Sreekumar vs The Divisional Manager, The National ... on 22 March, 2022

[Cites 52, Cited by 1]

Kerala High Court

Sreekumar vs The Divisional Manager, The National ... on 22 March, 2022

These appeals are preferred under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by the appellants-claimants in claim petitions filed under Section 166 of the Act before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals constituted under Section 165 of the Act, challenging the inadequacy of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal.

2. On 08.03.2019, when MACA No.480 of 2012 was taken up for consideration, the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, namely, the National Insurance Company Ltd., raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the appeal. It was submitted that the appellant-claimant was granted compensation more than what was claimed in the claim petition filed before the Tribunal under Section 166 of the Act. It was pointed out that only a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 2 claimed in the claim petition and the Tribunal has granted to the claimant a sum of Rs.1,07,600/-. According to the learned Standing Counsel, the claimant in a case of this nature cannot be treated as a 'person aggrieved', within the meaning of sub- section (1) of Section 173 of the Act, so as to enable him to prefer an appeal challenging the award passed by the Tribunal, invoking the said provision and that the appeal is, therefore, not maintainable. The decision of the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian v. Nidhish Eldo Joseph [2017 (3) KHC 710 :

2016 SCC OnLine Ker 41057 : 2018 ACJ 484] was cited by the learned Standing Counsel, in support of the objection raised as to the maintainability of the appeal.

3. In the order of reference, the learned Single Judge observed that, in Mithun Subramanian (supra), the Division Bench held that in a case where compensation more than what is claimed in the proceedings has been granted by the Tribunal, the claimant cannot be treated as a 'person aggrieved', within the meaning of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act and the appeals instituted by the claimants in such cases are not maintainable. Placing reliance on the judgments of the Apex Court in Civil Appeal Nos.9581 of 2018, 11042 of 2018 and MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 3 11495 of 2018, the learned counsel for the appellant-claimant submitted that the decision of the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is no longer good law.

4. In the order of reference, the learned Single Judge noticed that Section 168 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation that appears to it to be just. 'Just compensation', it is settled by now, is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered by the victim or the dependants of the victim, as the case may be, on account of the accident, as far as money can do, by applying the well settled principles relating to the award of compensation. See: Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003) 2 SCC 274], Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280] and Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710]. In other words, in terms of the scheme of the statute, the duty to determine just compensation in a given case is a duty vested in the Tribunal. No limitation whatsoever is imposed in terms of the provisions of the Act on the said power of the Tribunal. The attempt of the Tribunal, therefore, should be to equate, as far as possible, the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 4 misery on account of the accident with the compensation, so that the victim or the dependants of the victim, as the case may be, should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim. In the absence of any prescription in the statute as to the minimum or maximum of the compensation payable on any head to the claimant/claimants in the proceedings, the Tribunal is expected to fix the just compensation without succumbing to the technicalities of law. Further, after the amendment of the Act by Act 54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994, the report on motor vehicle accident prepared by the police officer and forwarded to the Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 is liable to be treated by the Tribunal as an application for compensation in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act. Prior to the amendment in 1994, it was left to the discretion of the Tribunal as to whether the report should be treated as an application or not. In a report on accident, there is no question of reference to any claim for damages, different heads of damages or such other details. It is on account of the said reasons that the courts have held time and again that the Tribunal shall award just compensation, irrespective of the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 5 claim made in the proceedings and if required, even in excess of the claim. See: Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]. There is, therefore, no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that a victim or dependants of a victim in a motor accident shall not be deprived of just compensation to which they are entitled to, merely for the reason that the claim in the application is only for a lesser amount. If the duty to award just compensation with reference to the settled principles on assessment of damages is a duty cast on the Tribunal in terms of the provisions of the Act, as observed by the Apex Court in Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121], the compensation awarded by a Tribunal does not become just compensation merely because the Tribunal considered it to be just. The expression 'person aggrieved' contained in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act has to be understood in the above context.

5. In the order of reference, the learned Single Judge noticed that the appellate court, viz., the High Court, in terms of the provisions of the Act, is empowered to exercise the same power that is vested in the Tribunal in the matter of considering the question as to whether just compensation has been granted MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 6 by the Tribunal in a given case and award additional compensation, wherever required. Needless to say, in exercise of the said power, the High Court is empowered to grant compensation more than what is claimed in cases where the High Court finds that the just compensation to which the claimant is entitled to, is more than what is claimed in the proceedings. If the expression 'person aggrieved' is understood in the manner in which it is interpreted by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra), it is possible to contend that the High Court in appeal is precluded from granting just compensation which, in a given case, is more than what is claimed by the claimant. Such a situation would be contrary to the scheme of the Act and the object of the beneficial piece of legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or dependants of victims of motor accidents. The learned Single Judge observed that any claimant who is able to show that just compensation has not been granted by the Tribunal would fall within the definition of 'person aggrieved' contained in sub- section (1) of Section 173 of the Act.

6. In the order of reference, the learned Single Judge noticed that in Mithun Subramanian (supra) the view taken MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 7 by the Division Bench is that, when the claimant limits the claim to a particular amount and pays court fee in terms of the Rules framed by the State Government in this connection, he is precluded from contending that the said amount is not the 'just compensation' to which he is entitled to. The expression 'person aggrieved' has to be interpreted having regard to the scheme of the statute, its provisions and object, and not with reference to the Rules made under the statute. The Rules framed by the State Government prescribing the form of application and the fees payable for preferring the application are Rules intended for carrying effect to the provisions contained in Sections 165 to 174 of the Act. They are, therefore, to be interpreted in a manner harmonious to the provisions of the Act, its object and scheme. The prescription in the Rules requiring the claimant to indicate the particulars of the claim made in the proceedings is intended only to enable the Tribunal to come to the correct conclusion as to the just compensation to which the claimant or the dependants of the claimant in a given case are entitled to. The learned Single Judge observed that merely for the reason that there is a provision in the form of application to indicate the amount MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 8 claimed, the same does not preclude the claimant from challenging the adequacy of the compensation granted by the Tribunal. There is, therefore, force in the stand taken by the appellants-claimants that Mithun Subramanian (supra) has not laid down the law correctly. Therefore, vide the order of reference dated 08.03.2019, the learned Single Judge referred the matter for consideration by a Division Bench to examine the correctness of the law laid down in Mithun Subramanian (supra). Accordingly, after obtaining orders from the Hon'ble the Chief Justice, Registry has placed MACA No.480 of 2012 and connected matters before the Division Bench.

7. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants- claimants in the respective appeals, the learned Senior Counsel/learned Standing Counsel for the insurer and also the learned counsel for the party respondents.

8. The learned counsel for the appellants-claimants in the respective appeals contended that in view of the law laid down by the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] and reiterated in a catena of decisions there is no restriction that in a claim filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act or in an appeal filed under Section 173 MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 9 of the said Act the compensation that could be awarded by the Claims Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, is only up to the amount claimed in the claim petition. In appropriate cases, if the Claims Tribunal or the High Court considers, from the evidence brought on record that the claimant/appellant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, an amount in excess of the compensation claimed can be awarded by the Claims Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be, in order to ensure that the claimant is awarded 'just' compensation as per the statutory mandate. Further, in view of the provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall treat the Accident Information Report forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, as an application for compensation under Section 166, even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. Therefore, the law laid down by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian [2017 (3) KHC 710] that, when the claimant limits the claim to a particular amount and pays court fee in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, he is precluded from contending that the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 10 said amount is not the 'just compensation' to which he is entitled to, runs contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in Nagappa (supra) and reiterated in a catena of decisions.

9. Per contra, the learned Senior Counsel/learned Standing Counsel for the insurer in the respective appeals contended that, it is well settled by a catena of decisions of the Apex Court that, though the provisions under Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, it can neither be allowed to be used as a source of profit, nor as a windfall to the persons affected nor should it be punitive to the persons liable to pay compensation. The amount of compensation determined to be payable to the claimants has to be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. As held by the Apex Court in Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176], and reiterated in a catena of decisions, a misplaced sympathy, generosity and benevolence cannot be the guiding factor for determining the compensation. The law laid down by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian [2017 (3) KHC 710] is that a claimant in a claim petition filed before the Claims Tribunal MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 11 under Section 166 of the Act cannot maintain an appeal before this Court under Section 173 of the Act without showing that by the award passed by the Claims Tribunal under Section 168 of the Act he had suffered a legal grievance, i.e., he was deprived of or refused something to which he was legally entitled to. When, by the award passed by the Claims Tribunal, nothing was deprived of or refused to the claimant to which he was legally entitled to, he could be considered as a 'person aggrieved', entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act.

10. The Parliament enacted the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to consolidate and amend the law relating to motor vehicles. Chapter XI deals with insurance of motor vehicles against third party risks and Chapter XII deals with Claims Tribunals. Section 165 of the Act deals with Claims Tribunal. As per sub-section (1) of Section 165, a State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute one or more Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals for such area as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating upon claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 12 vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. For the removal of doubts, it is declared in Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 165 that the expression 'claims for compensation in respect of accidents involving the death of or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles' includes claims for compensation under Section 140 and Section 163A.

11. Section 166 of the Act deals with application for compensation. As per sub-section (1) of Section 166, an application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 165 may be made

(a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be. As per the proviso to sub- section (1) of Section 165, where all the legal representatives of the deceased have not joined in any such application for compensation, the application shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased and MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 13 the legal representatives who have not so joined, shall be impleaded as respondents to the application.

