Andhra Pradesh High Court - Amravati
Chebrolu Sambasiva Rao Anr vs Guduru Venkateswarlu on 9 May, 2025
1
APHC010231782001
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
AT AMARAVATI [3369]
(Special Original Jurisdiction)
FRIDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF MAY
TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY-FIVE
PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO
SECOND APPEAL NO: 480/2001
Between:
Chebrolu Sambasiva Rao & Anr ...APPELLANT
AND
Guduru Venkateswarlu ...RESPONDENT
Counsel for the Appellant:
1. S GOPAL SINGH Counsel for the Respondent:
1. RAMA CHANDRA RAO GURRAM The Court made the following JUDGMENT:
1. This Second Appeal has been filed by the appellants/plaintiffs 2 and 3 against the Decree and Judgment dated 18.03.1995, in A.S.No.31 of 1989 on the file of learned District Judge, Guntur (for short, 'the 1st Appellate Court') confirming the decree and Judgment dated 25.11.1988, in O.S.No.343 of 1984 on the file of learned Principal Subordinate Judge, Guntur (for short, 'the Trial Court').
2. The appellants are the plaintiffs who filed the suit in O.S.No.343 of 1984 seeking delivery of possession of the suit schedule property and for profits from the date of suit till the date of delivery.2
3. Referring to the parties as they are initially arrayed in the suit in O.S.No.343 of 1984 is expedient to mitigate confusion and better comprehend the case.
4. The factual matrix, necessary and germane for adjudicating the contentious issues between the parties inter se, may be delineated as follows:
The suit schedule property originally belonged to Nukavarapu Venkatrayudu, who had four wives. He had two sons, Punnaiah through first wife and Kotaiah through second wife, and three daughters, Ramayamma and Soubhagyamma through third wife and Seshagiramma through fourth wife, Hanumayamma. Soubhagyamma married Jetti Ramaiah, brother of Hanumayamma. They had one daughter, Thirupathamma, who married 1st plaintiff. After partition with his sons, Venkatrayudu executed a will dated 28.10.1909, bequeathing most of his properties to his fourth wife, Hanumayamma. He directed that his widowed daughter, Ramayamma, would enjoy the income from the schedule property during her lifetime, with a vested remainder to Hanumayamma. Hanumayamma later executed a gift deed dated 06.05.1914 in favour of her brother, Jetti Ramaiah, including her direct bequest and the vested remainder. Ramaiah, in turn, executed a will dated 24.02.1954, granting a life estate to his wife, Soubhagyamma and a vested remainder to their only daughter, Thirupathamma. Upon Thirupathamma's intestate death in 1981, Plaintiffs 1 to 3 became her legal heirs. Ramayamma died on 29.06.1984.The defendant, currently in possession of the property, claims rights under a will allegedly executed by Ramayamma on 24.08.1983 in his favour. He is the husband of Ramayamma's foster daughter's sister. The plaintiffs assert this will is not genuine, unnatural, or executed voluntarily. Moreover, Ramayamma had only a life interest and no authority to bequeath the property. Thus, the 3 defendant acquired no valid rights, and the plaintiffs are entitled to possession of the suit property and mesne profits.
5. In the written statement, the defendant denied the allegations in the plaint and asserted that the alleged registered gift deed dated 06.05.1914 and the will dated 24.02.1954, purportedly executed by the donee and Jetti Ramaiah, are sham, nominal, and collusive documents lacking genuineness and legal effect. These documents are neither valid nor binding on the defendant. Ramayamma was the absolute owner of the plaint schedule property under the Hindu Succession Act, and she executed a registered will dated 24.08.1983 in a sound and disposing state of mind, bequeathing the property to the defendant. The will came into effect upon her demise, making the defendant the absolute owner. Given the legal obligation of Ramayamma's father to maintain his widowed daughter, and by the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, any limited rights she may have held were enlarged into absolute ownership. The original gift to Ramayamma was with absolute rights.
Therefore, any purported rights of Hanumayamma cannot override the vested rights of the defendant, and the documents relied upon by the plaintiffs are false, fictitious, and confer no legal entitlement.
6. During the pendency of the suit before the Trial Court, the 1st plaintiff passed away on 29.06.1988. The learned counsel for the plaintiffs filed a memo before the Trial Court stating that the 1st plaintiff's wife had predeceased him and that plaintiffs 2 and 3 were his surviving legal representatives. The plaintiffs 2 and 3 were accordingly shown as the legal representatives of the 1st plaintiff.
7. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues:
1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get possession of the suit property?
2) To what relief the parties are entitled to?4
8. During the trial, P.W.1 was examined and marked Exs.A.1 to A.10 on behalf of the plaintiffs. Conversely, on behalf of the defendant, DWs.1 to 7 were examined and marked Ex.B.1 and Ex.X.1.
