Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
Bachan Singh vs State Of Rajasthan And Anr ... on 13 October, 2025
Author: Anand Sharma
Bench: Anand Sharma
[2025:RJ-JP:42875]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN
BENCH AT JAIPUR
(1) S. B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 874/2015
Bachan Singh son of Shri Heera Singh, resident of Village Khalsa
Nagar, Tehsil & Police Station Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Trilochan Singh S/o Shri Harbansh Singh, Resident of Khilora,
Presently residing at Ramgarh, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar
(Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
Connected With
(2) S. B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 762/2015
Bachan Singh son of Shri Heera Singh, resident of Village Khalsa
Nagar, Tehsil & Police Station Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Anup Singh S/o Shri Kartar Singh, Resident of Khalsa Nagar,
Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
(3) S. B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 1436/2015
Bachan Singh son of Shri Heera Singh, resident of Village Khalsa
Nagar, Tehsil & Police Station Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Tirth Singh S/o Shri Gokal Singh, Resident of Khilora, Tehsil
Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
(4) S. B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4014/2017
1. Manmohan Singh son of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident of
25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
2. Harjeet Kaur wife of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident of
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25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
3. Manohar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
4. Bhupendar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
5. Paramjeet Singh son of Shri Manohar Singh, resident of
Khalasa Nagar, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
6. Gangasahai son of Shri Chandar, resident of Dohali, Tehsil
Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Trilochan Singh S/o Shri Harbansh Singh, Resident of Khilora,
Presently residing at Ramgarh, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar
(Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
(5) S. B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4017/2017
1. Manmohan Singh son of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident of
25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
2. Harjeet Kaur wife of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident of
25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
3. Manohar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
4. Bhupendar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
5. Paramjeet Singh son of Shri Manohar Singh, resident of
Khalasa Nagar, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
6. Gangasahai son of Shri Chandar, resident of Dohali, Tehsil
Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Tirth Singh S/o Shri Gokal Singh, Resident of Khilora,
presently residing at Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
(6) S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4024/2017
1. Manmohan Singh son of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident
of 25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
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2. Harjeet Kaur wife of Late Shri Nirmal Singh, resident of
25/508, Moti Nagar, New Delhi.
3. Manohar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
4. Bhupendar Singh son of Shri Heera Singh
5. Paramjeet Singh son of Shri Manohar Singh, resident of
Khalasa Nagar, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
6. Gangasahai son of Shri Chandar, resident of Dohali, Tehsil
Ramgarh, District Alwar, (Raj.)
----Accused-Petitioners
Versus
1. State of Rajasthan Through P.P.
----Respondent
2. Anoop Singh S/o Shri Kartar Singh, Resident of Khilora,
presently residing at Ramgarh, District Alwar (Raj.)
----Complainant-Respondent
For Petitioners : Mr. Pankaj Gupta Advocate with Mr.
Naman Yadav Advocate, Mr. Harshit
Bhatt Advocate, Mr. Chinmay Sharma
Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Manish Gupta Advocate with Ms.
Shweta Soni Advocate.
Mr. Vivek Choudhary Public
Prosecutor.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA Judgment REPORTABLE 13/10/2025
1. This batch of Criminal Miscellaneous Petitions under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code comes up before this court for consideration of identical and closely connected facts and contentious questions of law. Each petition in this batch involves allegations arising from similar transaction and raises common points, hence, with the consent of learned counsel (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:24 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (4 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] for the parties, the petitions were accordingly taken up and heard together and are being decided by this common judgment.
2. Details of above petitions are being given in short in tabular form as under:
S.B. Criminal FIR No., date and Accused in Date of Date of sale Date of Misc. Petition No. details of FIR agreement deed and filing of suit & Petitioners complainant with details details of and details of parties beneficiary of judgment of civil court 874/2015 370/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Bachan Singh 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Trilochan dated specific registered at Police Late Nirmal Singh 25/05/2012 performance Station Ramgarh, Singh; (Purchaser) in favour of of District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur & Bachan agreement Trilochan Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Manmohan Singh; dated Harbansh Singh Singh; Singh & Manohar 22.10.2011 Bachan Singh Harjeet Singh & and S/O Heera Kaur Bhupendra cancellation Singh; (Sellers) Singh of sale deed Manohar dated Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025 762/2015 Bachan 369/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Singh 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Anup Singh dated specific registered at Police Late Nirmal (Purchaser) 25/05/2012 performance Station Ramgarh, Singh; & in favour of of District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur Manmohan Bachan agreement Anup Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Singh & Singh; dated Kartar Singh Singh; Harjeet Manohar 22.10.2011 Bachan Singh Kaur Singh & and S/O Heera (Sellers) Bhupendra cancellation Singh; Singh of sale deed Manohar dated Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025 1436/2015 368/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Bachan Singh 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Tirth Singh dated specific registered at Police Late Nirmal (Purchaser) 25/05/2012 performance Station Ramgarh, Singh; & in favour of of District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur Manmohan Bachan agreement Tirth Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Singh & Singh; dated Gokal Singh Singh; Harjeet Manohar 22.10.2011 Bachan Singh Kaur Singh & and S/O Heera (Sellers) Bhupendra cancellation Singh; Singh of sale deed Manohar dated (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:24 