of inference drawn by it on its own imaginery assumptions and presumptions are devoid of truth and merit.
60. Now I proposes to test the veracity of the witnesses examined by the plaintiff-appellant in support of his case in the light of documentary evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant. The sale-deed Ex. 4 executed by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in favour of PW 4 on 22-2-68 admitting existence of disputed land belonging to PW 1 Veer Chand towards south of the plot sold to PW 4 leads towards an irresistible conclusion that at least upto 22-2-68 the title and possession over the disputed land of the plaintiff-appellant was admitted and recognised by all including the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur from which Babulal (defendant-respondent No. 3) claimed to have taken this land in dispute on lease in the year 1956 on rent at the rate of Re. 1/- per month. In my considered opinion, if the land in dispute actually belong to Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur which was given on rent to defendant-respondent No. 3, Babu Lal, then there could be no occasion to mention existence of land in dispute belonging to PW 1 Veer Chand in the south of the plot sold by Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in favour of PW 4.I am fully satisfied that Ex. 4 is a genuine document written prior to dispute arose between the plaintiff -appellant and defendant-respondents and it has not been prepared at the behest of the plaintiff-appellant to create title and possession over the disputed land in his favour otherwise instead of showing the name of Veer Chand, name of Kanti Lal plaintiff would have been written in Ex. 4. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact which is evident from Ex. 1 that in Maharashtra and in some portion of Rajasthan, the name of father is super-added with his son. The land in question was always recognised as land of Veer Chand and the plaintiff who are indisputable living jointly by all including Gram Panchayat Sumerpur.
61. There is yet another reason to arrive at the aforesaid conclusion. PW 4 has purchased the land in dispute from Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur, therefore, he could not afford to allow to describe wrong boundary towards south of his plot which was being purchased by him otherwise it may lead to litigation. It would be presumed that PW 4 was purchasing Abadi plot from Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur on 22-2-68 through registered sale-deed Ex. 4 by giving correct boundary towards south of his plot and he was not purchasing a litigation by giving incorrect boundary towards south of his plot. I am of the view that a man can speak lie but circumstances never speak lie. In the present case, Ex. 4 conclusively proves uninterrupted continuous possession and title of the plaintiff-appellant and finding contrary to it arrived at by the learned trial Court is not sustainable. The oral statements of PW 1 to PW 5 are in full consonance with Ex. 4, therefore, these statements inspire my confidence and held to be reliable whereas the statements of DW 1 to DW 5 which are inconsistent to Ex. 4 are held to be unreliable. Ex. 4 on record produced by the plaintiff-appellant goes a long way to prove that at least upto executing the aforesaid sale-deed dated 22-2-68 there was no existence of possession of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 as a lessee of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur as alleged in his written statement. His defence in his written statement to the effect that the land in question was leased out to him by Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in the year 1956 on monthly rent of Re. 1/- is proved to be false and concocted to grab the land in question of the appellant.
62. In my considered opinion, the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur is bound by its admission made in Ex. 4 executed by it in favour of PW 4 on 22-2-68 which clearly indicates that disputed land belonged to the plaintiff-appellant and the defendant-respondents as well as Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur had no right, title or interest or possession over the disputed land at least up to 22-2-68 when Ex. 4 sale-deed was executed by the Gram Panchayat Sumerpur in favour of P.W.
4. I am also of the opinion, that if Ex. 4 would have been taken into account by the learned trial Court in the present case then it would have not arrived at the findings on issues Nos. 1 to 7 as had been arrived by it. After taking into account the testimonial value of Ex. 4 on record, no reasonable man can arrive at the findings on issues Nos. 1 to 7 as had been arrived at by the learned trial Court in case on hand.
63. Looking to the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the present case, I have no hesitation to hold that due to utter ignorance of Ex. 4 on record by the learned trial Court, its findings on all the issues are perverse and not sustainable in the eye of law.
64. From the aforesaid discussion, it is held that the plaintiff-appellant in the present case has succeeded to establish continuous 41 years possession of his predecessor in title over the disputed land closed with boundary wall and fixed with wooden door up to the date of execution of the sale-deed dated 17-11 -65 in his favour and thereafter his own peaceful enjoyment of possession up to first week of May 1973 in which week, the defendant-respondents made violent invasion of his possession. It is further held that in the present case, sale-deed executed by Maknaji in favour of the plaintiff-appellant on 17-11 -65 did pass a valid title to him and finding contrary to it recorded by the learned Court is devoid of truth and merit.
