Karnataka High Court
Mr Firoz Pasha vs National Investigation Agency on 15 February, 2024
-1-
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB
CRL.A No.47 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2024
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.47 OF 2024
BETWEEN:
1. MR. FIROZ PASHA
S/O LATE ALLABAKSHA
AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS
R/AT NO.536, 9TH CROSS
UMAR NAGAR, GOVINDAPURA
BENGALURU 560045.
Digitally signed
by RUPA V ...APPELLANT
Location: HIGH
COURT OF (BY SRI. HASHMATH PASHA, SR. ADV., FOR
KARNATAKA SRI. MOHAMMED TAHIR, ADV.,)
AND:
1. NATIONAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY
MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
REP. BY SPECIAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
OFFICE AT HIGH COURT COMPLEX
OPP. TO VIDHANA SOUDHA
BANGALORE 560001.
...RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. P. PRASANNA KUMAR, SPL. P.P.)
THIS CRL.A IS FILED U/S 21(4) OF NIA ACT, PRAYING TO
SET ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 02.11.2023 OF
TRIAL COURT AT ANNEXURE-A CONSEQUENTLY APPRECIATE
-2-
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB
CRL.A No.47 of 2024
THE BAIL APPLICATION AVAILABLE AT ANNEXURE-F AND
GRANT BAIL TO THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED NO.7 IN
SPL.C.NO.141/2021 UNDER SEC 120B, 143, 145, 147, 188, 353
AND 427 R/W 34 AND 149 OF IPC AND SEC.16, 18, 20 OF THE
UA(P) ACT 1967 AND SEC.2 OF THE PREVENTION OF DAMAGE
TO PUBLIC PROPERTY ACT, 1981, PENDING IN THE FILES OF
XLIX ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE (SPL. JUDGE
FOR TRIAL OF NIA CASES BENGALURU.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY,
VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This appeal is filed by the accused No.7 under Section 21 of the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') challenging the order dated 02.11.2023 passed by the XLIX Addl. City Civil and Sessions Judge, (Special Court for Trial of NIA cases) at Bengaluru in Spl.C.No.141/2021 and further prayer to grant bail to the appellant.
2. Brief facts leading to filing of this appeal are that on 11.08.2020 around 8.45 p.m. a group of 25-30 persons gathered in front of Kadagondanahalli police station -3- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 (hereinafter referred to as the 'K.G.Halli police station') and started shouting slogans demanding the arrest of one Naveen, nephew of Sri.Akanda Srinivasa Murthy, MLA who had posted derogatory message on his facebook account against Prophet Mohammad. Under the leadership of Syed Ikramuddin, others entered K.G.Halli police station demanding for registration of FIR against Naveen and others. Police received the complaint and registered NCR No.384/2020 for the purpose of conducting preliminary enquiry as D.J.Halli police had already registered the crime against Naveen for the said incident as FIR No.195/2020. The said fact had also been informed to the complainant and others who had come to the K.G.Halli police station.
3. It is the case of the prosecution that the gathering in front of K.G.Halli police station started increasing gradually, became violent considering the violent situation which had already erupted at D.J.Halli police station area. On 11.08.2020 at around 9 p.m., the Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru City, imposed curfew -4- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 under the limits of D.J.Halli and K.G.Halli police stations with a view to control and avoid public gathering. K.G.Halli police made a public announcement of imposition of curfew. However, the gathering did not heed to the announcement and started mobilizing more people in front of the K.G.Halli police station. The assembly became unlawful, mob turned unruly and intensified their protest by shouting slogans which turned to violent activities. They started pelting stones on K.G.Halli police station, attacked police personnel on duty as well as innocent public who came to the aid of police. The mob carrying stones, iron rods, wooden sticks, improvised petrol bombs and other weapons became more violent and started vendalising, burning Government vehicles as well as private vehicles parked near the K.G.Halli police station. The mob demanded handing over of Naveen to them as they wanted to kill him. The police made their best efforts to control the mob. However, the aggressive mob was not ready to obey the orders of law enforcement agency. They entered the police station premises with deadly weapons and petrol filled in improvised plastic covers and -5- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 bottles and continued attacking K.G.Halli police station. The mob created horrifying and terror situation in the area. The police resorted to lathi charge and subsequently police fired tear gases. However, the situation could not be controlled. The mob became more aggressive, started attacking police personnel on duty, the Government and public properties on a large scale were set ablaze and injury was caused to the police personnel on duty. The police, in order to curb the unlawful act of the gathering and after warning over the public announcement system, fired two rounds in the air with their service weapons to disburse the mob. However, the members of the mob tried to snatch the weapons of the police personnel, attempted to kill the police personnel, set fire on public and private properties and parked vehicles. During the gun fire, one person among the mob who was injured, later succumbed to the injuries in the hospital. The mob damaged 12 vehicles including two wheelers and four wheelers, burnt police station by causing damage to the public and private properties on a large scale. K.G.Halli police, based on the written complaint of the Police -6- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Inspector registered the crime in FIR No.229/2020 on 12.08.2020 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 333, 353, 427 and 436 of IPC and Section 4 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 against Syed Abbas and others including other unknown individuals. The Investigating Agency, after obtaining approval from the competent authority and the permission of the Court, on 17.08.2020 invoked Sections 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the 'UAP Act').
