Madras High Court
Deluxe Road Lines Represented By Its ... vs P.K. Palani Chetty on 12 February, 1992
Equivalent citations: (1992)2MLJ481
ORDER Srinivasan, J.
1. This revision petition is at the instance of the tenant against whom an order of eviction has been passed by the Appellate Authority on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent.
2. There is no dispute that the petitioner is bound to pay a rent of Rs. 1,225 per mensem as tenant in premises No. 243, ground-floor, Govindappa Naicken Street, Madras The respondent filed the petition for eviction alleging that the petitioner had committed wilful default in payment of rent for four months from August, 1981 to November, 1981. The petition was presented on 18th January, 1982. The petitioner contested the same stating that he was paying rent regularly and there was no wilful default on his part. With regard to the period in question, he stated that he paid the rent for August, 1981 on 19.9.1981 to the respondent's son, who returned it on 26.2.1981 directing the petitioner to pay it to the respondent himself. On 5.10.1991, the petitioner paid the rent for August and September, 1981 to the respondent, who promised to send the receipt therefor later, but did not send the receipt. Again the petitioner paid the rent for the month of October on 14.12.1981 and for the month of November, 1981 on 17.12.1981 to the respondent's son. The amounts were returned on 12.12.1981 by the respondent's son with a direction lo pay it to the respondent in lump sum for the months of October, November and December, 1981 and January, 1982. The petitioner was shocked to receive a notice in the petition for eviction and on the first hearing date viz., 5.2.1982 he offered to pay the arrears of Rs. 4,900 and there was nobody on behalf of the respondent to receive the same in court. The tender was noted by the court on the docket and the matter was postponed to another dale. The petitioner sent the rental arrears by a demand draft through registered post on 12.2.1982 along with a covering letter.
3. The Rent Controller held that the petitioner was not guilty of wilful default and dismissed the petition for eviction. On appeal, the Appellate Authority by his order dated 25.1.1983 reversed the conclusion of the Rent Controller and held that the petitioner was guilty of wilful default. Consequently, he ordered eviction.
4. The petitioner filed this revision petition which was posted for hearing on 24.11.1986. On that date, nobody appeared for the petitioner and this Court dismissed the petition. The matter was taken to the Supreme Court by the petitioner by obtaining special leave. The Supreme Court passed an order imposing a condition that the petitioner should pay a sum of Rs. 1,000 by way of costs to the respondent within a week from 18.12.1986 for restoration of the revision petition in order to be heard on merits. Accordingly, the petitioner paid the costs and the Supreme Court remanded the matter directing this Court to restore this revision petition to file and dispose of the same on merits.
5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner contends that wilful default is a mixed question of law and fact and on the facts and circumstances of this case, the Appellate Authority is in error in holding that the petitioner is guilty of wilful default. Learned Counsel refers to the following circumstances: There was a tender of the entire arrears of rent on 5.3.1982, the first date on which the petition for eviction was posted before court. As there was none to accept the amount on behalf of the respondent, it was sent on 12.2.1982 by demand draft. That will show that the petitioner was quite conscious of his duties and obligations and if there was any deliberate intention on his part to avoid payment of rent, he would not have tendered the money on the date of first hearing. Secondly, it is submitted, that for about 12 years prior to the period in question, the petitioner had been paying rent very regularly without any default. The conduct of the petitioner during the prior period and immediately after the filing of the petition for eviction will prove that any default on his part is not wilful. Thirdly it is argued that there was no demand on the part of the' respondent before filing the petition for eviction. In order to prove before the court that a default is a wilful default, the landlord should have made a demand for payment of rent and only if the rent is not paid even after such demand, can be construed to be wilful. Fourthly it is urged that there was no refusal on the part of the petitioner to pay the rent at any time. The fifth contention is that the petitioner is carrying on business in the premises in question for quite a long lime and it is the discretion of the court to grant an order of eviction or not and in the present case, the discretion should be exercised only in favour of the petitioner. It is also submitted that the Rent Controller should grant time to the tenant to pay rent and only if there is failure to pay thereafter, an order for eviction should be made.
6. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent contends that the petitioner was never regular in payment of rent and he had always been irregular. It is submitted that the respondent as P.W.1 has given evidence that the petitioner used to pay rent always after delay and the said statement has not been challenged in cross-examination. It is also pointed out that even according to the versions put forward by the petitioner and the documents filed by him in support of his case, it is clear that the petitioner had not been regular in payment of rent. It is next argued that the books of accounts produced by the petitioner are fabricated and no reliance can be placed thereon. It is pointed out that very strangely the day book is said to have been maintained for the period from 1.9.1981 to 26.10.1981 and it is crystal clear that the said book has been prepared only for the purpose of this case to cover the period in question. It is also submitted that the alleged payments claimed by the petitioner have not been proved by examining the person who is said to have paid actually to the respondent's son and later to the respondent. The non-production of the ledger to corroborate the entries in the day books is a clinching circumstance which goes against the petitioner. It is argued that the petitioner had not availed himself, of the procedure prescribed in the Act for payment of rent in the event of the landlord refusing to accept the rent when tendered. It is pointed out that the only person who is examined by the petitioner is the manager of the firm and he is not competent to give evidence on the relevant facts. It is, therefore, contended that the petitioner not having complied with the mandatory provisions of the Act is not entitled to claim any privilege and argued that the court should exercise its discretion in his favour. It is also pointed out that there is no discretion left with the court and if wilful default is found, the only order that could follow is one of the eviction and the court cannot save the petitioner from the consequences of such wilful default.
7. Both sides have referred to certain authorities in support of their respective propositions. Before taking up the authorities cited, it is necessary to set out the following circumstances which are relied on by the Appellate Authority to hold that the petitioner is guilty in payment of rent for the period August, 1981 to November, 1981.
(a) Ex.P-4, the receipt book produced by the respondent proves that the rent was being paid always to the respondent and he was issuing receipts. The case of the petitioner that he used to pay rent to the respondent's son is disproved by Ex.P-4.
(b) The case of the petitioner that he had been paying rent regularly on the last day of the month or the first day of the next month, is not proved. The very averment that he had paid the rent for August, 1981 on 19.9.1981 to the respondent's son itself disproves his case. Even according to the petitioner, the rent paid on 19.9.1981 to the respondent's son was returned on 26.9.1981 in order to be paid to the respondent. But, he did not pay it to the respondent immediately. According to him, he paid it only on 5.10.1981 along with the rent for September 1981. There is no explanation as to why it was not paid to the respondent soon after it was returned by the respondent's son. On the other hand, the case of the respondent is that no rent was paid for August and September, 1981. Similarly, the rent for October, 1981 is sad to have been paid only on 14.12.1981 and the rent for November is said to have been paid on 17.12.1981. That also disproves the case of the petitioner that he was paying the rent on the first day of next succeeding month.
(c) It is not in dispute that the respondent has been issuing receipts whenever rent is paid. But, according to the petitioner, the respondent would not issue receipts immediately and he would send them on a later date. That does not appear to be correct. On the other hand, the case of the respondent is that he used to prepare the receipts and keep them ready on the first of every succeeding month and as and when the rent is paid, he used to issue the receipt immediately. That version is substantiated by the fact that rent receipts bearing No. 19 and 20 in Ex.P-4 are kept ready and the respondent has also signed the same. They bear the dates 1.9.1981 and 1.10.1981 respectively. They were intended to be used as soon as payments were made. As the petitioner has not paid the amount according to the respondent, the receipts continued to be in Ex.P-4 without being detached.
(d) While according to R.W.I, the respondent's only witness, the rent was actually paid by Ganesan, the cashier of the firm to the respondent's son, the said Ganesan was not examined. R.W.I is not in a position to say whether Ganesan paid the rent to the respondent or his son. Therefore, the alleged payment for August and September, 1981 has not been proved at all. In the notice issued by the petitioner, marked as Ex.P-1 there is no reference to the payment through Ganesan. It merely states that the rent had been paid.
(e) If the respondent had assured the petitioner that he would send the receipts for the payment for August and September, 1981, the petitioner would have demanded a receipt after waiting for some time. He never did so. Even after the filing of the petition, the petitioner has issued Ex. P-1 in which he made an offer to pay the rent for August and September, 1981 alleging that it was a second payment. If really the rent for the two months had been paid, the petitioner would never have offered to pay the same once again. The Manager of the petitioner firm examined as R.W.I has not been able to produce any record to show that his principals or employers permitted him to make a second payment for August and September, 1981.
