Karnataka High Court
Mr Santosh Kumar R S vs Mr Aditya Dhar on 22 April, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 22nd DAY OF APRIL, 2026
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
WRIT PETITION No.10911/2026 (C)
BETWEEN:
MR. SANTOSH KUMAR .R.S
S/O LATE MR. R.R. SHIVANAND,
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
WRITER, DIRECTOR & PRODUCER,
PASSION MOVIE MAKERS
NO.321, GAANA RESIDENCY,
KUMARASWAMY LAYOUT,
BENGALURU-560078.
...PETITIONER
(BY SRI RAJESH K.S., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MR. ADITYA DHAR
S/O SUNITA DHAR
AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS,
FILM DIRECTOR & PRODUCER,
2. MR. LOKESH DHAR
S/O SUNITA DHAR,
AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS,
FILM PRODUCER,
BOTH HAVE OFFICE AT/
M/S. B62 STUDIOS PVT. LTD.,
401, 4TH FLOOR, GLACIS TOWER,
BANDRA LINKING ROAD,
KHAR (WEST), MUMBAI-400052
MAHARASHTRA STATE.
ALSO AT/ B62 STUDIOS
REGISTERED OFFICE AT 611,
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RELIABLES PRIDE, ANAND NAGAR,
JOGESHWARI WEST, MUMBAI-400102.
3. SMT. JYOTHI DESHPANDE
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS,
W/O SANJAY DESHPANDE,
C.E.O. & FILM PRODUCER
OFFICE AT/ JIO STUDIOS,
19TH FLOOR, ONE BKC, B WING,
G BLOCK, BANDRAKURLA COMPLEX,
BANDRA EAST, MUMBAI-400051
MAHARASHTRA STATE.
4. CENTRAL BOARD OF FILM CERTIFICATION
NO.24, DR. GOPALRAO DESHMUKH MARG,
I.T COLONY, CUMBALLA HILL,
MUMBAI, MAHARASHTRA-400026.
REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIR PERSON
MR. PRASOON JOSHI.
...RESPONDENTS
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO DIRECTION TO THE
RESPONDENT NO.4, TO CANCEL THE CERTIFICATE GRANTED TO
RESPONDENT NO. 1 TO 3 THE SCREENING OF THE FILM DHURANDHAR-
2, HINDI MOVIE WHICH IS ALSO DUBBED AND RELEASED IN ALL
SOUTH INDIAN LANGUAGES IN DIFFERENT STATES BY THE
RESPONDENT NO.1 TO 3 AND SUB DISTRIBUTORS AND OTHER THAN
THIS IF IT IS DUBBED TO ANY OTHER INDIAN LANGUAGES AND OTT,
ALL THE SCREENING HAS TO BE STAYED IN THE COUNTRY UNTIL THE
DISPOSAL OF THIS CASE.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR
ORDERS ON 08/04/2026, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS
DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA
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CAV O R D E R
This writ petition is filed seeking issuance of a writ of
mandamus to direct respondent No.4-Central Board of Film
Certification to cancel certification granted to the Hindi movie
'Dhurandhar-2' and to restrain its screening across
platforms, alleging that the said movie is plagiarized version
of the petitioner's original story/script.
Brief facts:
2. The petitioner claims to be a film writer, director
and producer, who has authored an original script titled 'D-
Saheb' based on a patriotic theme involving anti-terror
operations. It is contended that the petitioner has developed
the story, screenplay, character sketches and has registered
the same with Screen Writers Association and other
authorities.
3. It is the case of the petitioner that during the year
2023, he had shared the said script with various production
houses and industry personnel, including respondent No.3
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through intermediaries such as one Dinesh Kumar, who was
engaged as a creative producer. The petitioner asserts that
the respondents, having gained access to his script, have
unlawfully copied the same and produced the movie
'Dhurandhar-2', which was subsequently released in multiple
languages across the country. Aggrieved, by the alleged
authorized use of story and failure of the respondents to give
credit or compensation, the petitioner has approached this
Court seeking cancellation of the certification granted to the
film and for consequential relief.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that:
i. The petitioner is the original author of the story,
screenplay and concept of 'D-Saheb', which has been duly
registered and documented.
ii. The respondents, having gained access to the
petitioner's script through industry interactions, have
dishonestly copied substantial portion of the story,
characters and screenplay.