4. The Central Government, Ministry of Home Affairs, taking note of the gravity of the offence vide order dated 21.09.2020 directed the National Investigation Agency (hereinafter referred to as 'the NIA') to take up the investigation of the said case. Pursuant to the said direction, NIA re-registered the case as R.C.No.35/2020 under Sections 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the UAP Act, Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 333, 353, 427 and 436 of IPC and -7- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Section 4 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act and continued the investigation.
5. The NIA, after completion of the investigation filed charge sheet before the jurisdictional Court on 05.02.2021. The facts on record indicate that the appellant
- accused No.7 surrendered before the Special Court on 20.09.2021 after the Special Court passed an order declaring the appellant - accused No.7 as a proclaimed offender. The appellant filed an application under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking to release him on bail. The said application was duly considered by the Special Court which came to be rejected vide order dated 02.11.2023 which is impugned in this appeal by observing that the prima facie material indicate the involvement of accused No.7, further the bail applications filed by the co-accused persons were rejected and the same were affirmed by the High Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court. It has further observed that the allegations made by the prosecution against the accused -8- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 No.7 are similar to that of the allegations made against accused No.3. Hence, there cannot be any different conclusion other than the conclusion arrived at by the High Court while rejecting the bail application of the accused No.3. The Trial Court rejected the bail application of the accused No.7 / appellant.
6. Sri.Hasmath Pasha, learned Senior counsel for the appellant - accused No.7 made the following submissions:
a) K.G.Halli police registered Crime No.229/2020 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 332, 333, 353, 427 and 436 of IPC and Section 4 of Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act showing accused Nos.1 to 16 and others. In the FIR or in the complaint filed by the police inspector, K.G.Halli does not indicate the name of the appellant. K.G.Halli police, with the permission of the competent authority and the Court invoked Sections 15, 16, 18 and 20 of the UAP Act. Thereafter, the Central Government entrusted the investigation to -9- NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 NIA nearly after 1 1/2 month. By that time, the State police recorded the statements of LW-4 Sri.Babu Reddy, LW-12 Sri.Kariyappa, LW-25 Sri.Anil and LW-
26 Sri.Santhosh B Dabbin. These witnesses are the police personnel and in their statement, they have not stated anything against the appellant.
b) It is submitted that the State police agency cited accused Nos.1 to 181 in all the investigation papers including the remand applications. None of the remand applications indicated the abscondance of the appellant.
c) It is submitted that in Column No.16 of the charge sheet pertaining to the appellant, Sections 120B, 143, 145, 147, 188, 353 and 427 read with 34 and 149 of IPC, Sections 16, 18 and 20 of UAP Act and Section 2 of Prevention of Destruction and Loss of Property Act, 1981 were mentioned. Except the provisions of the UAP Act and Section 353 of IPC, other offences are bailable and insofar as offence under Section 353 of IPC, the punishment with imprisonment
- 10 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 of 2 years or fine or both is provided. If the entire charge sheet material is perused, it is difficult to opine about conspiracy between the appellant and other accused. The statements relied on by the prosecution to implicate the appellant would not indicate the conspiracy. It is submitted that the entire incident took place in front of the police station and as per the prosecution more than 700-800 persons gathered and each of the individual had done some act. They were shouting slogans against Mr.Naveen, requested to register FIR and also requested to arrest him. The police did not respond to their request. Hence, each of the individuals have done certain overt act. Such an act would not constitute the offences invoked against the appellant. It is further submitted that if the statements of the witnesses relied on by the prosecution are read together, it would be an offence of unlawful assembly and not the offences under the UAP Act. He also submits that the nature of the act attributed by the prosecution attracts the offences
- 11 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code and not under the provisions of UAP Act. Such an act cannot be termed as a terrorist act. Hence, there is no impediment in considering the prayer of the appellant to grant bail.