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (5 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025 4014/2017 370/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Manmohan 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Trilochan dated specific Singh; registered at Police Late Nirmal Singh 25/05/2012 performance Harjeet Kaur; Station Ramgarh, Singh; (Purchaser) in favour of of Manohar Singh; District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur & Bachan agreement Bhupendar Trilochan Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Manmohan Singh; dated Singh; Harbansh Singh Singh; Singh & Manohar 22.10.2011 Paramjeet Singh Bachan Singh Harjeet Singh & and & Gangasahai S/O Heera Kaur Bhupendra cancellation Singh; (Sellers) Singh of sale deed Manohar dated Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025 4017/2017 368/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Manmohan 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Tirth Singh dated specific Singh; registered at Police Late Nirmal (Purchaser) 25/05/2012 performance Harjeet Kaur; Station Ramgarh, Singh; & in favour of of Manohar Singh; District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur Manmohan Bachan agreement Bhupendar Tirth Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Singh & Singh; dated Singh; Gokal Singh Singh; Harjeet Manohar 22.10.2011 Paramjeet Singh Bachan Singh Kaur Singh & and & Gangasahai S/O Heera (Sellers) Bhupendra cancellation Singh; Singh of sale deed Manohar dated Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025 4024/2017 369/2012 dated Manmohan 22/10/2011 Sale Deed Suit for Manmohan 05.07.2012 Singh S/o Anup Singh dated specific Singh; registered at Police Late Nirmal (Purchaser) 25/05/2012 performance Harjeet Kaur; Station Ramgarh, Singh; & in favour of of Manohar Singh; District Alwar by Harjeet Kaur Manmohan Bachan agreement Bhupendar Anup Singh S/O W/o Nirmal Singh & Singh; dated Singh; Kartar Singh Singh; Harjeet Manohar 22.10.2011 Paramjeet Singh Bachan Singh Kaur Singh & and & Gangasahai S/O Heera (Sellers) Bhupendra cancellation Singh; Singh of sale deed Manohar dated Singh S/o 25.5.2012 Heera Singh; filed on (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:24 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (6 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] Bhupendra 31.05.2012 Singh S/o has been Heera Singh; dismissed Paramjeet by Singh S/o Additional Manohar District Singh; Judge No. 4, Gangasahai Alwar vide S/o Chander judgment and decree dated 22.05.2025
3. For the sake of convenience and to avoid repetition, with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, facts stated in S.B. Criminal Misc Petition no. 874/2015 are being taken into consideration for the purpose of adjudication of the common dispute involved in the batch of petitions.
4. Criminal Misc. Petition no. 874/2015 has been filed by the accused-petitioner, Bachan Singh, challenging the order dated 20.03.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ramgarh, District Alwar, whereby cognizance of offences under Sections 420 and 120-B of IPC has been taken, and the order dated 12.12.2014 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, No.3, District Alwar, dismissing the revision petition filed against the said cognizance, is also under challenge.
5. The petitioner is one of four brothers namely Manohar Singh, Bhupendra Singh, Nirmal Singh, and Bachan Singh, who are having ancestral land in Village Khalsa Nagar, Tehsil Ramgarh, District Alwar. Nirmal Singh passed away leaving behind legal heirs, namely, Manmohan Singh (son), Harjit Kaur (widow), and daughters Jaspreet Kaur and Taranpreet Kaur. The petitioner and his family purchased the shares of Manmohan Singh and Harjit Kaur through a registered sale deed dated 25.05.2012, while the shares of the daughters remained with them.
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6. The complainant, Trilochan Singh, claimed a ¼ share of the same unpartitioned land on the basis of an alleged agreement dated 22.10.2011 executed by Manmohan Singh and Harjit Kaur. Notably, the daughters of Nirmal Singh namely, Jaspreet Kaur and Taranpreet Kaur did not sign the agreement. The complainant filed a civil suit on 31.05.2012 before the District Judge, Alwar, seeking cancellation of the registered sale deed dated 25.05.2012 and specific performance of the alleged agreement dated 22.10.2011. Despite the pendency of the civil suit, the complainant lodged a criminal complaint alleging offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B IPC, which led to FIR No. 370/2012. It was alleged in the FIR that the complainant and accused persons belong to the same family. Land bearing Khasra No. 899, area 35.901 bighas in the village Khalsa Nagar (previously Bilaur). Accused Manmohan Singh and Bachan Singh, with consent of their daughters Jaspreet Kaur and Taranpreet Kaur, agreed to sell this land to the complainant by an agreement dated 22.10.2011 at a rate of Rs. 3 lakh per bigha. An advance of Rs. 1 lakh was received in cash, and it was agreed that the daughters would execute the required documentation. Previously, there were disputes between Accused Manmohan Singh and Manohar Singh and their relations were not cordial. Accused Manmohan Singh and Bachan Singh resided in Delhi and intended to sell the land. Accused Manohar singh, along with others, allegedly attempted to forcibly take possession of the shares belonging to Manohar Singh, Bachan Singh and their daughters. To prevent this, Manohar Singh filed a suit before the District Judge, Alwar. The suit was transferred to the Additional (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (8 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] District Judge, Alwar. However, the stay was not granted there, so another case was filed by Sukhendra Singh against Manmohan Singh, in which a stay order was obtained on 15.11.2012. Due to this, the execution of sale deed and registration pursuant to the agreement could not take place within the prescribed time. On 17.11.2011, after the stay was vacated by the court, it was agreed to extend the period for execution of the sale deed and registration thereof, with a condition that accused would provide written notice to the complainant upon the lifting of the stay, and the complainant would arrange execution and registration of the sale deed within a week thereafter. The next hearing of the case was scheduled for 15-6-2012. During this period, Accused allegedly conspired to prepone the hearing and got the matter dismissed on 25.5.2012. On the same day, the sale deed dated 25.05.2012 was executed in favour of one of the accused. The complainant alleged that the accused intentionally conspired to cause financial loss, despite being aware that an agreement with the complainant existed. They allegedly executed the sale deed among themselves with deceitful intent, to obtain unlawful gains. The complainant became aware of this on 27.5.2012 and requested cancellation of the fraudulent sale deed dated 25.05.2012 and execution of sale deed in his favour, but the accused refused to do so on 01.6.2012.The complainant alleged that the actions of the accused fall under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code, hence, FIR was registered on 05.07.2012.