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iii. The impugned film, 'Dhurandhar-2' is a clear case
of plagiarism and the respondents have unjustly enriched
themselves by exploiting the petitioner's private proprietary
rights.
iv. The certificate granted by the Central Board of
Film Certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 (for
short 'the Cinematograph Act' for short), is liable to be
interfered with, as the very content of the film is illegal and
violative of the petitioner's right.
v. Unless immediate orders are passed, irreparable
injury would be caused to the petitioner, as the film is being
exhibited widely across theatres and OTT platforms.
5. The points that arise for consideration are :
i. Whether the writ petition alleging copyright
infringement is maintainable under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India?
ii. Whether Sections 5A and 5B of the
Cinematograph Act, which deals with certification
and regulatory control of films, can be invoked to
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adjudicate private dispute relating to
infringement of copyright?
iii. Whether in the absence of any challenge of
statutory action under Sections 5A and 5B of the
Cinematograph Act, invoking writ jurisdiction is
justified?
Point No.(i)
6. The principal grievance of the petitioner is that his
story/script has been copied by the respondents in producing
the film 'Dhurandhar-2'. Such a dispute, in substance,
pertains to copyright infringement and alleged plagiarism,
which necessarily requires a detailed examination of
evidence, including comparison of scripts, proof of
authorship, access and substantial similarity. The scope of
interference under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
limited, and the writ Court does not sit as a fact-finding in
matters involving such disputed questions of fact of such
nature. The landmark judgment of the Apex Court on
Copyright Law particularly on the distinction between idea
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and expression in dramatic and cinematography works is in
the case of R.G.Anand vs M/s Delux Films and Others1
(R.G.Anand), where it has been held at paragraph Nos.45
and 46 as under :
"45. Thus, the position appears to be that an
idea, principle, theme, or subject-matter or historical
or legendary facts being common property cannot be
the subject-matter of copyright of a particular person.
It is always open to any person to choose an idea as a
subject-matter and develop it in his own manner and
give expression to the idea by treating it differently
from others. Where two writers write on the same
subject similarities are bound to occur because the
central idea of both are the same but the similarities
or coincidences by themselves cannot lead to an
irresistible inference of plagiarism or piracy. Take for
instance the great poet and dramatist Shakespeare
most of whose plays are based on Greek-Roman and
British mythology or legendary stories like Merchant of
Venice, Hamlet, Romeo and Juliet, Julius Ceasar etc.
But the treatment of the subject by Shakespeare in
each of his dramas is so fresh, so different, so full of
poetic exuberance elegance and erudition and so novel
in character as a result of which the end product
becomes an original in itself. In fact, the power and
1
(1978) 4 SCC 118
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passion of his expression, the uniqueness, eloquence
and excellence of his style and pathos and bathos of
the dramas become peculiar to Shakespeare and
leaves precious little of the original theme adopted by
him. It will thus be preposterous to level a charge of
plagiarism against the great playwright. In fact,
throughout his original thinking, ability and incessant
labour Shakespeare has converted an old idea into a
new one, so that each of his dramas constitute a
masterpiece of English literature. It has been rightly
said that "every drama of Shakespeare is an extended
metaphor". Thus, the fundamental fact which has to
be determined where a charge of violation of the
copyright is made by the plaintiff against the
defendant is to determine whether or not the
defendant not only adopted the idea of the
copyrighted work but has also adopted the manner,
arrangement, situation to situation, scene to scene
with minor changes or super additions or
embellishment here and there. Indeed, if on a perusal
of the copyrighted work the defendant's work appears
to be a transparent rephrasing or a copy of a
substantial and material part of the original, the
charge of plagiarism must stand proved. Care however
must be taken to see whether the defendant has
merely disguised piracy or has actually reproduced the
original in different form, different tone, different
tenor so as to infuse a new life into the idea of the
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copyrighted work adapted by him. In the latter case
there is no violation of the copyright.
46. Thus, on a careful consideration and
elucidation of the various authorities and the case law
on the subject discussed above, the following
propositions emerge:
1. There can be no copyright in an idea, subject-
matter, themes, plots or historical or legendary facts
and violation of the copyright in such cases is confined
to the form, manner and arrangement and expression
of the idea by the author of the copyrighted work.