d) It is submitted that the offences charged against the appellant falls in the category of Section 16(1)(b) of the UAP Act and the punishment provided in the said Section is from 5 years to imprisonment for life. He submits that the Court while considering the application for bail is required to look into the charge sheet material and if it is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true then only bar under Section 43D of UAP Act applies. Keeping this principle in mind, if the charge sheet material is looked into, prima facie it is evident that the name of the appellant is neither reflected in the FIR nor in any of the remand applications. It is only after the NIA took over the investigation, further statements of LW-4
- 12 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Sri.Babu Reddy, LW-12 Sri.Kariyappa, LW-25 Sri.Anil and LW-26 Sri.Santhosh B Dabbin were recorded wherein they have spoken with regard to the presence of appellant during the incident. It is submitted that recording further statements of the said witnesses by the NIA is an improvement made only with an intention to falsely implicate the appellant in the case. It is submitted that the statements recorded by the local State police of the aforesaid witnesses do not indicate the involvement of the appellant. The statements of these 4 witnesses were available before the State police, hence they did not rightly include the appellant as accused nor showed the appellant as absconding in the remand applications. It was only after the NIA took over the investigation, the name of the appellant was reflected in the further statements of four witnesses in order to implicate him.
e) The investigation material indicates that already the agency has arrested Firoz Pasha accused No.1 and by mistaken identity and mechanically the
- 13 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 appellant was arrayed as accused No.7 in the charge sheet. The charge sheet refers to one Firoz of R.T.Nagar and another one of Govindrajapura. Accused No.1, in his voluntary statement, identified himself as SDPI leader of Govindarajapura. Hence, adding the appellant as accused No.7 is a mistake and without any material against the appellant.
f) It is submitted that one of the police officials had videographed the entire rioting and the said video was played by the Trial Court. The appellant is not found in the said video recording. The charge sheet materials indicate that there is no meeting of minds between the appellant and the other accused; there was no common object among the members of the assembly and the prosecution has not placed any such material before the Court. Hence, prima face, the charges leveled against the appellant are false and without any basis. It is submitted that no one has identified the appellant and his presence during the
- 14 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 incident till the NIA recorded further statement of the 4 witnesses.
g) It is submitted that there is no such absolute bar under Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. The Court is required to consider whether there is a reasonable ground for believing that the acquisition against the accused is prima facie true. He submits that in the instant case there is no material available on record to come to a definite conclusion with regard to the commission of crime by the appellant. The evidence relied on by the agency is not sufficient to come to a conclusion that the appellant has committed the crime attracting the provisions of UAP Act. The material collected are not prima face true.
h) He submits that the appellant is in incarnation for a period of 2 years 4 months and there are numerous witnesses in the case and there may be enormous delay in conclusion of trial. Hence, it is a fit case to grant bail. He further submits that the appellant is a law abiding citizen having roots in the
- 15 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 society and is ready to abide any conditions which may be imposed by this Court while granting the bail. He seeks to set aside the impugned order of the Trial Court and further seeks to enlarge the appellant on bail.
7. Sri.P.Prasanna Kumar, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the NIA made the following submissions:
a) It is submitted that the appellant filed bail application on 10.12.2021 and after the said application was heard by the Trial Court for some time, the appellant withdrew the application and thereafter, filed an application under Section 227 of the Cr.P.C.
seeking discharge from the proceedings. Hence, his application was rightly rejected by the Trial Court after assigning detailed reasons.
b) It is submitted that the State police registered the crime and recorded the statements of LW-4
- 16 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Sri.Babu Reddy, LW-12 Sri.Kariyappa, LW-25 Sri.Anil and LW-26 Sri.Santhosh B Dabbin. The statements of these witnesses clearly indicate the name of the appellant. These witnesses have stated that the appellant was present at the time of incident and along with few others burnt a bike parked in front of the police station by pouring petrol on it. Such an act of the appellant constitutes terrorist act within the definitions of the provisions of UAP Act.
c) It is submitted that after the NIA took over the investigation, the further statements of these 4 witnesses were recorded. The witnesses have clearly stated that SDPI leader Firoz Pasha and a few others burnt the bike parked by pouring petrol on it. The witnesses have not stated anything new before the NIA. Their statements have already been recorded by the State police and in both the statements, the name of the appellant is reflected and it clearly establishes that the appellant was very much present along with the others and committed an act of terrorism. The
- 17 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 statements recorded by the NIA clearly make a distinction between two Firoz, Firoz Pasha of R.T.Nagar and Firoz Pasha the appellant herein. Hence, the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant that the appellant Firoz Pasha has been mistakenly implicated as accused has no merit consideration.
e) It is submitted that non-referring of the appellant's name in the remand application by the State police agency itself is not a ground to contend that there is no material against the appellant to array him as an accused in the charge sheet. The appellant was absconding till filing of the charge sheet and only when the Trial Court issued the order of proclamation, the appellant surrendered before the Trial Court. This shows that the appellant is very much involved in the commission of crime along with the other accused. The charge sheet indicates that the appellant being the member of SDPI, instigated and conspired with the other accused to commit the crime.