9. After completing the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court dismissed the suit.
10. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed an Appeal in A.S.No.31 of 1989 on file of the 1st Appellate Court. The 1st Appellate Court, being the final fact-finding Court, framed the following points for consideration:
1) Whether it is section 14(1) or section 14(2) of Hindu Succession Act that attract to the acquisition of suit property of Ramayamma under the Will deed Ex.A.2 from her father?
2) Whether execution of the Will deed Ex.X.1 by Ramayamma in favour of the defendant is proved to be voluntarily and in sound and disposing state of mind?
11. The 1st Appellate Court, after scrutinising oral and documentary evidence on behalf of both sides, dismissed the Appeal in A.S.No.31 of 1989 by its Judgment and Decree dated 18.03.1995. Assailing the same, the plaintiffs preferred the present Second Appeal.
12. I heard Sri S. Gopal Singh, learned counsel representing the appellants/plaintiffs, and Sri Rama Chandra Rao Gurram, learned counsel for the respondent/defendant. Both learned counsel have filed their written arguments in support of their respective contentions.
13. Based on the appellants' contentions, the following substantial questions of Law are involved in this Second Appeal:
(a) The said Act came into force on 21.12.1956, which had no retrospective effect. The destitute widowed daughter could claim maintenance only if the father had died after the commencement of the said Act. The 1st Appellate Court did not give due credence to this established principle of Law.5
(b) The learned District Judge failed to appreciate the contention of the Appellants herein that on the admitted facts, by virtue of section 21(vi) of the said Act, a widowed daughter is not entitled to any maintenance as none of the conditions specified in that subsection exists to warrant the same.
(c) The widowed daughter had no legal right for maintenance under the provisions of Hindu Law, which were in vogue in 1909, i.e., long before the promulgation of the Act, as mentioned earlier, which came into force on 21.12.1956. As stated above, even after the commencement of the said Act, she acquired no right to maintenance. Even though she comes under the category of dependents specified in section 21(vi) of the said Act, in view of the proviso therein, her case, on the facts as admitted, is not covered by any of the provisions of sub-clauses (a), (b) or (c) of that sub-section. Thus, in either case and any event, she is not entitled to maintenance in Law. This is a crucial aspect the Court below failed to note. The decision of this Hon'ble Court reported in AIR 1981 Page 88 (Full Bench) supports the appellant's contention.
(d) The appellants submit that the widowed daughter had only a limited estate as per the will executed by her father in 1909, which did not ripen into an absolute estate by sub-section (2) of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act 956. This clear legal proposition has been lost sight of by the learned judge despite the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in 1994(2) SCC 511, which was cited before the learned judge.
14. Before delving into the matter, since the Appeal is filed under Sec.100 CPC, this Court must see the scope of Section 100 of C.P.C.
15. In H.P.Pyarejan V. Dasappa (dead) by L.Rs. and others1, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976), the jurisdiction of the High Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing on substantial questions of Law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it involves re-appreciation of evidence (see Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami (1997) 4 SCC 1 2006 (3) ALT 41 (SC) 6
713) and Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait (1997) 5 SCC 438)......
16. Considerations in Section 100 of C.P.C. arise only when there is a substantial question of Law and not mere such questions of Law or one based on facts. However, it has to be borne in mind that in case of misapplication of Law and improper appreciation of evidence on record, particularly the documentary evidence, it is the bounden duty of the High Court sitting in second Appeal to consider such questions which are substantial in terms of Law.
17. In the second Appeal, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the C.P.C., this Court must confine itself to the substantial questions of Law involved in the Appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings of the Courts below, where the Courts below recorded the findings judicially by appreciating both oral and documentary evidence. Further, the substantial questions of Law are the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substitute its own opinion unless the findings of the Courts below are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record.
18. A reading of the judgments of both Courts reveals that both parties raised the same contentions and relied on almost precedents. The 1st Appellate Court, after considering the matter afresh, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court, providing its reasons for doing so.
19. As seen from the pleadings, evidence adduced, and judgments of both Courts, it can be seen that the following facts are either admitted or undisputed:
The plaint schedule property originally belonged to N.Venkatrayudu, who had four marriages. Through his first wife, he had a son, Punnaiah; through his second wife, he had another son, Kotayya; through his third wife, he had two daughters, 7 Ramayamma and Sowbhagyamma; and through his fourth wife, Hanumayamma, he had a daughter named Seshagiramma. Hanumayamma's brother, Jetti Ramaiah, was married to Sowbhagyamma. The death extract (Ex.A.7) reveals that Jetti Ramaiah passed away in 1955, while Sowbhagyamma passed away in 1975, as indicated in Ex.A.6 death certificate, leaving behind their only daughter, Tirupathamma. The 1st plaintiff, C.Raja Ratnam, is the husband of Tirupathamma; and Tirupathamma passed away in 1981, as per Ex.A.8 death extract, survived by her husband (the 1st plaintiff) and their children (the second and third plaintiffs).