2. Where the same idea is being developed in a
different manner, it is manifest that the source being
common, similarities are bound to occur. In such a
case the courts should determine whether or not the
similarities are on fundamental or substantial aspects
of the mode of expression adopted in the copyrighted
work. If the defendant's work is nothing but a literal
imitation of the copyrighted work with some variations
here and there it would amount to violation of the
copyright. In other words, in order to be actionable
the copy must be a substantial and material one which
at once leads to the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty of an act of piracy.
3. One of the surest and the safest test to
determine whether or not there has been a violation of
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copyright is to see if the reader, spectator or the
viewer after having read or seen both the works is
clearly of the opinion and gets an unmistakable
impression that the subsequent work appears to be a
copy of the original.
4. Where the theme is the same but is presented
and treated differently so that the subsequent work
becomes a completely new work, no question of
violation of copyright arises.
5. Where however apart from the similarities
appearing in the two works there are also material and
broad dissimilarities which negative the intention to
copy the original and the coincidences appearing in
the two works are clearly incidental no infringement of
the copyright comes into existence.
6. As a violation of copyright amounts to an act of
piracy it must be proved by clear and cogent evidence
after applying the various tests laid down by the case-
law discussed above.
7. Where however the question is of the violation
of the copyright of stage play by a film producer or a
director the task of the plaintiff becomes more difficult
to prove piracy. It is manifest that unlike a stage play
a film has a much broader prospective, wider field and
a bigger background where the defendants can by
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introducing a variety of incidents give a colour and
complexion different from the manner in which the
copyrighted work has expressed the idea. Even so, if
the viewer after seeing the film gets atotality of
impression that the film is by and large a copy of the
original play, violation of the copyright may be said to
be proved."
(Emphasis supplied)
7. Thus, the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court in
the case of R.G.Anand, has authoritatively laid down that a
copyright infringement cannot succeed on mere allegation or
superficial similarity, but must be established by clear,
cogent and convincing evidence demonstrating that the other
side has in fact copied a substantial and material part of the
expression of the work. The burden squarely lies on the
person seeking infringement to prove not only that the other
side had access to the original work, but also there exists
such degree of similarity which led a prudent and reasonable
viewer to make an unmistakable impression that the
impugned work is a copy of the original. Such
adjudication/exercise necessarily requires appreciation of
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evidence and in appropriate cases, even expert analysis.
Such adjudication involves triable issue of facts, including
proof of access, originality and copying which cannot be
satisfactorily undertaken in a writ jurisdiction that is confined
to examining legality of administrative action and does not
permit detailed evidentiary enquiry, cross-examination or
fact finding trial. Therefore, it is well settled where the lis
pertains to alleged infringement of copyright, the appropriate
remedy is to institute a suit for injunction and damages
under the Copyright Act, 1957 ('the Copyright Act' for short),
where parties can lead oral and documentary evidence. A
writ petition would be maintainable except in exceptional
cases where issue is purely one of law or involves a
challenge to statutory action without disputed facts.
8. The Apex Court in the case of Whirlpool
Corporation vs. Registrar of Trademarks2 (Whirlpool
Corporation) has held at paragraph Nos.14 to 20 as under:
2
(1998) 8 SCC 1
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"14. The power to issue prerogative writs under
Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and
is not limited by any other provision of the
Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High
Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas
corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and
certiorari for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the
Constitution but also for "any other purpose".
15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the
High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has
a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ
petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself
certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective
and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court
would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the
alternative remedy has been consistently held by this
Court not to operate as a bar in at least three
contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has
been filed for the enforcement of any of the
Fundamental Rights or where there has been a
violation of the principle of natural justice or where the
order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or
the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of
case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of
forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions
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of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they
still hold the field.
16. Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana
[1950 SCC 221 : AIR 1950 SC 163 : 1950 SCR 566]
laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy
was a factor to be taken into consideration in the
matter of granting writs. This was followed by another
Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son v. Income Tax
Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207 : (1954)
25 ITR 167] which reiterated the above proposition
and held that where alternative remedy existed, it
would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to
interfere in a petition under Article 226. This
proposition was, however, qualified by the significant
words, "unless there are good grounds therefor", which
indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as
an absolute bar and that writ petition under Article 226
could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances.
