Andhra HC (Pre-Telangana)
M/S.Transstroy (India) Limited vs The State Of Telangana, Department Of ... on 5 February, 2016
Author: Vilas V. Afzulpurkar
Bench: Vilas V. Afzulpurkar
THE HONBLE SRI JUSTICE VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR
WRIT PETITION No.12809 of 2015
05-02-2016
M/s.Transstroy (India) Limited.PETITIONER
The State of Telangana, Department of Revenue, Rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Secretariat, Hyderabad and others.RESPONDENTS
!COUNSEL FOR PETIITONER : MR. B. CHANDRASEN REDDY
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS: ADVOCATE GENERAL
GP FOR REVENUE
MR. K. VIVEK REDDY
<GIST:
>HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred:
1.2015 (3) ALT 188 (DB)
2.AIR 1985 SC 1622
3.(2011) 9 SCC 207
4.(2010) 9 SCC 46
5.(2011) 5 SCC 287
6.(2008) 4 SCC 695
ORDER:
Acquisition proceedings for the purpose of Hyderabad Metro Rail is questioned by the petitioner by challenging the notification issued under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short Act of 1894) vide notification No.C/2341/2013 dated 30.12.2013 as well as draft declaration under Section 6 dated 06.01.2015 and the consequential award dated 31.03.2015. Petitioner also sought an alternate relief to direct the third respondent to acquire the property of the petitioner bearing premises No.8-2-293/82/A/61/1 in Plot Nos.60 and 61 of Jubilee Hills admeasuring 2099.97 sq. yards without built up area.
2. Petitioner states in the affidavit that it has purchased the commercial complex comprising of cellar, ground and four upper floors at the aforesaid premises with a total built up area of more than 1,00,000 sq. feet. Petitioner states that at the time of purchase, during due diligence, it was noticed that there was a proposal for 60 feet road widening on the southern side and except that there was no other proposal for acquisition. However, the third respondent issued notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 dated 30.12.2013, which was published in the local newspapers and in Hyderabad District Gazette for acquisition of the properties under the curves and bends in the Corridor III of the Hyderabad Metro Rail Project on the stretch from Greenlands to Road No.5, Jubilee Hills. However, noticed dated 06.01.2014 was issued notifying widening of road from Saradhi Studios to Road No.5 is proposed to 100 feet and calling for objections. Petitioner filed its objections on 10.02.2014 raising undue hardship and issue of jurisdiction of the authority on the purpose of acquisition being under the provisions of the Metro Railways Act, 1978. Meanwhile, petitioner obtained copies of alignment plans under the Right to Information Act.
3. Respondent No.3, thereafter, issued a revised notice under Form 3 under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 dated 13.05.2014 referring to draft notification dated 30.12.2013 clarifying that in the earlier notice it was wrongly informed that the acquisition is for road widening whereas acquisition is for curves and bends with 25.5 meters RoW in Corridor III of the Hyderabad Metro Rail Project and in that notice, it was informed that the objections received within due date, if any, will be enquired into on 16.06.2014. Petitioner filed fresh objections on 13.06.2014. On 10.12.2014, report of enquiry under Section 5-A of the Act of 1894 was submitted rejecting the objections and petitioner states that no notification under Section 6 of the Act of 1894 is, therefore, issued or published.
4. Petitioner questions the alignment on the ground that it is suited to serve the interest of senior retired IAS officers, who are highly influential and have prevailed upon change of alignment. Petitioner also complains that by acquiring part of the property, two asymmetrical triangular anti vasthu halves of the building are left, which are neither useful for any purpose nor have any value and as such, seeks that under Section 49(1) of the Act of 1894, the respondents are bound to acquire the entire structures. Petitioner also raised a legal contention viz. the proceedings under the Act of 1894 are initiated after coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short Act 30 of 2013). Hence, the notification published in the Gazette dated 07.01.2014 is invalid and the entire acquisition under the Act of 1894 is vitiated and bad in law.
