Rajasthan High Court - Jaipur
The Oriental Insurance Company Limited vs Sardar Sadhu Singh And Ors. on 13 August, 1993
Equivalent citations: II(1993)ACC663, 1994ACJ157, AIR1994RAJ44, 1993(2)WLC593
JUDGMENT
1. This is a special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 against the judgment of the learned single Judge dated 30th October, 1986.
2. On 24th June, 1974, Rao Dheer Singh was going from Manoharpura to Shahpura in his car No. RJL 8207. The fuel exhausted abruptly, as a result the car was stopped by its driver. He went to Shahpura to bring the petrol. Rao Dheer Singh, its owner, remained sitting in the car. At about 1.00 A.M. truck No. RJR 6607 driven by Tara Chand rashly and negligently dashed against the standing car resulting in instantaneous death of Rao Dheer Singh.
3. On the above bedrock of facts, a claim petition was filed by his widow, two sons and daughters under the Motor Vehicles Act claiming Rs. 6 lacs against the owner of the truck No. RJR 6607 and the Oriental Insurance Company with which the car was insured.
4. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur made an Award in favour of the claimants and also found that the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. (hereinafter to be referred as 'the Insurance Company') liable to pay Rs. 50,000/-. Against the Award, three appeals were filed which were S.B.C. Misc. Appeal No. 230/1985,231/1985 and 198/ 1985 under Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Act') before the High Court.
5. The learned single Judge, while disposing of these appeals, found that the liability of the Insurance Company being unlimited could not be confined to Rs. 50,000/- as was done by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal and awarded Rs. 5,15,000/- against it.
6. Against the judgment of the learned single Judge, the Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. has preferred this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949.
7. The first question that arise for decision is about the maintainability of this special appeal under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 (hereinafter to be referred to as 'the Ordinance').
8. Section 18 of the Ordinance reads as under:--
"18. Appeal to the High Court from Judges of the Court.-- (1) An appeal shall be to the High Court, from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under Section 43 or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court.
(2) Notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided, an appeal shall lie to the High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the High Court made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal."
9. Section 110D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 reads as under:--
" 110-D. Appeals-- (1) Subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time.
(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than two thousand rupees."
10. Section 110-D of the Act laid down that subject to the provisions of Sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer an appeal to the High Court.
11. A similar question about the maintainability of a special appeal came up for consideration before this Division Bench in The New Indian Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Lad Kanwar (D.B.C. Spl. Appeal No. 3/1984 decided on 30-3-1993). In this case, it was held that no special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance lay, inasmuch as, the Motor Vehicles Act was a special Act which conferred only right of one appeal to an aggrieved person. The special appeal preferred by the New India Assurance Company Ltd. in that case was dismissed.
12. Similar arguments were made in this case and a number of learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company and owners have advanced the submission that the view taken in the aforesaid case required reconsideration, inasmuch as, it did not lay down the correct law. For the submission made, the learned counsel referred to a number of decisions which would be considered by us in this judgment later.
13. A remedy to seek damages or compensation against a wrong doer or tort feasor or against any tortious act is a common law remedy. But, the Motor Vehicles Act has enacted a law different than what it is adoptable under the general law. Under it, a Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is created for determining the amount or liability of the wrong doer and also that of the Insurance Company. It has made extensive provisions as to its procedure. It has also provided for an appeal against the award of such Tribunal. An appeal lies to the High Court. In other words, it has extensively dealt with all contingencies. It has been enacted with the sole object of providing expeditious relief to the injured or the dependents of the deceased.
14. We will now analyse the various provisions of the Act to hold that as the Motor Vehicles Act being a special Act, will prevail over the general law and the right of the party aggrieved by an award of the Claims Tribual is confined to the filing of only one appeal. The legislature has designedly limited the right of that appeal only. No Letters Patent appeal can be filed in view of the specific prohibition or conferment of only one right of appeal.
15. Under Section 140 of the New Act, the injured person or the heirs of the deceased are entitled to a fixed sum of Rupees twelve thousands or twenty five thousands, as the case may be.
