Madhya Pradesh High Court
National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Subhiya Bai And Ors. on 7 August, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1999ACJ1513
Author: R.P. Gupta
Bench: R.P. Gupta
JUDGMENT R.P. Gupta, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the award dated 21.7.1994 passed by the VI Addl. Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Raipur, whereby a total sum of Rs. 46,200 was awarded as compensation to the claimant Subhiya Bai as Gobruram was killed in a motor vehicle accident on 25.6.1988. Gobruram was travelling in a private jeep No. MBS 51 on 25.6.1988. The jeep turned turtle due to some accidental reasons and Gobruram, as a result of injuries died.
2. The claimant filed the claim petition under Section 110-A of the then Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, within the prescribed period. The Tribunal held that she should be presumed to be the wife of the deceased as she was residing with him for the last 25 years before the death. The Tribunal also held that though the sons of the deceased were not made parties, it could not affect the maintainability of the claim petition. The deceased was 60 years old at the time of death.
3. The only question which needs to be discussed in this appeal is whether the claimant could be held to be wife of the deceased. Counsel for the appellant has brought to my notice the statement of the claimant made on oath before the Tribunal in which she stated that her previous husband was alive but she was living as wife of Gobruram for the last 25 years and that she never married Gobruram. Another witness Onkar, AW 2, produced by her also stated that there was no marriage between Gobruram and the claimant.
4. The Tribunal observed that for the purposes of claim under Motor Vehicles Act the relationship of wife and husband need not be strictly established as required by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act for proving the marriage. The question simply is whether whatever is admitted established the claimant as legal representative of the deceased. Section 110-A authorises all or any of the 'legal representatives' of the deceased to make claim petition for compensation in case of death from accident. Apparently the plaintiff's own evidence is that she had an earlier husband living and she never says that she divorced him and there was never any marriage between her and deceased Gobruram. So she could not be the wife of Gobruram. At best she was a concubine or keep of Gobruram, being maintained by him. She may be dependent. Whether dependency would fall under the definition of legal representative? Although, the word legal representative is not defined under the Motor Vehicles Act, yet the normal meaning of 'legal representative' is 'a person who succeeds to the estate of the deceased'. The Supreme Court in case of Gujarat State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Ramanbhai Prabhathhai, 1987 ACJ 561 (SC), observed that the term 'legal representative' has not been defined in the Motor Vehicles Act and the definition in Section 2(11) of Civil Procedure Code is as a person who in law represents the estate of the deceased person and includes any person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the concerned party. The Supreme Court observed that this definition does not apply to a case before the Claims Tribunal. According to the Supreme Court a legal representative means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person or a person on whom the estate devolves on the death of an individual. The court further noticed that under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act the application for compensation shall be made on behalf of or for the benefit of all the legal representatives of the deceased. Such application may be made by the legal representatives of the deceased or their agent but for benefit of all the legal representatives. Their Lordships considered this position in juxtaposition to the provisions of Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 and observed that 'legal representative' under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 was wider than the 'person entitled to sue' under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, i.e., wife, husband, parent and child of the deceased. Their Lordships were considering whether the brother had a right to file a petition as legal representative and the answer given was in the affirmative. After considering the various judgments of the High Courts on the point, their Lordships observed at one stage that all the legal representatives of the deceased according to the personal law applicable to the deceased, will be entitled to apportionment of the dependency according to their needs and according to their age and their apportionment is not limited as given under Section 1A of the Fatal Accidents Act. Their Lordships observed that it should be remembered that in the Indian families, brothers, sisters and sometimes foster children live together and they are dependent on the breadwinner of the family. There is no justification to deny this position. Gujarat High Court in the case of M.V. Santhakumari v. Dharujee Chogajee, 1982 ACJ (Supp) 477 (Gujarat), observed that while considering the person or persons to whom compensation is payable, the Tribunal will consider the claim of persons who had some dependency on the deceased, having any right legally recognised, either a right of inheritance or a share in the property or at least right to claim maintenance. Gujarat High Court observed that illegitimate children are legal representatives but concubine is not.
5. In the present case, the claimant said that she was not and could not be the wife of the deceased but she had been residing with the deceased for 25 years as his keep. The question is whether she was entitled to maintenance from the deceased under the personal law. The Hindu Guardianship and Maintenance Act, 1955 deals with this aspect and enumerates persons who are entitled to maintenance. It nowhere speaks of a concubine. The status of concubine is not recognised as a legal status even under the Hindu Law for the purpose of inheritance or maintenance. It is apparent that claimant/respondent No. 1 is not a legal representative and was not entitled to maintain a petition under Section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles Act.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 has raised two pleas; first, that a plea of this type could not be raised by the insurance company which could raise the limited pleas mentioned under Section 96 (2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Such a plea is not permissible. Second plea is that there were, as narrated by the claimant, two sons of the deceased but she did not know their names or their whereabouts and the Tribunal should have made an inquiry and should have impleaded them as a party and the petition should have been deemed to be a petition on their behalf or for their benefit.
7. As regards the first contention of the learned Counsel for respondent No. 1, the record shows that the owners who are respondent Nos. 2 and 3 have specifically denied locus standi of the claimant before the Tribunal and it was accepted by the Tribunal that they have a right to raise this plea. In this appeal it is the insurance company which has come up to challenge the entire award. Insurance company has raised those objections which were raised by the owners. The liability of the insurance company is co-terminus with that of insured. So the objection has been rightly taken and is not barred by any law.
8. The second submission of learned Counsel for the respondent No. 1 is that the petition was made on behalf of or for the benefit of sons. The Tribunal is not expected to do roving inquiry about the legal representatives of the deceased when somebody in the world apprises the Tribunal that somebody has died in an accident. The status of the respondent No. 1 is no more than that of a stranger, unless she claimed to be acting as an agent or on authority of the sons. She has to disclose them also. This petition cannot be deemed to be for the benefit of those sons or on their behalf.
9. The result of the above discussion is that the claim was without locus standi, the claimant has no right to claim dependency as she was not the legal representative of the deceased. The appeal must succeed. The impugned award is set aside. No order is made as to costs.