5. While petitioner had earlier filed WP.No.10629 of 2015, during pendency thereof, petitioner was served with a notice under Section 37(2) of the Act 30 of 2013 dated 31.03.2013 on 17.04.2015. In view of that, petitioner withdrew the said writ petition with a liberty to file a comprehensive writ petition. Accordingly, the present writ petition is filed. Petitioner also complains that there was no opportunity of personal hearing during 5-A enquiry and contends that all proceedings including the award proceedings are vitiated, as the very inapplicability of Act 30 of 2013, in view of the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978, being stipulated under Schedule IV of the Act 30 of 2013. On these averments, the reliefs, sought for in this writ petition, are already noticed above.
6. Respondent No.4 filed a counter affidavit, inter alia, stating that a requisition was sent by him on 27.11.2013, which was approved by the District Collector, Hyderabad on 30.12.2013 and notification was published as mentioned hereunder:
i. Andhra Bhoomi (Telugu daily) Dt.31-12-2013. ii. Times of India (English daily) Dt.31-12-2013.
iii. Hyd. Dist. Gazette No.1 Dt.07-01-2014. iv. Substance published Dt.06-01-2014.
It is also stated that notice under Section 5-A was served earlier and after finding an error therein and fresh notice was served on the petitioner to which he filed objections along with others. All the said objections were duly examined and under the report under 5-A the objections were rejected directing payment of compensation as per rules in force vide proceedings of the Collector dated 10.12.2014. The District Collector also approved notification under Section 19 (1) of the Act 30 of 2013, which has been published as follows:
i. Gazette No. Hyd-05 dated.06-01-2015
ii. New Indian Express (English daily)dated.29-01-2015
iii. Andhra Prabha (Telugu Daily) dated.29-01-2015
iv. Locality on dated.09-01-2015
It is also asserted that the proposed acquisition is strictly in accordance with the approved Master Plan and the alignment fixed thereunder. Hence, malafides, as alleged, are denied. It is, further, claimed that the alignment of the Hyderabad Metro Rail was already affirmed by rejecting the challenge thereto in WA.No.414 of 2012 and batch 27.11.2014 reported in HYDERABAD METRO RAIL v. GREENLANDS, AMEERPET, MADHURANAGAR, YOSUFGUDA, SRI KRISHNA NAGAR JOINT ACTION COMMITTEE . It is also asserted that the compensation has been determined under the award in terms of the Act 30 of 2013, which was duly served on the petitioner.
7. I have heard Mr. B. Chandrasen Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Advocate General for respondents.
8. The main thrust of the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 dated 30.12.2013 was published in the District Gazette only on 07.01.2014 and by then the Act 30 of 2013 was already in force. Learned counsel for the petitioner draws analogy of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 to contend that the last of the publications is relevant to ascertain the date of notification and submits that even if notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 is published in local newspapers prior to coming into force of the Act 30 of 2013, the same is not relevant in view of the last of the publications, being after the coming into force of the Act 30 of 2013. Learned counsel placed reliance upon a decision of the Supreme Court in THE COLLECTOR (DISTT. MAGISTRATE) ALLAHABAD v. RAJA RAM JAISWAL and particularly, paras 13 and 16 thereof. Learned counsel also relied upon another decision of the Supreme Court in KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. GOBINDA CHANDRA MAKAL and particularly, paras 33 and 36 thereof. Learned counsel submits that the draft declaration is published on 05.01.2015, which is beyond the one year period stipulated under the Act 30 of 2013 and hence, declaration also is non-est in law and void. Consequently, the award proceedings are liable to be declared as void.