(f) There is no explanation for not paying the rent for October, 1981 in November, 1981. Even according to the petitioner that was paid only on 14.12.1981 to the respondent's son and within a few days thereafter, the rent for November, 1981 was also paid to the respondent's son. Both are supposed to have been returned on 19.12.1981 by the respondent's son. The version is wholly unbelievable as it appears to be a cock and bull story.
(g) The petitioner claims to have sent the rent by money order and the evidence that the money orders had been returned on refusal But, no refused money order has been produced before court. There is absolutely no scrap of paper to prove that the petitioner sent rent by money order.
(h) The petitioner did not admittedly call upon the respondent to name the bank in which the rent could be deposited. The petitioner never adopted the procedure prescribed in the Act therefor.
(i) There is no statement either in the notice Ex.P-1 or in the counter filed in the eviction petition that the petitioner was sending rent by money order which was refused by the respondent.
(j) The evidence of the petitioner's only witness R.W.I runs counter to the statements contained in Ex.P-1 notice and the counter statement filed in the eviction petition. (k) The books of accounts produced by the petitioner are not reliable. The ledgers corresponding to the Day Book have not been filed in court.
8. I agree with the reasons given by the Appellate Authority. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places considerable reliance on the account books produced by the petitioners and submits that they prove beyond doubt the payments made by him and the return thereof by the respondent's son. I am unable to accept the contention. As rightly pointed out by learned Counsel for the respondent, the first Day Book is for the period from 1.9.1981 to 26.10.1981. It is really strange that there is a Day Book for such a short period. It is not as if the prior Day Book upto 31.8.1981 got completed and a new Day Book had to be opened for the period from 1.9.1981. There is no reference whatever in the Day Book to any period Day Book. If it is a continuing one for the year in question, the prior Day Book would have been referred and the relevant page number would have been noted. There is no such entry. Ex.P-2 is an entry at page 44. It is dated 19.9.1981. It reads that a sum of Rs. 1,225 was paid towards rent to B godown for the month of August, 1981. There is no mention as to how it was paid and through whom it was paid. At page 57 relating to the date 26.9.1981, a reverse entry is found. It reads that the amount has been received from the party viz., M/s. Palani Chettiar and Company. Here again it is not clear as to how it was returned. An entry is found at page 73 and it is marked as Ex.P-10. It reads, Mr. Palani Chettiar A/c-Amount returned to above Vide C.N. No. 3476/26.9.1981 D.N. No. -5176/1225.00.
It is stated that the said amount was paid to the respondent by way of rent for August 1981. According to the petitioner, the rent for August and September 1981 was paid together to the respondent on 5.10.1981. But, there are two different entries on the same date. One of the entries has been referred to above. The other entry is at page 75 which is marked as Ex.P-8. It is written that an amount of Rs. 1,225 was paid towards 'B' godown rent. The book is written only upto 26.10.1981 upto page 126. The book contains totally 470 pages 344 pages are not written up and they are blank. There is no explanation for having a Day Book of this kind. The other Day Book which is produced by the petitioner contains entries marked as Exs.P-14, P-15 and P-30 at pages 119, 126 and 130 respectively. In this book the entry reads as if the amount is paid towards rent account for the petition premises. There is nothing in the entry to show as to whom the amount was paid. Similarly, the entry at page 126 does not disclose as to whom the amount was paid and as to how that was paid. The reverse entry is found at page 130 as if the entire amount of Rs. 2,450 was returned. The court below is justified in rejecting the account books.