16. Sub-section (2) of Section 141 of the New Act provides that a claim for compensation made under Section 140 shall be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.
17. Section 169 of the New Act (Section 110-C of the old Act) laid down that the Claims Tribunal can follow "such summary procedure as it thinks fit". It is obviously with the purpose to ward off delay -- to keep it away from the regular suit. The tribunal has also been invested with the powers of a civil court in certain matter.
18. Under Section 166 of the New Act (Section 110-A(3)) of the old Act), the claim has to be preferred within six months of the occurrence of the accident. It again manifests intent of the Parliament towards expeditious disposal of claim cases. Under Section 168 of the New Act, the Claims Tribunal is obliged to issue a certified copy of the award to the parties within fifteen days from the date of award. The person, who is required to pay any amount under the award, is enjoined to deposit the amount awarded within 30 days from the date of award.
19. Under Section 173 of the New Act, any person desiring to file an appeal against an award is required to deposit twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less. Without it, the section provides, the appeal cannot be entertained.
20. Section 174 of the New Act (Section 110-E of the old Act) makes the amount awarded recoverable as arrears of land revenue.
21. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as well as the predecessor Act of 1939 evinced keen intent of the Parliament for very expeditious disposal of the claims cases by the Tribunal. A conspectus of the Act will demonstrate acute keenness on the part of the legislature to speedily provide for compensation to the injured or the dependents of the deceased.
22. A compendious reading of the aforesaid provisions of the Act demonstrates that great stress has been laid on conclusion of proceedings and execution of the award. Every effort has been made to minimise loss of time. Jurisdiction of civil courts has been expressly barred by Section 175 of the New Act. Viewed in the backdrop of such legislative intent, to hold that a special appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge is maintainable will amount to doing violence to the intention of the legislature so strongly manifested through the scheme of the Act.
23. The language of Section 110-D of the Act does not admit two interpretations. It lays down unequivocally that an aggrieved person can file an appeal. The words 'an appeal' used in Section 110D of the Act means 'one appeal'.
24. The Courts lean against a construction which reduces the statute to a futility. A statute must be construed to make it effective and operative. It should be remembered that a statute is designed to be workable, and the interpretation thereof by a court should be to secure that object. The court should reject that construction which will defeat the plain intention of the legislature.
25-26. In Section 110-D of the Act, the equivalent of which in the New Motor Vehicle Act is Section 173, the legislature has provided that an aggrieved person will have a right to file an appeal against an award of the Claims Tribunal. Sub-section (2) puts an embargo by saying that if the amount in dispute is less than thousand rupees, no appeal shall lie.
It is this provision which is required to be interpreted.
27. In Backe v. Smith (1836) 2 M and W 191 at p. 195, Parke, B. said :--
"It is a very useful rule, in the construction of a statute, to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention of the legislature, to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified, so as to avoid such inconvenience, but no further."
28. Where words are express, plain and clear, the words ought to be understood according to their plain and natural signification.
29. Section 110-D of the Act provides that any aggrieved person by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of award, prefer 'an appeal' to the High Court. The word 'an' as stated in Black's Law Dictionary Sixth Edition means "The English indefinite article, equivalent to "one" or "any"; seldom used to denote plurality". The same meaning is given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary. It reads as under:--
"An-- See 'A' 'A'--indefinite article (one-more at one) 1, used as a function word before most singular nouns other than proper and mass nouns when the individual in question is undetermined, unidentified, or unspecified, esp. when the individual is being first mentioned or called to notice."
30. The golden rule of interpretation is the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity, or some repugnance or inconsistency.
31. In the instant case, if any other meaning is given to the word 'an', that would result to absurdity and would create a situation which the legislature did not intent to provide for.
32. Cross in "Statutory Interpretation" at page 74 says:--
"If the judge considers that the application of the words in their ordinary meaning would produce an absurd result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature he may apply them in any secondary meaning which they are capable of bearing."