- 18 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
f) It is submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, in catena of cases held that unless the Court is of the opinion that there is no reasonable ground for believing that the acquisition against the accused is prima facie true, no bail can be granted.
g) It is further submitted that the Courts while considering the application for bail is required to satisfy itself with regard to prima facie truth of the allegations against the accused and in the instant case, 4 police witnesses clearly stated that the appellant was present and participated in the commission of crime along with the other accused. The charge sheet material indicates that the appellant conspired with the other accused and committed an act of terrorism in the K.G.Halli police station by setting the police station on fire, torching the private and public vehicles causing damage to life, public and private property. He submits that no indulgence should be shown to the appellant who is one of the prime accused for the commission of crime. The
- 19 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 charge sheet material prima facie establishes that the appellant is involved in the commission of crime. He seeks to dismiss the appeal as well as the application seeking for bail.
8. We have heard the arguments of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent - NIA, perused the material available on record.
9. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal are:
(a) Whether the charge sheet material indicates the reasonable ground for believing that the acquisition against the appellant is prima facie true? and
(b) Whether the impugned order passed by the Special Court rejecting the bail of the appellant is required to be interfered or is liable to be affirmed?
- 20 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
10. Before considering the points that arise for our consideration, it would be useful to consider the relevant provisions of law governing the dispute. Section 43D of the UPA Act reads as under:
"43D - Modified application of certain provisions of Code.
(1) xxxx (2) xxx (3) xxxx (4) xxxx (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.
(Emphasis supplied) (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
- 21 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing."
11. Sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAP Act indicates that if a person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of the UAP Act, is in the custody be released on bail unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of hearing on the application. Proviso to sub-section (5) contemplates that the accused person shall not be released on bail if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. Sub-section (6) contemplates that sub-Section (5) is an additional restriction on granting of bail under the provisions of the Code. On plain reading of the aforesaid provision of law, it is evident that the power to grant bail under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. has been restricted under
- 22 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 sub-Section (5) of Section 43D and it is an exception to Section 439 of Cr.P.C. The mandate of the law while considering the bail application of the accused when he is charge sheeted under the provisions of the UAP Act is different from the consideration of bail application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. The Court, on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code, is required to form an opinion whether there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or not. In other words, the degree of satisfaction of the Court is lighter in the cases of consideration of bail applications under the UAP Act.
12. It would be useful to refer the decision of the he Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of 'NIA Vs. ZAHOOR AHMAD SHAH WATALI' (2019) 5 SCC 1, wherein it is held as under:
"22. When it comes to offences punishable under special enactments, such as the 1967 Act, something more is required to be kept in mind in view of the special provisions contained in Section 43-D of the 1967
- 23 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Act, inserted by Act 35 of 2008 w.e.f. 31-12-2008. Sub- sections (5), (6) and (7) thereof read thus:
"43-D. Modified application of certain provisions of the Code.--(1)-(4)*** (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release:
Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true. (6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail. (7) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorisedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing."
23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The principle underlying
- 24 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 those decisions may have some bearing while considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of the alleged offence. There is a degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not guilty" of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is "prima facie" true. By its very nature, the expression "prima facie true" would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under the other special
- 25 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under the 1967 Act. Nevertheless, we may take guidance from the exposition in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma [Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 :
2005 SCC (Cri) 1057] , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court was called upon to consider the scope of power of the Court to grant bail. In paras 36 to 38, the Court observed thus : (SCC pp. 316-17) "36. Does this statute require that before a person is released on bail, the court, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of such offence? Is it necessary for the court to record such a finding? Would there be any machinery available to the court to ascertain that once the accused is enlarged on bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever?
37. Such findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of arriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on record only for grant of bail and for no other purpose.
38. We are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of the court to grant bail should not be pushed too far. If the court, having regard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability he may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed. The satisfaction of the court as regards his likelihood of not committing an offence while on bail must be
- 26 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 construed to mean an offence under the Act and not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence. ... What would further be necessary on the part of the court is to see the culpability of the accused and his involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or indirectly. The court at the time of considering the application for grant of bail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was possessed of the requisite mens rea."
And again in paras 44 to 48, the Court observed : (SCC pp. 318-20) "44. The wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the conclusion that the court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant for bail has not committed an offence under the Act. If such a construction is placed, the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the applicant has not committed such an offence. In such an event, it will be impossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the applicant. Such cannot be the intention of the legislature. Section 21(4) of MCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably. It must be so construed that the court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of acquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before commencement of trial. Similarly, the court will be required to record a finding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail. However, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and not any other offence. Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an accused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having regard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature and manner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.
- 27 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
45. It is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an application for grant of bail, although detailed reasons are not necessary to be assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at least in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the privilege of bail.
46. The duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence meticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities. However, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to the provisions contained in sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the court may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at a finding that the materials collected against the accused during the investigation may not justify a judgment of conviction. The findings recorded by the court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be tentative in nature, which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case and the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of evidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced thereby.
47. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 537-38, para 18) '18. We agree that a conclusive finding in regard to the points urged by both the sides is not expected of the court considering a bail application. Still one should not forget, as observed by this Court in Puran v. Rambilas [Puran v. Rambilas, (2001) 6 SCC 338 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1124] :
(SCC p. 344, para 8) "8. ... Giving reasons is different from discussing merits or demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case has not to be undertaken. ...
- 28 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 That did not mean that whilst granting bail some reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted did not have to be indicated."
We respectfully agree with the above dictum of this Court. We also feel that such expression of prima facie reasons for granting bail is a requirement of law in cases where such orders on bail application are appealable, more so because of the fact that the appellate court has every right to know the basis for granting the bail. Therefore, we are not in agreement with the argument addressed by the learned counsel for the accused that the High Court was not expected even to indicate a prima facie finding on all points urged before it while granting bail, more so in the background of the facts of this case where on facts it is established that a large number of witnesses who were examined after the respondent was enlarged on bail had turned hostile and there are complaints made to the court as to the threats administered by the respondent or his supporters to witnesses in the case. In such circumstances, the court was duty-bound to apply its mind to the allegations put forth by the investigating agency and ought to have given at least a prima facie finding in regard to these allegations because they go to the very root of the right of the accused to seek bail. The non-consideration of these vital facts as to the allegations of threat or inducement made to the witnesses by the respondent during the period he was on bail has vitiated the conclusions arrived at by the High Court while granting bail to the respondent. The other ground apart from the ground of incarceration which appealed to the High Court to grant bail was the fact that a large number of witnesses are yet to be examined and there is no likelihood of the trial coming to an end in the near future. As stated hereinabove, this ground on the facts of this case is also not
- 29 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 sufficient either individually or coupled with the period of incarceration to release the respondent on bail because of the serious allegations of tampering with the witnesses made against the respondent.'
48. In Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N. [Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal v. State of T.N., (2005) 2 SCC 13 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 481] this Court observed : (SCC pp. 21-22, para 16) '16. ... The considerations which normally weigh with the court in granting bail in non- bailable offences have been explained by this Court in State v. Jagjit Singh [State v. Jagjit Singh, (1962) 3 SCR 622 : AIR 1962 SC 253 :
(1962) 1 Cri LJ 215] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (UT of Delhi), (1978) 1 SCC 118 :
1978 SCC (Cri) 41] and basically they are -- the nature and seriousness of the offence; the character of the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar to the accused; a reasonable possibility of the presence of the accused not being secured at the trial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being tampered with; the larger interest of the public or the State and other similar factors which may be relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case.'"
24. A priori, the exercise to be undertaken by the Court at this stage--of giving reasons for grant or non-grant of bail--is markedly different from discussing merits or demerits of the evidence. The elaborate examination or dissection of the evidence is not required to be done at this stage. The Court is merely expected to record a finding on the basis of broad probabilities regarding the
- 30 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 involvement of the accused in the commission of the stated offence or otherwise.
25. From the analysis of the impugned judgment [Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali v. NIA, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 11185] , it appears to us that the High Court has ventured into an area of examining the merits and demerits of the evidence. For, it noted that the evidence in the form of statements of witnesses under Section 161 are not admissible. Further, the documents pressed into service by the investigating agency were not admissible in evidence. It also noted that it was unlikely that the document had been recovered from the residence of Ghulam Mohammad Bhatt till 16-8-2017 (para 61 of the impugned judgment). Similarly, the approach of the High Court in completely discarding the statements of the protected witnesses recorded under Section 164 CrPC, on the specious ground that the same was kept in a sealed cover and was not even perused by the Designated Court and also because reference to such statements having been recorded was not found in the charge-sheet already filed against the respondent is, in our opinion, in complete disregard of the duty of the Court to record its opinion that the accusation made against the accused concerned is prima facie true or otherwise. That opinion must be reached by the Court not only in reference to the accusation in the FIR but also in reference to the contents of the case diary and including the charge-sheet (report under Section 173
- 31 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 CrPC) and other material gathered by the investigating agency during investigation.
26. Be it noted that the special provision, Section 43-D of the 1967 Act, applies right from the stage of registration of FIR for the offences under Chapters IV and VI of the 1967 Act until the conclusion of the trial thereof. To wit, soon after the arrest of the accused on the basis of the FIR registered against him, but before filing of the charge-sheet by the investigating agency; after filing of the first charge-sheet and before the filing of the supplementary or final charge-sheet consequent to further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC, until framing of the charges or after framing of the charges by the Court and recording of evidence of key witnesses, etc. However, once charges are framed, it would be safe to assume that a very strong suspicion was founded upon the materials before the Court, which prompted the Court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged against the accused, to justify the framing of charge. In that situation, the accused may have to undertake an arduous task to satisfy the Court that despite the framing of charge, the materials presented along with the charge-sheet (report under Section 173 CrPC), do not make out reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against him is prima facie true. Similar opinion is required to be formed by the Court whilst considering the prayer for bail, made
- 32 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 after filing of the first report made under Section 173 of the Code, as in the present case."