17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in
State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh [AIR 1958 SC 86 : 1958
SCR 595] as under:
"But this rule requiring the exhaustion of
statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is
a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather
than a rule of law and instances are numerous
where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of
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the fact that the aggrieved party had other
adequate legal remedies."
18. This proposition was considered by a
Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V.
Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs v. Ramchand
Sobhraj Wadhwani [AIR 1961 SC 1506 : (1962) 1 SCR
753] and was affirmed and followed in the following
words:
"The passages in the judgments of this Court
we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two
exceptions which the learned Solicitor General
formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the
existence of an adequate alternative remedy were
by no means exhaustive, and (2) that even beyond
them a discretion vested in the High Court to have
entertained the petition and granted the petitioner
relief notwithstanding the existence of an
alternative remedy. We need only add that the
broad lines of the general principles on which the
Court should act having been clearly laid down,
their application to the facts of each particular case
must necessarily be dependent on a variety of
individual facts which must govern the proper
exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a
matter which is thus pre-eminently one of
discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it
would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules
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which should be applied with rigidity in every case
which comes up before the Court."
19. Another Constitution Bench decision in
Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. v. ITO, Companies Distt. I
[AIR 1961 SC 372 : (1961) 41 ITR 191] laid down:
"Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari
will not issue against an executive authority, the
High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an
order prohibiting an executive authority from acting
without jurisdiction. Where such action of an
executive authority acting without jurisdiction
subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy
proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High
Courts will issue appropriate orders or directions to
prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and
prohibition can issue against the Income Tax Officer
acting without jurisdiction under Section 34,
Income Tax Act."
20. Much water has since flown under the
bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these
decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field
with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the
High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative
statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case
where the authority against whom the writ is filed is
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shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to
usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation."
Thus, in the absence of such exceptional grounds, the
writ Court cannot entertain writ petition under Article 226.
Point Nos.(ii) and (iii):
9. Point Nos.(ii) and (iii) are taken up together in
order to avoid repetition of facts.
10. The petitioner also seeks to invoke Section 5A of
the Cinematograph Act which deals with certification of films
by the Central Board of Films Certification. To answer the
above points for consideration, the statutory provisions that
needs to be looked into are Sections 3, 5, 5A and 5B of the
Cinematograph Act.
11. Section 3 of the Cinematograph Act reads as
under:
"3. Board of film Certification.--(1) For the
purpose of sanctioning films for public exhibition, the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, constitute a Board to be called the Board of
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Film Certification which shall consist of a Chairman
and not less than twelve and not more than twenty-
five other members appointed by the Central
Government.
(2) The Chairman of the Board shall receive
such salary and allowances as may be determined by
the Central Government, and the other members shall
receive such allowances or fees for attending the
meetings of the Board as may be prescribed.
(3) The other terms and conditions of service
of the members of the Board shall be such as may be
prescribed."
12. Section 3 provides for the constitution of the
Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC) which is the
statutory authority entrusted with the examination and
certification of films.
13. The body that manages film certification in India is
commonly known as Censor Board. The Cinematograph Act
enacted by the Parliament regulates the film exhibitions in
India. The legislation is designed to guarantee that films are
appropriate for general viewing. It guarantees that they do
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not include any content that might offend or undermines
public moral or decency. The legislation also empowers the
Central Government to set up a Film Certification Body to
evaluate and certify films for screening. The Board consist of
a Chairman and members selected by the Central
Government. The members, include accomplished
professionals from variety of professions, including social
sciences, law, education, art and cinema.
14. The vision of Central Board of Film Certifications
(CBFC) is 'to ensure good and healthy entertainment' in
accordance with the Cinematograph Act and the
Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983. The
Cinematograph Act, which was one piece of legislation, was
passed in 1952 and authorized the Central Government to
form a Censorship Board. The Board certifies films without
which they are not allowed for public showing.
15. Section 5 of the Cinematograph Act reads as
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under:
"5. Advisory panels.--(1) For the purpose of
enabling the Board to efficiently discharge its functions
under this Act, the Central Government may establish
at such regional centres as it thinks fit, advisory
panels each of which shall consist of such number of
persons, being persons qualified in the opinion of the
Central Government to judge the effect of films on the
public, as the Central Government may think fit to
appoint thereto.
(2) At each regional centre there shall be as
many regional officers as the Central Government may
think fit to appoint, and rules made in this behalf may
provide for the association of regional officers in the
examination of films.