33. In Pinner v. Everett, (1969) 3 All ER 257 at p. 258, Lord Reid states : --
"In determining the meaning of any word or phrase in a statute the first question to ask always is what is the natural or ordinary meaning of that word or phrase in its context in the statute. It is only when that meaning leads to some result which cannot reasonably be supposed to have been the intention of the legislature, it is proper to look for some other permissible meaning of the word or phrase."
34. This is of course substantially similar to Lord Wensleydale's golden rule as stated in Grey v. Pearson, (1857), 6 H L Cas 61 at p. 106." ....... the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to.......".
35. Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Maunsell v. Olins (1975) 1 All ER 16 at p. 25, said :--
"..... the language is presumed to be used in its primary ordinary sense unless this stultifies the purpose of the statute, or otherwise produces some injustice, absurdity, anomaly or contradiction, in which case some secondary ordinary sense may be preferred......".
36. For what we have said above, it follows that the judge must have given to the ordinary or appropriate meaning to the words in the general context of the statute. Interpreting Section 110-D of the Act differently would create unjustified situation.
37. Since the Act provides only for one appeal, the filing of a special appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge is clearly and if not so impliedly negatived. If the intention of the legislature has any role to play, it could obviously be that the desire was to bring to an end the litigation relating to compensation. Endless fighting was thought not to be in public interest and it was for this purpose that the legislature laid down that only one appeal would lie. The language of Section 110-D of the Act has been used in Section 173 of the New Motor Vehicles Act.
This section has made provisions for depositing of a percentage of compensation awarded at the time of filing of appeal. But, no provision is envisaged when a special appeal is filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge. The obvious inference is that the legislature did not contemplate the filing of a special appeal as against the judgment of the learned single Judge.
38. The words used in Section 110-D of the Act are plain, simple and clear. Applying them, it is not possible to say that the Act provides for filing of two appeals.
39. In Polester Electronics Co. v. Addl. Commr. Sales Tax, AIR 1978 SC 897: (1978 Tax LR 1907) the Supreme Court laid down (at page 904) :--
"A statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to plain natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute."
It is settled that the law is the best expositor of itself.
40. A right of appeal is a creature of a statute. In other words, it requires legislative authority. The Motor Vehicles Act does not authorise filing of a special appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge.
41. The sheet anchor of the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant was that as the decision of the learned single Judge would amount to 'judgment' within the meaning of Section 18 of the Ordinance, the special appeal would lie.
42. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant has no merit. The result of the acceptance of the submission of the appellant's counsel would be that it is not necessary for the competence of an appeal that it should be conferred by a statute or that a legislative enactment is necessary.
43. In Garikapati v. Subbiah Choudhry, AIR 1957 SC 540 the Supreme Court said (at page 570) :
"The right of the suitor and the jurisdiction of the Court are both of them necessary and essential ingredients that together got to make up the concept of appeal, and both of them must expressly be granted by the legislature. Reference may be made to the following observation of Lord Westbury in Attorney General v. Sillem (Z 20) (supra) :
The creation of a new right of appeal is plainly an act which requires legislative authority. The court from which the appeal is given, and the court to which it is given, must both be bound, and that must be the act of some higher power."
44. It was further said in this case that when the law establishes a hierarchy of Courts and then provides in succession for appeals from a Court of the lower grade to one of the higher grade, it will not be correct to regard those appeals as forming a single proceeding, or the right to file them as a single right. Its view was that the right of filing an appeal has to be conferred by the legislature. In that connection, the observations were:--
"Thus, the rights of appeal conferred by Sections 96 and 100, Code of Civil Procedure are different in their quality and contents. Then again, under Sections 109 and 110, Code of Civil Procedure a further appeal is provided against the decision of the High Court to this Court subject again to certain conditions. This is a right different in its character from the right of appeal conferred by Section 96 or Section 100. The notion, therefore, that if a suitor has a right of appeal from Court A to Court B, that right includes a right of appeal from Court B to Court C and again from Court C to Court D, would appear to be untenable."