65. At this stage, I would like to examine whether the learned trial Court in case on hand has committed substantial error of law and procedure in not examining the better title of the defendant-respondents where suit for recovery of possession was filed on the basis of plaintiffs title and also of his possessory title by shifting burden of proof upon the defendant-respondents as ruled by the Apex Court in case of Kundan Lal (AIR 1961 SC 1316) (supra) and also in case of Nair Service Society Limited (AIR 1968 SC 1165) (supra) ? Whether the learned trial Court has committed blunder in not shifting burden of proof upon the defendant-respondents to establish that their possession over the land in question has not originated either in force or fraud after raising presumption under Section 110 of the Indian Evidence Act about continuity of possession of the predecessor in title of the plaintiff-appellant namely Maknaji and thereafterpresumption about title and continuity of his possession ?
66. For deeper understanding of the aforesaid questions involved in the present appeal, the provisions of the Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 framed under the Rajasthan Panchayat Act, 195-3 which are applicable in the present case, are to be examined regarding settlement of Abadi land and maintenance of other immovable property vested in a Gram Panchayat in Rajasthan. Detail procedures regarding settlement of Abadi lands and maintenance of other immovable properties vested in a Gram Panchayat, have been prescribed under Chapter XIII of the Rajasthan Panchayat (General) Rules, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules of 1961') meticulously providing the procedure for settlement of abadi land.
67. Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961 mandates that Panchayat shall maintain a register in Form No. XLVIII of all buildings and other immovable properties vested in it or placed at its disposal. Similarly, Rule 252 of the aforesaid Rules speaks about maintenance of the properties of a Gram Panchayat referred to in Rule 251 of the Rules in proper condition and shall arrange for their repair and white wash when the same is considered necessary. Rule 253 of the aforesaid Rules authorises Panchayat Extension Officer to examine the register maintained under Rule 251 aforesaid and inspect the properties entered therein at least once a year and certify as to whether the record is correct and the properties are in good condition. Rule 255 of the Rules of 1961 defines Abadi land to the effect that "Abadi land" means nazul land lying within the inhabitated areas of a Panchayat Circle which vests or has been vested or has been placed at the disposal of a Panchayat by an order of the State Government. Rule 256 of the aforesaid Rules further prescribes that a person desirous of purchasing any abadi land from Panchayat Samiti shall make an application in writing to the Panchayat giving such description thereof as may be sufficient to identify the land proposed to be purchased. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 256 of the said Rules further provides that applicant shall along with his application deposit a sum of Rs. 2/- with the Panchayat towards expenses of the preparation of the plan of the land sought to be purchased.
68. Rule 257 of the Rules of 1961 prescribes a detail procedure for preparation of plan under Rule 256 for allotment of abadi land and requires that such application is to be entered in a register in Form No. XLIX and shall have a file of the case opened. Rule 258 of the said Rules further prescribes that after plan is ready, a Panchayat Samiti shall by resolution nominate any three of its Panchas for holding a local inspection of the site. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 258 of the said Rules further prescribes that Panchas nominated under Sub-rule (1) shall submit their opinion to the Panchayat as to the desirability of the sale of abadi land applied for, after taking into consideration certain conditions enumerated therein. Then thereafter under Rule 259 of the aforesaid Rules, the Panchayat Samiti shall provisionally decide at a meeting whether the proposed sale should or should not be made. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 259 of the aforesaid Rules prescribes that if it decides not to make the sale, the application shall be rejected and the fact of such rejection shall be duly communicated to the applicant and he shall not be entitled to claim refund of the amount spent by way of remuneration for the preparation of the plan in accordance with Rule 257 of the Rules of 1961. Rule 261 of the said Rules prescribes for disposal of objections if any received in response to the notice issued under Rule 260 by Panchayat after giving the parties concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Rule 262 of the said Rules provides that if no objection is received under Rule 260 within one month or if all the objections so received have been dismissed under Rule 261, the Panchayat Samiti shall by its resolution order to auction of the land proposed to be sold on a date not earlier than one month from the date of the resolution at the time and place to be specified. Sub -rule (2) of Rule 262 further provides that thereupon a notice of such auction and of the date, time and place specified under Sub-rule (1) shall be proclaimed in the manner provided in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 133 and the provisions of Sub-rules (3) and (5) of that Rule shall apply mutatis mutandis.
