Kerala High Court
State Of Kerala vs Joseph on 19 June, 2002
Author: K.S. Radhakrishnan
Bench: K.S. Radhakrishnan
JUDGMENT K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. This appeal was preferred by the State of Kerala and Custodian of Vested Forests, Kozhikode against the order dated 28.3.1990 in O.A. No.3 of 1990 of the Forest Tribunal, Palakkad (O.A.No. 141 of 1977 of the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode) by which application preferred by the respondent herein for declaration that the properties shown in column No. 6 therein had not vested in the Government as private forest under Section 3(3) of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 was allowed.
2. The respondent had filed the application under Section 3(3) of the Act for assignment of 25 acres of land in survey number 73, 5/5A2 of Kavilumpara village of Badagara Taluk, which according to the State formed part of thick a forest lying contiguous to other vested forest. For a proper appreciation of the contentions raised on either side it is necessary to examine the facts at some length.
3. The respondent-applicant had filed O.A. No. 141 of 1977 before the Forest Tribunal, Kozhikode claiming exemption of the aforementioned land under Section 3(3) of Act 26 of 1971. Petitioner along with others had claimed title over the properties in question vide Ext. P1 registered document of 4.4.1955. Ext. P1 was an assignment deed executed by one Harihara Iyer and others in favour of one Thomas and others in respect of two item's of properties, the first measuring 589.10 acres in R.S. No. 5/5A2 of Kavilumpara village and the second item having an extent of 554.95 acres in the same survey number. Applicant was stated to be assignee No. 5 in Ext. P1. Complaining that various officials had tried to interfere with the rights of the applicant, he filed application under Section 8 of the Act claiming exemption under Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act. Respondent-State objected to the claim stating that the applicant did not hold valid title or possession of the properties and that he had not satisfied the requisite conditions for claiming exemption and that claim was barred by limitation. State also disputed the claim of the applicant that he got only 4 acres of rubber plantation apart from the property covered by the application. Further it was stated that the applicant had no intention to cultivate the area on the appointed date and that the area involved was a thick forest of natural origin lying contiguous to other vested forest forming a large block and that the property has no boundary from the adjoining vested forest. Before the Tribunal, on the side of the applicant Ext. P1 registered document dated 4.4.1955 was produced and the brother of the applicant was examined as PW1. On the side of the Department, Forest Range Officer, Kuttiadi was examined as RW-1. After considering all the aspects of the matter the Tribunal had earlier dismissed the application.
4. Before we proceed further it would be appropriate to examine the scope of Section 3(3) of the Act and the ingredients to be proved by the applicant while claiming exemption under Section 3(3). For easy reference we may extract Section 3(3) of the Act.
"(3) Nothing contained in Sub-section (1) shall apply in respect of so much extent of private forests held by an owner under a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed day and intended for cultivation by him, which together with other lands heldby him to which Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 is applicable, does not exceed the extent of the ceiling area applicable to him under Section 82 of the said Act".
Scope of Section 3(3) as well as the conditions to be proved so as to claim the benefit of exemption are well settled by a catena of decisions. We may re-iterate three conditions to be established for claiming exemption under Section 3(3) which are as follows:
(a) Applicant has to prove that he has derived title to the property under a valid registered document executed on or before 10.5.1971.
(b) Applicant has to establish that he had the intention to cultivate the property as on 10.5.1971.
(c) Applicant has to prove that the extent of properties in his possession including the extent of the property in respect of which exemption is claimed does not exceed the ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act.
It is well settled that unless the abovementioned conditions are established no relief could be granted under Section 3(3) of the Vesting Act. The Tribunal while considering O.A. 141 of 1977 examined the question whether applicant had established the three conditions enumerated herein before. It is worthwhile to extract the relevant portion of the order passed by the Tribunal on 17.7.1979.
4. Ext.,P1 which is the only document produced by the petitioner is the registration copy of an assignment deed executed by Harihara Iyer and others to Thomas and others on 4.4.1955 in respect of the two items, the first measuring 589.10 acres in R.S.5.5A2 of Kavilumpara village and the second item having an extent of 554.95 acres in the same survey number and village. It is alleged in this document itself that an application for permission to assign this property was filed before the District Collector and it was rejected. It is further stated that they had filed another application for permission to execute the assignment deed and permission was granted. No such permission is produced. The fact that the M.P.P.F. Act applied to this area, therefore, is not disputed. In the absence of permission from the District Collector the assignment is void, and Ext. P1 is not a valid registered document of title executed before the appointed day.