45. It would, therefore, be wrong to think that since a person has a right to file an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, it had to be presumed that he possesses the right to file a special appeal under Section 18 of the Ordinance. Section 18 of the Ordinance may be interpreted to mean that an appeal lies as against the judgment passed by the learned single Judge. But, its meaning cannot be stretched to include even those cases where the legislature has provided only one appeal. Making of a provision for one appeal would obviously mean that an aggrieved person would have no right to file a special appeal as against the judgment of the learned single Judge.
46. Counsel for the appellant urged that it is the duty of a Court which is called upon 16 interpret a statute to ascertain the intention of the legislature not only from the words actually used, but by taking into consideration the equitable side of law as well. His contention was that in a matter of awarding of compensation, equity intended that the special appeal should lie as against the judgment of the learned single Judge.
47. Where the language of the Act is clear and explicit, we must give effect to it, whatever may be the consequences.
48. In Mutto v. T.K. Nandi reported in 1979 (2) SCR 409 : (AIR 1979 SC 460) the Supreme Court held that the Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary then to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense.
49. Recently, in State of West Bengal v. Gourangalal Chatterjee, (1993) 3 SCC 1, the question of maintainability of an appeal as against the order passed by the learned single Judge under Section 39 of the Arbitration Act came up for consideration. The Supreme Court held that in view of bar created by Sub-section (2) of Section 39 of the Arbitration Act debarring any second appeal from an order passed in appeal under Sub-section (1) the conclusion was inevitable and that it was so done with a view to restrict the right of appeal within strict limits defined by Section 39 and consequently, the appeal under Letters Patent was debarred. Following its decision in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Co., AIR 1962 SC 256 : (1962 All LJ 1) it look the view that an appeal under Letters Patent as against an order of the learned single Judge passed under Section 39(1) of the Arbitration Act was not maintainable.
50. These two Authorities of the Supreme Court laid down that an appeal against the judgment or order of the learned single Judge passed in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction could not lie under Letters Patent.
51. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court, it is found that the present special appeal filed as against the judgment of the learned single Judge under Section 18 of the Ordinance was not maintainable.
52. The legislature provided only for the appeal and that right was exhausted with its decision by the learned single Judge. Letters Patent did not create any right of appeal. What it did only was that against a judgment, an appeal can lie, but where as here, there was a specific provision in the Act to the effect that against the award of the Claims Tribunal only one appeal lay (sic). Hence, an appeal under Letters Patent or Section 18 of the Ordinance was not maintainable.
53. Our view is supported by two decisions of the Madhya Pradesh High Court reported in Uttam Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., AIR 1988 MP 199 and Vijayaraje v. Madhavrao, 1988 MPLJ 78. These decisions lay down and with which we respectfully agree that the power of the High Court to hear and decide the appeal was exhausted when that power is once exercised. The Letters Patent do not create any right of appeal but provide only forum for exercise of the right.
54. In Secy. of State v. H. C. I. Society, AIR 1931 PC 149, it was held (at page 153) :--
"Even if the award of the Tribunal under Calcutta Improvement Act were deemed to be a decree, that would not of itself be sufficient to give a right of appeal to His Majesty in Counsel, To come within the purview of Clauses 16 and 39, Letters Patent, it must be a decree of a Court subject to the superintendence of the High Court, and it is at least doubtful whether the Tribunal is such a Court."
55. Similarly, in Kollegal Silk Filatures Ltd. v. Province of Madras, AIR (36) 1949 Mad 39 the Madras High Court held that no appeal lay against an award made under Section 19 of the Defence of India Act, 1939. This decision also supports our conclusion.
56. In our opinion, the Claims Tribunal gives an award which does not have the status of a 'judgment', 'decree' or 'order' as contemplated by the Code of Civil Procedure. The legislature wanted the determination of the Claims Tribunal to be distinguished from an 'order' or 'decree' of an ordinary civil court. For the view taken by us, reliance is placed on a decision of the Madras High Court reported in Manavikraman v. Collr, Nilgiris, AIR 1919 Mad 626 (FB).