20. It is undisputed that N. Venkatrayudu and his two sons partitioned their properties, and Venkatrayudu executed a registered will on 18.10.1909 (Ex.A.2) regarding his share, bequeathing most of his properties to his fourth wife, Hanumayamma. However, he granted life interest in the plaint schedule property to his widowed daughter, Ramayamma, for her maintenance, and vested remainder to his fourth wife, Hanumayamma. Ramayamma held the property until her death in 1984, as evidenced by Ex.A.9.
21. The record shows that Hanumayamma executed a gift deed dated 06.05.1914 (Ex.A.3 / Ex.A.10), gifting her vested remainder in the suit property to her brother, Jetti Ramaiah. As per Ex.A.4 (original Will executed by Jetti Ramaiah dated 24.02.1954), Jetti Ramaiah later bequeathed a life estate to his wife, Sowbhagyamma, with the remainder to Tirupathamma. Tirupathamma, the only daughter of Jetti Ramaiah and Sowbhagyamma, died intestate in 1981, leaving behind her husband (1st plaintiff) and their children (plaintiffs 2 and 3). The plaintiffs claim that upon Ramayamma's death on 29.06.1984, they became entitled to the suit property, as Tirupathamma, the vested remainderman, died intestate. They rely on the terms of Exs.A.2 and A.4 and assert that any alienation made by Ramayamma during her lifetime is not binding on them.
822. The defendant claims that Ramayamma had a foster daughter, Kamala Kumari, who became mentally disabled after marriage and was abandoned by her husband. Both then lived with the defendant, Kamala Kumari's sister's husband. He contends that Ramayamma's father had a legal duty to maintain her and that her rights in the property were recognised, leading to absolute ownership under the Hindu Succession Act. Accordingly, she executed a registered will (Ex.B.1 = Ex.X.1) in his favour, which took effect upon her death, making him the rightful owner of the suit schedule property.
23. The plaintiffs argue that the interest granted to Ramayamma under Ex.A.2 was a restricted estate governed by Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, not an absolute one under Section 14(1). They claim she had no pre-existing legal right to maintenance, and the property was given solely due to her father's moral, not legal, obligation. Since Ex.A.2 provided her only a lifetime enjoyment of the property, they assert this does not create a legal right but a limited grant, with the vested remainder going to Hanumayamma and they contend section 14(2) of the Act applies.
24. As evidenced in the record, the execution of the Ex.A.2 document is undisputed. A perusal of Ex.A.2 reveals that Venkatrayudu granted the scheduled property to his twelve-year-old widowed daughter, who was residing with him and under his care, for her maintenance during her lifetime, with the vested remainder passing to Hanumayamma. In light of these contentions, the Trial Court has considered whether a daughter, married, unmarried or widow, has any pre-existing right of maintenance from the father and whether it should be only a legal pre-existing right.
25. The Trial Court referred to the evidence of PW.1 and DWs.1 to 3 in this regard. PW.1, during cross-examination, stated that Ramayamma did not inherit any property from her husband. As DW.1, the defendant testified that Ramayamma had no children and did not inherit any property from her husband or her father-in-law, either as a share or in lieu of maintenance. The 9 evidence on record establishes that Ramayamma was married at the age of 10 or 12, and her husband passed away before she could live with him in family life.
26. After analysing the evidence, the Trial Court recorded its findings, which the 1st Appellate Court affirmed. Both the Courts found that the evidence of PW.1 and DWs.1 to 3, along with Ex.A.2, clearly established that Ramayamma was married as a child, a practice prevalent during that period and she became a child widow and lived under the care and maintenance of her father, Venkatrayudu and she received no property or maintenance from her husband, father-in-law, or any of their heirs. Given that she had no other means of support, Venkatrayudu provided her with the suit property, allowing her to cultivate it and enjoy the income during her lifetime. The correctness of these findings, as recorded by the Trial Court and affirmed by the 1st Appellate Court, has not been disputed before this Court.
27. The Trial Court has referred to the decision of the High Court of Madras in Ambu Bai Ammal V. Soni Bai Ammal 2 , wherein, number of earlier decisions and passages from various tests were considered. The Full Bench has considered the question in decision whether Hindu widow is bound to maintain out of her husband estate, her husband's widowed daughter, when the daughter is without means and her husband's family is unable to support her. After referring to various decisions, the learned Trial Judge was inclined to hold that the widowed daughter is entitled to maintenance out of her father's estate in the hands of his widow.
28. The Trial Court also referred another decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Shiv Narain and others V. Mst. Raji and others 3, wherein it is observed that:
"26............Thus, Hindu Law imposes a moral obligation upon the father to maintain or to provide for the maintenance of his unmarried 2 AIR 1940 Madras 804 3 AIR 1982 Rajasthan 119 10 daughters and a father-in-law to provide for the maintenance of his son's widow during his lifetime, even out of his self-acquired property".