5. The petitioner did not give evidence. His brother gave evidence as PW1 and stated that the petitioner is assignee No. 5 in Ext. P1. Ext. P1 properties were assigned to 8 persons. The other persons are not parties to this proceedings either as petitioners or as respondents. The petitioner has no case that there was any partition of the properties under Ext. P1 and that this 25 acres was allotted to his share. Without implementing the other co-owners the application will not lie.
6. under Section3(3) only the maximum extent which can be held by the owner under the K.L.R. Act can be exempted. All the assignees I am saying this assuming that the sake of argument that Ext. P1 is a valid document - are co-owners, in respect of the entire property covered by Ext. P1. All of them together will be entitled, subject to the provision of Section 3(3), to the extent of land which can be held by them. Each'of them cannot claim separately the maximum extent which can be held under the K.L.R. Act.
7. The petitioner has not produced any certificate from the Tahsildar as required under Rule 4 of the Kerala Private Forest(Exemption from Vesting) Rules, to prove the total extent of land held by him. There is also no evidence with regard to the number of members in the family of the petitioner as on 1.1.1970 to calculate the ceiling limit even if each of the assignees can claim separate ceiling limit. PW1 admitted that at the time of Ext. P1, the entire property covered by that was a thick forest. The total extent of land covered by Ext.P1 is 1144.05 acres. It is not possible to identify the 25 acres claimed in this petition, from the total extent of 1144.05 acres. PW1 admitted that all the 8 persons to whom Ext. P1 property was assigned, had equal right in respect of the entire property covered by that document. Therefore, the evidence of PW1 itself conclusively prove that the petitioner is not entitled to exemption under Section 3(3).
The Tribunal after having found that the applicant had not established the abovementioned three conditions held that the applicant was not entitled to get exemption under Section 3(3) of the Act and the application was dismissed. Aggrieved by the said order applicant had approached this Court by filing M.F.A. 407 of 1979. The findings on all the three conditions which were found against the applicant were challenged in the appeal before.this Court. The Division Bench considered the legality of the order and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal. While so, in paragraph 2 of the judgment the Division Bench stated as follows:
"The Tribunal found against the petitioner on the short ground that there was no evidence forthcoming as to whether the Collector did or did not give sanction for the assignment in favour of the petitioner." (underline supplied) The Bench went on examining that point alone. The other two conditions to be satisfied by the applicant and which were found against him by the Tribunal were omitted to be considered by the Bench. The Bench felt since there was no evidence to show that the Collector had given sanction for assignment under the M.RP.F. Act and during the relevant period, petitioner's name was not shown in the register it would prove that the recital in the deed was false. In that aspect the Bench held as follows:
"We do not think that the State should be deprived of a valid contention if it has any, solely on the ground that it has not produced the register at the appropriate time, especially when, it has already an order in its favour. At the same time, we cannot direct the petitioner to produce evidence which it is not possible for him to produce.
After hearing both sides, in the interest of justice, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and direct that the matter be heard afresh by the Tribunal after giving an opportunity to the State to produce the register for the relevant period showing the names of the persons to whom sanction has been granted under the M.P.P.F. Act and/or any other document to prove that the petitioner did not get the necessary sanction as stated in Ext. P1. The petitioner is also at liberty to adduce fresh evidence. If no fresh evidence is let in by the State, the Tribunal will be free to rely on the recital in Ext. P1 itself to grant relief to the petitioner."
The Tribunal considered the matter after remand. After remand no evidence was let in by either side. The Special Government Pleader contended before the Tribunal that it was difficult to get the register maintained by the District Collector. Contention was raised by the counsel for the applicant that the scope of the remand was only to consider whether Ext. P1 transaction had the prior permission of the District Collector under Section 3 of the M.RP.F. Act for which counsel submitted, State was directed to produce the register to show that there was no such permission. Counsel submitted before the Tribunal that State had not produced the register and the Tribunal had allowed the application on that ground alone and other ingredients need not be established by the claimant since that would be going beyond the scope of the remand order. The Tribunal however did not accept the said contention and went on to decide the question whether applicant had satisfied other two conditions as well so as to claim exemption under Section 3(3) of the Act. With regard to the first condition Tribunal held as follows:
" "The respondents, have not produced the Register showing the names of persons to whom permission under the provision of the M.P.P.F. Act was given by the District Collector. Therefore the recital in Ext. P1 regarding permission has to be accepted as true and correct. Therefore the original of Ext. P1 has to be treated as a valid registered document."