12. As per sub-section (2) of Section 166 of the Act, every application under sub-section (1) shall be made, at the option of the claimant, either to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction over the area in which the accident occurred or to the Claims Tribunal within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the claimant resides or carries on business or within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the defendant resides, and shall be in such form and contain such particulars as may be prescribed. As per the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 166, where no claim for compensation under Section 140 is made in such application, the application shall contain a separate statement to that effect immediately before the signature of the applicant. As per sub-section (4) of Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act.

13. As per sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, substituted by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994, as soon as any information regarding MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 14 any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this Section is completed by a police officer, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, he shall also within thirty days of receipt of such report, forward the same to such Claims Tribunal and insurer.

14. Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 deals with furnishing of copies of reports to the Claims Tribunal. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 150, the police report referred to in sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act shall be in Form 54. As per sub-rule (2) of Rule 150, a Registering Authority or a police officer who is required to furnish the required information to the person eligible to claim compensation under Section 160, shall furnish the information in Form 54, within seven days from the date of receipt of the request and on payment of the fee of rupees ten. As per Form No.54 prescribed in the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, the 'Accident MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 15 Information Report' shall contain necessary particulars in respect of the deceased/injured, the vehicle involved in the accident, etc., as enumerated in clauses (1) to (13), which include the name and address of the person injured/deceased and also the name and address of the driver of the vehicle; the driving licence particulars; the name and address of the owner of the vehicle; the name and address of the insurance company with whom the vehicle was insured and the particulars of the Divisional Officer of the said insurance company; the insurance particulars of the vehicle; the registration particulars of the vehicle; etc.

15. Section 168 of the Act deals with award of the Claims Tribunal. As per sub-section (1) of Section 168, on receipt of an application for compensation made under Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall, after giving notice of the application to the insurer and after giving the parties (including the insurer) an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim or, as the case may be, each of the claims and, subject to the provisions of Section 162 may make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just and specifying the person or persons to whom MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 16 compensation shall be paid and in making the award the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident or by all or any of them, as the case may be. As per the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 168, where such application makes a claim for compensation under Section 140 in respect of the death or permanent disablement of any person, such claim and any other claim (whether made in such application or otherwise) for compensation in respect of such death or permanent disablement shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of Chapter X. As per sub-section (2) of Section 168, the Claims Tribunal shall arrange to deliver copies of the award to the parties concerned expeditiously and in any case within a period of fifteen days from the date of the award. As per sub-section (3) of Section 168, when an award is made under this Section, the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall, within thirty days of the date of announcing the award by the Claims Tribunal, deposit the entire amount awarded in such manner as the Claims Tribunal may direct.

16. Section 169 of the Act deals with procedure and MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 17 powers of Claims Tribunal. As per sub-section (1) of Section 169, in holding any inquiry under Section 168, the Claims Tribunal may, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. As per sub-section (2) of Section 169, the Claims Tribunal shall have all the powers of a Civil Court for the purpose of taking evidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling the discovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposes as may be prescribed; and the Claims Tribunal shall be deemed to be a Civil Court for all the purposes of Section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. As per sub- section (3) of Section 169, subject to any rules that may be made in this behalf, the Claims Tribunal may, for the purpose of adjudicating upon any claim for compensation, choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of any matter relevant to the inquiry to assist it in holding the inquiry.

17. Section 173 of the Act deals with appeals. As per sub-section (1) of Section 173, subject to the provisions of sub- section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 18 prefer an appeal to the High Court. As per the first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty percent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court. As per the second proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 173, the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. As per sub-section (2) of Section 173, no appeal shall lie against any award of a Claims Tribunal, if the amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.

18. In Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003) 2 SCC 274] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that in view of the provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which provides that the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub- section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under the said Act, the Claims Tribunal in an appropriate case MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 19 can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed.

19. In Jai Prakash v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 2 SCC 607] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noticed that, by the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994 the Legislature tried to reduce the period of pendency of claim cases and quicken the process of determination of compensation by making two significant changes in the Act, making it mandatory for registration of a motor accident claim within one month of receipt of first information of the accident, without the claimants having to file a claim petition. In General Insurance Council v. State of A.P. [(2007) 12 SCC 354], the Apex Court emphasised the need for implementing the aforesaid provisions, by directing all State Governments and Union Territories to instruct all police officers concerned about the need to comply with the requirement of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Motor Vehicles Act, keeping in view the requirement indicated in Rule 150 and in Form 54 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules. Periodical checking shall be done by the Inspector General of Police MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 20 concerned to ensure that the requirements are being complied with. In case there is non-compliance, appropriate action shall be taken against the erring officials. The Court directed the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways to make periodical verification to ensure that action is being taken and in case of any deviation immediately bring the same to the notice of the State Governments/Union Territories concerned so that necessary action can be taken against the officials concerned. But unfortunately, neither the police nor the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals have made any effort to implement these mandatory provisions of the Act. If these provisions are faithfully and effectively implemented, it will be possible for the victims of accidents and/or their families to get compensation, in a span of few months. There is, therefore, an urgent need for the concerned police authorities and Tribunals to follow the mandate of these provisions.

20. In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Company v. M.D. Davasia @ Jose and another [2019 (4) KHC 157 :

2019 ACJ 2953 : AIR 2020 Kerala 8] a Full Bench of this Court noticed that sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Motor Vehicles Act makes it incumbent on the part of a police officer MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 21 to forward any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury of any person in the form of a report to the Claims Tribunal having jurisdiction within thirty days from the date of recording of such information and sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act directs the Claims Tribunal to treat such a report as an application for compensation under that Act. This provision would indicate that the claimant need not even file an application for the purpose of raising a claim under the Act.

That is the reason why elaborate procedures as required in a civil suit are not necessary for adjudicating matters before a Claims Tribunal.

21. In Shaji @ Shaji V.D. v. Arjun R. and another [2019 (5) KHC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine Kerala 4625], a decision rendered by one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J], it was noticed that in Jai Prakash [(2010) 2 SCC 607] the Apex Court emphasised the need to comply with the requirement of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, keeping in view the requirement indicated in Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, in Form 54 of the said Rules. As per the mandate of sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 22 Rules, the 'accident information report' forwarded to the Claims Tribunal by the officer in charge of the police station, in Form No.54, shall contain necessary particulars in respect of the deceased/injured, the vehicle involved in the accident, etc., which includes the name and address of the person injured/deceased and also the name and address of the driver of the vehicle; the driving licence particulars; the name and address of the owner of the vehicle; the name and address of the insurance company with whom the vehicle was insured and the particulars of the Divisional Officer of the said insurance company; the insurance particulars of the vehicle; the registration particulars of the vehicle; etc.

22. As held by the Apex Court in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] and reiterated/relied on in a catena of decisions, in view of the provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 166 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal shall treat the Accident Information Report forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, read with sub-rule (1) of Rule 150 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rules, in Form No.54, as an application for compensation under Section 166, even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed. The said provisions MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 23 make it mandatory, registration of a motor accident claim within one month of receipt of the first information of the accident, without the claimants having to file a claim petition.

23. In Syed Basheer Ahamed v. Mohd. Jameel [(2009) 2 SCC 225] the Apex Court noticed that Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act enjoins the Claims Tribunal to make an award determining "the amount of compensation which appears to be just". However, the objective factors, which may constitute the basis of compensation appearing as just, have not been indicated in the Act. Thus, the expression "which appears to be just" vests wide discretion in the Claims Tribunal in the matter of determination of compensation. Nevertheless, the wide amplitude of such power does not empower the Tribunal to determine the compensation arbitrarily or to ignore settled principles relating to the determination of compensation. Similarly, although the Act is a beneficial legislation, it can neither be allowed to be used as a source of profit nor as a windfall to the persons affected nor should it be punitive to the persons liable to pay compensation. The determination of compensation must be based on certain data, establishing reasonable nexus between the loss incurred by the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 24 dependants of the deceased and the compensation to be awarded to them. In a nutshell, the amount of compensation determined to be payable to the claimants has to be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. As observed in Kerala State Road Transport Corporation v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176], the determination of the quantum must answer what contemporary society 'would deem to be a fair sum such as would allow the wrongdoer to hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing'. The amount awarded must not be niggardly since the 'law values life and limb in a free society in generous scales'. At the same time, misplaced sympathy, generosity and benevolence cannot be the guiding factor for determining compensation. The object of providing compensation is to place the claimants, to the extent possible, in almost the same financial position, as they were in before the accident and not to make a fortune out of misfortune that has befallen them.

24. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343] the Apex Court held that the provision of the Motor Vehicles Act makes it clear that the award must be just, which MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 25 means that compensation should, to the extent possible, fully and adequately restore the claimant to the position prior to the accident. The object of awarding damages is to make good the loss suffered as a result of wrong done as far as money can do so, in a fair, reasonable and equitable manner. The Court or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damages objectively and exclude from consideration any speculation or fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the nature of disability and its consequences, is inevitable. A person is not only to be compensated for the physical injury, but also for the loss which he suffered as a result of such injury. This means that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead a full life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned. See: C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair [(1969) 3 SCC 64], Baker v. Willoughby [(1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)] and R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551]

25. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [(2011) 10 SCC 509] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 26 Court noticed that the Motor Vehicles Act nowhere says that the insurer is not a "person aggrieved" with reference to the amount of compensation awarded which he is required to pay. It is difficult to countenance the submission that a person who is required to pay a sum of money, from his pocket, has no right even to say:"Look here, the calculation of the amount claimed is wrong." Interests of justice will not be served by allowing obvious errors to remain uncorrected.