9. Per contra, learned Advocate General submits that the substance of the notification was published in the newspapers even before the enforcement of the Act 30 of 2013 and that the requirement under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 being only with regard to giving a public notice of the decision of the Government is satisfied and admittedly, that was done when the Act of 1894 was in force. Learned Advocate General, therefore, submits that merely because the printing and publication in the District Gazette got delayed and the notification was published in the District Gazette after coming into force of the Act 30 of 2013, the same does not vitiate the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894. Learned Advocate General, further, submitted that the petitioner has never pleaded any prejudice nor raised any such objection on the applicability of the Act 30 of 2013 and as such, the said ground stands waived by the petitioner. Learned Advocate General submits that, in any case, the award is passed only under the Act 30 of 2013 and as such, there is no reason for the petitioner to complain and cites Section 24(1) of the Act 30 of 2013 in support of his contention wherein only the requirement is to pass the award under the Act 30 of 2013, if the acquisition proceedings are not completed on the date of coming into force of the Act 30 of 2013. Learned Advocate General also placed reliance upon a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in HYDERABAD METRO RAILs case (1 supra), which has upheld the alignment for Corridor III of the Hyderabad Metro Rail Project. Learned Advocate General also relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court in RAJINDER KISHAN GUPTA v. UNION OF INDIA (para 16 thereof) and SHANTA TALWAR v. UNION OF INDIA (paras 15 and 18) to contend that acquisition proceeding are not vitiated in any manner.
10. So far as alternate relief, sought for by the petitioner, is concerned, learned Advocate General contends that the petitioner has to apply, if balance of his property has become useless, as remedy under Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013 exists. Learned Advocate General also assured that if the petitioner makes appropriate application, the fourth respondent is bound to consider the same in terms of Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013. A decision of the Supreme Court in SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LTD. v. STATE OF RAJASTHAN is also relied upon to contend that if the challenge to the acquisition is made after the award, the same is not sustainable.
11. On the aforesaid contentions, the following points arise for consideration:
1. Whether the acquisition under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894/Central Act 30 of 2013 is invalid in view of the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978 and Metro Railways (Operation and Maintenance) Act, 2002.
2. Since Section 4(1) notification under the Act of 1894 is published in the Hyderabad District Gazette on 07.01.2014, whether the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894 are non-est in view of the enforcement of Central Act 30 of 2013 as on the date of publication of Gazette.
3. Maintainability of challenge to the acquisition proceedings after the award proceedings.
POINT No.1:
12. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed before the Court a copy of the Gazette of India Extraordinary published on 24.01.2012 whereunder a notification of Ministry of Urban Development (Metro Rail) and S.O. 152(E) was published. Under the said notification, the Central Government extended the provisions of the Metro Railways (Operations and Maintenance) Act, 2002 to the metropolitan area of Hyderabad, as specified in Subsection (1) of Section 3 of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Development Authority Act, 2008. By further notification under S.O. 2445(E) of the Ministry of Urban Development dated 19.09.2014, the metro alignment of the Hyderabad Metro Rail - Phase I was also notified under the aforesaid Act. We are presently concerned with Corridor III thereof, as the property, in question, falls within Road No.5 of Jubilee Hills and Jubilee Hills Check Post.
13. Learned Advocate General placed reliance upon RAJINDER KISHAN GUPTAs case (4 supra) and particularly paras 13 to 16 thereof, extracted hereunder, completely answer the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.
13. As raised before the High Court, it was contended before us that in view of the Metro Railways (Construction of Works) Act, 1978, the respondents are not permitted to invoke urgency provision under the Land Acquisition Act which deprived the appellants from participating in the enquiry under Section 5-A.
14. The Metro Railways Act (33 of 1978) was enacted by the Parliament to provide for the construction of works relating to metro railways in the metropolitan cities. Chapter III of the said Act deals with `Acquisition'. It is not in dispute that similar provisions as that of Sections 4, 5-A, 6, 9 and 11 of the Land Acquisition Act have been incorporated in the Metro Railways Act.
15. Section 17 makes it clear that when acquisition of land is initiated under the Metro Railways Act, the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall not apply. Section 45 also makes it clear that any proceeding initiated under the Land Acquisition Act for the purpose of any metro railway project pending immediately before the commencement of the Metro Railways Act is to be continued and be disposed of under that Act (Land Acquisition Act).