31. A daughter is entitled to maintenance until her marriage and to have her marriage expenses defrayed, and an unmarried daughter of a Hindu coparcener can sue the manager of the joint family for her maintenance. After marriage, her maintenance is a charge upon her husband during the lifetime and, after his death, upon her husband's family. If they are unable to support her and the widowed daughter returns to live with her father, there is a moral obligation to maintain his widowed daughter during his lifetime and to make provision out of his self-acquired property for her maintenance after his death. On his death, the moral obligation becomes a legal obligation when his estate comes into the possession of his heirs.
49. The legal conclusions on the subject were summarised in the aforesaid case, after an exhaustive consideration of the entire Law on the subject, as under:--
50. "Applying the principles enunciated above to the facts of the present case, it is apparent that Smt. Omkumari, being the unmarried daughter of Bastiram, had a right to be maintained out of the joint family property in the hands of Bastiram and after his death in the hands of his son Arjunshigh". Even after the death of Arjun Singh, Smt. Omkumari had a right of maintenance out of the properties left by Arjunsingh, and although the aforesaid right may not constitute a right to the said properties, she certainly had a right to be maintained out of the properties in question or in other words it may be said that she had a right of maintenance against the property in question. The plaintiffs, though are nearest reversioners of deceased Arjunsingh, cannot, therefore, be entitled to claim possession of the property in question as they have not made any suitable arrangements for the maintenance of Omkumari. The decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in V. Tulasamma's case (AIR 1977 SC 1944) directly leads to this conclusion that even if no specific charge is created in her favour, yet the right of maintenance possessed by Omkumari, is enforceable against the joint family property left by Arjunsingh, irrespective of the fact whether the property may be in the hands of reversioners of deceased Arjunsingh. The right is enforceable against the joint family property or even against a volunteer or reversioner or even against a purchaser, taking the same with notice of her claim. In this view of the matter, as Omkumari is presumably in possession of the property in dispute in satisfaction of her claim for maintenance the suit for possession filed by the nearest reversioners must fail.
1129. The Trial Court has also referred the decision in T.A.Lakshmi Narasamba V. T. Sundaramma and others.4, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh observed that:
67. The other question that remains to be answered is when the donee or devisee is a stranger, whether he is liable to maintain the daughter-in-law.
Reference made to be only speaks :
"whether the moral obligation of father in law possessed of separate and self acquired property, to maintain the widowed daughter in law ripens into a legal obligation in the hands of the persons to whom he had either bequeathed his property or made a gift of his property".
75.................. Accordingly we hold that the donee or devisee strangers are liable for maintenance of the widow ed daughter-in-law.
79. In the result, our answer to the reference is that the Moral obligation of a father-in-law possessed of separate or self-acquired property to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law ripens into a legal obligation in the hands of persons to whom he has either bequeathed or made a gift of his property.
30. The Trial Court took note of the fact that the moral claim of a widowed daughter matures into a legal right upon the death of the father, regardless of whether a Will or a gift transfers the property. The Trial Court has referred the Full Bench decision of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.A. Lakshmi Narasamba case cited supra, while referring to the decision of the High Court of Calcutta in Gopala Chandra Pal V. Kadambini Dasi and others.5, observed that the learned judge (in AIR 1924 Calcutta) treated both the will and gift on the same footing, one being transferred during the lifetime and the other being a transfer taking place by the time of his death.
31. The Trial Court further found that it made no difference whether the father's property was ancestral or self-acquired. Based on the evidence, the Trial Court concluded that when a Hindu father executed a will bequeathing certain property to his daughter to be enjoyed by her for life in lieu of maintenance, in fulfilment of his moral obligation, it must be recognised as acknowledging her pre-existing right to maintenance. After thoroughly appreciating the material on record and adhering to the principles established 4 AIR 1981 AP 88 5 AIR 1924 Calcutta 364 12 in the cited decisions, the Trial Court concluded that there can be no distinction between a moral claim and a legal claim in determining the existence of a pre-existing right. This approach aligns with the recognition of the maintenance rights of daughters and widowed daughters under Section 19(v) and (vi) of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.
32. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that since the father was under a moral obligation and not a legal one, the will marked as Ex.A.2 does not confer a pre-existing right of maintenance. Consequently, the interest created in favour of Ramayamma is only a restricted interest, with a vested remainder in Hanumayamma, and therefore, Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act applies.
33. Learned counsel for the respondent relied on the decision in Kota Varaprasada Rao and Ors. V. Kota China Venkaiah and Ors.6, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
27. In view of the different texts cited and the case law noted, we hold that a destitute widowed daughter has a right of maintenance against her brothers after the death of her father when she could not get sufficient provision from her deceased husband's family for her maintenance.
28. It is now contended by Mr. PLN Sarma that the suit property given to Adi Lakshmamma in lieu of her maintenance -- a pre-existing right -- though for life-
estate matures into an absolute-character by virtue of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Mr. P. V. Seshaiah, on the other hand, contended that the suit property settled was out of sympathy for her maintenance and not by virtue of a pre-existing right and therefore, Section 14(1) does not work in and it is Section 14(2) that operates so as to uphold the restricted estate.