57. In Hanskumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 947 dealing with the nature of an award under Section 19(1)(g) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, Supreme Court held that the decision of the High Court in the appeal was not a 'judgment', 'decree' or 'order' under Sections 109 & 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Clause 29 of the Letters Patent of the Nagpur High Court. For the view taken by us, we find support from this decision.
58. Amongst the authorities cited at bar, reference may be made to a decision reported in Delhi Municipality v. Kuldi, AIR 1970 Del 37 (FB). In this case, the Delhi High Court held that it does not act as an Arbitrator or a Tribunal in deciding appeal under Section 110-D. It laid down that a decision given by the learned single Judge of the High Court in appeal under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act against an award was a 'judgment' within the meaning of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent. No arguments were addressed to Their Lordships of the Delhi High Court that only one appeal is admissible under the Motor Vehicles Act. Neither had any occasion nor have they said anything about the same.
59. Shanti Devi v. G.M. Haryana Roadways, AIR 1972 P & H 65 (FB) is another authority relied by the learned counsel for the appellant laying down that an appeal lies under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the decision of the learned single Judge. This may be an authority for the proposition that an order in appeal under Section 110-D satisfies the test of a 'judgment' under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent, but for not agreeing with the decision reported in Delhi Municipality v. Kuldip (supra), we are unable to share the view of this case also.
60. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kastoori Devi, 1988 ACJ 8, the Division Bench of this Court allowed the special appeal preferred against the judgment of the learned single Judge passed under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. However, in this case also, the argument about the maintainability of the special appeal did not come up for consideration.
61. In N. S. Thread Co. v. James Chadwick & Bros., AIR 1953 SC 357, the Supreme Court considered the question about the maintainability of Letters Patent appeal preferred under the Trade Marks Act. It held that the decision given under Section 76 of the said Act amounted to 'judgment'. The provision of that Act was altogether different than what it is before us.
62. Central Coalfields Ltd. v. Anjan Banerjee, 1990 ACJ 550 is a decision of the Patna High Court deciding that a Letters Patent appeal lay before a Division Bench from the decision of the learned single Judge made under Section 110-D of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this case also, arguments made before us were not raised for consideration. Hence, it is not a precedent having bearing on the controversy before us.
A decision is an authority only for the points decided.
63. Lord Halsbury's dicta in Quinn v. Leathern, (1901) AC 494 at page 506 is :--
"....... every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be made. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides."
64. In State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Misra, 1968 (2) SCR 154 : (AIR 1968 SC 647) the Supreme Court held that a decision is only an authority for what it actually decides."
65. In the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, the controversy was different and not one which we are considering in this special appeal. Consequently, they are no precedent for our purpose.
66. We have already held above that the language used in Section 110 of the Act is clear and explicit, hence, to accept the submission of the appellants's counsel would be to hold contrary to the words used in the aforesaid section.
67. The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is a well accepted law.
68. In the instant case, as stated above, the Motor Vehicles Act is a special statute. It will deem to have overriden the general law by providing a specific relief in the matters provided by it.
69. In U.P. State Electy. Board v. Hari Shanker, AIR 1979 SC 65 : (1978 Lab IC 1657), it was held (at page 72 of AIR) :--
"The rule that general provisions should yield to specific provisions is not an arbitrary principle made by lawyers and judges but springs from the common understanding of men and women that when the same person gives two directions one covering a large number of matters in general and another to only some of them his intention is that these latter directions should prevail as regards those while as regards all the rest the earlier direction should have effect."
For the view taken in this case, the Supreme Court found support from its decision in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P., AIR 1961 SC 1170. In this case, it was held (at page 1174) :--
"In the interpretation of statutes the courts always presume that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that every part of the statute should have effect. These presumptions will have to be made in the case of rule making authority also."
70. In our view, the Motor Vehicles Act barred the filing of a special appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge. The submission of the appellant's counsel would require us to interpret the language differently than what it means. We have mentioned above that in similar circumstances, the Supreme Court took the view that Letters Patent appeal did not lie.
71. Consequently, we have no reason to differ from the view taken in The New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Lad Kanwar (supra).
72. We consequently dismiss this special appeal with costs.