7. The police, upon investigation, submitted a negative final report on 29.10.2012, observing that the dispute was purely (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (9 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] civil in nature. Being aggrieved protest petition was filed by the complainant on 27.02.2013. On such protest petition, learned Magistrate took cognizance vide order dated 20.03.2013 for offences under Section 420 and 120-B IPC. Cognizance order was unsuccessfully challenged by the accused petitioner by way of filing revision petition under Section 397 Cr.P.C., however, the same was also dismissed on 12.12.2014. Similarly, revision petitions filed by other accused-petitioners were dismissed by the revisional court vide orders dated 17.05.2017.
8. Subsequently, during the pendency of the Criminal Misc. Petition before this court, the civil suit was adjudicated by the Additional District Judge No.4, Alwar, vide judgment dated 22.05.2025 and complainant's suit for specific performance and cancellation of the sale deed was dismissed. Copy of the judgment dated 22.05.2025 was placed before this Court by learned counsel for the petitioners during the course of arguments, after supplying copy of the same to the learned counsel for the opponents. The judgment dated 02.05.2025 would reveal that after due consideration of the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and the submissions advanced by both sides, the Civil Court concluded that the plaintiff-complainant utterly failed to prove that the defendants (accused in the present criminal complaint) executed a valid and enforceable agreement to sell in his favour. The Agreement dated 22.10.2011,produced as Exhibit-1, was found not proved in accordance with law, as neither its execution nor the signatures of the executants were established. It was also not registered or sufficiently stamped as required under law.
(Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (10 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] Accordingly, the suit filed by the plaintiff Trilochan Singh for specific performance of contract, cancellation of sale deed and permanent injunction was dismissed. It was held that the alleged agreement to sell dated 22.10.2011 is not proved and is unenforceable in law. A categorical finding has also been given that the registered sale deed dated 25.05.2012 in favour of the subsequent purchasers is valid and binding.
9. Shri Pankaj Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that bare reading of the impugned FIR lodged on the basis of criminal complaint does not make out any cognizable offence against the accused. In fact the alleged dispute, if any, is of purely civil in nature, and criminal proceedings cannot be invoked to circumvent civil remedies. Instead of disclosing the already ongoing civil dispute, by concealing the same, complaint was filed by the complainant on the basis of incomplete, incorrect and distorted facts so as to criminalize the civil transaction in quite malicious manner and to exert undue pressure against the petitioner. Hence, the Police authorities after investigation, on the basis of statements and material as well as details of pending civil suit, rightly filed negative final Report in the matter treating the dispute to be of civil nature.
10. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that under such circumstances, when the negative FR was opposed by the complainant by filing protest petition, the same ought to have been treated as complaint under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and without following the process contemplated for taking cognizance over complaint, directly cognizance could not have been taken by (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (11 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] the Magistrate. Learned counsel indicated that the cognizance order itself would reveal that the complainant has refused to give statements under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and under such circumstances, as per legal procedure, the Magistrate had no other option to close the protest petition and to accept the Negative FR proposed by the Investigation Agency, and he could not have proceeded further to take cognizance in the matter. Learned Counsel emphasized that the Magistrate did not comply with the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., more so, when two of the accused were residing outside jurisdiction of this court, he mechanically took cognizance despite the submission of a negative police report. Hence, non-compliance of mandatory procedure by the concerned court would vitiate the entire proceeding.
11. Learned Counsel further adds that under criminal jurisprudence, where fate of a trial may put liberty of a person at stakes, following the procedure contemplated in Cr.P.C. by the Trial court is fundamentally indispensable and ignorance thereof would amount to denial of fair opportunity and fair trial to the accused; and may ultimately result in denial of justice.
12. Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the petitioner Bachan Singh is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, having executed the registered sale deed after paying the full consideration. The civil court judgment has already confirmed this position and the alleged agreement relied upon by the complainant has been held as not a valid agreement and could not be enforced under law.