So we have to take it that applicant had satisfied the first condition under Section 3(3) of the Act. We have our own reservation regarding the manner in which burden was cast on the State to establish that the applicant had no permission prior to the transaction of Ext. P1. We are however not justified in re-examining that question since this Court had in the earlier remand order cast the burden on the State to prove the negative. Let us take that point as final since State could not produce the register as directed by this Court. Tribunal therefore rightly held that Ext. P1 was a valid registered document since State had failed to produce the register to show that sanction was not obtained by the applicant prior to the execution of Ext. P1. The Tribunal also examined the other two conditions as well. We may indicate in the earlier order Tribunal had held against the applicant on all the three conditions. It was that order which was challenged by the applicant before this Court in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979.
5. We may now examine how the Tribunal in its order dated 26.8.1985 had dealt with the other two conditions. We have indicated that in order to claim exemption under Section 3(3), one of the conditions to be established by the applicant is that he had the intention to cultivate the property on 10.5.1971 i.e., on the appointed day. On that point Tribunal held as follows:
"The applicant has not come forward to give evidence that the 25 acres described in the petition was intended for cultivation. The respondents had stated in their counter that the applicant has no intention to cultivate the property. When there is no evidence regarding intention to cultivate the property, the point has to be held against the petitioner."
The third ingredient to be proved by the applicant is that the extent of properties in his possession including the extent of property in respect of which exemption is claimed does not exceed the ceiling limits prescribed under Section 82 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. On that point the Tribunal held as follows:
"Rule 4 of the Kerala Private Forests (Exemption from Vesting) Rules 1974 requires the applicant to produce a certificate from the Tahsildar. Rule 4 reads: "Certificate from Tahsildar to accompany applications in certain cases. If an owner claims exemption under Rule 3 in respect of any land and he has no other land in the taluk in which the land in respect of which he claims exemption is situate, he shall, along with the application referred to in that rule also produce a certificate in Form No. 2 from the Tahsildar of the taluk to the effect that he does not hold any other land in the taluk. The applicant has not produced any such certificate as required by Rule 4. Apart from the interested testimony of PW. 1 there is no evidence regarding the extent of properties in the possession of the petitioner. Relief under Section 3(3) can be granted only after ascertaining the extent of the other lands in the possession of the claimant. If he has sufficient lands to come upto the ceiling limit, the applicant would not be entitled to claim any land under Section 3(3) of the Act. In view of the applicant's failure to produce the certificate from the Tahsildar regarding the extent of the lands in his possession, relief has to be denied to him."
It is therefore evident from the aforementioned order of the Tribunal dated 26.8.1985 that the Tribunal had held that the applicant had established only the first condition but failed to establish the other two conditions for claiming exemption under Section 3(3) of the . Act. We may indicate that in the original order of the Tribunal dated 17.7.1979 the Tribunal had held that the applicant had failed to establish all the three conditions.
6. The order passed by the Tribunal on 26.8.1985 was then appealed again by the applicant by filing M.F.A. No. 293 of 1986. The applicant found fault with the Tribunal for having examined the question whether he had complied with the other two conditions as well. Counsel contended scope of the remand order was to consider the first condition alone and consequently it was contended that the Tribunal had exceeded its jurisdiction and gone beyond the scope of the remand order. The contention was found favour by the Division Bench. It is worthwhile to refer to some of the observations of the Division Bench, which is extracted below:
"From the judgment of this Court dated 7.6.1985, it is evident that the only question mooted was regarding the claim of exemption pleaded by the appellant under Section 3(3) of the Act 26 of 1971. The appellant pressed into service a registered assignment deed in his favour, Ext. P1 dated 4.4.1955. Initially the Tribunal held against him, stating that the appellant did not adduce evidence to show whether the Collector did or did not give sanction for the assignment in his favour. There is specific reference in Ext. P1 regarding the order of sanction issued by the District Collector, Malabar. According to the appellant he could not obtain the said order since it was destroyed. So he pleaded that the reference or recital in Ext. P1 should be given effect to. This Court was inclined to do so. But Government Pleader who appeared on behalf of the Government prayed for an opportunity to produce the register for the relevant period showing the names of persons to whom sanctions have been granted under the M.P.P.F. Act, so that, if during the relevant period the appellant's name is not shown in the Register, it will prove that the recital in Ext. P1 was false or incorrect. This Court acceded to the request of the Government Pleader and set aside the order of the Tribunal and ordered a remit. The remit was to give an opportunity to the State to produce the register for the relevant period showing the names of the persons to whom sanctions have been granted under the M.P.P.F. Act or any other material to prove that the appellant did not get necessary sanction. The parties were given opportunity to adduce fresh evidence.