29. We have already held on point No. 1 that the daughter, Adi Lakshmamma, had a pre-existing right against her brothers for her maintenance and admittedly the suit property was settled in her favour, though for life-estate, for her maintenance as she could get nothing for dependence from her husband's family.
34. The Supreme Court in Gulwant Kaur V. Mohinder Singh MANU/SC/0514/1987MANU/SC/0514/1987 : [1987] 3 SCR 576 again held (at p. 2256 of AIR):
6MANU/AP/0001/1992 13 If a female Hindu is put in possession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in the property and once that position is accepted, it follows that the right gets enlarged to a full ownership u/S. 14(1) of the Act.
38. We accordingly hold that the suit property given to Adi Lakshmamma under Ex. B-1 for her maintenance for life time enlarges into an absolute-estate under sub-sec. (1) of S. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.
34. In Laxmappa and others V. Balawa Kom Tirkappa Chavdi 7 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:
3. The Law on the subject was taken stock of by the High Court by quoting para 546 of Mulla's book on Hindu Law, 15th Edition, which provides that a Hindu father is bound to maintain his unmarried daughters, and on the death of the father, they are entitled to be maintained out of his estate. The position of the married daughter is somewhat different. It is acknowledged that if the daughter is unable to obtain maintenance from her husband or, after his death, from his family, her father, if he has got separate property of his own, is under a moral, though not a legal, obligation to maintain her. The High Court has concluded that it was clear that the father was under an obligation to maintain the plaintiff-respondent. Seemingly, the High Court in doing so was conscious of the declaration made in the gift deed in which she was described as a destitute and unable to maintain herself. In that way, the father may not have had a legal obligation to maintain her, but all the same, there existed a moral obligation. And if in acknowledgment of that moral obligation the father had transferred property to his daughter then it is an obligation well-fructified. In other words, a moral obligation, even though not enforceable under the Law, would, by acknowledgment, bring it to the level of a legal obligation, for it would be perfectly legitimate for the father to treat himself obliged out of love and affection to maintain his destitute daughter, even impinging to a reasonable extent on his ancestral property. It is duly acknowledged in Hindu Law that the Karta of the family has, in some circumstances, the power to alienate ancestral property to meet an obligation of the kind. We would rather construe the said paragraph more liberally in the modern context having regard to the state of Law which has been brought about in the succeeding years. Therefore, in our view, the High Court was within its right to come to the conclusion that there was an obligation on the part of the father to maintain his destitute widowed daughter.
35. The Trial Court relies on the decision in Smt. P. Hanumayamma V. T. Kotilingam8, wherein the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that:
7MANU/SC/0961/1996 8 1986 (2 )APLJ 90 14
23......... the provisions of Sec. 14(1) are attracted to cases governed by wills and that if the property is given to the female in lieu of a pre-existing right, the widow becomes an absolute owner of the property and the vested remainder is accordingly nullified and the provisions of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 will not, in such cases, apply and I also hold that it is not necessary that the will or other document under which property is given to a female should expressly specify that the property is given in lieu of a pre-
existing right or a right of maintenance. It is sufficient if such a right was in existence in favour of the female on the date when the document is executed.
25................Even as a matter of Law, if Ramamma's estate had indeed become absolute by force of the statute and even if she made a statement in 1961 that her estate was not enlarged, such a statement would not be binding on her or those who claim through her, in as much as it is well settled that there is no estoppel on a pure question of Law........... there is no question of any election or estoppel which precludes the defendants from relying on the provisions of the 1956 Act.
36. The Trial Court has also made a reference to the decision in V. Tulasamma and Ors. V. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by Lrs9., wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoyed by pure Shastric Hindu Law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed as follows:
70................(2) Section 14(j) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-
economic ends sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.
(3) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the mean provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.
(4) Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time End has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a 9 MANU/SC/0380/1977 15 restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the Sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's* limited interest would auto metrically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of Sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.
(5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes Sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of Sub-section (2).
(6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in Section 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same. Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of Section 14(1) she would get absolute interest in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title.
(7) That the words "restricted estate" used in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.
72. It is therefore, clear that the compromise by which the properties were allotted to the appellant Tulasamma in lieu of her maintenance were merely in recognition of her right to maintenance which was a pre-existing right and, therefore, the case of the appellant would be taken out of the ambit of Section 14(2) and would fall squarely within Section 14(1) read with the Explanation thereto.....................
37. As seen from the judgment of the 1st Appellate Court, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants/plaintiffs relied on the decision in T.A.Lakshmi Narasamba's case (cited supra), wherein the full bench of the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh, after referring various 16 pronouncements on the subject agreed with the view expressed in Rangamahal V. Echammal10, Gopal Chandrapal V. Kadaimbini Das (cited supra) and Foolcomari Dasti V. Debendra Nath11, held that there is a legal liability upon a Hindu heir to provide maintenance to a daughter-in-law irrespective of the fact whether heir takes property of intestacy or under gift. Their lordships also fully agreed with the principles enunciated in Janaki V. Nan Ram12, that there is a moral obligation on the part of the father-in-law to maintain the widowed daughter-in-law, and it is treated as a debt and if not discharged by providing maintenance to a daughter-in-law, the same has to be discharged by heirs and that the moral obligation ripens into legal obligation against the property in the hands of heirs.