13. In a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of 'GURWINDER SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB & ANOTHER' in Crl.A.No.704/2024 decided on 07.02.2024, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"15. Learned Senior Counsel further raised contentions about the lack of scrutiny of the Appellant's mobile phone, marked as M-4 to indicate that the phone number did not belong to the Appellant. He argued that the absence of incriminating conversations in the Communication Data Records (CDR) related to the Appellant's phone supports the case for bail. He further contended that the Appellant has been in custody since the last Five years facing charges of UAP Act which is contrary to the law laid down in KA Najeeb v. Union of India.
16. He further submitted that only 19 out of 106 witnesses have been examined in the last five-year period. He also drew our attention to terror funding chart to demonstrate that the name of the Appellant does not find place in the same. Mr. Gonsalves also questioned the omission of the alleged main conspirator, Nihal Singh, as an accused, emphasizing that the Appellant did not procure any weapons.
- 33 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
17. He further sought our attention to the 4th supplementary chargesheet, aimed at establishing a funding link with ISI, to illustrate the Appellant's exclusion from relevant documentation. Lastly, he stated that out of Nine protected witnesses that have been examined, eight have not mentioned the name of Appellant. Hence, he prayed to set aside the impugned order and grant bail to the Appellant.
18. Per contra, Mr. Suryaprakash V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General, on behalf of the Respondent, submitted that there is sufficient evidence on record to prove the incriminating role of the Appellant and the same is revealed by the statements of Protected witnesses.
19. He further submitted that the Appellant-accused along with co-accused Bikarmjit Singh @ Vicky (Accused No. 3) were involved in the activities of "Sikhs for Justice", a banded terrorist organisation, whose chief proponent is Gurpatwant Singh Pannu (Accused No. 12) and Bikramjit Singh @ Vicky (Accused No. 3) had asked their known persons to arrange weapons from Kashmir. In furtherance of their activities to procure arms and ammunition, the Appellant-accused along with co- accused Bikarmjit Singh @ Vicky and Harpreet Singh @ Happy (Accused No. 7) had visited Srinagar.
20. He further submitted that Appellant in his voluntary disclosure statement admitted that on gaining knowledge of purpose of visit to Srinagar, he voluntarily
- 34 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 continued the journey. In fact, the Appellant suggested an alternative to the co-accused and advised them to procure the weapon from Western Uttar Pradesh.
21. Further, he submitted that the provisions of section 43D(5) of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 are completely applicable in this case and as such the High court has rightly denied bail to the Appellant-accused.
22. He also contended that the case is presently under trial and so far 22 witnesses have been examined. The accused is facing charges of grave nature pertaining to crimes that are not attributable to an individual but members of a terrorist gang operating at the behest of Gurpatwant Singh Pannu (Accused No. 12), a proscribed terrorist. If the Appellant is released on bail, there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case hampering the process of justice. Hence, he prayed that the bail petition should be rejected.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
23. We have heard the learned counsel on behalf of both the parties and have perused the records of the case. The present case involves the charges under the UAP Act along with other charges under the IPC and Arms Act therefore, it is apt to consider the bail provision envisaged under section 43D of the UAP Act before we delve to analyze the facts.
Bail under UAP Act : Section 43D (5)
- 35 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
24. In the course of oral argument, both sides have laid great emphasis on the interpretation of section 43D(5) of the 1967 Act. We will begin our analysis with a discussion on the scope and limitations of bail under Section 43D(5) UAP Act.
25. We shall extract Section 43D(5) for easy reference:
"Section 43D - Modified application of certain provisions of the Code (1)......
................
(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, no person accused of an offence punishable under Chapters IV and VI of this Act shall, if in custody, be released on bail or on his own bond unless the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity of being heard on the application for such release : Provided that such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case diary or the report made under section 173 of the Code is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation against such person is prima facie true.
(6) The restrictions on granting of bail specified in sub- section (5) is in addition to the restrictions under the
- 36 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Code or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.
(7) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-sections (5) and (6), no bail shall be granted to a person accused of an offence punishable under this Act, if he is not an Indian citizen and has entered the country unauthorizedly or illegally except in very exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing."
26. The source of the power to grant bail in respect of non-bailable offences punishable with death or life imprisonment emanates from Section 439 CrPC. It can be noticed that Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act modifies the application of the general bail provisions in respect of offences punishable under Chapter IV and Chapter VI of the UAP Act.
27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing
- 37 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the UAP Act."