16. The above provisions make it clear that if any land is required/needed for the construction works relating to metro railways in the metropolitan cities, the authorities are free to apply the Metro Railways Act and acquire any land. But at the same time, there is no specific prohibition in the Metro Railways Act from applying the Land Acquisition Act to acquire any land for a public purpose, more particularly, for the construction works relating to metro railways in the metropolitan cities. (emphasis supplied) In view of the above, therefore, point No.1 is answered in the negative.
POINT No.2:
14. It is no doubt true that as per the counter affidavit, the publication of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, extracted above, shows that press publication were carried out on 31.12.2013 and the publication of Section 4(1) in the Hyderabad District Gazette was on 07.01.2014. The Act 30 of 2013 was brought into force from 01.01.2014.
15. Hence, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, on the date of publication of Section 4(1) notification under the District Gazette under the Act of 1894, the Act 30 of 2013 was already in force. Hence, the acquisition itself is vitiated. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in RAJA RAM JAISWALs case (2 supra) to support his contention. Para 13 of the said decision, on which reliance is placed, may be extracted hereunder:
13. A bare perusal of S. 4 (1) clearly shows that in order to comply with the statutory requirements therein set out, a notification stating therein the land which is needed or is likely to be needed for a public purpose' has to be published in the official Gazette. The second part of the sub-section provides that 'the Collector has to cause public notice of the substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in the locality in which the land proposed to be acquired is situated. Both the conditions are held by a catena of decisions to be mandatory Whether the second condition is mandatory or directory is no more res integra. In Khub Chand v. State of Rajasthan (1967) 1 SCR 120 at p.125 : (AIR 1967 SC 1074 at p.1077) Subba Rao, C.J. speaking for the court observed that 'the statutory intention is, therefore, clear, namely, that the giving of public notice is mandatory. If so: the notification issued under S. 4 without complying with the said mandatory direction would be void and the land acquisition proceedings taken pursuant thereto would be equally void.' While reaching this conclusion, the Court distinguished the decision in Babu Barkya Thakur v. State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 128: (AIR 1960 SC 1203), wherein it was held that 'any defect in the notification under S. 4 is not fatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when the acquisition is for a company and the purpose has to be investigated under S. 5A or S. 40 necessarily after the issue of the notification under S. 4 of the Act'. The Court pointed out that the defect with which the notification in Babu Barkya Thakur's case sufferred was of a formal nature and did not go to the root of the matter. However, the decision is not an authority for the proposition that if a public notice of the notification was not given as prescribed by S. 4, it can be ignored. The pertinent observation of the court is that such an approach would constitute re-writing the section. The court also referred to Smt. Somavanti. v. State of Punjab. (1963) 2 SCR 774: (AIR 1963 SC 151) and quoted with approval the statement therein made that a valid notification under sub-s. (I) of S. 4 is a condition precedent to the making of a declaration under sub-s. (1) of S. 6. This view has been consistently followed and was approved in State of Mysore v.
