Kerala High Court
V.P.Indira Devi vs The High Court Of Kerala on 19 February, 2014
Author: C.K. Abdul Rehim
Bench: C.K.Abdul Rehim
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM
PRESENT:
THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE C.K.ABDUL REHIM
TUESDAY, THE 13TH DAY OF MAY 2014/23RD VAISAKHA, 1936
WP(C).No. 8359 of 2014 (R)
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PETITIONER:
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V.P.INDIRA DEVI,
UNDER ORDERS OF POSTING AS JUDGE,
MOTOR ACCIDENTS CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, MANJERI,
MALAPPURAM DISTRICT.
BY SRI.K.RAMAKUMAR,SENIOR ADVOCATE
ADV.SRI.C.S.MANU
RESPONDENTS:
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1. THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA,
REPRESENTED BY THE REGISTRAR GENERAL,
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI 682 031.
2. THE REGISTRAR (SUBORDINATE JUDICIARY),
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI - 682 031.
3. THE REGISTRAR (VIGILANCE),
HIGH COURT OF KERALA, ERNAKULAM, KOCHI - 682 031.
R1 TO R3 BY SMT.V.P.SEEMANDINI,SENIOR ADVOCATE
ADV. SRI.M.R.ANISON
THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING COME UP FOR ADMISSION
ON 09/04/2014, THE COURT ON 13/05/2014 DELIVERED THE
FOLLOWING:
Kss
WP(C).No. 8359 of 2014 (R)
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APPENDIX
PETITIONER(S)' EXHIBITS:
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EXHIBIT P1 TRUE COPY OF THE G.O (MS) NO.33/2014 HOME DATED 19-02-2014.
EXHIBIT P1(A) TRUE COPY OF THE POSTING ORDER DATED 07-03-2014 ISSUED
BY THE IST RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P1(B) TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 06-11-2013 OF THE HON'BLE
HIGH COURT OF KERALA.
EXHIBIT P2 TRUE COPY OF THE REQUEST DATED 03-02-2014 SUBMITTED BY
THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE ADGP,NORTH ZONE,KOZHIKODE.
EXHIBIT P2(A) TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 14-03-2014 ADDRESSED TO
THE 2ND RESPONDENT BY THE PETITIONER.
EXHIBIT P3 TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. I 3-27664/14/I-I DATED 19-03-2014
ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT.
EXHIBIT P4 TRUE COPY OF ORDDER NO.G.O.(MS)NO.183/94/HOME DTD.
17/10/1994 ISSUED BY THE GOVT. OF KERALA.
EXHIBIT P5 TRUE COPY OF NOTIFICATION G.O.(MS) NO.183/94/HOME DTD.
17/10/1994 ISSUED BY THE GOVT. OF KERALA.
RESPONDENT(S)' EXHIBITS:
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EXHIBIT R1(A): TRUE COPY OF RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE FULL COURT
OF THE KERALA HIGH COURT DATED 12/06/1986.
EXHIBIT R1(B): TRUE COPY OF MINUTES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMITTEE MEETING HELD ON 18/03/2014 BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE
COMMITTEE/DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE APPOINTED BY THE FULL COURT.
EXHIBIT R1(C): TRUE COPY OF THE RELEVANT PAGES OF THE MINUTES
OF THE JUDGES MEETING HELD ON 12/06/1986.
/TRUE COPY/
P.A.TO JUDGE
Kss
"C.R."
C.K. ABDUL REHIM, J.
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W.P.(c) No. 8359 OF 2014
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DATED THIS THE 13th DAY OF MAY, 2014.
J U D G M E N T
Petitioner herein is the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Chalakudy, who is under orders of posting as Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Manjeri. She is challenging Ext.P3 order of suspension issued by the 2nd respondent. In Ext.P3 it is indicated that an enquiry proceedings under the Kerala Civil Service (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1960 is contemplated against the petitioner for grave allegations of misconduct and she was suspended from service pending further action, in public interest.