38. The 1st Appellate Court also referred to the decision in Ram Sarup and others V. Smt. Patto and others 13, wherein it held that though the Hindu father is not bound to maintain his married, widowed daughter under the Law yet, he is under a moral obligation to maintain her if she is unable to obtain maintenance from the family of her husband, a moral obligation becomes a legal obligation when the estate of a person on whom moral obligation lay comes into possession of his heirs.
39. The learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs before the 1st Appellate Court relied on the decision in Gumpha V. Jaibai 14 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that acquisition in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance and any manner whatsoever needs elucidation and the use of words 'in lieu of' or 'arrears of' appear to be significant. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that if a female Hindu acquires possession after the enforcement of the Succession Act and that possession was traceable to an instrument or a document described in sub-section (2), then she could not get a higher right than what is stipulated in the document itself.
101899 ILR page 22 Madras 305 11 AIR 1942 Calcutta 474 12 1889 ILR 11 Allahabad 194 13 AIR 1981 Punjab and Haryana 69 14 1994 (2) SCC 511 17
40. Upon detailed analysis of the applicability of the decision in Gumpha V. Jaibai to the facts of the present matter, the 1st Appellate Court correctly held that the legal proposition laid down therein is distinguishable on facts. In Gumpha V. Jaibai, the last male holder with two wives executed a Will in 1941, granting a life interest in equal shares to both wives, with his daughter named as the ultimate beneficiary. However, the testator in that case passed away in 1958, after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Consequently, the will took effect post-1956, and the Supreme Court found no necessity to examine the earlier decision in Thota Seshamma V. Thotal Manikayamma, which concerned a testator who had died before the enactment, wherein the widow held the property as a limited owner and later acquired absolute rights by operation of Law. The 1st Appellate Court rightly observed that the fact of the testator's death in 1958 in Gumpha V. Jaibai constitutes a material distinction, rendering that authority inapplicable to the facts of the present case. This Court concurs with the 1st Appellate Court's reasoning and affirms its conclusion regarding the limited relevance of the decision in Gumpha V. Jaibai to the matter at hand.
41. The 1st Appellate Court has correctly concluded that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thota Seshamma's case (cited supra) squarely applies to the facts of the present case. In that decision, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, must be limited in its application to cases where a Hindu female acquires property for the first time--without any pre-existing right--through a grant, gift, Will, or under any other instrument, decree, or award, wherein the terms explicitly confer a restricted estate. The provision, therefore, does not apply where the female had a pre-existing right in the property, and the instrument merely formalizes or recognizes such right.
42. As rightly observed in the preceding paragraphs, the recitals in Ex.A.2, when read in conjunction with the settled legal proposition that a father bears a moral obligation to maintain his dependent daughter, clearly indicate that 18 Venkatrayudu fulfilled this obligation by transferring the suit property to Ramayamma. This moral obligation, in Law, is treated as a debt chargeable upon the father's property. Hence, the transfer of property under Ex.A.2 must be construed as one made in recognition of that obligation and for maintenance. The 1st Appellate Court, after assigning cogent reasons, affirmed the Trial Court's finding that Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, governs the present case, not Section 14(2). This is because Venkatrayudu died before 06.05.1914, and Ramayamma was already in possession of the property at the time of the commencement of the Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Gumpha V. Jaibai (cited supra) is inapplicable. In contrast, the ratio laid down in Thota Seshamma V. Thotal Manikayamma (cited supra) aptly applies to the facts of the present case
43. The learned counsel for the appellants contends that what is given to Ramayamma under the will only confers a right to the usufructs of the land and not the land itself, and Black's Law Dictionary defines the words 'Usufruct' as follows:
" A right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another's property without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the property over time. In Roman Law, the usufruct was considered a personal servitude, resulting in a real right. In Modern Civil Law, the owner of the usufruct is similar to a life tenant and the owner of the property burdened is known as the naked owner:"
44. As already observed, both the Courts concurrently held that possession of the schedule property was delivered to Ramayamma, and that she remained in possession of the property during her lifetime. Subsequently, in pursuance of the documents she executed, the defendant came into possession of the said property.
45. Learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Kali V. Choudhri Ajit Shankar and Ors. 15 , wherein, although the right of residence until death was given, the 15 MANU/SC/1420/1997 19 observations made therein are nonetheless applicable to the facts of the present case. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the pertinent observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which bear directly on the issue at hand:
20. Having held as above, the High Court, on a wrong understanding of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, held further that Kamlawati got under the will only a limited interest in the suit house, namely a right of residence till her death. In the light of the ruling of this Court in Tulsamma's case (supra), we have no doubt that the High Court went wrong in taking the view that Kamlawati, the appellant's vendor, got only a limited estate in the suit house because of the terms of the will. As pointed out earlier, Kamlawati had a pre-
existing right, and she was in possession of the suit house when the Hindu Succession Act came into force. in view of Section 14(1) of the said Act, her limited estate enlarges into an absolute one. The reversioners have no right in the property till it comes to them by reversion because the widow is not a 'trustee' of the interests of the reversioners after the coming into force of the 1956 Act. In that view, the appellant succeeds in this Appeal.
In light of the principles cited supra, this Court is not inclined to accept the submissions made by the appellants counsel, as it is clearly stated in Ex.A.2 that the right granted to Ramayamma cannot be construed as a mere licence to use the land. The property was delivered to her in terms of the will, which explicitly recognises her pre-existing title to the estate, and such recognition transforms into full ownership upon the death of her father.
46. The 1st Appellate Court, after considering the principles laid down in Ram Sarup's case (cited supra) and noting that Sections 21 and 22 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act are prospective, rightly held that N. Venkatrayudu was under a moral obligation to maintain his destitute daughter, Ramayamma. The recitals in Ex.A.2 make it evident that Ramayamma had no independent source of maintenance. Accordingly, the suit property was granted to her so that she could enjoy its usufructs through cultivation during her lifetime. The admitted facts on record further establish that Ramayamma became a widow at the young age of 12 and had no support from her husband's family. She resided with her father, who, in recognition of his 20 obligation, conferred the suit property upon her with a life interest solely for her maintenance.
47. Upon careful consideration of the material on record, this Court is of the view that both the Courts below have rightly concluded that the allotment made to Ramayamma, as evidenced by the original of Ex.A.2, should be construed as having been made in satisfaction of her right to be maintained from her father's property. The said property was admittedly given to her in lieu of maintenance for life, thereby recognising her pre-existing right of maintenance. It is further undisputed that Ramayamma had the property, having acquired it before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Since she passed away on 29.06.1984, after the commencement of the Act, the provisions of Section 14(1), read with the Explanation thereto, of the Hindu Succession Act are attracted to the present case. Consequently, Ramayamma became the absolute owner of the said property
48. As evident from the record, the plaintiffs assert their claim over the suit property based on the following documents: the gift deed marked as Ex.A.3 dated 06.05.1914, the will marked as Ex.A.4 dated 24.02.1954, and the will marked as Ex.X.1 (also exhibited as Ex.B.1) dated 24.08.1983. The Trial Court correctly observed that Exs.A.3 and A.4 were executed before the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act. In contrast, the defendant asserts his right to the property by virtue of the will marked as Ex.X.1. Both the Trial Court and the Appellate Court have noted that Ramayamma, who initially held only a life interest in the suit property under Ex.A.2, became the absolute owner by operation of Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Consequently, she was entitled to dispose of the property as she wished. Exercising this right, she executed a registered Will dated 24.08.1983 (Ex.X.1) in favour of the defendant, bequeathing the suit property to him. The record further reveals that Ramayamma had no biological children but fostered a daughter named Kamala Kumari. The defendant is the husband of Kamala Kumari's sister. It is undisputed that Kamala Kumari was mentally disabled, had been abandoned 21 by her husband, and was residing with Ramayamma. The Trial Court accepted the defendant's contention regarding the valid execution of the Will (Ex.X.1/Ex.B.1) in his favour.
49. In this context, both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have taken note of specific admissions made by PW.1, the 1st plaintiff. PW.1 deposed that during Ramayamma's lifetime, Kamala Kumari was under her care and protection. He further stated that he was unaware of the reasons behind Ramayamma executing the registered will dated 24.08.1983 in favour of the defendant and that he did not know how the defendant came into possession of the suit property. To establish the execution of the Will by Ramayamma, the defendant adduced evidence by examining DW.3, Kalari Venkateswarlu, who testified that he was present at the time of the will's execution. The defendant also examined DW.4, S.V.S. Prasad, an employee of Canara Bank, who produced the original Will (Ex.X.1) before the Court to corroborate the defendant's loan transaction, thereby confirming the document's authenticity. Further, DW.5, B. Venkata Ramana Rao, the scribe of Ex.X.1, was examined in support of the defendant's case. He testified that he prepared the will based on instructions given by Ramayamma. After drafting it, he read its contents to her, and upon her acceptance, she affixed her thumb impressions to the document. He also confirmed that the attesting witnesses were present and observed Ramayamma affixing her thumb impressions while she likewise witnessed them signing the will.