.....In the light of the orderof remit of this Court, the Tribunal was competent to rely upon the recital in Ext. P1 to grant relief to the petitioner. But instead of deciding that question, the Tribunal considered the entire matter and came to the conclusion that the appellant is not entitled to claim any land under Section 3(3) of the Act.....
On hearing the rival contentions of the parties, we are of the view that the Forest Tribunal in passing the revised order, dated 26.8.1985, has transgressed its powers. The order of remit passed by this Court, dated 7.6.1985 is specific in that it was so done to enable the State to produce the register of the District Collector for the relevant period showing the names of the persons to whom sanction have been accorded under the M.P.P.F. Act or any other material to prove that the appellant did not get any such sanction as stated in Ext. P1. It was to prove or substantiate this fact, that the parties were also given an opportunity to adduce fresh evidence. The only matter for which the remit was made and both parties were given the opportunity to adduce fresh evidence, was for producing the register for the relevant period, showing the names of persons, to whom sanction have been accorded under the MPPF Act. After the remit, on this aspect no light was thrown. Instead, the Tribunal was invited to consider other matters, which were not directed by this Court to be considered in the order of remit. If this Court was of the view, that a fresh consideration 'de novo' was what was meant, this Court would have said so or the order of the Tribunal would have been set aside only to the limited extent..... In such circumstances, we are of the view that the revised order passed by the Forest Tribunal dated 26.8.1985 travels far beyond the specific question which it was directed to consider. The order by the Forest Tribunal, appealed against, cannot therefore stand. It is vacated. We remit the matter to the Forest Tribunal to decide the specific question referred to it by this court in the judgment dated 7.6.1985, and dispose of the matter as directed by this Court in the said judgment".
The Division Bench has therefore remitted the matter back to the Tribunal again. Tribunal has now passed the present order dated 26.3.1990 allowing the application and granted declaration that the State has failed to produce registration showing that no sanction was granted to the applicant before the execution of Ext. P1. The question whether the applicant had satisfied the other two conditions were not considered holding that the same would go beyond the scope of the remand order. The State and the Custodian of Forests are aggrieved by the order and hence this appeal.
7. We may indicate at this juncture that immediately after the Division Bench judgment dated 27.6.1988, State of Kerala along with the Custodian of Conservation of Forests, had filed R.P. No. 157 of 1988 in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979 seeking review of the judgment dated 7.6.1985 to clarify whether remand was a total remand or remand on the specific question regarding the validity of Ext. P1. In the affidavit filed by the Custodian in support of the petition for review it is stated as follows:
"When the matter came up in appeal in MFA No. 407 of 1979, this Hon'ble Court remanded the case for fresh consideration enabling the State to produce the register for the relevant period showing the names of the persons to which sanction has been granted under the MPPF Act and/ or other document to prove that the petitioner did not get the necessary sanction as stated in Ext. P1. It may be seen that in the judgment nothing was mentioned about the findings of the Tribunal on the other two conditions of Section 3(3). They were not set aside or confirmed. It may also be seen that the applicant had taken a specific ground as ground No. 8 in the Memorandum of Appeal regarding the findings on the remaining 2 conditions of Section 3(3). The ground reads: "the defect, if any of the Tahsildar's Certificate and the details of the members of applicant's family could have been easily rectified if an opportunity were granted for it. Appellant prays that he may be granted leave to implead his co-owners also in the case."