69. Rule 262 prescribed procedure for auction and Rule 265 envisages the acceptance of the highest bid subject to confirmation by the Panchayat and the authorities prescribed under Sub-rule (3). There is another mode prescribed for sale of Abadi land under Rule 266 of the Rules of 1961 according to which the Panchayat Samiti may transfer any Abadi land by way of sale by private negotiation.
70. It goes without saying that the defence taken by defendant-respondents in their written statements to the effect that Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur leased out the Abadi land to Babulal defendant No. 3 in the year 1956 at monthly rent of Rs. 1/-, who in turn, executed a sale-deed on 27-2-73 in favourof Smt. Shanti Devi defendant-respondent No. 1 wife of Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2 will depend on the proof that the Abadi land in question has vested in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur and it is so entered in the register of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur maintained under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961. Thus, if the defendant-respondents fail to establish that Abadi plot in question has vested in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur and it is so entered in the register in Form No. XLVIII their defence concocted in their written statements will have no leg to stand.
71. The register maintained in the aforesaid form is subjected to inspection by Panchayat Extension Officer periodically at least once in a year and require to be certified by him as to whether the record showing the property of Gram Panchayat in Form No. XLVIII is correct. I am of the view that the defendant-respondent deliberately avoided to produce the register of immovable properties maintained by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961 to prove that the Abadi land in question has vested in it and it is so entered in the said register, therefore, an adverse inference is to be drawn against them to the effect that if the property register of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur would have been produced by the defendant-respondents, it would have disclosed that the Abadi land in question has neither vested in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur nor it is so entered in the register maintained under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961. This is the only reason as to why the defendant-respondents have deliberately avoided to produce register of immovable properties maintained by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961.
72. I am of the view that in the present case, the defendant-respondents have utterly failed to establish that the land in question has either vested in the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur or it was placed at its disposal, therefore, giving of Abadi land in question to defendant-respondent No. 3 Babu Lal by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur on lease in the year 1956 at monthly rent of Rs. 1/- does not arise as alleged in their written statement.
73. By way of legal fiction, it is presumed that even an illiterate persons know the law. Here in the present case, defendant-respondent No. 2 Narain Lal is employed as clerk in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur who examined himself as DW 2, therefore, he must be presumed to have full knowledge about the register maintained by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961 and law relating to settlement of Abadi land either on the basis of auction or private negotiation but he did not produce the property register of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur to prove that the land in dispute has vested in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur. The defendant-respondents also failed to establish how Abadi land in question was allotted to Babu Lal against mandatory provisions of allotment. Neither there is any allegation in the written statement nor proof how the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur settled abadi land in favour of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 who has executed sale-deed in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi w/o Shri Narain Lal in absence of resolution of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur. No resolution of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur has been filed to prove allotment in favour of Babu Lal.
74. From the aforesaid discussion, it is held that no abadi land of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur can be settled in favour of a person in absence of resolution of Gram Panchayat against the mandatory provisions of Chapter XIII of the Rules of 1961. In absence of averment made in the written statement about the resolution of Gram Panchayat and also in absence of any proof about resolution of Gram Panchayat in favour of Babu Lal about permission for construction dated 11 -2-72 Ex. A/2 by the then Sarpanch is void ab initio. It is further held that under Chapter XIII of the Rules of 1961, the Sarpanch is not entitled to deal with abadi land of Gram Panchayat as his own personal property but such abadi land can be settled only after resolution of Gram Panchayat on the basis of collective wisdom of the members of Panchayat in a meeting after deliberation amongst them. Here in the present case, permission for construction given by Sarpanch Sukh Raj to Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 on 11-5-72 vide Ex. A/2 at his own whim and fancy in absence of resolution of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur is held to be void ab initio and fabricated to grab the land of the plaintiff-appellant.