50. The record indicates that Ex.X.1 is a registered Will. The attesting witnesses have consistently deposed that the testator, Ramayamma, was in good health and possessed a sound and disposing state of mind when executing the will in favour of the defendant. DW.6, K.S.S. Prakasa Rao, fully corroborated the defendant's case. He testified that both he and DW.3, Venkateswarlu, signed as attesting witnesses to the will in the presence of Ramayamma. His evidence confirms that all the formalities required for the valid execution of a Will were duly complied with. Additionally, the defendant 22 examined DW.7, Naidu Venkateswarlu, who also testified that he and DW.6 attested Ex.X.1 in Ramayamma's presence. His testimony is equally clear and categorical regarding the due execution of the will and the fulfilment of all legal formalities.
51. Both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court have carefully evaluated the evidence of the attesting witnesses and the scribe of Ex.X.1 and rightly concluded that the testimony of DWs.5 to 7 establishes that Ramayamma voluntarily expressed her intention to execute the will in favour of the defendant. Their evidence was natural, consistent, and credible, and it remained unshaken during cross-examination. Notably, the witnesses are independent and unrelated to the parties. Their testimonies demonstrate that Ramayamma was healthy, in a sound and disposing state of mind and that she instructed DW.5 to prepare a draft of the will. After reading the contents to her and confirming their correctness, DW.5 proceeded to scribe the will. DWs.6 and 7 attested the will by signing it in the presence of DW.5 and Ramayamma, and DW.5 also subscribed his signature. Additionally, DWs.6 and 7 identified Ramayamma before the Sub-Registrar at registration. The Trial Court took note of the plaintiffs' contention that Ramayamma's thumb impression on Ex.X.1 was allegedly obtained without her knowledge.
52. However, the plaintiffs did not dispute that the thumb impression affixed to Ex.X.1 was indeed that of Ramayamma. Upon a thorough analysis of the evidence on record, the Trial Court rightly concluded, supported by the findings of the 1st Appellate Court, that the will was voluntarily executed by Ramayamma. At the same time, she was in a sound and disposing state of mind. The Trial Court also found no valid grounds to disbelieve the testimonies of DWs.5 to 7 and observed that the plaintiffs failed to produce any evidence to suggest any unnatural circumstances surrounding the execution of the will. Furthermore, it was noted that Ramayamma had been in possession and enjoyment of the properties covered under Ex.A.1 for many years and that she executed Ex.X.1 in favour of the defendant. The evidence 23 of DW.2, aged approximately 80 years, and DW.3, aged about 60 years, was also taken into account, both of whom stated that Ramayamma was being cared for by the defendant and his wife. The Trial Court found the evidence adduced on behalf of the defendant to be convincing and credible. The 1st Appellate Court has also duly appreciated the evidence pertaining to the will executed by Ramayamma and rightly concluded that the findings of the learned Subordinate Judge were based on a proper and thorough evaluation of the material on record. Specifically, the defendant examined the attesting witnesses and the scribe of Ex.X.1 as DWs 6, 7, and 5, whose testimony sufficiently establishes the due execution of the registered Will by Ramayamma. Upon a careful and independent assessment of the entire evidence, the 1st Appellate Court concurred with the Trial Court and observed that there is no basis to take a view different from that of the learned Subordinate Judge regarding the validity and execution of Ex.X.1. Accordingly, both the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, based on cogent and well-reasoned analysis, accepted the execution of Ex.X.1 Will by Ramayamma in favour of the defendant as valid and genuine.
53. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in several cases, has held that the exercise of powers under Section 100 of C.P.C. can interfere with the findings of fact only if the same is shown to be perverse and based on no evidence. Some of these judgments are Hajazat Hussain V. Abdul Majeed & others16, Union of India V. Ibrahim Uddin 17 , and Vishwanath Agrawal V. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal18.
54. In light of the foregoing, the findings of the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court, which affirm that the plaintiffs cannot succeed in getting possession of the suit property as it is not available to them by virtue of the force of statute and Ex.X.1 and that the plaintiffs are not entitled to get possession of the suit property, are neither perverse nor a result of 16 2011 (7) SCC 189 17 2012 (8) SCC 148 18 2012 (7) SCC 288 24 misinterpretation of documents or misreading of evidence. After careful reading of the material on record, this Court finds that the trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court concurrently dismissed the Plaintiffs' suit by recording all the findings of facts as enumerated above, and the findings are neither against the pleadings nor evidence nor against any provisions of Law. This Court finds no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of both courts, which are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on record. This Court considers that the conclusions of the Trial Court and the 1st Appellate Court are not subject to interference under Section 100 of C.P.C. There is no question of Law, let alone a substantial question of Law, involved in this Second Appeal, and therefore, the Appeal is liable to be dismissed.
55. As a result, this Second Appeal is dismissed without costs. Consequently, the judgment and decree dated 18.03.1995 of the learned District Judge, Guntur, in A.S.No.31 of 1989, is hereby affirmed.
Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Appeal, shall stand closed.
_____________________________ JUSTICE T. MALLIKARJUNA RAO Date: 09.05.2025 SAK 25 THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE T MALLIKARJUNA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO: 480/2001 Date:09.05.2025 SAK