(3) The Board may consult in such manner as
may be prescribed, any advisory panel in respect of
any film for which an application for a certificate has
been made.
(4) It shall be the duty of every such advisory
panel whether acting as a body or in committees as
may be provided in the rules made in this behalf to
examine the film and to make such recommendations
to the Board as it thinks fit.
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(5) The members of the advisory panel shall
not be entitled to any salary but shall receive such
fees or allowances as may be prescribed."
16. Section 5 deals with the procedure in relation to
the Board, including the manner in which the films are to be
examined and certified in accordance with the
Cinematograph Act and the Rules framed there under.
17. Section 5A of the Cinematograph Act reads as
under:
"5A. Certification of films.--(1) If, after
examining a film or having it examined in the
prescribed manner, the Board considers that--
(a) the film is suitable for unrestricted public
exhibition, or as the case may be, for
unrestricted public exhibition with an
endorsement of the nature mentioned in the
proviso to clause (i) of sub-section (1) of section
4, it shall grant to the person applying for a
certificate in respect of the film a "U" certificate
or, as the case may be, a "UA" certificate with
any UA marker;
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(b) the film is not suitable for unrestricted public
exhibition, but is suitable for public exhibition
restricted to adults or, as the case may be, is
suitable for public exhibition restricted to
members of any profession or any class of
persons, it shall grant to the person applying for
a certificate in respect of the film an "A"
certificate or, as the case may be, a "S"
certificate;
and cause the film to be so marked in the prescribed
manner:
Provided that the applicant for the certificate,
any distributor or exhibitor or any other person to
whom the rights in the film have passed shall not be
liable for punishment under any law relating to
obscenity in respect of any matter contained in the
film for which certificate has been granted under
clause (a) or clause (b).
(2) A certificate granted or an order refusing
to grant a certificate in respect of any film shall be
published in the Gazette of India.
(3) Subject to the other provisions contained
in this Act, a certificate granted by the Board under
this section shall be valid throughout India."
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18. Section 5A confers the power of grant a refusal of
certification. Upon examination, the Board may:
i. Grant a certificate of unrestricted public exhibition (U)
ii. Grant a certificate with parental guidance (U/A)
iii. Restrict exhibition to adults (A) or
iv. Refuse certification altogether
The certification is the statutory authorization, and once
granted, the film can be exhibited subject to the conditions
imposed.
19. Section 5B of the Cinematograph Act reads as
under:
"5B. Principles for guidance in certifying
films.--(1) A film shall not be certified for public
exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent
to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is
against the interests of the sovereignty and integrity
of India the security of the State, friendly relations
with foreign States, public order, decency or morality,
or involves defamation or contempt of court or is likely
to incite the commission of any offence.
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(2) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-
section (1), the Central Government may issue such
directions as it may think fit setting out the principles
which shall guide the authority competent to grant
certificates under this Act in sanctioning films for
public exhibition."
20. Section 5B lays down the substantive criteria
governing certification. It mandates that films shall not be
certified, if it is against:
a. The sovereignty and integrity of India
b. The security of the State
c. Friendly relation with foreign States
d. Public order, decency or morality or
e. Involves defamation, contempt of Court or
incitement to an offence.
This provision incorporates the Constitutional
limitations under Article 19 (2) and forms the guiding
standard for the CBFC while exercising powers under Section
5A.
21. To challenge a certificate, the grounds include:
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i. Violation of guidelines: The Board ignored
statutory censorship guidelines (examples inciting violence,
disrupts public order or defamation).
ii. Procedural irregularity: The Board did not follow
the proper legal steps while granting the 'U', 'U/A' or 'A'
Certificate.
iii. Violation of fundamental rights: The film infringes
the petitioner's rights, (example right of dignity or right to
privacy).
22. The Certification granted by the Board is regarded
as an 'expert opinion, unless there is a blatant illegality'.
Thus, the certification process is confined to examining
whether the film conforms to the statutory guidelines relating
to public order, decency, morality and other specified
considerations.