In the judgment rendered by this Court the above ground was not considered. Hence Forest Tribunal after remand understood the remand as a total remand without any limitation. Tribunal entered into a finding on all the three conditions under Section 3(3) of the Act and ultimately dismissed the application by order dated 26.8.1985. It was also stated in the affidavit as follows:
"It may be seen that the order of the Forest Tribunal was set aside by this Hon'ble Court without entering into a finding regarding the ceiling area as well as the intention. It is an error apparent on the face of the judgment. It should have been made clear whejher the findings of the Tribunal were affirmed or set aside. It should also have made clear whether the remand was a total remand or a remand for a specific purpose alone. In the absence of clear indication in the judgment, the Tribunal proceeded under the impression that it is a total remand. In appeal MFA 293 of 1996, this Hon'ble Court, however, held that so long as it is not specified in the judgment in MFA 407/79 as to whether it is total remand or a remand for a specific purpose, it has to be understood that the other findings have become conclusive. The result would be that the applicant would be given the benefit under Section 3(3) on his satisfying only one condition as against three conditions which he is bound to satisfy. It will be causing great injustice. The judgment requires clarification. The present remand is only to consider the validity of Ext. P1. Unless the Tribunal considers all the three conditions of Section 3(3) there will be infirmity in the order".
We find that the above mentioned review petition was happened to be dismissed as time barred. We do not at this stage wish to probe into the reasons which led to the dismissal of the R.P. as time barred. After examining the facts in this case we are of the view that this Court as a court of record has the duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law and therefore this Court has to examine whether this Court had committed any mistake inadvertently and whether there was any error apparent on the face of the record. On examining the facts of this case at length, we felt that there is serious error apparent on the face of the judgment of this Court in M.F.A.No. 407 of 1979 as well as the judgment of this Court in MFA No. 293 of 1986. We therefore asked the counsel appearing for the applicant to show cause why this court shall not correct its records since error is apparent on the face of the record.
8. Counsel appearing for the applicant submitted that the judgments in M.F.A. Nos. 407 of 1979 and 293 of 1986 are judgments between the parties which have become final and consequently not liable to be reviewed. Further it was stated that the review petition filed against the judgment in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979 was also dismissed as time barred. Counsel also submitted in any view of the matter Section 8C of the Vesting Act would not be available to the Government to file review as well since the judgment in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979 was rendered on 7.6.1985. Only those judgments which were rendered during the period beginning with the commencement of the Kerala Private Forest (Vesting and Assignment) Amendment Act, 1986, i.e., 1.12.1986 and ending on 31.3.1987 alone can be reviewed, if it is established that if any judgment, decree or order of any court has not been passed on the basis of concessions made before the High Court without the authority in writing of the Government or due to the failure to produce relevant data or other particulars before the High Court or that an appeal against such order could not be filed before the Supreme Court by reason of the delay in applying for and obtaining a certified copy of such order. It was contended that only those judgments alone could be reviewed. Counsel therefore submitted that this Court was not justified in re-examining or re-appreciating the matters once again.
9. We may in this connection indicate scope of Section 8C as well as the provision in Section 3(3) of the Act came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in State of Kerala v. Thomas (1987 (1) KLT 530) and the Bench held as follows:
"We have found that the only basis for the appellate judgment on the prior occasion was that the respondent was entitled to the benefit of Section 3(2) of the Act. The grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal related to the refusal of the Tribunal to grant exemption under Section 3(3) of Act 26 of 1971. No grounds were urged regarding the rejection of the claim for exemption under Section 3(2) of the Act. Normally, counsel for the State and Custodian would have pointed out this fact to this Court and would have made the request not to entertain or consider any ground not specifically raised in the memorandum of appeal. The facts and circumstances which justify exemption under these two Sub-sections 3(2) and 3(3) are substantially different. In the former, the applicant has to prove that the land was held under personal cultivation; whereas in the latter, what the applicant has to prove are that the land was held under a valid registered document of title, and was intended for cultivation. In either case the applicant has to prove, in addition, that he was not holding lands in excess of the ceiling area applicable to him under Chapter III of the Kerala Land Reforms Act. It is elementary that a person who claims exemption under either of these sub-sections has to affirmatively prove by positive evidence that he fulfils all the requirements of the provision. A mere assertion by him will not be sufficient substitute for affirmative evidence of positive proof. These two are important aspects, which counsel for the State and Custodian omitted to urge before this Court on the prior occasion".
The Court ultimately held as follows:
"We are satisfied that in so far as the earlier appellate judgment was rendered on a point which did not really arise in the appeal and on the assumption that the circumstances justifying exemption of the land of the applicant under Section 3(2) of Act26 of 1971 were not seriously disputed, the State and the Custodian of Vested Forests are right in invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 8C of Act 26 of 1971.