26. In ICICI Lombard General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Ajay Kumar Mohanty [(2018) 3 SCC 686] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court reiterated the law laid down in Laxman v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2011) 10 SCC 756] that, if the victim of an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, then efforts should always be made to award adequate compensation not only for the physical injury and treatment but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to accident, loss of earnings and victim's inability to lead a normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.

27. In Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar [AIR 2020 SC 4424 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 752 : 2020 ACJ MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 27 2695] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court noticed that the principle consistently followed by the Court in assessing compensation in motor accident claims, is to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatory directions for loss of amenities and other payments. These general principles have been stated and reiterated in several decisions. The Court has emphasised time and again that 'just compensation' should include all elements that would go to place the victim in as near a position as she or he was in, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that a victim undergoes after a serious accident, (or replace the loss of a loved one), monetary compensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assures some measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have to face their lives.

28. In Jithendran v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. [2021 SCC OnLine SC 983] the Apex Court reiterated that the Motor Vehicles Act is in the nature of social welfare legislation and its provisions make it clear that the compensation should be justly determined. As held in Helen C. MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 28 Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation [(1999) 1 SCC 90] the word 'just', as its nomenclature, denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness having a large peripheral field. The largeness is, of course, not arbitrary; it is restricted by the conscience which is fair, reasonable and equitable, if it exceeds; it is termed as unfair, unreasonable, unequitable, not just. A person, therefore, is not only to be compensated for the injury suffered due to the accident but also for the loss suffered on account of the injury and his inability to lead the life he led, prior to the life-altering event. As observed by the Three-Judges Bench in Jagdish v. Mohan [(2018) 4 SCC 571] the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not law's doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. The Courts should strive to provide a realistic recompense having regard to the realities of life, both in terms of assessment of the extent of MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 29 disabilities and its impact including the income-generating capacity of the claimant.

29. As held by the Apex Court in Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176] and reiterated/relied on in a catena of decisions, the determination of the quantum of compensation under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act must answer what contemporary society 'would deem to be a fair sum such as would allow the wrongdoer to hold up his head among his neighbours and say with their approval that he has done the fair thing'. At the same time, misplaced sympathy, generosity and benevolence cannot be the guiding factor for determining the compensation. In a nutshell, the amount of compensation determined to be payable to the claimants has to be fair and reasonable by accepted legal standards. It can neither be allowed to be used as a source of profit nor as a windfall to the persons affected nor should it be punitive to the persons liable to pay compensation.

30. In Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the appellant-claimant who was an agriculturist met with a road accident, on 06.02.1985, while he was travelling along with MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 30 others in a bullock cart. A truck hit on the bullock cart, as a result of which he suffered injuries including injuries on his right foot and right ankle exposing soft tissues and bones. It has come on record that the appellant had suffered 80 to 85 percent permanent disability. The medical evidence further revealed that his right leg was amputated and he was required to change the artificial leg once in 2 to 3 years. The Claims Tribunal passed an award dated 26.03.1990 granting a sum of Rs.15,000/- for injury, pain and suffering, Rs.5,000/- for loss of enjoyment of life and Rs.5,000/- for loss of earnings and Rs.5,000/- for medical treatment, totalling Rs.30,000/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of application. Against that award, the appellant preferred MFA No.2237 of 1990 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High Court enhanced the compensation and awarded Rs.82,000/- towards the loss of amenities of life, loss of future earnings, pain and sufferings. Apart from this sum, it was ordered that the appellant shall be entitled to a further sum of Rs.18,000/- for the purchase of an artificial leg. Before the Apex Court, at the time of hearing of the Civil Appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant-claimant filed an application MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 31 seeking permission to amend the claim petition and for enhancement of claim to Rs.5,00,000/- as compensation. Before the Claims Tribunal, the claim was only for a sum of Rs.1,00,000/-.

31. In Nagappa (supra), before the Apex Court, the learned counsel for the insurer contended that the appellant- claimant cannot be permitted to amend the claim petition and claim enhanced compensation. Per contra, the learned counsel for the appellant-claimant contended that under the Motor Vehicles Act there is no prohibition for amending the claim petition and in any case, Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 is applicable to such claim petition under the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989. Hence, it is the discretion of the court to permit amendment of the claim petition in an appropriate case. After considering the rival contentions, the Apex Court noticed that, under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where, from the evidence brought on record if the Claims Tribunal considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 32 claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is - it should be 'just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the said Act. After referring to the provisions under sub-section (4) of Section 166 and sub-section (6) of Section 158 of the Act, the Apex Court held that the Claims Tribunal in appropriate cases can treat the report forwarded to it as an application for compensation even though no such claim is made or no specified amount is claimed.

32. In Nagappa (supra), the Apex Court noticed that, Section 168 of the Act empowers the Claims Tribunal to 'make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just'. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation. Under Section 169 of the Act, the Claims Tribunal in holding any inquiry under Section 168 is required to follow the rules that are made in this behalf and follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. Rule 253 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 empowers the Claims Tribunal to MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 33 exercise all or any of the powers vested in a civil court under the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Rule 254, inter alia, makes a specific provision that Order VI, Rule 17 of the Code is applicable to such proceedings. In that view of the matter, the Apex Court held that, in an appropriate case, depending upon the facts and the evidence which has been brought on record and in the interest of justice, the Claims Tribunal may permit amendment of the claim petition so as to award enhanced compensation. Further, for amendment of the pleadings, it is settled law that, unless it causes injustice to the other side or it is not necessary for the purpose of determining the real issue between the parties, the court would grant amendment. Under the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no time limit prescribed for claiming compensation. Therefore, there is no question of an enhanced claim being barred by limitation.

33. In Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transport Insurance Co. [(1971) 1 SCC 785], in the context of Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, the Apex Court observed that under Section 110B of the Act the Claims Tribunal is required to fix such compensation which appears to it to be just. The power given to the Tribunal in the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 34 matter of fixing compensation under that provision is wide. Without deciding the question as to whether the compensation under Section 110B of the Motor Vehicles Act has to be fixed on the same basis as is required to be done under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the Apex Court observed that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party in a claim under Section 110B would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture. The determination of the question of compensation depends on several imponderables. In the assessment of those imponderables, there is likely to be a margin of error.

34. In Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274], after quoting the law laid down in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. (supra), the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that, in a claim filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it is for the Claims Tribunal to determine just compensation from the evidence which is brought on record despite the fact that the claimant has not precisely stated the amount of damages of compensation which he is entitled to. If the evidence on record justifies the passing of such award, the claim cannot be rejected solely on the ground that the claimant has restricted MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 35 his claim. Form 63 of the Karnataka Motor Vehicles Rules, which is for filing an application for compensation, does not provide that the claimant should specify his claim amount. It, inter alia, provides that he should mention his monthly income as well as nature of the injury sustained and medical certificates. In case, where there is evidence on record justifying the enhanced compensation for the medical treatment which is required because of the injury caused to a claimant due to the accident, there is no reason why such amendment or enhanced compensation should not be granted. In such cases, there is no question of introducing a new or inconsistent cause of action. Cause of action and evidence remain the same. Only question is - application of law as it stands.

35. In Nagappa (supra), before the Apex Court, in support of the contention that the Claims Tribunal has no jurisdiction to award a higher amount of compensation than what is claimed even though it is not likely to cause prejudice to the Insurance Company, the learned counsel for the insurer relied on the decision of a Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Dr. Urmila J. Sangani v. Pragjibhai Mohanlal MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 36 Luvana [AIR 2000 Gujarat 211]. In paragraph 10 of that decision, the Full Bench observed that, when the claimant feels that he is entitled to more compensation than what is claimed in the petition, it is always open to him/her to amend the claim petition and if the same is in consonance with the equity, justice and good conscience, there is no reason why the Claims Tribunal should not grant amendment. Before compensation more than claimed is awarded, the opposite parties should be put to notice, the requisite additional issue/issues should be raised and the parties should be permitted to adduce their evidence on the additional issues, but if no such opportunity is given, the procedure would obviously suffer from material irregularity affecting the decision.

36. In Nagappa (supra) the Apex Court held that from the aforesaid observations made by the Full Bench of the High Court of Gujarat in Dr. Urmila J. Sangani it cannot be held that there is a bar for the Claims Tribunal to award the compensation in excess of what is claimed, particularly when the evidence which is brought on record is sufficient to pass such award. In cases where there is no evidence on record, the court may permit such amendment and allow to raise additional MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 37 issue and give an opportunity to the parties to produce relevant evidence.

37. In Nagappa (supra), at paragraphs 17 to 20 of the judgment, the Apex Court has dealt with the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the appellant-claimant that there are no fetters on the power of the Claims Tribunal to award compensation in excess of the amount which is claimed in the application. Paragraphs 17 to 20 of the judgment read thus;

"17. In support of her contention, the learned counsel for the appellant Ms.Kiran Suri referred to the decision of the Bombay High Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Kisan Gangaram Hire [1987 ACJ 311] wherein the Court dealt with a similar contention and observed thus:

"8. What is further necessary to note is that what gives a cause of action for preferring an application for claim for compensation is the accident by motor vehicle or vehicles and not a particular monetary loss occasioned by such accident. While the compensation in all no-fault claim cases is fixed and uniform, in fault claim cases the losses may vary from case to case.