9. Significantly, the person who wrote the accounts has not been examined. The person who is said to have made the payments mentioned in the accounts has not been examined. It is only the Manager, who had nothing to do with either the payment or the writing of the accounts, who has been examined. There is no explanation for not examining the others. It is a well settled proposition of law that mere production of accounts will not be sufficient to charge any person with any liability. The requirements of Section 34 of the Evidence Act will not be satisfied by the production of accounts simpliciter. In Chandi Ram Deka v. Jamini Kanta Deka A.I.R. 1952 Assam 92, it has been held that where the books produced are merely the ledger not supported by any bookor containing no entries of transactions as they took place, the books do not fulfil the requirements of Section 34 of the Evidence Act. In Chandradhar Goswami and others v. Gauhati Bank Ltd. , it is held that no person can be charged with liability merely on the basis of entries in books of account, even where such books of account are kept in the regular course of business and there has to be further evidence to prove payment of the money which may appear in the books of account in order that a person may be charged with liability there under, except where the person to be charged accepts the correctness of the books of account and does not challenge them. In V.K. Abraham v. N.K. Abraham , A Division Bench of this Court has, after referring to all the authorities on the subject, held that the accounts books by themselves are not sufficient to charge any person with liability and the party has to show by some independent evidence that the entries in his books represented real and honest transactions and that the moneys paid or the transactions took place, in accordance with those entries. In Zonna Sorabji and Ors. v. Mirbella Hotel Company (P.) Ltd. and Ors. , the Bombay High Court held that in order that a document could be relied upon as a book of accounts, it must have the characteristic of being fool-proof, and the ledger by itself could not be a book of account of the character contemplated by Section 34 of the Evidence Act. The learned Judge held that the corresponding journal or Rojmal or day-book should be produced in order to place reliance on the ledger.
10. I have already referred to the suspicious circumstances attending to the preparation of the daybooks produced by the petitioner. The non-production of the ledger, the non-examination of the person who wrote the accounts and the non-examination of the person who is said to have made the payment taken along with the suspicious circumstances are sufficient to hold that no reliance can be placed on the books of accounts produced by the petitioner. The Appellate Authority is, therefore, justified in rejecting the same. The Appellate Authority has also pointed out that the relevant vouchers said to be existing have not been produced.
11. There is absolutely no doubt whatever in this case that the petitioner is guilty of default in payment of rent for the period from August, 1981 to November, 1981 as alleged in the petition for eviction. His case of payment of rent for August, 1981 and September, 1981 has not been proved. His case of payment to the respondent's son of the rent for October and November, 1981 and the return thereof by the latter is also not proved. The only question that remains to be considered is whether the default is wilful default or not.
12. The explanation put forward by the petitioner for non-payment of rent for October and November, 1981 has been found to be false. The plea of payment for August and September, 1981 is also found to be false. Hence, there is no explanation on whatever for the non-payment of rent for the said period of four months. An unexplained default is undoubtedly wilful. It is for the tenant to plead and prove the circumstances under which he failed to pay the rent required by the statute. The obligation to pay rent is not merely contractual but also statutory. Section 10(2)(1)of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) reads that if the controller after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing case against the application for eviction, is satisfied that the tenant has not paid or tendered the rent due by him in respect of the building, within fifteen days after the expiry of the time fixed in the agreement of tenancy with his landlord or in the absence of any such agreement, by the last day of the month next following that for which is the rent payable, he shall issue a direction evicting the tenant. The proviso to the section reads that if the Controller is satisfied that the tenant's default was not wilful, he may give the tenant a reasonable time, not exceeding fifteen days, to pay or tender the rent due by him. A reading of the main section and proviso makes it clear that it is for the tenant to prove that his default is not wilful. It is only the tenant who knows the relevant facts and he should plead the same and prove them before the Controller in order to satisfy the Controller that the default was not wilful. If the tenant is not able to satisfy the Controller that there were circumstances which prevented him from carrying out his contractual or statutory obligation of having paid the rent, then necessary consequential inference is that the default is wilful. No doubt, the explanation introduced by the Amending Act of 1973 is to the effect that a default should be construed as wilful if the tenant fails to pay even after issue of two months notice by the landlord claiming the rent. But it is not necessary in every case that a notice should have been issued by the landlord to the tenant in order to hold that the default is wilful. Even in cases where there was no notice calling upon the tenant to pay the rent, the default could still be held to be wilful. Vasvambol v. Chennia Gounder 93 L.W. 578.
13. In K. Ramachandran v. K. Kumaraswamy 76 L.W. 569, Anantanarayanan, J., held that if the explanation given by the tenant for non-payment of rent is false, it is a circumstance which could be considered along with others in arriving at the conclusion that the default was wilful. The learned Judge observed that after all wilful default or intentional default is a default accompanied by a particular state of mind, which cannot be directly proved, but has to be inferred from the entire complex of circumstances.