2. By virtue of Ext.P1 proceedings dated 19-02-2014 issued by the State Government the petitioner was appointed as District Judge in the State Higher Judicial Service. Consequently by virtue of Ext.P1 (a) proceedings issued by the High Court on 07-03-2014 the petitioner was ordered to be posted as Motor Accident Claims Tribunal/Additional District Judge, Tirur. W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -2-
3. While the petitioner was holding charge as Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur Ext.P1 (b) Official Memorandum was issued by the High Court directing her to take steps for conducting a thorough police investigation with respect to forgery committed at the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Chalakudy in issuing receipt in ST No.1510/2013 and with respect to missing of records of S.T. Cases, 1510/2013 1511/2013. According to the petitioner, Ext.P2 complaint was lodged before the Additional Director General of Police, North Zone, Kozhikode, in compliance with Ext.P1 (b) directions and a criminal case was registered based on Ext.P2 complaint, as Crime No.357/2013 of Chalakudy Police Station. The staff concerned of the Magistrate Court, Chalakudy was placed under suspension by the petitioner.
4. It is stated in the writ petition that the petitioner had conducted annual inspection at the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy on 15-03-2014, after giving prior information to the High Court. The petitioner camped at the Forest Guest House situated near to the court W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -3- premises at Chalakudy, in connection with the inspection. It is mentioned that, in another room in the Guest House the Investigating Officer in Crime No.357/2014 was questioning some of the accused persons including one Smt. Mini, who is an Advocate clerk attached to a lawyer practicing at Chalakudy. Version of the petitioner is that, after preparing the notes of inspection, while going out she had noticed the presence of certain Advocates and Media persons in the premises. Thereafter on 17-03-2014 the 3rd respondent requested the petitioner to be present in the very same Forest Guest House, at 9 a.m. on the next day. When the petitioner was present on 18-03-2014 there were a large number of Media persons with Cameras at the Guest House. The petitioner had signed the proceedings of enquiry prepared by the 3rd respondent which according to her was without properly reading the notes, unsuspectingly in an honest manner. But on the next day the impugned order of suspension was issued with immediate effect.
5. Challenge against Ext.P3 order of suspension is based on legal and factual grounds. It is contended that the W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -4- order of suspension was issued contrary to Rule 10 (1) (a) of KCS (CC&A) Rules. Therefore the impugned order is attacked as violative of Article 14, 19 & 21 of the Constitution of India. Besides, allegation is that it is malafide and issued in an abuse of the power vested on the respondents. Further it is contended that the petitioner on the date of suspension is a District and Sessions Judge in the State Higher Judicial Service, appointed by the Governor of Kerala under Rule 5 of the Kerala State Higher Judicial Service Special Rules, 1961. Hence she can be suspended only by the appointing authority or by any authority to which it is subordinate or by any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf, as per Rule 10 of the KCS (CC&A) Rules. Since the High Court is not an authority contemplated under Rule 10 it is not empowered to place a District Judge under suspension. Therefore the order impugned is void and inoperative and unenforceable, is the contention.
6. A further ground raised is that, placing a District Judge under suspension is an administrative function which W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -5- can be done only by the 'Full Court'. The 'High Court' in such circumstances means only the 'Full Court' as held by this court in Ajith V. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT 1044). Inter alia, the petitioner contented that the order of suspension is totally unwarranted and it is not on the basis of any public interest, but a malafide action which is in the nature of vindictive victimization. Various contentions on factual aspects are also raised to substantiate that the petitioner was totally innocent with respect to the circumstances related to the inspection and camping at the Forest Guest House on the particular day.
7. Initially the 1st respondent had filed a counter affidavit answering only the legal grounds raised by the petitioner. On the facts it is averred that the decision to suspend the petitioner was taken by the Administrative Committee which was appointed by the Full Court. It is pointed out that, on 12-06-1986 the Full Court of the Kerala High Court had adopted Ext.R1 (a) resolution to the effect that the administrative work in the High Court will vest with the Administrative Committee consisting of the Chief Justice W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -6- and 4 Senior Judges. Referring to Ext.R1 (a) it is pointed out that, the Administrative Committee is authorised to deal with disciplinary matters relating to judicial officers including suspension of a judicial officer. The 1st respondent had subsequently produced full text of the minutes of the Full Court meeting held on 12-06-1986, as Ext.R1 (c). A copy of the minutes of the Administrative Committee meeting held on 18-03-2014 was also produced as Ext.R1 (b). Facts revealed from Ext.R1 (b) indicates that the District Judge, Thrissur had forwarded copy of a newspaper report dated 16-03-2014 to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, which contained an allegation that the petitioner was present at the Forest Guest House on 15-03-2014 when an accused in the above said crime, Smt. Mini, was being questioned by the Assistant Police Commissioner. On receipt of the same Hon'ble Chief Justice had directed the 3rd respondent to conduct an enquiry. Enquiry report of the 3rd respondent indicated that there are sufficient reasons to believe that the petitioner had unholy alliance with the accused/Smt. Mini and with the Investigating Officer. The report further W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -7- mentioned that the conduct of the petitioner was improper and unbecoming of a judicial officer, warranting suitable and strict action. It is considering such prima facie findings in the preliminary enquiry report that the Administrative Committee had resolved to place the petitioner under suspension, in public interest, pending finalisation of the disciplinary action.