The particular losses are merely the consequence of the accident which is the cause of action. This being so, the amounts of compensation claimed are nothing but the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 38 particulars of the claim made. By its very nature, further, the amount of compensation claimed cannot always be calculated precisely. In many cases, it can at best be a fair estimate...."

18. The High Court observed that in all such cases, it is necessary to keep the doors open for the claimant to make the claims, on grounds not stated earlier or for more amounts under heads already specified in the application.

19. The aforesaid decision of the Bombay High Court was relied upon and referred to by the Orissa High Court in Mulla Md. Abdul Wahid v. Abdul Rahim [1994 ACJ 348] and G.B. Pattanaik, J. (as he then was) observed that the expression 'just compensation' would obviously mean what is fair, moderate and reasonable and awarded in the proved circumstances of a particular case and the expression 'which appears to it to be just' vests wide discretion in the Tribunal in the matter of determining of compensation. Thereafter, the Court referred to the decision in Sheikhupura Transport Co. Ltd. [(1971) 1 SCC 785] and held that the pecuniary loss to the aggrieved party would depend upon data which cannot be ascertained accurately but must necessarily be an estimate or even partly a conjecture, and if this is so, then it will be unreasonable to expect the party to state precisely the amount of damages or compensation that it would be entitled to. The Court also held that there are no fetters on the power of the Tribunal to award compensation in excess of the amount which is claimed in the application.

20. Similarly, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 39 Devki Nandan Bangur v. State of Haryana [1995 ACJ 1288] observed that the grant of just and fair compensation is the statutory responsibility of the court and if, on the facts, the court finds that the claimant is entitled to higher compensation, the court should allow the claimant to amend his prayer and allow proper compensation."

38. In Nagappa (supra), at paragraph 21 of the judgment, the Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court concluded that, under the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. Further, in such cases, there is no question of the claim becoming time-barred or it cannot be contended that by enhancing the claim there would be change of cause of action. It is also to be stated that, as provided under sub-section (4) to Section 166, even the report submitted to the Claims Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 can be treated as an application for compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act. If required, in appropriate cases, the court may permit amendment to the claim petition.

MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 40

39. In Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. M. Ramadevi [(2008) 3 SCC 379] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the respondents- claimants filed a claim petition before the Claims Tribunal, under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- on account of the death of M. Nageshwar Rao in a motor accident, which occurred on 18.05.1998. The deceased was working as a driver of the appellant-Corporation. In the claim petition, it was stated that on account of the rash and negligent driving of bus bearing registration No.AP-10/Z-998 belonging to the Corporation, which was being driven in a rash and negligent manner, the deceased lost his life. It was claimed that the deceased was aged 38 years and was an employee of the Corporation earning a salary of Rs.4,467.50. The appellant-Corporation filed its objection before the Claims Tribunal taking the stand that it was not liable to pay any compensation. The quantum of salary claimed and the age of the deceased was also disputed. The Tribunal observed that the age of the deceased was 40 years and he was getting a salary of Rs.4,000/- and after deduction, his take-home pay was Rs.2,367/- and the total emoluments MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 41 was Rs.3,983/-. Applying the multiplier of 12, the entitlement of the claimants was fixed at Rs.2,16,000/-, in addition to Rs.15,000/- awarded for non-pecuniary damages and Rs.5,000/- as loss of consortium. Thus, the total compensation was fixed at Rs.2,46,000/-, which was directed to be paid with interest at the rate of 12% per annum. The appellant- Corporation filed an appeal before the High Court. The claimants did not prefer any appeal. The High Court held that the award as made by the Claims Tribunal was inadequate and just compensation was not awarded. The High Court was of the view that the pay of the deceased was Rs.3,536/- and not Rs.2,367/- as taken by the Tribunal. Accordingly, the High Court took the basic pay as Rs.3,500/- after deducting 1/3 rd towards the personal expenses. The monthly contribution was fixed at Rs.2,333/- and the annual contribution at Rs.27,996/-. The multiplier was taken at 12. Accordingly, the entitlement of the claimants was fixed at Rs.3,35,952/- to which the High Court added Rs.20,000/- additionally awarded by the Tribunal towards non-pecuniary damages and loss of consortium. Before the Apex Court, in support of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant- Corporation contended that when there was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 42 no appeal by the claimants, in the appeal filed by the appellant- Corporation the High Court should not have enhanced the amount. It was also contended that the multiplier as adopted was high. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondents- claimants contended that there is no embargo on the Tribunal or the High Court awarding compensation exceeding the amount claimed. It was submitted that the interest was reduced to 9% from 12% as fixed by the Tribunal. Therefore, there was no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. The Apex Court repelled the contention of the appellant- Corporation, after quoting the law laid down in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] that, under the Motor Vehicles Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. On the question as to whether the income has been rightly adopted by the Tribunal and the High Court and whether the correct multiplier was adopted, considering the figure in Ext. A7 the Apex Court took the monthly income Rs.3,000/-. After deducting 1/3rd therefrom the annual contribution was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 43 fixed at Rs.24,000/-. Adopting the multiplier of 10, as against the multiplier of 12 taken by the Tribunal and the High Court, the amount payable to the claimants was fixed as Rs.2,40,000/-, to which the Apex Court added Rs.20,000/- awarded by the Tribunal for non-pecuniary damages and loss of consortium, as there was no challenge by the Corporation to the award of such amounts. Therefore, the Apex Court fixed the entitlement of the respondents-claimants at Rs.2,60,000/-. The interest rate of 9% fixed by the High Court was not interfered with.

40. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [(2009) 6 SCC 121] the Apex Court held that the compensation awarded does not become 'just compensation' merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to the award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit.

MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 44

41. In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280] the Apex Court held that both the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 are beneficent legislation insofar as they provide for payment of compensation to the workmen employed by the employers and/or by use of motor vehicle by the owner thereof and/or the insurer to the claimants suffering permanent disability. The amount of compensation is to be determined in terms of the provisions of the respective Acts. Whereas in terms of the 1923 Act, the Commissioner who is a quasi- judicial authority, is bound to apply the principles and the factors laid down in the Act for the purpose of determining the compensation, Section 168 of the 1988 Act enjoins the Tribunal to make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to be just. Both the Acts aim at providing expeditious relief to the victims of accidents. Both the statutes are beneficial ones for the workmen as also the third parties. The benefits thereof are available only to the persons specified under the Act besides under the contract of insurance. The statutes, therefore, deserve liberal construction. The legislative MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 45 intent contained therein is required to be interpreted with a view to give effect thereto.

42. In Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710] the Apex Court noticed that Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with 'just compensation' and even if in the pleadings no specific claim was made under Section 166 of the Act, a party should not be deprived of getting 'just compensation' in case the claimant is able to make out a case under any provision of law. The said Act is beneficial and welfare legislation. In fact, the court is duty-bound and entitled to award 'just compensation' irrespective of the fact whether any plea on that behalf was raised by the claimant or not.

43. In Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi v. Kasam Daud Kumbhar [(2015) 4 SCC 237] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the Claims Tribunal took the income of the deceased, who was a housewife aged 22 years, who died in a motor accident which occurred on 21.09.1990, as Rs.1,500/- per month, and awarded compensation of Rs.2,24,000/-. As against the award of the Tribunal, the claimants have not filed any appeal. In an appeal filed by the insurance company, the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 46 High Court assessed the income of the deceased as Rs.1,350/- per month and reduced the compensation to Rs.2,09,400/-. As against the award passed by the Tribunal, when the claimants have not filed any appeal, the question arose whether the income of the deceased could be increased and compensation could be enhanced. The Apex Court held that, in terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Courts/Tribunals are to pass awards determining the amount of compensation as to be fair and reasonable and accepted by the legal standards. Though the claimants have not filed any appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal, as it is obligatory on the part of Courts/Tribunals to award just and reasonable compensation, the Apex Court took the income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- per month, in order to award just and reasonable compensation. After deducting 1/3rd towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased and adopting the multiplier of 18, the Apex Court recalculated loss of dependency at Rs.4,32,000/-. Paragraph 12 of the judgment reads thus;

"12. The Tribunal has awarded Rs.2,24,000 as against the same, the claimants have not filed any appeal. As against the award passed by the Tribunal when the claimants have not filed any appeal, the question arises whether the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 47 income of the deceased could be increased and compensation could be enhanced. In terms of Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the courts/the Tribunals are to pass awards determining the amount of compensation as to be fair and reasonable and accepted by the legal standards. The power of the courts in awarding reasonable compensation was emphasised by this Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003) 2 SCC 274], Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280] and Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710] As against the award passed by the Tribunal even though the claimants have not filed any appeal, as it is obligatory on the part of courts/the Tribunals to award just and reasonable compensation, it is appropriate to increase the compensation."

44. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of 'just compensation' and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of 'just MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 48 compensation' has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability.