75. DW 3 Mohan Raj was Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur from 1960 to 1965, therefore, it must be presumed that he was fully aware of the existence of the property register in Form No. XL VIII of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur yet in his statement on oath he did not speak anything as to whether the Abadi land in question is entered in property register of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur as proof that it has vested in it. Nowhere it is deposed by him how the abadi land in question was settled with Babu Lal against the statutory Rules of 1961 except proving Ex. A/2 permission to Babulal defendant No. 3 for construction given by the then Sarpanch treating the Abadi land of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur as his personal property against the mandatory Rules of 1961 in absence of resolution of Gram Panchayat Sumerpur. A close scrutiny of Ex. A/2 reveals that in this document, nowhere it is mentioned that the permission for construction to Babu Lal defendant No. 3 was given by the then Sarpanch in pursuant to a resolution passed by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur. ,
76. DW 5 Manchha Ram was the then Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur and as such, he was also required to know about existence of the property register maintained by the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961 but he did not explain as to whether the Abadi land in question is entered in the property register of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur maintained under Rule 251 of the Rules of 1961 who was responsible to maintain all records of the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur on the relevant date. Being literate person DW 5 Machha Ram the then Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur must be presumed to know the law that there is total prohibition under Rule 277 of the Rules of 1961 not to grant lease of Abadi land to any one. DW 5 Manchha Ram did not explain in his statement on oath under what circumstances against the mandatory prohibition to grant Abadi land on lease to any one it was given on lease to defendant-respondent No. 3 Babu Lal in the year 1956 at monthly rent of Re. 1 /-. Before giving his statement on oath supporting the false statements of DW 1, DW 2, DW 3 and DW 4, he did not verify the fact whether the rent paid by defendant-respondent No. 3 Babu Lal was credited in the account of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur. DW 5 did hesitate to give statement about settlement of Abadi land in favour of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 but he did not hesitate to give false statement about non-existent possession of Babu Lal from 1956 up to executing of sale-deed by him Ex. A/4 on 27-2-73 over the land in dispute in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi defendant-respondent No. 1.
77. The aforesaid discussion leads towards an irresistible conclusion that the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur has not granted lease of the land in question to defendant-respondent No. 3 Babu Lal but Ex. A/1, Ex. A/2, Ex. A/5 and A/6 purported to have been issued from the office of Panchayat Samiti, S umerpur have been ante dated fabricated by Shri Narain Lal defendant No. 2 an employee in the office of Panchayat Samiti, Sumerpur in favour of defendant-respondent No. 3 Babu Lal in collusion of Mohan Raj Ex-sarpanch (DW 3) and Manchha Ram the then Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur (DW 5) to grab the land in dispute of the plaintiff-appellant through his wife Smt. Shanti Devi with tacit consent of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 who appears to be under their thumb. Once it is held that Ex. A/1, A./2, A/5 and A/6 have been ante dated forged by Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2 with collusion of Mohan Raj DW 3. Manchha Ram DW 5 with tacit consent of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3, no right, title or interest will accrue in favour of Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 on the basis of these ante-dated forged documents. The aforesaid ante-dated forged documents have been prepared by them after hatching a conspiracy in secrecy to give a true colour to the so-called sham sale-deed dated 27-2-73 alleged to have been executed by Babulal defendant-respondent No. 3 in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi defendant-respondent No. 1 wife of Shri Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2.
78. Ex. A/1 purported to be a receipt alleged to have been issued and signed by Roshan Lal as stated by DW 3 when Babu Lal Rajguru was Sarpanch who is stated to be dead. DW 3 Mohan Raj Ex Sarpanch extended his support to Shri Narain Lal to prove the signatures of Roshan Lal although it is admitted in his statement on oath that Roshan Lal is alive. The defendants deliberately avoided to produce Roshan Lal to prove Ex. A/1 therefore, an adverse inference is to be drawn against them under the Evidence Act.
The forgery is evident from perusal of receipt Ex.