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13. Counsel for the petitioners further argued that the findings of civil court shall always prevail over any of the criminal proceedings, hence, once there is a judgment disbelieving the legal existence and enforceability of the alleged agreement, on the basis of which the complainant was seeking any rights whatsoever, and the sale deed in favour of the accused petitioner has been held to be a valid one creating legitimate rights, title and interest in favour of the petitioner, by no stretch of imagination, the accused petitioner can be left to face vexatious criminal prosecution on the basis of the said civil transaction.
14. Counsel for the petitioners emphasised that in the aforesaid circumstances it is clear that the criminal prosecution, pursuant to impugned FIR and cognizance by the trial court, if allowed to continue, would cause manifest failure of justice to the petitioner, hence, the petitioner has rightly invoked the inherent powers of this court under section 482 Cr.P.C. for prevent the abuse of process of law.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of his arguments, relied upon several precedents including Vijay Dhanuka & Others vs Najima Mamtaj & Others (2014) 14 SCC 638, Dalip Kaur & Others vs Jagnar Singh & Another (2009) 14 SCC 696, Mohammed Ibrahim & Others vs State of Bihar & Another (2010 Crl.L.J. 2223 SC), Videocon Industries Limited & Another vs State of Maharashtra & Others (2016) 12 SCC 315, Mukul Agrawal & Others vs State of Uttar Pradesh & Another (2020) 3 SCC 402, Manoj Kumar & Others vs State of Rajasthan & Another 2012(3) (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (13 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] Cr.L.R. (Raj.) 1342 and Vinod Baid vs State of Rajasthan & Another 2002 (2) RLR 56.
16. Per contra, Shri Manish Gupta, learned Counsel for the Complainant and learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the Criminal Misc. Petition and submitted that the petition is misconceived and misdirected. It was argued that jurisdiction of this court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is meant to be exercised sparingly and in extraordinary circumstances, and not in routine manner on mere asking of the petitioner. Merely for the reasons that the complainant, who on account of conduct of the accused persons, was enduring civil as well as criminal wrong, had approached the court for redressal of his grievances available in Civil law as well as Criminal law, would not itself debar him from any relief under criminal jurisdiction; more so, where the civil jurisprudence and criminal jurisprudence rest on altogether different principles and standard of proof.
17. Shri Manish Gupta, learned Counsel for the complainant submitted that an agreement, under civil law may fail to confer any rights due to suffering some technicalities with regard to lack of registration and insufficiency of stamp value, and on account of such deficiencies, rights may not be enforced in civil law; yet on the other hand, such technicalities would not absolve the accused from mens rea attached to such transactions and if such transaction apparently reveals undue gain and undue loss arose due to inducement of the accused persons, merely referring such dispute to be of purely civil nature and closing the criminal (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (14 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] complaint on that basis, would certainly amount to perpetuating the illegalities already committed by the accused.
18. Learned counsel for the complainant submitted that bare perusal of contents of FIR would manifestly disclose offences under Sections 420 and 120-B IPC and that criminal liability arose from alleged fraudulent execution of the sale deed by the petitioners. However, on the basis of faulty investigation in ignorance of relevant material, the police authorities filed negative FR in the matter.
19. Learned Counsel while explaining the procedure after lodging of protest submits that in all cases it is not necessary for the Magistrate to take statements under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. and in the cases, where the learned Magistrate finds that sufficient material is already on record leading to an inference that prima facie offence is made out against the accused persons, he can take cognizance of the offence without resorting to the procedure of examining the complainant and witnesses under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Procedure contemplated under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. is to be adopted by the Magistrate only in those cases, where the police report does not reflect any evidence whatsoever. In the instant case, sufficient material on the basis of statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and other documents collected during investigation by the Investigating agency was already on record, which was ignored by the Police Authorities while proposing Negative FR, hence, on the basis of such material already available on record, the court below has rightly taken cognizance against the accused persons.
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20. Learned counsel for the complainant further highlights that fundamental principle is that at the time of taking cognizance, the Magistrate is required to examine only the material collected by the Investigation agency, which is available on record and not the defence of the accused persons.
21. Learned counsel for the complainant has also objected that judgment of the civil court delivered in the year 2025 cannot be seen to examine the order of cognizance of the year 2015, as the same was not there before the court at the time when cognizance was taken.
22. Learned Counsel for the complainant relied on judgments such as Vishnu Kumar Tiwari vs State of Uttar Pradesh through Secretary, Home, Civil Secretariat, Lucknow & Another, (2019) 8 SCC 27, Mukhtar Zaidi vs the State of Uttar Pradesh & Another, SLP(CRL.) No. 9122/201 decided by Hon'ble Supreme Court on 18.04.2024 and judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this court in Gajanand vs State of Rajasthan & Another, S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 08/2014 (decided on 22.06.2015).
23. I have perused the record and carefully heard the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties.
24. At the first place, the question for consideration before this court is that as to whether it was incumbent on the part of the Magistrate to follow the provisions of Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., before taking cognizance on the protest petition filed by the complainant in the instant case.