45. In Ramla v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2019) 2 SCC 192] the Apex Court was dealing with a case in which the deceased Ismail succumbed to death due to grievous injuries sustained in the accident that occurred on 10.05.2008. His wife aged 22 years, two children aged about 3 years and 9 months respectively and his father aged 90 years moved the claim petition before the Claims Tribunal, seeking total compensation of Rs.25,00,000/-. The Tribunal took the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.12,000/- for the purpose of assessing compensation, deducted half of that amount towards his personal and living expenses and awarded a total compensation of Rs.11,83,000/- together with interest at the rate of 7.5% p.a. from the date of filing the claim petition till its realisation. The insurer filed an appeal before the High Court against the award of the Tribunal, whereas the claimants filed cross-objection seeking enhancement in compensation. The High Court awarded a sum of Rs.9,70,000/- as additional compensation, in addition to Rs.11,83,000/- awarded by the Tribunal. The High Court took into consideration Ext.A6 salary MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 49 certificate of the deceased issued by Al-Rawabi Food Centre, Doha, which was attested/countersigned by the Assistant Consulate Officer, Embassy of India, Doha, disclosing a salary of 2500 Qatar Riyals, which is equivalent to Rs.30,000 per month. The Apex Court found that the overall compensation awarded by the High Court was just and reasonable in respect of all the heads, except the head loss of dependency. The High Court deducted 2/3rd of the total income of the deceased towards his personal and living expenses while quantifying the compensation. The Apex Court held that taking into consideration the high cost of living at Doha, the fact that the deceased was having his wife, two minor children and aged father as dependants, with no other earning member in the family, a deduction of 40% of the salary for the personal expenses would be appropriate for the purpose of quantifying compensation. Taking into consideration such factors including the factor of uncertainties in the job at Doha as well as uncertainty in staying back at Doha for a longer period and in the absence of any material to show the balance service of the deceased as per the terms of the contract, the Apex Court found that the claimants are entitled to total compensation of MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 50 Rs.28,00,000/- inclusive of the compensation awarded by the High Court, together with interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till its realisation, as just and reasonable compensation under the facts and circumstances of the case. Though the claimants had claimed only a total compensation of Rs.25,00,000/- in the claim petition filed before the Claims Tribunal, the Apex Court found that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than that claimed in the claim petition. The Apex Court noticed that there is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the tribunal or court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is to award 'just compensation'. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A 'just compensation' is one that is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation. See: Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003) 2 SCC 274], Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 51 v. Nanu Ram [(2018) 18 SCC 130] and Ibrahim v. Raju [(2011) 10 SCC 634]

46. In Prasanna B. v. Kabeer P. K. and another [2019 (3) KLJ 310 : 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1793] a learned Single Judge of this Court was dealing with a case in which the appellant-claimant filed MACA No.2017 of 2013 under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act challenging the award passed by the Claims Tribunal to the extent the insurer was exonerated them from the liability holding that the vehicle was not covered by a policy at the time of the accident. On the question of maintainability of the appeal, the learned counsel for the insurer contended that an award exonerating the insurer from the liability can be challenged only by the owner of the vehicle, who would be consequently liable to pay compensation to the claimant. Therefore, the appellant-claimant cannot be said to be a person aggrieved in terms of S ection 173 of the Act to prefer an appeal challenging the award in such cases.

47. In Prasanna B. (supra), on the maintainability of the appeal filed by the appellant-claimant, the learned Single Judge noticed that the said contention taken of the insurer was in the light of the expression 'any person aggrieved by an MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 52 award' contained in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. True, if the insurer in the proceedings is exonerated from the liability, the owner would be liable to pay compensation to the claimant. But that does not mean that only the owner would be aggrieved in such cases. In a case where the owner pays the claimant the compensation directed to be paid or where the claimant would be in a position to realise the compensation from the owner without much difficulty, the claimant may not be aggrieved by the award. But, in cases where the claimants are not in a position to realise the compensation from the owners, they would certainly be aggrieved by the award. Even in cases where the claimants would be in a position to realise the compensation from the owners, it is common knowledge that it would be a cumbersome effort for the claimants to realise the compensation from them, while insurers would deposit the compensation payable to the claimants by default, in cases where they have liability. In the above circumstances, it cannot be said that the legislature intended to deprive the claimants in proceedings before the Claims Tribunal a right of appeal for challenging the award exonerating the insurer from the liability MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 53 to indemnify the owner. If the contention taken by the insurer is accepted, in cases where the Claims Tribunal exonerates the insurer from the liability erroneously and the owner who is consequently made liable is not aware or otherwise prevented by circumstances from preferring an appeal challenging the exoneration of the insurer, the victim might be deprived of compensation which he/she is entitled to the loss caused on account of the accident. Such an interpretation of Section 173 of the Act would go against the social welfare provisions contained in Chapter XI of the Act. Therefore, the learned Single Judge rejected the contention raised by the learned counsel for the insurer as regards the maintainability of the appeal filed by the appellant-claimant under Section 173 of the Act.

48. In Jinto John v. V.J. Linto and others [2018 (1) KHC 362 : 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 24120] a Division Bench of this Court in one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J] was dealing with a case in which the Tribunal accepted the entire extent of permanent disability certified in Ext.A7 viz., 40%. The Tribunal fixed the monthly income of the appellant-claimant as Rs.3,000/-, the multiplier as 18 with reference to his age at the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 54 time of the accident. Accepting the entire extent of disability certified in Ext.A7, the Tribunal assessed the compensation payable to the claimant towards permanent disability as Rs.2,59,200/-. However, the Tribunal declined to award the entire amount as assessed, i.e., Rs.2,59,200/-, since the claimant had claimed only an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- under the head permanent disability and consequently, awarded only a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation under that head. The Division Bench held that it is in deviation from the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Ningamma [(2009) 13 SCC 710]. The said decision was rendered by the Apex Court following its earlier decision in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274].

49. In Jinto John (supra) the Division Bench quoted paragraph 10 of the judgment of the Apex Court in Nagappa (supra), wherein it was held that Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the Claims Tribunal to "make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just". Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be just. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation. In Jinto John (supra) the Division Bench held MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 55 that assessment of compensation under different heads is done for the purpose of granting just compensation. Hence, when once it is found that the compensation to which the claimant is entitled, be it under any particular head or aggregate, is more than what is claimed, its denial after assessment would result in denial of just compensation. Therefore, in the light of the law laid down in Nagappa and Ningamma referred to supra, the Division Bench held that the Claims Tribunal ought to have granted the entire amount assessed as compensation for permanent disability. There was no justification in awarding only Rs.1,00,000/- after assessing Rs.2,59,200/- as compensation for permanent disability. Therefore, the appellant-claimant was found entitled to get the balance amount assessed by the Tribunal under the head permanent disability.

50. In Thressia v. James [2003 SCC OnLine Kerala 509 : 2004) (1) KLJ 517] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that, though the appellants-claimants have claimed only Rs.1,00,000/- as additional compensation for the purpose of valuation of the appeal for determining jurisdiction and court fee, the amount claimed before the Claims Tribunal was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 56 Rs.7,50,000/-. The Tribunal awarded total compensation of Rs.1,17,500/-. The Division Bench found that the appellant- claimant is entitled to additional compensation of Rs.2,42,500/-. The Division Bench noticed that, as held by the Apex Court in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case where from the evidence brought on record if Tribunal/Court considers that claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal/Court may pass such award. The only embargo is it, should be 'Just' compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. Thus, the appellant-claimant was found entitled to get an additional compensation of Rs. 2,42,500/- with 9% interest from the date of application till realisation.

51. In Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza v. Ahmedabad Municipal Transport Service [(2013) 16 SCC 719] the Apex Court found that the appellants-claimants are entitled to re-fixation of the total compensation as Rs.16,90,000/- under various heads, as mentioned in paragraph 18 of the judgment, though there is no specific mention for enhancing the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 57 compensation awarded by the High Court. In the Civil Appeal, the appellant-claimant has basically requested to set aside the judgment dated 11.01.2012 of the High Court of Gujarat in First Appeal No.1549 of 2002. The Apex Court held that in view of the law laid down in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] the legal representatives of the deceased are entitled to the compensation as mentioned in paragraph 18, under the various heads, even though certain claims were not preferred by them, as they are legally and legitimately entitled for the said claims. Accordingly, the Apex Court awarded compensation, more than what was claimed by them, as it is the statutory duty of the Tribunal and the Appellate Court to award just and reasonable compensation to the legal representatives of the deceased to mitigate their hardship and agony, as held in a catena of cases.

52. As held by the Apex Court in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] and reiterated/relied on in a catena of decisions, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the Claims Tribunal to 'make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just'. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation under Section 168 of the Act, in a claim petition filed under Section MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 58 166 of the Act is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on the power of the Claims Tribunal for awarding just compensation. The law is well settled that, under Section 168 of the Act, there is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where, from the evidence brought on record if the Claims Tribunal considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is - it should be 'just' compensation, i.e., it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. Under the provisions of the Act, there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. In an appropriate case, depending upon the facts and the evidence which has been brought on record and in the interest of justice, the Claims Tribunal may permit amendment of the claim petition so as to award just compensation, as held by the Apex Court in MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 59 Nagappa (supra) and reiterated/relied on in a catena of decisions.

53. In M. Ramadevi [(2008) 3 SCC 379], the Apex Court repelled the contention of the appellant State Road Transport Corporation that, when there was no appeal by the claimants, in the appeal filed by the appellant-Corporation the High Court should not have enhanced the compensation amount. The Apex Court repelled the above contention of the appellant-Corporation, after quoting the law laid down in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274]. Adopting the multiplier of 10, as against the multiplier of 12 taken by the Tribunal and the High Court, the Apex Court re-fixed the amount payable to the claimants as Rs.2,40,000/-, to which the Apex Court added Rs.20,000/- awarded by the Tribunal for non-pecuniary damages and loss of consortium, as there was no challenge by the Corporation to the award of such amounts.