8. The petitioner had raised an additional ground through amendment, contending that the power of suspension even under Article 235 can be exercised only by the Full Court as held by the hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh V Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and another (1978) 2 SCC 102. According to the petitioner the Administrative Committee consisting of few of Judges cannot exercise power delegated to the entire body of Judges. Therefore the committee can only recommend for suspension, but not to suspend by itself, since the power is vested with the 'Full Court'. It is contended that the High Court has not framed any Rules under Article 235 constituting the Administrative Committee and the W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -8- protection afforded to a judicial officer under Articles 309 and 311 cannot be taken away through an Administrative order. The petitioner had also sought for an additional relief to the extent of declaring that, the Administrative Committee constituted only by way of a resolution and empowering the said committee to place a member of the subordinate judiciary under suspension, is violative of Articles 234, 235, 236, 309 & 311 of the Constitution of India and hence the resolution adopted by the Administrative committee is unconstitutional.
9. The petitioner had further amended the writ petition incorporating the contention that, the power under Article 235 can be exercised by the Administrative Committee only in a case where the Full Court had constituted such Administrative Committee by specifying that the power of control over the District Judges can be exercised by such committee. It is contended that no such authorisation existed in the High Court of Kerala and the Administrative Committee is not nominated by the Full Court, but only by the Chief Justice. Since the Chief Justice W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -9- has no power to nominate the Administrative Committee to perform the constitutional mandate by virtue of Article 235, it can be construed that Ext.R1 (a) decision taken by an Administrative Committee, which is not a creation of the 'Full Court' is invalid.
10. Yet another contention raised is that, the last limb of Article 235 of the Constitution provides that, "or as authorising the High Court to deal with him otherwise than in accordance with the conditions of service prescribed under such law". Since the conditions of service of a District Judge is prescribed under KCS (CC&A) Rules which is framed under Article 309 of the Constitution, an Executive Committee which is claimed to be constituted in exercise of power under Article 235 by the Chief Justice alone, cannot claim supremacy over the Rules framed under Article 309. Therefore the order of suspension even if it is on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Administrative Committee nominated by the Chief Justice, cannot be treated as a substitute for exercise of power by the High Court, which means the 'Full Court'. Factually it is also contended that W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -10- there was no meeting of the Administrative committee convened at 4.30 p.m. on 18-03-2014, as mentioned in Ext.R1 (b) and the decision alleged is not real and proper.
11. The foremost contention raised is that the impunged order is contrary to Rule 10 (1) (a) of KCS (CC&A) Rules because the appointing authority is the Governor and the High Court is not an authority contemplated under the said Rule empowered to place a District Judge under suspension. Admittedly on the date of the impugned order the petitioner was promoted as District Judge by virtue of Ext.P1 proceedings. The petitioner relied on a decision of the hon'ble Supreme Court in Maharashtra State Judicial Service Association and others V. High Court of Judicature at Bombay and others (2002) 3 SCC 244) in which it is held that seniority of a promotee District Judge would be reckoned from the date of his promotion, from which date he is appointed to work as District Judge and in case of a direct recruitee the same would be the date from which he is appointed to work as a District Judge. Question as to whether the petitioner W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -11- was a District and Sessions Judge as on the date of the impugned suspension, appointed by the Governor under Rule 5 of the Kerala Higher Judicial Service Special Rules, 1961, need not be adjudicated and decided herein because this court is not inclined to accept the contention that the High court is not an authority empowered to place a District Judge under suspension.