14. Keeping in mind the exposition of law by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on various provisions of the UAP Act, now we may deal with the issue on hand. The case of the prosecution is that on 11.08.2020 between 8.30 p.m. and 1.30 a.m., a large number of persons gathered in front of the K.G.Halli police station and initially started slogans demanding for the arrest of Naveen on the ground that he had posted derogatory remarks on Prophet Mohammad on his facebook account. The protest was led by the SDPI leaders and other leaders of the locality. They entered the K.G.Halli police station, insisted for registration of FIR. The police registered the same as NCR as already D.J.Halli police had registered the FIR against said Naveen for the said
- 38 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 incident. The gathering turned violent taking law in their hand, police tried their best to control the rioting and unlawful activity of the gathering. However, the members of the gathering started pelting stones at K.G.Halli police station and the police personnel. Accused persons carried iron rods, wooden sticks, improvised petrol bombs, stones and other weapons to attack the police personnel, police station. The mob later poured petrol on the public and private vehicles, burnt them, caused damage to public and private properties, caused harm to police personnel on duty and innocent public. Sri.Ajay Sarathi, Police Inspector of K.G.Halli police station lodged a written complaint of the incident and took up the investigation. During the course of investigation, a number of persons were arrested, weapons were recovered from the accused by drawing mahazar. Later, the investigation was continued by the NIA as per the orders of the Union Government. After completion of the investigation, charge sheet came to be filed against the appellant as well as other accused for the offences committed under the various provisions of law.
- 39 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
15. From the charge sheet, it is evident that the investigating officer recorded the statement of the police personnel who were present at the time of incident. The statements of LW-4 Sri.Babu Reddy, LW-12 Sri.Kariyappa, LW-25 Sri.Anil and LW-26 Sri.Santhosh B Dabbin recorded by the State agency before the investigation was handed over to the NIA. Further, the NIA has also recorded the statements of the aforesaid witnesses which clearly indicate that the appellant was present at the time of incident and had participated in unlawful activities along with the other accused by pouring petrol on the motor cycle and setting fire to it. The contention of the learned Senior counsel appearing for the appellant that the investigating officer of the State police recorded the statements of the aforesaid witnesses and those witnesses did not speak anything with regard to the appellant, appears to be factually incorrect. The statements of Sri.Babu Reddy, LW-4, LW-12 Sri.Kariyappa, LW-25 Sri.Anil and LW-26 Sri.Santhosh B Dabbin recorded by the State police clearly indicate that the
- 40 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 appellant was not only present but also actively participated in the commission of crime. The said statements further make it clear that there are two persons of the same name Firoz, one Firoz from R.T.Nagar Bangalore and another Firoz from Govindarajapura i.e. the appellant herein. Hence, the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant that the investigating agency has mistakenly implicated the appellant in the case, has no merit consideration. The investigating agency has recorded further statements of the aforesaid 4 witnesses. Those witnesses are the eye witnesses to the incident and have clearly spoken with regard to the overt act of the appellant. The statement of LW-12 clearly indicates that the accused was present at the time of incident. The appellant was giving instructions to the co-accused and others who were present that 'aaj kisiko chodna nahi hai, chahe kuch bhi karna pade' (not to spare anyone today whatever we have to do for the same). The statement of LW-26 clearly indicates that during the incident between 11.08.2020 and 12.08.2020, he noticed that SDPI, Govindapura leaders Syed Abbas, Habib Rehman,
- 41 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 Peer Pasha, Zia Ur Rehman and Feroz Pasha actively participated in the rioting. They were shouting slogans and also forcefully tried to enter the police station. The statement of LW-25 Sri.Anil V., police constable clearly indicates that along with the appellant, other accused burnt a bike parked in front of the police station. All the four police personnel clearly identified the presence of the appellant, his overt act, hence, contrary contentions raised by the learned Senior counsel for the appellant has no merit consideration and accordingly, the same are rejected.
16. With regard to the vehement contention of the appellant that the mobile seized by the respondent - agency did not belong to the appellant, hence no reliance can be placed on CDR, the charge sheet materials clearly indicate that the investigating agency seized mobile phone of the appellant and the call details of the mobile number 9448265211 clearly indicate the presence of the appellant at the time of incident. The charge sheet materials further clearly indicate that several witnesses have identified the
- 42 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 presence of the appellant at the time of incident and also spoken about his active participation in rioting and burning the vehicle by using inflammable substance. The statements of eye witnesses and seized mobile prima facie establish the active involvement of the appellant in the commission of crime. Hence, there is no material in the contentions urged by the learned Senior counsel.