23. The petitioner's claim that the movie is a
'plagiarized version of an original script' is a matter of
copyright law. This constitutes a private proprietary rights
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dispute between the creator and the filmmakers. The
petitioner has to prove that he is the rightful owner of the
original script, that the filmmakers had access to the
petitioner's script and the movie is 'substantially similar to
the said script' are required to be proved by a full fledged
trial which are to be handled through a civil suit for the
reasons envisaged earlier while answering point No.(i), in
light of the proposition of law laid down by the Apex Court in
R.G.Anand (supra).
24. The Board's primary mandate under the
Cinematograph Act is to classify content based on statutory
guidelines as stated supra, and the Board is not a specialized
forum for adjudicating private proprietary rights disputes or
title over the script. The challenge to certification by the
petitioner is based solely on a private copyright dispute and
not maintainable unless the petitioner is able to demonstrate
'a manifest illegality' in the Board's certification process.
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25. In the present case, the petitioner has failed to
establish any violation of the statutory guidelines warranting
for this Court to interfere under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. Merely because a film has been
certified under Section 5A of the Cinematograph Act, the
same cannot be interfered with, on the ground of alleged
plagiarism, particularly when such allegations pertains to
private proprietary rights disputes, which require trial. Thus,
this Court finds that the challenge to the CBFC certification
lacks a statutory basis, as the Board is not an arbitrator of
private proprietary rights. However, regarding plagiarism
claim, this Court is of the considered view that the petitioner
is at liberty to approach the Civil Court for copyright
infringement, and the writ petition is not maintainable.
26. Section 5A of the Act does not grant the Board
any judicial or quasi-judicial power to adjudicate 'title or
ownership of the screenplay'. The certification process is a
regulatory function to ensure the film's adherence to the
public order, decency, and morality. Unless the film's content
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itself violates Section 5B, (example it is defamatory to the
petitioner), Section 5A certificate cannot be revoked merely
because of a plagiarism dispute. A writ of mandamus is
issued when a public official fails to perform a legal duty.
Under Section 5A, the Board's duty is to certify based on the
Cinematograph Act and the Rules framed there under.
27. There is no statutory duty for the Board to
investigate allegations of script theft before issuing a
certificate. The petitioner relied upon the decision in Bobby
Art International Vs. Om Pal Singh Hoon and Others3
(Bobby Art International). That was a case where the Apex
Court dealt with film censorship, obscenity and freedom of
expression. The film 'Bandit Queen' was certified by the
CBFC, the same was challenged by Om Pal Singh Hoon and
others, arguing that it was obscene, defamatory and violated
privacy and decency standards, before the High Court of
Delhi and the judgment in Bobby Art International (supra)
did not deal with the copyright infringement, but arose in the
3
AIR 1996 SC 1846
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context of alleged violations under the provisions of
Cinematograph Act.
28. Similarly, the decision relied by the petitioner in
the case of N.P.Amruthesh vs State of Karnataka and
Others4 (N.P.Amruthesh), where the challenge in the writ
petition (PIL) was that the Censor Board wrongly certified the
film despite such content, violating Constitutional values and
guidelines under the Cinematograph Act. Therefore, the issue
therein also pertained to whether the exhibition of a film
violated the statutory provisions or offended public order,
decency or morality and not a dispute inter se between the
parties involving adjudication of competing proprietary rights
and hence, the reliance placed by the petitioner on the
aforesaid decisions in Bobby Art international and
N.P.Amruthesh is wholly distinguishable and not applicable
to the present facts.
4
ILR 1998 KAR 2885
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29. On the other hand, a claim of copyright
infringement, as settled in R.G.Anand (supra) necessarily
involves determination of disputed questions of fact such as
access, originality and substantial copying of expression,
which can be established only upon appreciation of evidence.
Such an exercise squarely falls within the domain of the Civil
Court in a properly instituted suit and not within the limited
scope of writ petition. The petitioner has failed to show a
legal right 'to have the Board investigate plagiarism under
the Cinematograph Act and the remedy lies to the petitioner
under the provisions of the Copyright Act and not under the
Cinematograph Act'. Section 5A of the Cinematograph Act is
a safety and morality 'filter' not plagiarism. For the foregoing
reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the writ
petition is not maintainable and devoid of merits.
Accordingly, this Court pass the following:
- 31 -
ORDER
The writ petition is hereby dismissed, reserving liberty to the petitioner to avail an appropriate remedy in accordance with law, before the competent forum.
Sd/-
______________________ JUSTICE K.S. HEMALEKHA MBM/CKL