A/1 wherein it is written about payment of rent from 1-4-56 to the year 1957 but month of 1957 is missing there is over-writing on the amount of Rs. 12/-. On Ex. A/1 printed receipt which indicates that this receipt was meant to be issued either by Sarpanch or by Sachiy Panchayat. The printed word "Sarpanch" is made blurred by scoring the word by ink. However, the Sachiv Panchayat is allowed to remain as it was. Nowhere it is stated by DW 3 Mohan Raj that Roshan Lal who alleged to have signed on Ex. A/1 was either Secretary or Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur. It is not clear from the statement of DW 3 Mohan Raj that in which capacity the forged receipt Ex. A/1 was signed by Roshan Lal who is not examined by the defendant-respondents in Court. There is over-writing on the amount paid. Earlier Ex. A/1 was a receipt for payment of Re. 1/- but later on, it was made acknowledgment of receipt of payment of Rs. 12/- hence it becomes necessary for the persons forging this document to remove date and month of the year 1957, so that, inconsistency may be explained with Ex. A/6.
79. Ex. A/2 purported to be permission letter dated 11-5-72 alleged to be issued by Sarpanch Sukh Raj. It is admitted by DW 3 Mohan Raj that Sukh Ram is alive but he was not produced to prove Ex. A/2. This ante-dated document was fabricated to give a colour to the sham sale-deed executed by Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 in favour of defendant-respondent No. 1 Smt. Shanti Devi w/o defendant-respondent No. 2 Shri Narain Lal. Contents of Ex. A/2 are not proved by any of the DWs adduced by the defendant-respondents.
80. As regards Ex. A/5, it is bold forgery committed by Ex-secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur Shri Manchha Ram (DW 5). Ex. A/5 alleged to have been issued by DW 5 Machha Ram on 31 -5-73 which reveals that it is a House-tax receipt paid by Smt. Shanti Devi for a period from 1-4-73 to 31-3-74. DW 5 Manchha Ram while forging ante-dated house-tax receipt Ex. A/5 has forgotten that even the sham sale-deed itself was executed by Babu Lal in favour of Smt. Shanti Devi on 27-2-73 which is foundation of her right, title and interest then how Smt. Shanti Devi defendant-respondent No. 2 wife of Shri Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2 had built a house over the disputed land which was assessed for payment of house-tax from 1-4-73. This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that after so-called purchase by Smt. Shanti Devi on 27-2-73 vide Ex. A/4 she is required to obtain sanctioned plan, she is required to manage expenses and some time would be required in constructing the house in question. In fact, the house-tax is assessed only after completion of a house. As held in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, the husband of Smt. Shanti Devi started to demolish Parkota belonging to the plaintiff-appellant in the first week of May 1973, hence, raising of construction by Smt. Shanti Devi prior to 1-5-73 does not arise. Ex. A/5 is ante-dated forged document indicating payment of assessment of house tax over disputed land with effect from 1-4-73 by Smt. Shanti Devi to create erroneous opinion of the Court on the question of possession.
81. As regard Ex. A/6 again, it is an ante-dated forged document indicating therein that the land in dispute was given to Babu Lal defendant-respondent No. 3 for a period of one year by the then Sarpanch Babu Lal Rajguru, who is stated to be dead. The signature of deceased Babu Lal Rajguru Ex Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in the year 1956-57 has been proved by Mohan Raj DW 3 who is biased witness having no regard for truth and honesty. The forgery in Ex. A/6 is evident from comparison done with Ex. A/1. Initially, it appears that DW 2, DW 3 and DW 5 forged ante-dated Ex. A/1 receipt in acknowledgment of payment of Re. 1/- yearly rent by Babu Lal to Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur but at a subsequent stage, they gave a second thought and in place of Re. 1/- yearly rent, it was made Re. 1/- monthly rent, therefore, figure ' 1' was subjected to over-writing in to ' 12' to make Ex. A/1 in consonance with Ex. A/6. A question was asked to DW 5 Manchha Ram the then Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur to this effect that in whose writing Ex. A/6 was written. He expressed his inability to state, who has filled in the gap in Ex. A/6. Thus it is further proved that filling up the gap in Ex. A/6 has not been made by Shri Babu Lal Rajguru the then Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur who alleged to have issued this receipt Ex. A/6. I am fully satisfied that the signature of Babu Lal Rajguru the then, Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur has been forged by DW 2 with collusion of DW 3 and DW 5 with tacit consent of DW 1. At the risk of repetition, it is held that from perusal of Ex, A/6 it is not possible to deduce that Babu Lal Rajguru the then Sarpanch was authorised by resolution of Panchayat Samiti to grant lease of Abadi land to Babu Lal defendant. In absence of any resolution, the then Sarpanch Babu Lal Rajguru was not entitled to deal with the abadi land of Panchayat Samiti Sumerpur as his own personal property by giving it on lease to Babu Lal defendant against the Rules of 1961 by Ex. A/6.