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25. Hence, it would be relevant to refer provisions of Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., which are quoted as under:-
"200. Examination of complainant.--A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate:
Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses--
(a) if a public servant acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or
(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192:
Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re-examine them.
202. Postponement of issue of process.--(1) Any Magistrate, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which he is authorised to take cognizance or which has been made over to him under section 192, may, if he thinks fit, 1[and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction,] postpone the issue of process against the accused, and either inquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding:
Provided that no such direction for investigation shall be made,--
(a) where it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session; or
(b) where the complaint has not been made by a Court, unless the complainant and the witnesses present (if any) have been examined on oath under section 200.
(2) In an inquiry under sub-section (1), the Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, take evidence of witnesses on oath:
Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that the offence complained of is triable exclusively by the Court of Session, he shall call upon the complainant to produce all his witnesses and examine them on oath.
(3) If an investigation under sub-section (1) is made by a person not being a police officer, he shall have for that investigation all the powers conferred by this Code on an (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (17 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] officer in charge of a police station except the power to arrest without warrant."
26. Section 200 of the Cr.P.C. outlines the procedure for a Magistrate to examine the complainant and their witnesses on oath, which is a necessary step before a private complaint can proceed. Section 202 allows the Magistrate to postpone the issuance of process where the accused resides at a place beyond area of his jurisdiction and instead conduct an inquiry or direct the police or another person to investigate to determine if there are sufficient grounds to proceed. The Magistrate can also dismiss the complaint if the inquiry or investigation reveals there are no sufficient grounds to proceed. In the instant cases, admittedly procedure under Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. was not followed by the learned Magistrate before taking cognizance on the protest petition filed by the complainants against negative FR filed by the police authorities.
27. In the case of Vijay Dhanuka & Others (supra), Hon'ble Supreme court discussed the scheme of Sections 200 & 202 Cr.P.C. and it was held that use of words "shall" in Section 202 Cr.P.C. makes it mandatory and it was observed that it is mandatory to follow procedure under Section 202 before summons are issued against accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate. Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down following guidelines:
"11. Section 202 of the Code, inter alia, contemplates postponement of the issue of the process "in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction" and thereafter to either inquire into the case by himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. In the face of it, what needs our determination is as to whether in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (18 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] in which the Magistrate exercises his jurisdiction, inquiry is mandatory or not.
12. The words "and shall, in a case where the accused is residing at a place beyond the area in which he exercises his jurisdiction" were inserted by Section 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act (Central Act 25 of 2005) w.e.f. 23-6-2006. The aforesaid amendment, in the opinion of the legislature, was essential as false complaints are filed against persons residing at far off places in order to harass them. The note for the amendment reads as follows:
"False complaints are filed against persons residing at far off places simply to harass them. In order to see that innocent persons are not harassed by unscrupulous persons, this clause seeks to amend sub-section (1) of Section 202 to make it obligatory upon the Magistrate that before summoning the accused residing beyond his jurisdiction he shall enquire into the case himself or direct investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit, for finding out whether or not there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused."
The use of the expression "shall" prima facie makes the inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, by the Magistrate mandatory. The word "shall" is ordinarily mandatory but sometimes, taking into account the context or the intention, it can be held to be directory. The use of the word "shall" in all circumstances is not decisive. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principle, when we look to the intention of the legislature, we find that it is aimed to prevent innocent persons from harassment by unscrupulous persons from false complaints. Hence, in our opinion, the use of the expression "shall" and the background and the purpose for which the amendment has been brought, we have no doubt in our mind that inquiry or the investigation, as the case may be, is mandatory before summons are issued against the accused living beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate.
13. In view of the decision of this Court in Udai Shankar Awasthi v. State of U.P. (2013) 2 SCC 435, this point need not detain us any further as in the said case, this Court has clearly held that the provision aforesaid is mandatory. It is apt to reproduce the following passage from the said judgment:
(SCC p. 449, para 40) "40. The Magistrate had issued summons without meeting the mandatory requirement of Section 202 CrPC, though the appellants were outside his territorial jurisdiction.The provisions of Section 202 CrPC were amended vide the Amendment Act, 2005, making it [Ed.:
The matter between the two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.]*mandatory to postpone the issue of process*[Ed.: The matter between the two asterisks has been emphasised in original as well.] where the accused resides in an area beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned. The same was found necessary in order to protect innocent persons from being harassed by unscrupulous persons and making it obligatory upon the Magistrate to enquire into the case himself, or to direct investigation to be made by a police officer, or by such other person as he thinks fit (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (19 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] for the purpose of finding out whether or not, there was sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused before issuing summons in such cases."
(emphasis supplied)
14. In view of our answer to the aforesaid question, the next question which falls for our determination is whether the learned Magistrate before issuing summons has held the inquiry as mandated under Section 202 of the Code. The word "inquiry" has been defined under Section 2(g) of the Code, the same reads as follows:
"2. (g) 'inquiry' means every inquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or court;"
It is evident from the aforesaid provision, every inquiry other than a trial conducted by the Magistrate or the court is an inquiry. No specific mode or manner of inquiry is provided under Section 202 of the Code. In the inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code, the witnesses are examined whereas under Section 200 of the Code, examination of the complainant only is necessary with the option of examining the witnesses present, if any. This exercise by the Magistrate, for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, is nothing but an inquiry envisaged under Section 202 of the Code."