12. The power of administrative control over District Courts and Subordinate Courts is vested with the High Court by virtue of Article 235 of the Constitution of India. The ambit and scope of power vested under Article 235 was subjected to judicial scrutiny by the apex court ever since from 1978 onwards. In State of Uttar Pradesh V Batuk Deo Pati Tripathi and another (1978) 2 SCC
102) it is held that the control vested in the High Court comprehends a large variety of matters like transfers, subsequent postings, leave, promotions other than initial promotions, imposition of minor penalties, decisions regarding compulsory retirements, recommendations for imposition of major penalties etc:. Even before that in W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -12- State West Bengal V. Nripendra Nath Baghchi (AIR 1966 SC 447) Hidayatullah (J.) (as he then was) speaking for the Bench observed that, the control which is vested in the High Court is a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment (including dismissal and removal) and posting and promotion of District Judges. Within the exercise of such control vested, the High Court can hold enquiries, impose punishments other than dismissal or removal, subject however to the conditions of service to the extent of a right of appeal if granted. A leading judgment of the hon'ble Supreme Court in this scenario is Samsher Singh V. State of Punjab (AIR 1974 SC 2192) which is a decision by a Bench of 7 Judges. It is held that;
"the "control" vested in the High Court is a mechanism to ensure independence of the subordinate judiciary. Under Article 235 of the Constitution, the control over the subordinate judiciary, vested in the High Court, is exclusive in nature, comprehensive in extent and effective in operation and it is to sub serve a basic feature of the Constitution i.e. independence of judiciary. Among other things, it includes:
(a) (i) disciplinary jurisdiction and a complete control subject only to the power of the Governor in the matter of appointment, dismissal, removal and reduction in rank of W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -13- the District Judges and initial posting and promotion to the cadre of District Judges, (ii) in Article 235 the word "control" is accompanied by the word "vest" which shows that the High Court alone is made the sole custodian of the control over the judiciary and (iii) suspension from service of a member of judiciary with a view to hold disciplinary enquiry; (emphasis supplied)
(b) transfers, promotion and confirmation of such promotions, of persons holding posts in judicial service, inferior to that of the District Judge;
(c) transfer of District Judges;
(d) recall of District Judges posted on ex-cadre posts or on deputation on administrative posts;"
13. After referring to a catena of decisions on the point, in Rajendra Singh Verma and others V. Lieutenant Governor (NCT of Delhi) and others (2011) 10 SCC 1) the hon'ble apex court found that it is fairly well settled that in the matter of compulsory retirement of a judicial officer the Governor cannot act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, but has to act on the recommendation of the High Court. Therefore it is evident that the "control" contemplated under Article 235 vests on the High Court, which includes the power to initiate disciplinary action against any District Judge or subordinate judicial officer. Such power will include the power of W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -14- suspension and it cannot be contended that the Governor/the appointing authority alone has got competence to initiate disciplinary action or to suspend a District and Sessions Judge. Exercise of power vested on the High Court under Article 235 will not in any manner offend the protection afforded under Article 309 and 311. So also it cannot be contended that exercise of such power will run contrary to Rule 10 of KCS (CC&A) Rules.
14. Another ground seriously contended by Senior Counsel, Sri. K. Ramkumar on behalf of the petitioner is that, the Full Court alone is competent to take a decision suspending the petitioner, even assuming that the High Court can do it in exercise of the power vested under Article
235. Much reliance is placed on the decision rendered by a learned Judge of this court in Ajith V. State of Kerala (2007 (2) KLT 1044). Challenge in that case was against validity of the Judicial Service (Amendment) Rules 2006 (Kerala). Question discussed was regarding scope of mandatory consultation contemplated under Article 234. It is held that the Registrar of the High Court is not a W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -15- consultant in terms of Article 234. Condemning the action adopted by the Government in making consultation with the Registrar, the learned Judge observed that, even if Government have any different view in the matter, it was its constitutional obligation to intimate such views to the High Court through the Registrar, which would gain attention of Full Court of the High Court, as may be required by the Rules and Practice or procedure and administrative business of the High Court. While discussing the issue the learned Judge observed as follows;
"The Constitution has vested the control of the subordinate judiciary under Article 235 of the Constitution in the High Court as a whole and not its Chief Justice alone. Every Judge of the High Court is duty bound to take adequate interest in the institution which is placed under the control of the High Court. The administrative control of the subordinate courts of the State vests not in the Chief Justice alone, but in the Court over which the Chief Justice presides - (See All India Judges' Association 1992). The provisions of Articles 234 and 235 work in unison and it is therefore that the authority of control under Article 235 is conferred exclusively on the authority which is to be consulted to make a rule in exercise of authority under Article 234. This, plainly, is the High Court which is the Court presided by the Chief Justice, thereby meaning the High Court as a whole, that is, the Full Court."