82. The aforesaid conducts of Narain Lal defendant-respondent No. 2 an employee of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur, who examined himself as DW 2, DW 3 Mohan Raj Ex Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur and DW 5 Manchha Ram Ex-Secretary of Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur in forging the ante-dated documents Ex. A/1, A/2, A/5 and A/6 fall within the definition of offence under Section 192, IPC. Section 192, IPC envisaged that a person is said to have fabricated a false evidence if he makes a document containing a false statement intending that such false statement so fabricated may appear in evidence and so appearing in evidence may cause any person who in such proceedings is to form an opinion upon the evidence to entertain an erroneous opinion touching any point material to the result of such proceedings. He who commits offence under Section 192, IPC is to be punished under Section 193, IPC.
83. Apart from this, DW 1 Babu Lal, DW 2 Narain Lal, DW 3 Mohan Raj, DW 4 Ibrahim and DW 5 Manchha Ram have given false statements on oath before the learned trial Court stating false possession of Babu Lal who was not in possession over the disputed land at any part of time.
Aforesaid witnesses have given false statements before the learned trial Court that Parkota in dispute was built by Babu Lal whereas it was built by Maknaji and his son PW 2 Bhabhut Mal. In fact, in order to counter-blast the case of the plaintiff-appellant, the aforesaid DWs have given false statements on oath before the learned trial Court that Parkota was built by Babu Lal. These witnesses have again given a false statements on oath that Babu Lal was living over the disputed land after constructing a Zhupa (hut). The aforesaid false statements of DW 1 to DW 5 fall within the definition of an offence under Section 191 IPC according to which, whenever in a court of law, a person binds himself on oath to state the truth he is bound to state the truth and if he states anything on oath which is false, he is liable to be punished under Section 193, IPC.
84. Now the question which deserves to be considered would be whether the present suit was filed within 12 years from the date of violent invasion of possession of the plaintiff-appellant? In this regard, the Law of Limitation contemplated under Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act are to be examined. Article 64 of the said Act provides that for possession of immovable property based on previous possession and not on title begins to run from the date of dispossession and the plaintiff is required to file a suit within 12 years from the date of his dispossession whereas under Article 65 of the said Act for possession of immovable property or any interest therein based on title begins to run when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to the plaintiff and in such suits, the plaintiff is required to file suit within 12 years from the date when the possession of the defendant becomes adverse to him.
85. In the present case, from the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, I am fully satisfied from the oral and documentary evidence produced by the plaintiff-appellant that his possession was invaded violently and fraudulently by the defendant-respondents in the first week of May 1973 and the present suit for recovery of possession was filed by the plaintiff-appellant on 13-1-75 before the learned trial Court which was registered on 16-1-75. Thus, it goes without saying that the present suit was filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant in the first week of May 1973 and the finding of the learned trial Court contrary to it is perverse. The learned trial Court has committed substantial error of law in not shifting the onus of proof on the defendant-respondents calling upon them to establish a better title and their entitlement to retain possession over the land in question. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, the defendant-respondents failed to establish their better title against the plaintiff-appellant and as such, they are not entitled to Abadi land in dispute over which their possession has originated by force and fraud. It is also held that possession of defendant-respondents Nos. 1 to 3 originated in the first week of may 1973 by force and fraud, therefore, such possession of the defendant-respondents which has originated by force and fraud cannot be allowed to be retained by them by any stretch of imagination. The present suit is well within limitation of 12 years from the date of filing of the suit under Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act and a finding contrary to it recorded by the learned trial Court is perverse.
86. Learned trial Court has erred in law and facts both in the present suit in not computing 12 years limitation from the date of dispossession of the plaintiff-appellant in the first week of May 1973 from the land in question by the defendant-respondents by force and fraud to the date of filing of the suit on 13-1 -1975. In the present suit, running of 12 years limitation against the plaintiff-appellant shall be deemed to be arrested when he filed the present suit for recovery of possession from the defendant-respondents on 13-1-1975, although it was registered by the learned trial Court on 16-1-1975.
