State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
B.K. Sharma vs Dda on 14 November, 2022
FA-38/2014 14.11.2022
B.K. SHARMA VS. DDA
14.11.2022
Present : None for the parties.
FA-38/2014
Before deciding the present appeal on merits, we find that an application seeking condonation of delay is yet to be disposed off.
The present appeal has been filed on 10.01.2014 against the impugned order dated 25.10.2013 passed by District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-V (District North-West), Shalimar Bagh in compliant case No.1010/2011. An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act read with Section 151 of CPC for condonation of delay was filed on 13.01.2014 vide diary No.300. However, this application is being considered under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.
Record has been carefully and thoroughly perused. It has been averred in the application that the clerk of counsel Mr. U.S. Tewari has received the copy of the judgment on 13.12.2013 and thereafter, appeal was filed on 10.01.2014 i.e. within the period of limitation; the appeal could not be filed within 30 days from the date of order dated 25.10.2013 as the applicant was not aware of the judgment and the copy of the judgment was also not supplied to the applicant prior to 13.12.2013. This application is supported by an affidavit of Mr. Uma Shanker Tewari S/o Mr. Rama Kant Tewari, clerk of the counsel. However, name of the counsel has not been mentioned in the affidavit. Neither affidavit of the appellant nor his counsel has been filed. Stating the aforementioned grounds, the Appellant submitted that the non-filling of appeal within time was neither intentional nor deliberate.
Page 1 of 5FA-38/2014 14.11.2022 To adjudicate this issue, we deem it appropriate to refer to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which provides as under:
"Any person aggrieved by an order made by the District Forum may prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of thirty days from the date of the order in such form and manner as may be prescribed.
Provided that the State Commission may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it within that period:
Provided further that no appeal by a person, who is required to pay any amount in terms of an order of the District Forum, shall be entertained by the State Commission unless the appellant has deposited in the prescribed manner fifty per cent. of the amount or rupees thirty-five thousand, whichever is less."
A perusal of the aforesaid statutory position reflects that the appeal against an impugned order should be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of such order. On perusal of record before us, it is clear that the impugned judgment was pronounced on 25.10.2013 and the present appeal was filed on 10.01.2014 with a delay of 76 days.
In order to condone the delay, the Appellant has to satisfy this commission that there was sufficient cause for preferring the appeal after the stipulated period. The term 'sufficient cause' has been explained by the Apex Court in Basawaraj and Ors. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer reported in AIR 2014 SC 746. The relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a Page 2 of 5 FA-38/2014 14.11.2022 platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose." We also deem it appropriate to refer to Anil Kumar Sharma vs. United Indian Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors.reported inIV(2015)CPJ453(NC), wherein the Hon'ble NCDRC held as under: -
"12. .........we are not satisfied with the cause shown to justify the delay of 590/601 days. Day to day delay has not been explained. Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment of AnshulAggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has held that while deciding the application filed for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986, for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes, will get defeated if the appeals and revisions, which are highly belated are entertained."
We further deem it appropriate to refer to Lingeswaran Etc. Versus Thirunagalingam in Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos.2054- Page 3 of 5
FA-38/2014 14.11.2022 2055/2022 decided on 25.02.2022, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: -
"5. We are in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court. Once it was found even by the learned trial Court that delay has not been properly explained and even there are no merits in the application for condonation of delay, thereafter, the matter should rest there and the condonation of delay application was required to be dismissed. The approach adopted by the learned trial Court that, even after finding that, in absence of any material evidence it cannot be said that the delay has been explained and that there are no merits in the application, still to condone the delay would be giving a premium to a person who fails to explain the delay and who is guilty of delay and laches. At this stage, the decision of this Court in the case of PopatBahiruGoverdhane v. Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 765 is required to be referred to. In the said decision, it is observed and held that the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same.
From the aforesaid dicta of the Hon'ble Apex Court and the Hon'ble National Commission, it is clear that 'sufficient cause' means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part and applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay.
Reverting to the material available before us, we find that period for filing the present appeal expired on 25.11.2013. However, the Appellant could not file the Appeal within stipulated time and the Page 4 of 5 FA-38/2014 14.11.2022 reason stated by the Appellant is that the copy of the impugned order was received by the appellant on 13.12.2013 as the applicant/ appellant was not aware of the judgment and the copy of the judgment was also not supplied to the applicant before 13.12.2013, the present appeal was filed by the Appellant within 30 days from the date of receipt of such copy.
This application is supported by an affidavit of Mr. Uma Shanker Tewari, clerk of the counsel who had allegedly received the copy of impugned order from the learned District Forum. Even date on which certified copy was applied has not been mentioned.
Having regard to the statutory position discussed in para Supra and the facts of the case, the Appellant has failed to show any sufficient cause for the delay in filing the present appeal. Therefore, the application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay cannot be admitted and accordingly, the same is dismissed on the above grounds.
Consequently, the present appeal filed beyond the statutory period shall also stands dismissed. However, in the facts of the case, there shall be no orders as to cost.
Copy of this order alongwith Record of District Forum be sent to the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission-V (District North-West), Shalimar Bagh, New Delhi - 110005, for information.
File be consigned to record room.
(Pinki) Member (Judicial) (Justice Sangita Dhingra Sehgal) President Page 5 of 5