28. In the case of Vinod Baid (supra), while examining the provisions of Section 200 and 202 Cr.P.C., Co-ordinate Bench of this Court held as under:
"15. I have considered the above submissions. It is a settled proposition of law that in case if a protest petition is ordered to be treated as a complaint, the Magistrate is under an obligation to proceed further in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 200, 202 and 204 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
16. While dealing with the same controversy, their Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of (2) Ashok Vs. State of U.P. (1994 Cr.L.J 2132) have observed as under:
"Thus it is clear that whenever a protest petition is treated as a complaint, the Magistrate will have to proceed in accordance with the procedure laid down in Sections 200, 202 and 204 Cr.P.C....".
17. The legal settled position that emerges is that when a Magistrate treats the protest petition as complaint then he has to comply with the provisions of Sections 200, 202 and 204 Cr.P.C.
18. The only question that has to be considered is whether in the cases at hand the protest petitions were treated as complaints. In Cr. Cases no. 1742/2001 and 1743/2001 the protest petitions were ordered to be registered as complaint, whereas in Cr. Case no. 1343/2000, the complianant averred in the protest petition that he wants to proceed with his complaint by examining himself and his witnesses in support thereof. Thus, it is evident that in all the three criminal cases, the protest petitions were complaints and therefore, the (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (20 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] learned Chief Judicial Magistrate was required to proceed in accordance with Sections 200, 202 and 204 Čr.P.C., viz., to record the statements of complainant and his witnesses before passing the impugned orders. The learned Magistrate having failed in doing so, the orders impugned in these revisions petitions deserve to be quashed and set aside only on this ground."
29. In the case of Manoj Kumar & Others (supra), order of taking cognizance without taking statements under Sections 200 & 202 was quashed by this court and it was held as under:
"2. Assailing the order of the Court below, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in this case, the respondent No. 2-complainant filed an application before the Court below praying for prosecution of the petitioners for the said offence. The learned Magistrate straight away directed the police to make an enquiry upon the complaint and upon receiving the enquiry report, the Magistrate without recording the statement of the complainant and her witnesses as warranted under Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. has taken cognizance against the petitioners. Learned counsel further submits that the provision of Section 200 Cr.P.C. is mandatory and cognizance upon a complaint is not permissible, unless the statement of the complainant has been recorded on oath under the said provision. Thus, he prays that the order taking cognizance amounts to abuse of process of law.
3. Learned counsel for the complainant is not in a position to dispute the fact that no statement of the complaint was recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C. in this matter.
4. In view of the aforesaid admitted position which is also evident from the record, this Court has no hesitation in arriving at a conclusion that the order taking cognizance dated 27.11.2006 does not stand to scrutiny. In a complaint case wherein a complaint is filed by a person other than a public servant, it is mandatory that the statement of the complainant is to be recorded before cognizance of an offence can be taken.
5. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the misc. petition succeeds. The order dated 27.11.2006 taking cognizance against the petitioners for the offence under Section 506 I.P.C. and all subsequent proceedings are hereby quashed. Stay application also stands disposed of."
30. In the case of Vishnu Kumar Tiwari (supra.), the Hon'ble Supreme Court explained the procedure to be adopted by the Magistrates in dealing with the protest petitions and observed that a protest petition can be treated as a complaint and a Magistrate can deal with the same as required under Section 200 (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (21 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] read with Section 202 of CrPC. Para 42 of the above judgment is relevant and is quoted as under:
"42. In the facts of this case, having regard to the nature of the allegations contained in the protest petition and the annexures which essentially consisted of affidavits, if the Magistrate was convinced on the basis of the consideration of the final report, the statements under Section 161 of the Code that no prima facie case is made out, certainly the Magistrate could not be compelled to take cognizance by treating the protest petition as a complaint. The fact that he may have jurisdiction in a case to treat the protest petition as a complaint, is a different matter. Undoubtedly, if he treats the protest petition as a complaint, he would have to follow the procedure prescribed under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code if the latter section also commends itself to the Magistrate. In other words, necessarily, the complainant and his witnesses would have to be examined. No doubt, depending upon the material which is made available to a Magistrate by the complainant in the protest petition, it may be capable of being relied on in a particular case having regard to its inherent nature and impact on the conclusions in the final report. That is, if the material is such that it persuades the court to disagree with the conclusions arrived at by the investigating officer, cognizance could be taken under Section 190(1)(b) of the Code for which there is no necessity to examine the witnesses under Section 200 of the Code. But as the Magistrate could not be compelled to treat the protest petition as a complaint, the remedy of the complainant would be to file a fresh complaint and invite the Magistrate to follow the procedure under Section 200 of the Code or Section 200 read with Section 202 of the Code. Therefore, we are of the view that in the facts of this case, we cannot support the decision of the High Court."