14. In A.M. Chakrapani Reddiar v. Issa Munirathnam Chetti 79 L.W. 600, it has been held by this Court that a default for even one month could be held to be wilful default.
15. In S. Balochandran v. A. Chamnalal Jain , Ratnam, J., held that there could be no automatic adjustment of advance paid by the tenant as against unpaid rent and even if some amount remained with the landlord, the default in payment of rent could be wilful default The learned Judge observed:
There is no explanation whatever for the nonpayment of the rents by him for nearly a period of five months. In the. circumstances, the default in the payment of rents is clearly wilful.
16. In Marudachala Udayar v. Dhandapani , it was held that the court could not ignore the implications of Section 8 of the Act and assess the controversy without reference to such implications. It was pointed out that where the tenant had not availed of the provisions of Section 8 of the Act it would be a relevant circumstances to be taken into account for deciding the question of wilful default.
17. Learned Counsel for the petitioner places reliance on the following observations of a Division Bench of this Court in Durgai Ammal v. R.T. Mani (1989)1 L.W. 155:
It is then argued that even at the agreed rate of Rs. 16 per month, not only the respondent has not sent the rent to the petitioner but also has not deposited it as she is enabled under Section 9 and therefore she must be deemed to have committed wilful default in payment of rent. In support of this plea reliance is placed on the decision in G.K. Jose v. Ramathal 92 L.W. 315. In that case the rent sent by the tenant was refused by the landlord but nevertheless it was found by Ramanujam, J., that the tenant committed wilful default for the reason that she has not deposited the arrears of rent in a bank or before the Rent Controller, and therefore the default should be taken as wilful. On the basis of this judgment it is argued in this case that when there is a bona fide doubt or dispute as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent the tenant has the right to deposit the rent before the Rent Controller but she did not do so and hence it follows that she committed wilful default. But with great respect we are unable to agree with the learned Judge. Section 8 provides that in case the landlord refuses to receive rent tendered by the tenant the tenant can call upon the landlord to name a bank where she can deposit it an did he fails to do so the tenant can send it by money order and if even that money order is not received, the tenant can deposit the rent before the Rent Controller. But it is nowhere stated that if the tenant does not do so it will amount to wilful default. When a landlord refuses to receive the rent sent by the tenant it is his fault. He cannot subsequently say that the tenant has not exercised his right given under Section 8 and, therefore, he must be taken to have committed wilful default. Similarly, if the tenant has not deposited the rent before the Rent Controller in case of bona fide doubt as to the person who is entitled to receive the rent and the person concerned does not help to remove the doubt of the tenant, the tenant cannot be said to have committed wilful default in payment of rent.
18. In the case before the Division Bench, there was a refusal to accept the rent on the part of the landlord. In the present case, the alleged payment or tender has not been proved at all. This is not a case of refusal on the part of the landlord to accept the rent. Hence, the observations made by the Division Bench could have no bearing on the present case.
19. At any rate, it is necessary to point out that an earlier ruling of a Division Bench of this Court has not been taken note by the Bench in Durgai Ammal v. R.T. Mani (1989) 1 L.W.155. That is a judgment in T.C.A. Anandalvar v. The Second Judge Court of Small Causes Madras 62 L.W. 307 : (1949) 1 M.L.J. 528. The Division Bench comprising of Rajamannar, C.J., and Raghava Rao, J., held that merely because the rent due for one month has been improperly refused by the landlord when tendered, the rent for succeeding months is neither due nor payable. The Division Bench held, that under Section 7(2) of Madras Act of 1946 corresponding to Section 10(2) of the present Act a duty was cast on the tenant to make a payment or tender every month, if he desired to take advantage of the provisions of the Act. It is not necessary for me in the present case to elaborate further on that subject. On the facts of this case, there can be no doubt whatever that the petitioner has committed wilful default in payment of rent.