54. In Ningamma [(2009) 13 SCC 710] the Apex Court noticed that, Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act deals with 'just compensation' and even if in the pleadings no specific claim was made under Section 166 of the Act, a party should not be deprived of getting 'just compensation' in case the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 60 claimant is able to make out a case under any provision of law. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Ningamma (supra) and reiterated/relied on in a catena of decisions, the Tribunal/Court is duty-bound and entitled to award 'just compensation' irrespective of the fact whether any plea in that behalf was raised by the claimant/appellant or not.

55. In Jitendra Khimshankar Trivedi [(2015) 4 SCC 237], the Apex Court reiterated that, though the claimants have not filed any appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal, as it is obligatory on the part of Courts/Tribunals to award just and reasonable compensation, the Apex Court took the income of the deceased as Rs.3,000/- per month, as against Rs.1,500/- per month taken by the Tribunal and Rs.1,350/- per month taken by the High Court, in order to award just and reasonable compensation. After deducting 1/3 rd towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased and adopting the multiplier of 18, the Apex Court recalculated loss of dependency at Rs.4,32,000/-.

56. In Ramla [(2019) 2 SCC 192] the Apex Court found that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than that claimed in the claim petition. The Apex MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 61 Court reiterated that there is no restriction that the Court cannot award compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the tribunal or court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, is to award 'just compensation'. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount.

57. In Prasanna B. [2019 (3) KLJ 310] on the maintainability of the appeal filed by the appellant-claimant, a learned Single Judge of this Court held that, in the light of the expression 'any person aggrieved by an award' contained in sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, an appeal filed by the claimant challenging the award of the Claims Tribunal exonerating the insurer from the liability to indemnify the owner, is maintainable, since it is common knowledge that it would be a cumbersome effort for the claimants to realise the compensation from the owner.

58. In Jinto John [2018 (1) KHC 362] a Division Bench of this Court noticed that the Tribunal declined to award the entire amount as assessed, i.e., Rs.2,59,200/-, since the claimant had claimed only an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- under the head permanent disability and consequently, awarded only MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 62 a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- as compensation under that head. It is in deviation from the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] and Ningamma [(2009) 13 SCC 710]. The Division Bench held that the assessment of compensation under different heads is done for the purpose of granting just compensation. Once it is found that the compensation to which the claimant is entitled, be it under any particular head or aggregate, is more than what is claimed, its denial after assessment would result in denial of just compensation.

59. In Sanobanu Nazirbhai Mirza [(2013) 16 SCC 719] the Apex Court found that the appellants-claimants are entitled to re-fixation of the total compensation as Rs.16,90,000/- under various heads, though there is no specific mention for enhancing the compensation awarded by the High Court. In view of the law laid down in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] the Apex Court held that the legal representatives of the deceased are entitled to the total compensation as Rs.16,90,000/- under the various heads, even though certain claims were not preferred by them, as they are legally and legitimately entitled to the said claims.

MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 63

60. In Valsamma and another v. V.A. Baiju and others [2018 (1) KLJ 393 : 2017 SCC OnLine Kerala 23174] the appellants-claimants in MACA No.711 of 2010, were the mother and younger brother of the deceased, seeks for enhancement of the amount of compensation awarded. Before the Division Bench of this Court, the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer raised the question of maintainability of the appeal, contending that the claimants are not 'persons aggrieved' within the purview of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and hence they are not entitled to file an appeal against the award passed by the Tribunal. The said contention was based on the factual aspect that the claimants have limited their claim before the Tribunal to Rs.8 lakhs and the Tribunal had already awarded more than the said amount. Learned Standing Counsel for the insurer placed reliance on the decision in Mithun Subramanian [2017 (3) KHC 710] in support of the above contention.

61. In Valsamma (supra) the Division Bench noticed that the question dealt with in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is purely with respect to locus standi of the claimants to file an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 64 enhancement of the amount of compensation. If the Tribunal had awarded amount more than what was claimed, the claimants cannot be termed as 'person aggrieved', coming under Section 173, is the finding therein. Before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants-claimants pointed out that, the total claim raised before the Tribunal was Rs.8,89,676/-, which was limited to Rs.8 lakhs. The Division Bench noticed various decisions of the Apex Court, wherein it was held that the Tribunals are entitled to award more amount than what was claimed, in order to ensure that 'just compensation' is paid to the victims of motor vehicle accidents. The above approach is made by considering the relevant provisions in the Motor Vehicle Act, as a beneficial legislation. Further, even if the claimants have not filed an appeal seeking enhancement, this Court is empowered to enhance the amount of compensation awarded, while dealing with an appeal filed by the insurance company challenging the quantum, in exercise of the jurisdiction vested on it under Order XLI, Rule 33 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and also taking note of the settled legal principle that the courts should ensure 'just compensation' to the victims of motor vehicle accidents. MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 65 Therefore, even if it is found that MACA No.711 of 2010 is not maintainable, this Court has got jurisdiction to examine the justifiability or reasonableness of the amount of compensation awarded and is empowered to grant enhancement if any required, while considering the appeal filed by the insurer challenging the quantum of compensation. Therefore, the Division Bench found no need to arrive at any specific finding on the question of maintainability of MACA No. 711 of 2010.

62. In Mithun Subramanian [2017 (3) KHC 710], the Division Bench of this Court was dealing with an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Act arising out of the award passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal in OP(MV) Nos.853 of 2012 and 2326 of 2012. Those claim petitions were in respect of a motor accident, which occurred on 13.12.2011, in which the deceased in MACA No.2613 of 2016, arising out of OP(MV) No.853 of 2012, was riding a motorcycle bearing Registration No.KL-11/AC-7658. The appellant in MACA No.2628 of 2016, who was the claimant in OP(MV) No.2326 of 2012 was the pillion rider of another motorcycle bearing Registration No.KL-42/E-3014 ridden by his friend Adhithyaraj. When these motorcycles reached the place of accident, the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 66 offending motorcar bearing Registration No.K-41/B-7576 overtook the motorcycles through the left side and then suddenly turned towards the road without giving a proper signal. The said vehicle hit both the motorcycles, resulting in the death of Sajad, who succumbed to fatal injuries on 20.03.2012. Mithun Subramanian, the pillion rider of the other motorcycle sustained serious injuries, which had resulted in permanent disability. Mithun Subramanian filed OP(MV) No.853 of 2012 claiming compensation for the injuries sustained in the motor accident and also for the resultant permanent disability. In the claim petition, the total compensation was limited to Rs.5,00,000/-. The legal heirs of Sajad, namely, his mother and sister, filed OP(MV) No.2326 of 2012, limiting the claim to Rs.15,00,000/-. In OP(MV) No.853 of 2012, the Tribunal granted a total compensation of Rs.6,83,060/- together with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till realisation as against the claim of Rs.5,00,000/-. As against Rs.2,00,000/- claimed as compensation for permanent disability, the Tribunal awarded a compensation of Rs.4,01,760/-. In OP(MV) No.2326 of 2012, the Tribunal awarded Rs.16,20,500/-, as against the claim, which was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 67 limited to Rs.15,00,000/-. In both the claim petitions, the insurer of the offending motorcar was held liable to indemnify the insured owner. The insurer has not preferred any appeal against the compensation awarded by the Tribunal in excess of the total compensation claimed in respect of the claim petitions. However, the claimants in both the claim petitions preferred appeals before this Court as MACA Nos.2613 and 2626 of 2016, invoking the provisions under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, claiming enhanced compensation. Before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that though the claimants have limited their claim to Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- respectively, the Tribunal granted compensation more than the total compensation claimed. The award of compensation by the Tribunal in excess of the total compensation claimed cannot be a fetter to their rights to prefer an appeal under Section 173 of the Act seeking further enhancement of compensation.

63. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that, the fact that the appellants confined their claim to Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- respectively and the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 68 Claims Tribunal granted compensation more than the amount thus claimed, cannot be a fetter to their rights to prefer an appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking enhancement of the quantum of compensation. The learned counsel submitted that in fact, in the claim petitions, the appellants made their own assessment of compensation of more than Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- respectively, though the claim was limited to Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- respectively. The Tribunal has deprived them 'just compensation'. The Tribunal has failed to compensate them adequately under different heads and hence they would fall within the expression 'person aggrieved' for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the 2nd respondent insurer contended that, since the appellants were granted compensation much in excess of their claim before the Tribunal they would not fall within the expression 'person aggrieved'. Since their grievance is only against the quantum of compensation, even after obtaining compensation more than the claimed amount, they are not entitled to prefer an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal in terms of MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 69 sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act.

64. In Mithun Subramanian (supra) the Division Bench noticed that the term 'person aggrieved' is not defined under the Motor Vehicles Act. Therefore, its meaning in common parlance has to be looked into. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Concise Law Dictionary the word 'aggrieved' is given the meaning 'a person who has suffered a legal grievance - a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected of his title to something'. Going by the New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary, Encyclopedic Edition, the word 'aggrieved' means 'injured', as by legal decision adversely infringing upon one's rights. The Division Bench referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Binu Chacko v. Regional Transport Authority and another [2006 (2) KLT 172 : AIR 2006 Kerala 177], wherein, while dealing with the revisional power under Section 90 of the Motor Vehicles Act, it was held that to be 'legally aggrieved' a person must be not merely dissatisfied with or even prejudicially affected by an act or decision, he must also have been deprived of or refused something to which he was MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 70 legally entitled to or is subjected to a legal burden.

65. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), before the Division Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants relied on the principle of 'restitutio in integrum' which means 'restore into the original position' and in the matter of determination of compensation it means 'to compensate a person or a party who is a victim of a wrong or tort, for the loss or damage sustained or suffered'. It was contended that, while considering 'just compensation' under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, the Claims Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors and quantify the amount of 'just compensation'. Therefore, while adjudicating 'just compensation' the Claims Tribunal has got unfettered powers to go into the claims in detail and grant compensation in excess of what is actually claimed. It would be open to the Claims Tribunal to grant compensation in excess of the amount claimed, if in its opinion the 'just compensation' to which the claimant deserves is more than the amount actually claimed. The Division Bench found that the above contention raised by the appellants is certainly in conformity with the decision of the Apex Court in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54].

MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 71

66. In Mithun Subramanian [2017 (3) KHC 710], the Division Bench noticed that, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54] it would be open to the Claims Tribunal or a Court and virtually it is the duty of the Court to properly award just and equitable, fair and reasonable compensation and if necessary, by ignoring the claim made in the application for compensation. Indisputably, it is in view of the said exposition of law by the Apex Court that the Claims Tribunal as per the impugned awards granted more amount of compensation than claimed by the appellants in their respective claim petitions.

67. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), after referring to the law laid down in Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54] and Binu Chacko [2006 (2) KLT 172], the Division Bench in paragraphs 8 and 9 of the judgment posed the following questions;

"Solely seeking enhancement of compensation without showing that by the legal decision he had suffered a legal grievance or in other words, as held in Binu Chacko [2006 (2) KLT 172] that he was deprived of or refused something to which he is legally entitled to, how can a claimant maintain an appeal in such circumstances where he was granted compensation in excess of his claim?"

MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 72 "How can a petitioner in a claim petition, who is a grantee of compensation in excess of his claim, could be considered as a 'person aggrieved', entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act when as per the said legal decision nothing was deprived of or refused to him to which he was legally entitled to?

(underline supplied)

68. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), the Division Bench observed that the mere fact that the claimant in a claim petition is dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation granted even though in excess of his claim or after the award he felt that he is entitled to more, cannot be a reason to treat him as 'a person aggrieved' for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act. How can the petitioner in a claim petition, who is a grantee of compensation in excess of his claim, be considered as a 'person aggrieved', entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act when as per the said legal decision nothing was deprived of or refused to him to which he was legally entitled to? Merely because a claimant had actually made an own assessment of compensation to which he is entitled, and then, limited the claim below such assessed amount, it cannot be a reason for such a claimant to canvass the position that denial of the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 73 compensation assessed by him, as can be seen from the claim petition or his hindsight that he is entitled to more than the amount claimed, should confer him an indefeasible right to prefer an appeal, even if he is not otherwise aggrieved by the award in question. The Division Bench noticed that in terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ad valorem fee was paid by the appellants only for the amount to which the claim is limited. In the eye of law, that amount alone can be taken as the amount claimed and the aforesaid question has to be decided based on the amount thus claimed as compensation. In such circumstances, the claimants cannot be permitted to fall back on their own original assessment, ignoring the fact that the claim was then limited below that amount and the court fee was paid only for the amount actually claimed while considering the aforesaid question.

69. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), the Division Bench noticed that, as per sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, the Claims Tribunal may, in its discretion, exempt a party from the payment of the fee prescribed under sub-rule (1). In Raman Nair v. Mukundan MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 74 Nair [2005 (3) KLT SN 83 : 2005 KHC 1176] it was held that a rowing inquiry as required under the Code of Civil Procedure is not required for granting exemption from payment of court fee, as permissible under sub-rule (2) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules and its proviso. In Suma v. Rajesh [2011 (4) KLT 109] it was held that seeking exemption from payment of court fee under the Motor Vehicles Act is not similar to an application claiming dispensation of court fee to sue as an indigent person. A rowing inquiry as provided under the Code of Civil Procedure would not be required for exercising the power under the aforesaid Rules in the matter of granting exemption from payment of court fee and it could be allowed on condition that the claimant would be entitled to such amount only after deducting the court fee payable. The Division Bench held that, in the light of the provisions under Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules and the decisions referred to supra the claimants cannot put forth a contention that they refrained themselves from making a claim in tune with their own assessment solely because they got no means to pay the ad valorem fee. The Division Bench noticed that the appellants got no case that they filed such an MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 75 application and it was rejected. In view of all the aforesaid circumstances and provisions, the aforesaid question can be considered only with reference to the amount actually claimed to which court fee was paid and also by taking into account the amount awarded.

70. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), at paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision, the Division Bench scanned the contentions raised by the appellants in both the appeals and found no reason whatsoever to arrive at a conclusion that they suffered a legal grievance as nothing to which they are legally entitled to, in the circumstances, was deprived of or refused to them. In the said circumstances, the Division Bench concluded that legally the appellants could not have any grievance on that issue. For the foregoing reasons, the Division Bench dismissed the appeals as the appellants cannot be said to be aggrieved persons legally entitled to seek enhancement of compensation. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the said decision read thus;

"14. As noticed hereinbefore, in this case, the appellant in the former appeal limited his claim to 5 lakhs and the Tribunal after considering all the relevant factors granted compensation in excess of the same, to be precise, Rs.6,83,060/-. Though the appellant attempted to canvass MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 76 the position that there exists dispute regarding the assessment of permanent disability as according to him, his disability ought to have been taken as 62%, according to us, it also cannot be a reason to contend that he was deprived of or refused the amount to which he was legally entitled to. It is to be noted that Ext.C3 is the disability certificate issued by the Medical Board issued from Medical College, Kottayam and going by the same his permanent disability is only 31%. The appellant was aged 20 years at the time of the accident and he was then pursuing his study in B.Sc Degree course. Still, the Tribunal notionally fixed his income as Rs.6,000/- despite the fact that he was a non-earning person and then, the entire percentage of disability, viz., 31% was taken into account for the purpose of granting compensation for permanent disability. He was given a compensation of Rs.4,01,760/- as against the claim of Rs.2,00,000/- under that head. Evidently, the Tribunal after considering the evidence on record and the nature of injuries found that the appellant is entitled to get more than the compensation claimed viz., Rs.5,00,000/- and awarded an amount of Rs.6,83,060/- with 9% interest per annum from the date of petition till realisation.

15. As relates O.P.(MV)No.2326 of 2012 from which the latter appeal arises, the deceased was a bachelor and was aged 19 years. He was also a B.Sc Degree student viz., a non-earning person. The claimants/ appellants are his mother and sister and his father pre-deceased him. As noticed hereinbefore, as against a claim of Rs.15,00,000/- they were granted Rs.16,20,500/- with interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of petition till realisation. MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 77 Despite the fact he was a student and a non-earning person the Tribunal fixed the monthly income notionally as RS.6,000/-. In fact, regarding his status as a B.Sc student no evidence was adduced. Towards compensation for love and affection the appellants, who are respectively the mother and sister of the deceased, were given Rs.2,00,000/-. In view of the aforesaid circumstances as also in the absence of any averment and evidence to the effect that either of them had actually witnessed the incident no separate damages are awardable for the grief or sorrow caused by the death. There is also no case that either of them was afflicted with any recognizable psychiatric illness on account of having witnessed the accident in question. Having scanned the contentions raised by the appellants in both the appeals we do not find any reason whatsoever to arrive at a conclusion that they suffered a legal grievance as nothing to which they are legally entitled to, in the circumstances, was deprived of or refused to them. In the said circumstances, legally the appellants could not have any grievance on that issue. For the foregoing reasons, these appeals are liable to fail as the appellants cannot be said to be aggrieved persons legally entitled to seek enhancement of compensation."

(underline supplied)

71. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), before the Division Bench, the appellants-claimants contended that in the claim petitions the claimants made their own assessment of compensation of more than Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 78 respectively, though for the purpose of payment of ad valorem court fee under sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules the claim was limited to Rs.5,00,000/- and Rs.15,00,000/- respectively. The fact that the claimants confined their claim to the aforesaid sum and the Claims Tribunal granted compensation more than the amount thus claimed, cannot be a fetter to their rights to prefer an appeal under sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking enhancement of the quantum of compensation since the Tribunal deprived them 'just compensation'. Since the Tribunal failed to compensate them adequately under different heads they would fall within the expression 'person aggrieved' for the purpose of sub-section (1) of Section 173 of the Act. Per contra, the 2nd respondent insurer contended that since the appellants-claimants were granted compensation much in excess of their claim before the Claims Tribunal they would not fall within the expression 'person aggrieved'. Since their grievance is only against the quantum of compensation even after obtaining compensation more than the claimed amount, they are not entitled to prefer an appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal in terms of sub-section (1) of Section 173 MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 79 of the Act.

72. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), while dealing with the aforesaid contentions, the Division Bench noticed that since the term 'person aggrieved' is not defined under the Motor Vehicles Act its meaning in common parlance has to be looked into. In Ramanatha Aiyar's Concise Law Dictionary the word 'aggrieved' is given the meaning 'a person who has suffered a legal grievance - a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected of his title to something'. Then the Division Bench referred to the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in Binu Chacko [2006 (2) KLT 172], wherein it was held that to be 'legally aggrieved' a person must be not merely dissatisfied with or even prejudicially affected by an act or decision, he must also have been deprived of or refused something to which he was legally entitled to or is subjected to a legal burden. In Binu Chacko (supra), the Full Bench noticed that, in a broad sense, the words 'person aggrieved' as held by Lord Denning in A.G. of the Gambia v. N Jie [(1961) 2 All E.R. 504] include a person who has a genuine grievance MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 80 because an order has been made which prejudicially affects his interests.