31. In the case of Mukhtar Zaidi (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that on protest petition, in case the Magistrate intended to take cognizance, then he ought to have proceeded the procedure contemplated in chapter XV of Cr.P.C., which includes Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C. Para 11 of the above judgment is relevant and is being reproduced as under:
"11. In the present case as the Magistrate had already recorded his satisfaction that it was a case worth taking cognizance and fit for summoning the accused, we are of the view that the Magistrate ought to have followed the provisions and the procedure prescribed under Chapter XV of the Cr.P.C. Accordingly, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned orders passed by the High Court as also the CJM, Aligarh."
32. Essence of above discussion is that the protest petition filed by the complainant against the Negative Final Report before (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (22 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] the Magistrate can be treated to be a private complaint and therefore, procedure for taking cognizance on complaint would be applicable even in the cases of protest petition.
33. The procedural mandates under Sections 190, 200, and 202 Cr.P.C. are designed to ensure a fair and meticulous preliminary inquiry before cognizance is taken, particularly in complex matters involving alleged offences with a disputed civil background. The Magistrate's failure to comply with these provisions, including not recording statements of the complainant and witnesses, and mechanically taking cognizance despite the negative police report, is a grave procedural irregularity.
34. It is vitally significant that two accused resided at Delhi, i.e. outside the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, but such accused were also summoned without proper procedure, violating territorial and procedural safeguards. Such lapses amount to defiance of mandatory procedure contemplated in aforesaid provisions of Cr.P.C. and hence, the cognizance taken by the Magistrate in ignorance of the procedure is manifestly illegal. This Court observes that the essence of criminal jurisprudence is fairness, which can be achieved by following the mandatory procedure in its letter and spirit. Ignorance or circumvention of procedural requirements wholly vitiates the legitimacy of continued criminal proceedings.
35. Next point which emerges from the record is that the dispute relates entirely to ownership and sale of land arose from execution of agreement to sale and the sale deed, which is fundamentally a civil dispute. The FIR and complaint sought (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (23 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] remedies that overlap with civil rights, which are properly adjudicated by civil courts.
36. A significant fact cannot be escaped from notice of this Court that although the criminal complaint was filed by the complainant after filing the civil suit, yet the complainant did not disclose about the pendancy of the suit in the criminal complaint, which is apparently misleading the court and reflects malafide intention of the complainant. This not only amounts to misrepresentation and abuse of process of law; but simultaneously also puts a big question over the bonafides of the complainant.
37. Facts of the case would also reveal that the Petitioner Bachan Singh and others purchased the land for valuable consideration, which is proved by the execution of registered sale deed dated 25.05.2012, and thereafter, he remained in possession.
38. As held in Mohammed Ibrahim (supra) merely alleging that a person acted fraudulently is not enough to constitute offence, until and unless a false inducement and misrepresentation is proved.
39. The aforesaid sale deed was challenged by the complainant by way of filing civil suit before the Civil Court in which he also sought specific performance of the agreement dated 22.10.2011. The civil court, after detailed evidence, held that the agreement dated 22.10.2011 was unproved, unregistered, and unenforceable, and the registered sale deed was valid. As per settled law, findings of a civil court on the same subject matter prevail over criminal proceedings. This view has been settled by (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (24 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of M/s. Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & Another vs Union of India & Others, 1970 (3) SCC 694, wherein it has been observed as under:
"4. ..... It is a well-established principle of law that the decisions of the civil courts are binding on the criminal courts. The converse is not true. ...."
40. In Dalip Kaur vs Jagnar Singh, (2009) 14 SCC 696, the Hon'ble Supreme Court framed a question as to whether breach of contract of an agreement would constitute an offence under Section 406 or Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860 or not ? After analysing the scope and intricacies of Section 415 Cr.P.C., which defines cheating, the Hon'ble Apex Court held that an offence of cheating would be constituted when the accused has fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. A pure and simple breach of contract does not constitute an offence of cheating.
41. Hence, it can be safely held that the complainant's criminal complaint is thus wholly misconceived and without any basis. Civil Court's findings recorded vide judgment dated 22.05.2025 in favour of the petitioner shall prevail over the criminal proceedings, reinforcing that disputes of civil nature must be adjudicated in civil courts.
42. It also reveals from the series of facts and record of the case that the complaint was evidently filed to exert pressure on the petitioners. Continuation of criminal proceedings for 13 years, when civil remedies have been exhausted and the Civil Court has adjudicated the dispute, amounts to abuse of the process of law.
(Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (25 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of Videocon Industries Limited & Another (supra), was examining the essential ingredients for constitution of cognizable offence in a case where there were charges for committing offence under Section 56(1)(i) of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, based on alleged violation of provisions of Section 18(2) and 18(3) of the Act, in the circumstances where an Administrative body for foreign exchange had already exonerated the accused persons, the Hon'ble Supreme Court concluded that once a competent administrative body has adjudicated on the merits and exonerated the accused, a criminal prosecution based on the same facts is not maintainable.
43. In the case of Mukul Agrawal & Others (supra), where the dispute arose on account of an agreement and where also the civil suit preceded the criminal complaint, after decision of the civil suit in favour of the accused, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme court that the very substratum of the criminal complaint vanished and in such circumstance to allow the accused to be prosecuted would be only a complete abuse of process of law. Hence, only on the basis of decision of civil suit in favour of accused, the criminal proceedings were quashed by the Hon'ble Supreme court.