Abdul Razak Sahib, (1973) 1 SCR 856: (AIR 1973 Sc 2361), wherein it was observed that in the case of a notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, the law has prescribed that in addition to the publication of the notification in the Official Gazette, the Collector must also give publicity of the substance of the notification in the concerned locality. Unless both these conditions are satisfied, S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be said to have been complied with. The publication of a notice in the locality is a mandatory requirement. Mr. Kacker, however, drew our attention to a few more observations in the judgment wherein it was said that there is an important purpose behind publication of the substance of the notification in the locality because in the absence of such publication, the interested persons may not be able to file their objections challenging the proposed acquisition and they will be denied an opportunity afforded by S. 5A which confers a very valuable right. Relying on this observation Mr. Kacker urged that if the underlying purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality is to give an opportunity to the person interested in the land to object to the acquisition, where in a case the purpose is achieved as in this case the petitioner having filed his objections, the failure to publish the substance of the notification in the locality need not be treated fatal and cannot invalidate the proceedings. The submission as presented is very persuasive and but for binding precedents, we would have accorded considerable attention to it. But we would not whittle down a mandate of legislation recognised by a long line of decisions solely depending upon the facts of a given case. Further the submission is predicated upon an assumption that the sole purpose behind publication of substance of notification in locality is to make requirements of S. 5A, functionally effective. The assumption as would be pointed out is not well founded. In fact, the court in the last mentioned case went so far as approving the decision of the Mysore High Court in Gangadharaiah v. State of Mysore, (1961) 1 Mys LJ 883 wherein it was ruled that 'when a notification under S. 4 (1) is published in the official Gazette and it is accompanied by or immediately followed by the public notice, that a person interested in the property proposed to be acquired can be regarded to have had notice of the proposed acquisition. 'This is a mandatory requirement for legal compliance with requirements of Sec. 4 (1). In Narendra Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P. (1977) 2 SCR 226: (AIR 1977 SC 660), this Court reiterated that a publication of the notice in the locality as required by the second part of S. 4 (1) is mandatory and unless that notice is given in accordance with the provisions contained therein, the entire acquisition proceedings are vitiated. Repelling the contention, that the only purpose behind publication of a notice in the locality is to give opportunity to the person interested in the land to prefer objections under Sec. 5A which confers a valuable right, it was held that even though in the facts of that case, the inquiry under S. 5A was dispensed with by a direction under S. 17 (4) of the Act, the failure to comply with the second condition in S. 4 (1) is fatal. It was pertinently observed that provisions of S. 4(1) cannot be held to be mandatory in one situation and directory in another and therefore, it cannot be said that the only purpose behind making the publication of notice in the locality mandatory is to give an opportunity to the persons interested in the land to file objections under S. 5A. Of course, what other object it seeks to subserve has been left unsaid. But the answer is not far to seek. At least we have no doubt that the only visible and demonstrable purpose behind publication of the substance of the notification under S. 4 (1) in the locality where the land proposed to be acquired is situated, is to give the persons interested in the land due opportunity to submit their considered objections against the proposed notification.
It would be noticed therefrom that the Supreme Court held that the State must comply with all the requirement of Section 4(1), which includes press publications as well as publication of substance at the convenient place in the locality and the decision further holds that public notice is also essential part of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894.
16. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision, learned Advocate General contends that publication of notification in the official Gazette is only a formal expression of the decision of the Government and the said purpose is achieved already by press publications in the Andhra Bhoomi Telugu daily and the Times of India English Daily on 31.12.2013. Mere late publication of the notification in the District Gazette would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894.
17. However, in order to substantiate the argument, further, learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the provisions of Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894, which mandates that last of the publications will be taken as the date of publication and by that analogy submits that the last of the publications being on 07.01.2014, the proceedings initiated under the Act of 1894 are, in any case, vitiated.
18. I find difficulty in accepting the said contention as ex facie the words last of the publications used under Section 4(1) have to be understood with reference to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act of 1894, since the time limit was prescribed under Section 6 for its publication. More so, the meaning of the words date of publication used in Sections 4 and 6 of the Act of 1894 is interpreted only for the purpose of those provisions as is evident from the decision of the Supreme Court in SHANTA TALWARs case (5 supra). In the said decision, the Supreme Court considered the same words last of the publication used in Section 4 vis--vis Section 23 of the Act of 1894. Paras 33 and 36 of the said decision, being relevant on this aspect, are extracted hereunder:
33. Section 6 was amended in 1984 providing that no declaration under section 6 in respect of any land covered by a notification under section 4(1) shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1). In that context, to avoid any confusion as to what would be the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1), section 4(1) was also amended to clarify the position and it was provided that "the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of publication of the declaration". But the words publication of the notification under section 4(1) occurring in the first clause of section 23(1) have different meaning and connotation from the use of the said words in sections 4(1) and 6 of the LA Act. Prior to the 1984 amendment of Section 4, the words "publication of notification under section 4(1)" in section 23(1) referred to the date of publication of the notification in the official Gazette.