As rightly held by the Tribunal, the applicant has not substantiated his claim of exemption under Section 3(3) of the Act. As the claim under Section 3(2) of the Act was not pressed before the Tribunal "and as the applicant confined his claim under Section 3(3) it is not at all possible to allow the relief under Section 3(2) of the Act. In view of the above position the judgment of this Court has to be reviewed and we do so".
The abovementioned judgment was taken in appeal before the Apex Court by the applicant. The Apex Court examined the scope of Section 8C(2) of the Vesting Act as well as the power of the High Court as a Court of record under Article 215 of the Constitution of India in MM. Thomas v. State of Kerala (2000 (1) SCC 666). In that case the Apex Court held as follows:
"In this case we are not concerned with the power of review of the Forest Tribunal. It was the High Court which reviewed its own judgment and so the question is whether the High Court has such power de hors Section 8C(2) of the Act. Power of review conferred on the Supreme Court under Article 135 of the Constitution is not specifically made applicable to the High Court. Does it mean that the High Court has no power to correct its own orders, even if the High Court is satisfied that there is error apparent on the face of the record? High Court as a court of record, as envisaged in Article 215 of the Constitution, must have inherent powers to correct the records. A Court of Record envelopes all such powers whose acts and proceedings are to be enrolled in a perpetual, memorial and testimony. A Court of record is undoubtedly a superior court which is itself competent to determine the scope of its jurisdiction. The High Court, as a Court of record, has a duty to itself to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. Hence, if any apparent error is noticed by the High Court in respect of any orders favoured by it the High Court has not only power, but a duty to correct it. The High Court's power in that regard is plenary".
The Apex Court further held as follows:
If such a power of correcting its own record is denied to the High Court, when it notices High Court has noticed the apparent errors its consequence is that the superior status of the High Court will dwindle down. Therefore, it is only proper to think that the plenary powers of the High Court would include the power of review relating to errors apparent on the face of record.
We are inclined to apply the above mentioned principle to examine whether there is any error apparent on the face of the judgment rendered by this Court in MFA No. 407 of 1979 and MFA No. 293 of 1986 in public interest.
10. We have indicated Tribunal had in its original order found that applicant had not established all the three conditions. Consequently it rejected the application.
Applicant preferred M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979 challenging all those grounds. This Court in MFA 407 of 1979 in our considered view had committed a grave error in holding that the Tribunal found against the applicant on the short ground that there was no evidence on the aspect whether the Collector did or did not give sanction for assignment to the applicant. We are of the view this is an error apparent on the face of the record. The Tribunal had found against the applicant on all the three grounds. This Court in MFA No. 407 of 1979 had proceeded as if it was the only ground on which the Tribunal had decided against the applicant, was the first condition. The applicant had failed to satisfy the othertwo conditions as well. Facts reveal eloquently. We may also endorse the view of the Division Bench in M.F.A. No. 293 of 1986 that the Tribunal had travelled beyond the jurisdiction since the only point directed to be considered in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979 was whether applicant had prior permission, before the execution of Ext. PL.
11. We have found there is error apparent on the face of the record in M.F.A. No. 407 of 1979. Consequently the subsequent judgment in MFA No. 293 of 1986 also requires review. We are of the view having come to our notice that there is error apparent on the face of the record in MFA No. 407 of 1979 we will be failing in our duty if the same is not corrected. As a court of record, it is the duty of this Court to keep all its records correctly and in accordance with law. In such circumstances we are inclined to allow this appeal holding that the applicant had not proved other two conditions so as to attract Section 3(3) of the Act, but only the first condition of having prior permission for the execution of Ext. P1. On merits we have also considered the question whether the applicant had established the other two conditions. The applicant had not given any oral evidence. His brother mounded the box. No independent evidence was adduced to establish that the applicant had the intention to cultivate as on 10.5.1971. Applicant was a co-owner going by Ext. P1. Partition deed was not produced. None of the so-called co-owners were made parties and no evidence was adduced to show that he had no excess land as per the Kerala Land Reforms Act. We therefore uphold the order of the Tribunal dated 26.8.1985.
12. We therefore in exercise of the powers conferred under Article 215 of the Constitution suo motu review the judgment in MFA Nos. 407 and 1979 and 293 of 1986 since the mistake has been committed by this Court. Judgments in both the above appeals stand reviewed and the order dated 26.8.1985 would stand. Application preferred by the respondent under Section 3(3) will stand dismissed.