44. Thus, it is clear that the fundamental principle underlying the initiation of criminal proceedings is the existence of a prima facie cognizable offence showing dishonest intention or criminal conspiracy. The petitioners have convincingly demonstrated that the genesis of allegations is apparently civil dispute regarding property rights, governed by contract and (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (26 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] property laws. The FIRs and protest petitions lodged by the complainants failed to reveal any independent criminal ingredient beyond disputed ownership and sale transactions.
45. It would be relevant to reiterate the well-known principles of law that the Civil remedies exist for resolution of contract or property disputes, and criminal law cannot be invoked as a substitute to bypass elaborate civil processes and judicial scrutiny. This principle of preserving the distinct domains of civil and criminal law has been repeatedly upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Courts to prevent misuse of criminal law to exert undue pressure in disputes relating to commercial or property disagreements.
46. More so, in the present matters, the Complainants deliberately concealed in FIRs the significant fact regarding the pendency of a civil suit involving the same subject matter, which is a material fact and ought to have been considered by the Magistrate. The invocation of criminal law on mere allegations of fraud does not require cognizance, when the issue was already under consideration of the civil court and quite notably, thereafter, after recording evidence, the civil court has already passed a decree declaring the petitioner as a bona fide purchaser and rejecting the purported agreement relied upon by the complainants. To pursue criminal proceedings in the face of a conclusive civil judgement would lead to oppressive and vexatious litigation.
47. It can be deduced from the principles laid down in the aforesaid precedential law that the criminal proceedings initiated (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (27 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] without a valid cognizable offence amount to an abuse of the process of court. Needless to observe here that Section 482 Cr.P.C. is a potent safeguard against such mala fide and oppressive proceedings. The petitioners' case fits squarely within this protective scope, where the impugned FIR and cognizance have been used to exert undue pressure and harassment, deviating from the course of justice.
48. The investigation led to a negative final report, rightly concluding that no criminal offence was made out, yet the complainants' malafide protest petitions were improperly entertained without adherence to mandatory procedures. Allowing such cognizance to continue further in the shape of criminal trial would amount to perpetuate the illegality committed by the learned Magistrate.
49. As discussed above, Civil Court decree carries the supremacy of judicial authority on questions of title and ownership. Although criminal proceedings must be independently examined, yet clear and unambiguous civil findings negating the existence and enforceability of the complainants' rights cannot be ignored, which may otherwise put the remedial justice in a dubious position. The petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value, with valid registration and full payment, as confirmed by the judgment of civil court. To allow parallel criminal proceedings on the same facts undermines finality of civil adjudication and amounts to a serious miscarriage of justice.
50. It is imperative to note that the Magistrate's power to take cognizance is circumscribed by the requirement of a plausible (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (28 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] allegation of criminal offence supported by credible evidence on record. The mere filing of protest is not an automatic trigger for cognizance in absence of material reflecting mens rea or criminal conspiracy.
51. This court finds that even the Revisional court has utterly failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it and the Revision petition has been decided in quite mechanical and cursory manner, without addressing the fundamental principles of taking cognizance in the light of facts and circumstances of the instant case.
52. In the instant case, the material collected during investigation, considering the allegations in FIR totally disregarded the civil suits details, do not demonstrate any prima facie criminal offence. The FIRs reads more like a civil grievance twisted into a criminal complaint, hence, the same cannot be allowed to be proceeded further in a vexatious trial just to harass and victimize the accused, who is having civil court's decree in his favour.
53. Statutory protection of an accused's right to a fair trial includes safeguarding against unnecessary and vexatious criminal proceedings that serve as instruments of oppression rather than justice. The accused's reputation, liberty, and property interests merit protection from vexatious litigation initiated on incorrect legal premises.
54. This Court, therefore, concludes that allowing the criminal trial to proceed in this case on the basis of illegal cognizance, will not only produce manifest injustice but will also (Uploaded on 27/10/2025 at 03:45:56 PM) (Downloaded on 07/11/2025 at 10:59:25 PM) [2025:RJ-JP:42875] (29 of 29) [CRLMP-874/2015] encourage misuse of criminal law as a weapon in civil disputes, fundamentally unacceptable to the rule of law.
55. Resultant of aforesaid analysis is that (i) no cognizable offence is made out from the material available;(ii) the dispute between the complaint and the accused petitioner is essentially civil in nature and already adjudicated by competent Civil Court;
(iii) there is manifest and apparent procedural non-compliance in taking cognizance; and (iv) in the facts and circumstances of the case, even the Criminal complaint/ FIR is malicious and vexatious, designed to harass the petitioner and hence, the cognizance orders are apparently illegal and deserves to be quashed.
56. Consequently, this court deems it just and proper to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, and in view of the above discussion, learned Magistrate's orders dated 20.03.2013 taking cognizance and the Revisional Courts' orders dated 12.12.2014 and 17.05.2017, which are impugned in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 874/2015 and all the above connected matters, are quashed and set aside.
57. All the above criminal misc. petitions are, accordingly, allowed.
58. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
59. Office is directed to keep one copy of this judgment in file of each connected matter for record.
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