87. In my considered opinion, the defendant-respondents miserably failed to rebut the evidence adduced by the plaintiff-appellant to the effect that suit was filed within 12 years from the date of his dispossession. Even if the-present suit is taken to have been filed on the basis of title even then the act of violent invasion of the plaintiff-appellant's possession by the defendant-respondents shall be taken to be adverse against him from the first week of May 1973 when the defendant-respondents invaded his peaceful possession. Thus, the present suit was filed within limitation under Articles 64 and 65 of the Indian Limitation Act.
88. POINT NO. (x) :
In order to avoid repetition and to maintain brevity, in view of what has been discussed in detail in the preceding paragraphs of this judgment, the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to recover Rs. 820/- mesne profits from the defendant-respondents up to the date of filing of the suit and further he is entitled to recover mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month up to recovery of possession from them. The defendant-respondents have not adduced any evidence in rebuttal to the effect that the mesne profits claimed by the plaintiff-appellant for loss of his possession, is excessive. In absence of any evidence in rebuttal adduced by the defendant-respondents, the claim of the plaintiff-appellant claiming mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month is to be believed. Thus, this point No. (x) is also answered in affirmative,
89. The Court is constrained to observe with anguish that its judicial conscience is shocked to note the behaviours of defendant-respondent No. 2 Narain Lal, employed as a Clerk in Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur who examined himself as DW 2 husband of defendant-respondent No. 1 Smt. Shanti Devi with the tacit consent of defendant-respondent No. 3-Babu Lal who examined himself as DW 1 in collusion of Mohan Raj Ex-sarpanch of the said Gram Panchayat Samiti (DW 3), Machha Ram, the then Secretary of the said Gram Panchayat, Sumerpur (DW 5) intentionally, wilfully and deliberately fabricating and forging ante-dated documents Ex. A/1, A/2, A/5 and A/6 and all of them along with Ibrahim (DW 4) giving false statements on oath in judicial proceedings before the learned trial Court for the purpose of being used in such judicial proceedings, which fall within the definition of offences under Sections 191/192, IPC and punishable under Section 193, IPC. This Court cannot afford to allow Shri Babu Lal (DW 1), Shri Narain Lal (DW 2), Shri Mohan Raj (DW 3), Shri Ibrahim (DW 4) and Shri Manchha Ram (DW 5) to contaminate, poison and distort the fountain of administration of justice by fabricating false documentary evidence as well as by giving false statements on oath. The aforesaid persons cannot be allowed in a civilised justice system to dehumanise the conceptualisation of humane justice by intentionally fabricating and forging false evidence in judicial proceedings for the purpose of being used in such judicial proceedings giving a chance to a judicial human mind to commit judicial error resulting in miscarriage of justice as has been done in the present case by the learned trial Court.
As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the judgment and decree under appeal passed by the learned trial Court on 1-7-1980 is hereby set aside and the instant appeal is allowed with costs throughout. The suit for declaration and recovery of possession after ejectment of the defendant-respondents and recovery of mesne profits of Rs. 820/- upto the date of filing the suit and further mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 40/- per month from the date of filing the suit till recovery of possession from the defendant-respondents is hereby decreed. The defendant-respondents are directed to get construction over the disputed land demolished and removed the debris from the disputed land within two months from today and within the aforesaid period hand-over the vacant possession over the disputed land to the plaintiff-appellant. In case, the defendant-respondents fail to do so within the aforesaid period, the plaintiff-appellant would be at liberty to execute the decree for demolition and recovery of possession of the disputed land through Court. The expenses so incurred by the plaintiff-appellant in demolition and removal of debris from the land in dispute shall be recoverable by him from the defendant-respondents.
Registrar of this Court is hereby directed to file a complaint against DW 1 Babu Lal, DW 2 Narain Lal, DW 3 Mohan Raj, DW 4 Ibrahim and DW 5 Manchha Ram under Sections 191 and 192, IPC punishable under Section 193, IPC before a competent criminal Court and prosecute them for fabricating ante-dated documents Ex. A/1, A/2, A/5 and A/6 and also for giving false evidence on oath by them before the learned trial Court.