15. Learned Senior Counsel had also placed reliance on certain observations contained in a Full Bench decision W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -16- of this court in Rehim V. M.V. Jayarajan (2010 (4) KLT 286 (FB). The question considered therein is as to whether the Chief Justice is required to cause the matter placed before the Full Court for its opinion as to whether a 'suo motu' criminal contempt is to be initiated. It is held that the matter need only to be placed before the Chief Justice on the administrative side. While deciding the issue, the Full Bench observed that, the High Court as an institution necessarily has to act through some human agency. No doubt in the context of Articles 233 & 235 the expression "High Court" was interpreted to mean the Chief Justice and all the companion Judges collectively. But such an interpretation need not govern the expression wherever it occurs either in the Constitution. Under Article 226, if given the same interpretation, would render the jurisdiction wholly unworkable and purposeless. It is pertinent to note that in the very same judgment the Full Bench observed that, eventhough the control over the subordinate courts is vested institutionally in the High Court by Article 235, it does not follow that the High Court has no power to W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -17- prescribe the manner in which that control may in practice be exercised. In fact, the very circumstance that the power of control which comprehends matters of wide-ranging variety vests in the entire body of Judges makes it imperative that the Rules must be framed to make the exercise of control feasible, convenient and effective. The seeds of the jurisdiction to frame Rules regulating the manner in which the control over subordinate courts is to be exercised are thus to be found in the very nature of the power and in the fact the power vests in the entire body of Judges. The High Court has therefore the power under Article 235 itself to frame Rules for regulating the manner in which the control vested in it may be exercised. The power to do a thing necessarily carries with it the power to regulate the manner in which the thing may be done. It is an incident of the power itself and indeed, without it, the exercise of the power may in practice be fraught with difficulties which will frustrate, rather than further the object of the power.
W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -18-
16. In seeking support of the proposition Sri. Ramkumar had placed further reliance on various decisions of the hon'ble apex court. In High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan V. P.P. Singh and another (2003) 4 SCC
239), the court had interpreted the terminology of "consultation" used in Rule 15 of the Rules of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, 1952. Distinguishing Article 235 and 229 it is held that control over subordinate courts vest in the High Court as a whole, but control over High Court vests in Chief Justice only. Hence it is held that "consultation" contemplated under Rule 15 should be with the Full Court. But it is pertinent to note that while discussing the issue the apex court observed that, however it does not mean that a Full Court cannot authorise the Chief Justice in respect of any matter whatsoever. In relation to certain matters keeping the rest of it in itself by the Full Court, authorisation to act on its behalf on a Committee of Judges is permissible in law. How far and to what extent such power has been or can be delegated would be discernible only from the Rules. It is further held that W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -19- once the Full Court adopts the resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute a committee there cannot be doubt whatsoever that the exercise of power by the Chief Justice in that behalf was absolutely valid. Therefore it is not correct to content that the Chief Justice could appoint the committee only with approval of the Full Court.
17. While discussing the question as to whether resolution adopted by the Administrative Committee to suspend the petitioner is valid, without there being any decision of the Full Court, it is evidently clear from Exts.R1
(a) and R1 (c) that a meeting of the Full Court of the High Court of Kerala held on 12-06-1986 had taken resolution regarding distribution of the administrative work in the High Court. It is resolved that the Administrative Committee should consist of the Chief Justice and 4 other Judges as may be nominated by the Chief Justice. It also resolved to accept the proposal with respect to distribution of Administrative works, with effect from 1st July, 1986. Among the distribution of administrative works, the disciplinary matters relating to judicial officers including W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -20- holding of disciplinary enquiry and power of suspension of judicial officers is assigned to the Administrative Committee. Various decisions of the apex court had discussed the issue and held that such delegation or authorisation is valid. As already pointed out, in the decision of the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan (supra) it is held that the Full Court authorising the Chief Justice in respect of exercise of powers under Article 235 and in turn the Chief Justice constituting a committee, is valid. An identical view has been followed by the hon'ble Supreme Court in Registrar of High Court of Madras V. R. Rajiah (1988) 3 SCC 211 and in High Court of Judicature of Bombay V. Shirish Kumar Rangrai Patil and another (1997) 6 SCC 339). It is held that, for convenient transaction of administrative business in the court, the Full court of the Judges of the High Court generally passes resolutions authorising the Chief Justice to constitute various committees, including the committee to deal with disciplinary matters pertaining to subordinate W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -21- judiciary or the ministerial staff working therein. Article 235 therefore relates to the power of taking a decision by the High Court with respect to a member of the subordinate judiciary. Any decision to consider the report of the Enquiry Officer and to take follow-up action and to make appropriate recommendations to the Disciplinary Committee or to the Governor, is entirely on the High Court, which acts through the Committee of the Judges authorised by the Full Court. Once a resolution is passed by the Full Court there is no further necessity to refer the matter again to the Full Court while taking such procedural steps relating to control of the subordinate judiciary, is the findings.