73. In Mithun Subramanian (supra), while dealing with the contention raised by the appellants-claimants relying on the principle of 'restitutio in integrum', the Division Bench held that the contention advanced by the appellants that, while adjudicating 'just compensation' the Claims Tribunal has got unfettered powers to go into the claims in detail and grant compensation in excess of what is actually claimed and that, it would be open to the Tribunal to grant compensation in excess of the amount claimed, if in its opinion the 'just compensation' to which the claimant deserves is more than the amount actually claimed are certainly in conformity with the decision of the Apex Court in Rajesh v. Rajbir Singh [(2013) 9 SCC 54]. The Division Bench, in clear and categorical terms, stated that in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Rajesh (supra) it would be open to the Claims Tribunal or a Court and virtually it is the duty of the Court to properly award just and equitable, fair and reasonable compensation and if necessary, by ignoring the claim made in the application for compensation. The Division Bench noticed that it is in view of MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 81 the said exposition of law by the Apex Court that the Claims Tribunal as per the impugned awards granted more amount of compensation than claimed by the claimants in their respective claim petitions. Therefore, the law laid down by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is that, while adjudicating 'just compensation' the Claims Tribunal or the High Court has got unfettered powers to go into the claims in detail and grant compensation in excess of what is actually claimed, if in the opinion of the Claims Tribunal or the High Court the 'just compensation' to which the claimant deserves is more than the amount actually claimed.

74. It is pertinent to note that, in Rajesh (supra) one of the issues that came up for consideration before a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court was as to whether the Claims Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court noticed that, in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] that Section 168 of the Act empowers the Claims Tribunal to 'make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just'. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 82 must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation. The above principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280] and Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710]. The underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a 'just compensation' and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. The attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim. There is another reason why the court should award proper compensation irrespective of the claim and, if required, even in excess of the claim.

75. In Rajesh (supra), the Apex Court noticed that, after the amendment of the Motor Vehicles Act by Act 54 of 1994, with effect from 14.11.1994, the report on motor vehicle accident prepared by the police officer and forwarded to the Claims Tribunal under sub-section (6) of Section 158 has to be MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 83 treated as an application for compensation. As per sub-section (4) of Section 166, the Claims Tribunal shall treat any report of accidents forwarded to it under sub-section (6) of Section 158 as an application for compensation under this Act. Prior to the amendment in 1994, it was left to the discretion of the Claims Tribunal as to whether the report be treated as an application or not. In a report on the accident, there is no question of any reference to any claim for damages, different heads of damages or such other details. It is the duty of the Claims Tribunal to build on that report and award just, equitable, fair and reasonable compensation with reference to the settled principles on assessment of damages. Thus, the Tribunal/Court has a duty, irrespective of the claims made in the application, if any, to properly award a just, equitable, fair and reasonable compensation, if necessary, ignoring the claim made in the application for compensation. In the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in Rajesh (supra), the Division Bench noticed in Mithun Subramanian (supra) that, it would be open to the Claims Tribunal or a Court and virtually, it is the duty of the Court to properly award just and equitable, fair and reasonable compensation and if necessary, by ignoring the MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 84 claim made in the application for compensation.

76. As already noticed hereinbefore, the law laid down by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is that, while adjudicating 'just compensation' the Claims Tribunal or the High Court has got unfettered powers to go into the claims in detail and grant compensation in excess of what is actually claimed, if in the opinion of the Claims Tribunal or the High Court the 'just compensation' to which the claimant deserves is more than the amount actually claimed. After referring to the law laid down in Rajesh [(2013) 9 SCC 54] and Binu Chacko [2006 (2) KLT 172] and laying down the law as above, the Division Bench posed the following questions; (1) How a claimant who was granted compensation in excess of his claim maintain an appeal seeking enhancement of compensation without showing that by the award of the Claims Tribunal he had suffered a legal grievance or that he was deprived of or refused something to which he is legally entitled to?; and (2) How a claimant who is a grantee of compensation in excess of his claim, could be considered as a 'person aggrieved', entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act, when as per the award of the Claims Tribunal MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 85 nothing was deprived of or refused to him to which he was legally entitled to? In that context, the Division Bench observed that, merely because a claimant had actually made an own assessment of compensation to which he is entitled, and then, limited the claim below such assessed amount, it cannot be a reason for such a claimant to canvass the position that denial of the compensation assessed by him, as can be seen from the claim petition or his hindsight that he is entitled to more than the amount claimed, should confer him an indefeasible right to prefer an appeal, even if he is not otherwise aggrieved by the award in question. In terms of sub-rule (1) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ad valorem fee was paid by the appellants only for the amount to which the claim is limited. The Division Bench observed that in the eye of law that amount alone can be taken as the amount claimed and the aforesaid question has to be decided based on the amount thus claimed as compensation. In such circumstances, the claimants cannot be permitted to fall back on their own original assessment, ignoring the fact that the claim was then limited below that amount and court fee was paid only for the amount actually claimed while considering the aforesaid question. In MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 86 the light of the provisions under Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules and the decisions in Raman Nair [2005 (3) KLT SN 83] and Suma [2011 (4) KLT 109] the claimants cannot put forth a contention that they refrained themselves from making a claim in tune with their own assessment solely because they got no means to pay the ad valorem fee. In view of all the aforesaid circumstances and provisions the aforesaid question can be considered only with reference to the amount actually claimed to which court fee was paid and also by taking into account the amount awarded. At paragraphs 14 and 15 of the decision, the Division Bench scanned the contentions raised by the appellants-claimants in both the appeals and found no reason whatsoever to arrive at a conclusion that they suffered a legal grievance as nothing to which they are legally entitled to, in the circumstances, was deprived of or refused to them. In the above circumstances, the Division Bench concluded that, legally the appellants-claimants could not have any grievance on that issue. For the aforesaid reasons, the Division Bench dismissed the appeals as the appellants cannot be said to be aggrieved persons legally entitled to seek enhancement of compensation. Therefore, the law laid down by the Division MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 87 Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is that, a claimant who was granted compensation in excess of his claim by the Claims Tribunal cannot maintain an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking enhancement of compensation without showing that by the award of the Claims Tribunal he had suffered a legal grievance or that he was deprived of or refused something to which he is legally entitled to. When as per the award of the Claims Tribunal nothing was deprived of or refused to the claimant to which he was legally entitled to, a claimant who is a grantee of compensation in excess of his claim, could be considered as a 'person aggrieved', entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act.

77. In the result, the question referred to the Division Bench is answered as follows; The law laid down by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra) is that, while adjudicating 'just compensation' the Claims Tribunal or the High Court has got unfettered powers to go into the claims in detail and grant compensation in excess of what is actually claimed, if in the opinion of the Claims Tribunal or the High Court the 'just compensation' to which the claimant deserves is more than the amount actually claimed. Further, a claimant who was granted MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 88 compensation in excess of his claim by the Claims Tribunal cannot maintain an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act seeking enhancement of compensation without showing that by the award of the Claims Tribunal he had suffered a legal grievance or that he was deprived of or refused something to which he is legally entitled to. When as per the award of the Claims Tribunal nothing was deprived of or refused to the claimant to which he was legally entitled to, a claimant who is a grantee of compensation in excess of his claim, could not be considered as a 'person aggrieved', who is entitled to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act. The interpretation given to the expression 'person aggrieved' by the Division Bench in Mithun Subramanian (supra), in the case of an appeal filed under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act by a claimant who was granted compensation by the Claims Tribunal in excess of his claim, without showing that by the award of the Claims Tribunal he had suffered a legal grievance or that he was deprived of or refused something to which he is legally entitled to, is neither contrary to the scheme of the provisions under Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act which is a beneficial piece of legislation nor contrary to the law laid MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 89 down in Nagappa [(2003) 2 SCC 274] and reiterated in a catena of decisions that there is no restriction that the Claims Tribunal or the High Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Claims Tribunal or the High Court is to award 'just' compensation which is reasonable on the basis of evidence placed on record. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be 'just'. There is no other limitation or restriction on the power of the Claims Tribunal or the High Court for awarding 'just compensation'. Therefore, it would be open to the Claims Tribunal or the High Court and virtually it is the duty of the Tribunal and the High Court to award 'just compensation' under each head and if found necessary, by ignoring the claim made in the application for compensation.

78. The assessment of compensation under different heads is done for the purpose of granting just compensation. Hence, once it is found that the compensation to which the claimant is legally entitled, be it under any particular head or aggregate, is more than what is claimed, its denial would result in denial of 'just compensation'. Therefore, once it is found that MACA No. 480 of 2012, etc. 90 the claimant had suffered a legal grievance by the award passed by the Claims Tribunal under Section 168 of the Act, whereby he is deprived of 'just compensation' to which he was legally entitled to under any particular head, he can be considered as a 'person aggrieved' to prefer an appeal in terms of Section 173 of the Act for seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal. Such legal grievance can be with reference to the adoption of wrong multiplier; improper deduction towards personal and living expenses; improper assessment of percentage of functional disability; improper addition of future prospects; denial of 'just compensation' under the conventional heads like, loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenses, etc., in terms of the law laid down by the Apex Court in National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680]; etc. Registry is directed to list the above appeals before the Bench as per roster.

Sd/-

ANIL K. NARENDRAN, JUDGE Sd/-

P.G. AJITHKUMAR, JUDGE bkn/AV 22-03-2022 /True Copy/ Assistant Registrar

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