Even after the amendment of section 4(1), the said words in section 23(1) continue to have the same earlier meaning. We may briefly indicate the reasons for our said conclusion.
36. The same words used in different parts of a statute should normally bear the same meaning. But depending upon the context, the same words used in different places of a statue may also have different meaning. (See: Justice G.P. Singh's Principles of Statutory Interpretation - 12th Edition - Pages 356-358.) The use of the words publication of the notification in sections 4(1) and 6 on the one hand and in section 23(1) on the other, in the LA Act, is a classic example, where the same words have different meanings in different provisions of the same enactment. The words publication of the notification under section 4 sub-section (1), are used in section 23(1) for fixing the relevant date for determination of market value. The words "the last of the date of such publication and giving of such public notice being hereinafter referred to as the publication of the date of notification" in section 4(1) and the words one year from the date of the publication of the notification" in the first proviso to section 6, refer to the special deeming definition of the said words, for determining the period of one year for issuing the declaration under section 6, which is counted from the date of publication of the notification. Therefore the context in which the words are used in sections 4(1) and 6, and the context in which the same words are used in section 23(1) are completely different. In section 23(1), the words "the date of publication of the notification under section 4(1)" would refer to the date of publication of the notification in the gazette. Therefore, 13.9.2000 will be the relevant date for the purpose of determination of compensation and not 16.11.2000.
19. It cannot be denied that the purpose of notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1984 is only formal expression of the decision of the Government and the petitioner, being well aware of the same, has already filed objections twice and no such ground was ever raised by the petitioner. Mere late publication of the notification in the District Gazette, therefore, in my view, would not vitiate the acquisition proceedings under the Act of 1894 initiated will within the time when the said Act was in force.
Point No.2 is also, therefore, answered in the negative.
POINT No.3:
20. In SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LTD.s case (6 supra), the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in C. PADMA v. DY. SECY. TO THE GOVT. OF TN. [(1997) 2 SCC 627)] was relied upon and another decision in MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR v. SHAH HYDER BEIG [(2002) 2 SCC 48] and para 17 of the said decision was extracted, which is reiterated as under:
18. To the similar effect is the judgment of this Court in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [(2002) 2 SCC 48] wherein this Court, following the decision of this Court in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of .TN. [(1997) 2 SCC
627)] held: (Shah Hyder case, p. 55, para 17)
17. In any event, after the award is passed no writ petition can be filed challenging the acquisition notice or against any proceeding thereunder. This has been the consistent view taken by this Court and in one of the recent cases (C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of .TN.) In SWAIKA PROPERTIES (P) LTD.s case (6 supra) not only award was passed but possession was also taken. In the present case, though possession is not yet taken, the award, undoubtedly, having been passed on 31.03.2015, the present writ petition, challenging acquisition proceedings, filed on 27.04.2015 cannot be sustained.
Point No.3 is also answered in the negative.
21. This, however, leaves the alternate relief sought for by the petitioner. As noted above, learned Advocate General did not join in issue on the said contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and has, in fact, readily offered that if petitioner makes an appropriate application under Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013, the respondents would, undoubtedly, act in accordance with the Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013. Hence, if the balance of the property of the petitioner is, in any manner, rendered useless, it is open for the petitioner to make an appropriate application to the respondents under Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013 and if any such application is received, the fourth respondent, in particular, shall consider the same in terms of the said provision and take further consequential steps expeditiously. The alternate relief sought for by the petitioner is, therefore, granted accordingly permitting the petitioner to apply and directing the fourth respondent to consider the application of the petitioner under Section 94 of the Act 30 of 2013.
The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. As a sequel, the miscellaneous applications, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.
______________________ VILAS V. AFZULPURKAR, J February 5, 2016