18. Incidentally, learned Senior Counsel also took a contention that the entrustment of power with the Administrative Committee is possible only by virtue of Rules framed within the authority of Article 235. But as held in the various decisions cited above, if the Full Court adopts a resolution authorising the Chief Justice to constitute any committee to deal with any particular administrative action W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -22- coming within the scope of powers vested under Article 235, it cannot be contended that such exercise of power by a committee constituted by the Chief Justice on the basis of such resolution is without competence. Therefore such a contention deserves no merit.
19. Yet another ground raised through the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner it that, there was no proper meeting of the Administrative Committee on the crucial date of 18-03-2014 at 4.30 p.m. This factual contention was refuted in the additional counter affidavit and the petitioner could not produce any materials to substantiate such an allegation. Under the above mentioned circumstances, all the contentions regarding competence and jurisdiction raised to impugn Ext.P3 order cannot be held as sustainable.
20. On the factual aspects, vehement arguments were advanced to content that the petitioner was totally innocent of the allegations levelled against her, which led to the initiation of disciplinary action and the suspension. Strenuous attempts were made to explain the presence of W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -23- the petitioner at the Forest Guest House at the relevant date and time as a coincidence and to substantiate that presence of the Investigating Officer or the accused in question at the Guest House during the same time was not within the knowledge of the petitioner. It is pertinent to note that the inspection at the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court, Chalakudy was on 15-03-2014, after issuance of Ext.P1 proceedings through which the petitioner was appointed as District Judge in the Higher Judicial Service, and after Ext.P1 (a) proceedings issued by the High Court posting her as Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tirur. Evidently, as per Ext.P1 (a) the High Court had directed the petitioner to take charge in the new post after 10-03-2014. That being the position the petitioner has to explain as to why she continued in the post of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Thrissur even on 15-03-2014 and ventured to conduct an inspection at the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Chalakudy on 15-03-2014.
21. In this context, in order to have an appreciation of the factual situation, this court directed the respondents to W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -24- make available copy of the report of enquiry submitted by the 3rd respondent. Smt.Seemandini, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents had produced a copy of the enquiry report of the 3rd respondent, along with copies of statements recorded by him during the course of enquiry, including statement of the petitioner, in a sealed cover. Since the disciplinary proceedings is in progression, I am not revealing the contents of those documents. On a perusal of the report and connected documents, I am convinced that the 3rd respondent was prima facie satisfied through the materials, in submitting such a report recommending disciplinary action against the petitioner. Therefore the challenge against the decision of the Administrative Committee to initiate disciplinary action against the petitioner, on the factual aspects, cannot be sustained. A judicial review on those factual aspects which were considered by the Administrative Committee is not at all warranted at this stage. It is made clear that this court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations or on the veracity of the report of enquiry. All such aspects W.P.(c) No. 8359/2014 -25- are left open for agitation in the disciplinary proceedings.
22. Contention of the petitioner that there is no public interest involved in the matter of the impugned suspension cannot be countenanced in view of the fact that the suspension was ordered pending finalisation of the disciplinary action initiated. However, it is open to the petitioner to seek review of the suspension, if it continues beyond any reasonable period, if the disciplinary action is not finalised. It is for the appropriate authority to consider such question, if circumstances warrants.
23. Having found that the grounds raised in challenge of the impugned order is not sustainable, the writ petition fails and the same is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
C.K. ABDUL REHIM, JUDGE.
AMG True copy P.A to Judge