17. Further, the contention of the appellant that the investigating agency has not referred the name of the appellant in the remand application nor has shown him as an absconder, is also required to be rejected for the simple reason that immediately after the incident, the appellant was absconding and only after filing of the charge sheet and after issuance of the proclamation order by the Special Court, the appellant surrendered before the Court. Such an act of the appellant clearly establishes that the appellant was very much aware about he being made an accused. Mere non- mentioning of the appellant's name in the remand application as an absconding accused ipso facto would not
- 43 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 lead to a conclusion that the appellant has been falsely implicated by the agency. The final report filed by the NIA clearly indicates the overt act of the appellant, his participation in the meeting along with the other accused prior to the commission of crime and the evidence collected by the investigating officer appears to be prima facie true. This Court does not find any reason to disbelieve the statements of the police personnel referred to supra with regard to the active participation of the appellant in the commission of crime. This Court does not find any perversity or error in the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court while rejecting the bail application of the appellant. The Trial Court, before recording the reason has looked into the investigation papers and case diary and has come to a definite conclusion that the appellant was actively involved in the commission of crime and there is sufficient reason to believe that the evidence collected against the appellant is prima facie true.
- 44 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
18. This Court, on perusal of the entire charge sheet papers is of the considered view that there are reasonable and sufficient material available on record to come to a conclusion that the appellant was actively involved in the commission of crime and the evidence collected by the agency are prima facie true. The role of the appellant has been established through the 4 eye witnesses referred to supra, electronic evidence and CDR of the mobile number used by the appellant during the relevant period by the prosecution. These evidences prima facie are sufficient to come to conclusion that the overt act of the appellant meets the ingredients of the charged offences by the prosecution.
19. The learned Senior counsel for the appellant tried to make out a case that the initial statements recorded by the State police do not implicate the appellant and only after NIA took over the investigation, further statement of the 4 witnesses were recorded which is an improvement made to implicate the appellant in the case. The statements of 4 witnesses recorded by the State police at the earliest point of
- 45 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 time, makes a specific reference to the presence of the accused at the time of commission of crime and his active involvement of pouring petrol on the motor bike and torching the same. Further statement recorded by the NIA makes the overt act of the appellant further clear. Hence, the contention that the NIA has recorded further statement of the 4 witnesses with an intention to implicate the appellant, has no merit consideration and accordingly, the same is rejected.
20. The further contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant is that the appellant is in custody for more than 2 years 4 months and there would be delay in conclusion of the trial and hence, his application for grant of bail is required to be considered favourably. The material available on record would indicate that the Special Court has posted the matter for framing of charges in 2021 itself and the matter was adjourned at the request of the accused persons. The prosecution has taken a specific plea in their objections that there is no delay on behalf of the prosecution
- 46 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 in conducting the case. When things stand thus, the delay in concluding the trial cannot be the sole basis to consider the application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., more particularly when the offences invoked against the accused are under the provisions of the UAP Act. The material available on record would indicate that the appellant / accused No.7 being the SDPI leader of the locality had political connection and there may be a likelihood that he may influence or tamper the prosecution witnesses. Hence, the contention of the learned Senior counsel for the appellant to consider the application for grant of bail on the ground of delay in conclusion of the trial, has no merit consideration.
21. The material available on record indicates that the applications filed by the other accused under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. came to be rejected by the Special Court which were challenged before this Court. The co-ordinate Benches of this Court in Crl.A.Nos.576/2021, 1448/2021 and Crl.A.No.1640/2021 vide judgments dated 15.09.2021
- 47 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 and 22.12.2021 rejected the appeals. The said order of the co-ordinate Bench has been confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (criminal) No.842/2022 and connected Special Leave Petitions vide order dated 28.02.2022. The grounds urged by the co- accused in the aforesaid appeals are similar to that of the grounds urged in the present appeal. The co-ordinate Benches of this Court dismissed the appeals taking into account the various investigation materials available against the accused therein and prima facie came to the conclusion that there is sufficient evidence available against the accused. In the instant case also, on close scrutiny of the charge sheet material this Court is of the opinion that there is reasonable ground for believing that the accusation against the appellant is prima facie true.
22. On perusal of the investigation material, it is evident that the accused and others caused damage to 12 vehicles and huge loss to the public as well as private properties. The accused had brought inflammable
- 48 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024 substance and deadly weapons for the commission of crime. The final report indicates that the appellant / accused No.7 is the member of SDPI Nagawara Ward. He had attended meeting along with other accused on 11.08.2020 where the accused persons conspired and decided to carry out violent acts by attacking police personnel and police station of K.G.Halli. The statements of eye witnesses placed along with the final report clearly indicate that the appellant along with the other accused burnt a bike parked in front of the K.G.Halli police station by pouring petrol on it. At this stage, this much of materials are sufficient to hold that there was conspiracy between the appellant and the other accused and in furtherance of it the appellant as well as other accused hatched a plan to commit crime with an intention to strike terror and cause fear in the minds of public. Prima facie, the materials available on record indicate that the act of the appellant and other accused is an act of creating fear in the minds of public. The magnitude of the crime is so grave that a common man feels insecure.
- 49 -
NC: 2024:KHC:6395-DB CRL.A No.47 of 2024
23. For the aforementioned reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal. Accordingly, the appeal and the application for bail are dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE RV