20. In Ministry Premjibhi Vithaldas v. Ganeshbhai Keshavji , the Apex Court held that the statutory protection given by the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, to a tenant was available only on the terms on which it was permissible under the Act. It was observed that to prove readiness and willingness of the tenant to pay the rent, he should have complied with the provisions of the Act and that the Act did not cover the case of a person who was unable to pay owing to want of means, but was otherwise ready and willing. The relevant passage in the judgment reads thus:
The readiness and the willingness of the tenant to pay could be found only if he had complied with the provisions of the Act. The Act does not cover the case of a person who is unable to pay owing to want of means but is otherwise ready and willing. Such a case is no doubt a hard one. But, unfortunately, it does not enable courts to make a special law for such hard cases which fall outside the statutory protection.
21. In Ganpat Latha v. Shashikant Vishnu Shinde , under the same Bombay Act it was held that once it is found that the conditions prescribed by the Act are not fulfiled, the protection given by the Act will not be available to the tenant and the Court has no discretion whatever to be exercised in favour of the tenants. The relevant passage in the judgment is very instructive. It reads thus:
It is clear to us that the Act interferes with the landlord's right to property and freedom of contract only for the limited purpose of protecting tenants from misuse of the landlord power to evict them, in these days of scarcity of accommodation, by asserting his superior rights in property on trying to exploit his position by extracting too high rents from helpless tenants. The object was not to deprive the landlord altogether of his rights in property which have also to be respected. Another object was to make possible eviction of tenants who fail to carry out their obligation to pay rent to the landlord despite opportunities given by law in that behalf. Thus Section 12(3)(a) of the Act makes it obligatory for the court to pass a decree when its conditions are satisfied as was pointed out by one of us (Bhagawati, J.) in Ratilal Balabhai Nazar v. Ramchodhbai Shankerbhai Patel . If there is statutory default or neglect on the part of the tenant, whatever may be its cause, the landlord acquires a right under Section 12(3)(a) to get a decree for eviction. But where the conditions of Section 12(3)(a) are not satisfied, there is a further opportunity given to the tenant to protect himself against eviction. He can comply wit the conditions set out in Section 12(3)(b) and default the landlord's claim for eviction. If, however, he does not fulfil those conditions, he cannot claim the protection of Section 12(3)(b) and in that event, there being no other protection available to him, a decree for eviction would have to go against him. It is difficult to see how by any judicial valour discretion exercisable in favour of the tenant can be found in Section 12(3)(b) even where the conditions laid down by it are satisfied to be strictly confined within the limits prescribed for their operation. We think that Chagla, C.J., was doing nothing less than legislating in Kalidas Bhavan case (supra) 60 Bom. L.R. 1359, in converting the provisions of Section 12(3)(b) into a sort of discretionary jurisdiction of the court to relieve tenants from hardship. The decisions of this Court referred to above, in any case, make the position quite clear. Section 12(3)(b) does not create any discretionary jurisdiction in the court. It provides protection to the tenant on certain conditions and these conditions have to be strictly observed by the tenant who seeks the benefit of the section. If the statutory provisions do not go far enough to relieve the hardship of the tenant the remedy lies with the legislature. It is not in the hands of courts.
The same view was reiterated in Arjun Khamal Mahijani v. Jamnadas C. Tuliani .
22. Thus, there is no substance in the contention of learned counse If for the respondent that the court has a discretion to exempt the tenant from the consequence of wilful default and refuse to pass an order of eviction. Learned Counsel places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Sundaram Pillai, etc., v. V.R. Pattabiraman, and contends that a default in order to be wilful, must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing there from. He refers to the following passage in judgments:
Thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words wilful default appears to indicate that default in order to be wilful must be intentional, deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequence flowing there from. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after dealt despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of conduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated by the Act or by other Acts referred to above.
23. The Supreme Court has only given an example. It is not exhaustive. Each case has to be considered on the facts thereof and the question whether there is wilful default or not must be decided only on the fact of the case. It cannot be decided on the basis of any axiomatic propositions of law. In the present case, it is found that there is absolutely no explanation for non-payment of rent during the relevant period on the other hand, the petitioner has come forward with false explanations. The petitioner has gone to the extent of preparing books of accounts for the sole purpose of the case, for limited periods. That is enough to hold that the petitioner does not deserve any indulgence. Even if the court has got a discretion in the matter, I am of the view that there is no discretion left with the court once it is found that the tenant is guilty of wilful default.
24. In the result, the civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 1,000.