Delhi District Court
Smt. Sharda Rani vs Ms. Kamlesh Kumari on 6 December, 2018
-1-
IN THE COURT OF SH. AJAY NAGAR, COMMERCIAL CIVIL
JUDGE-CUM-ADDITIONAL RENT CONTROLLER (WEST), TIS
HAZARI COURTS, DELHI.
ARC No- 152/2017
1. Smt. Sharda Rani
W/o Late Sh. Mahinder Kumar
2. Ms. Bhawna
D/o Late Mahinder Kumar
Both R/o D-219,
Tagore Garden Extension,
New Delhi-110027. .... Petitioners
VERSUS
Ms. Kamlesh Kumari
R/o A-67-B, 1st floor,
Raghubir Nagar,
Near Central School,
New Delhi-110027. .... Respondent
Date of filing : 14.10.2017
Date of order : 06.12.2018
ORDER ON LEAVE TO DEFEND
1. The present petition U/Sec. 14 (1) (e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'DRC Act') has been filed by the petitioners against the respondent for her eviction from two rooms, latrine, bath and ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -2- kitchen and also covered room in the front portion at first floor in property bearing No. A-67-B, Raghubir Nagar, Near Central School, New Delhi- 110027 more specifically shown in red color in the site plan (hereinafter referred to as 'tenanted premises') annexed with the petition.
2. It is averred by the petitioners that the tenanted premises were allotted to Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi. That Sh. Om Prakash sold the said premises to Sh. Mahinder Kumar, husband of the petitioner no. 1 and father of the petitioner No. 2.
It is further averred that the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent about 16 years back by late Sh. Mahinder Kumar. It is further averred that Sh. Mahinder Kumar expired on 23.01.2012 and the petitioners being only legal heirs of late Sh. Mahinder Kr. succeeded to the tenanted premises.
It is lastly submitted that the petitioners require the tenanted premises bonafidely for occupation as residence for themselves as they have no other reasonably suitable accommodation available.
3. Notice of this eviction petition was sent to the respondent in the prescribed format which was duly served on the respondent. In response to which the respondent filed leave to defend application accompanied by affidavit.
4. Respondent in her leave to defend application has inter-alia submitted that in the present petition, the respondent is shown as Kamlesh ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -3- Kumari but the name of deponent is Bimlesh and she was residing in the tenanted premises as licensee by Sh. Om Prakash, who is the allottee of the tenanted premises.
It is contended that there is no direct relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It is further contended that the owner of the tenanted premises is Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash and the petitioner no. 1 was also introduced by the said Sh. Om Prakash and he further told the respondent to pay the desired rent to the petitioner no. 1 and the respondent is paying monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/- to the petitioner no. 1.
It is further contended that the present petition is barred by Sec. 3(a)
(b) and (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
That the tenanted premises is the lease hold property of J.J. Land/ MCD allotted to Sh. Om Prakash on lease hold basis and the said premises cannot be transferred to anybody as per rules and regulations of the concerned department and the deceased husband of the petitioner no. 1 illegally got G.P.A and other documents annexed with the petition in his favour. That the address mentioned in the petition is D-219, Tagore Garden Extension, New Delhi and the said property is ancestral property of the petitioner's and they are residing there for last 23 years. It is also submitted that the petitioner has not disclosed in her petition that they bonafidely require the tenanted premises. It is further submitted that the petitioners have not stated that they do have any other accommodation to reside. That the respondent has no alternative accommodation to reside other then the tenanted premises.
ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -4-
5. Reply to leave to defend filed by the petitioner wherein the petitioners have submitted that the tenanted premises were allotted to Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash and the said Sh. Om Prakash sold the tenanted premises to Sh. Mahender Kumar, late husband of the petitioner no. 1 and father of the petitioner no. 2. It is also submitted that the respondent has admitted herself to be tenant under late Sh. Mahender Kumar and after his death, respondent has been paying the rent to the petitioner no. 1 and, therefore, respondent is tenant under the petitioners. Furthermore, it is specifically denied that the petitioners are residing in property No. D-218, Tagore Garden Extension, New Delhi belonging to Sh. Kanwal Nain Dhingra, brother-in-law/ Jeth of the petitioner no. 1 for the last 23 years.
It is further submitted that the petitioners are living as licensee/ permissive user in the property belonging to the brother-in-law of petitioner no. 1 for the last 23 years and now the children and brother-in- law have grown up and are of marriageable age and as such, they need the tenanted premises to be vacated from the possession of the respondent since the petitioners have to vacate the premises in which they are residing.
It is lastly submitted that the respondent has failed to raise any triable issue which could entitle her leave to defend in the present petition.
6. I have heard the arguments at length advanced by both the Ld. Counsels and perused the record very carefully.
It is submitted by the Ld. Counsel for the respondent that in the present petition, the respondent is shown as Kamlesh Kumari and the ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -5- name of respondent is Ms. Bimlesh and she was residing in the suit premises as licensee by Sh. Om Prakash, who is the allottee of the tenanted premises. It is submitted that there is no direct relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. That the owner of the tenanted premises is Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash and the petitioner no. 1 was also introduced by the said Sh. Om Prakash and the respondent is paying monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/- to the petitioner no. 1. That the present petition is barred by Sec. 3(a)(b) and (c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.
That the tenanted premises is the lease hold property of J.J. Land/ MCD allotted to Sh. Om Prakash on lease hold basis and the said premises cannot be transferred to anybody as per rules and regulations of the concerned department and the deceased husband of the petitioner no. 1 illegally got G.P.A and other documents annexed with the petition in his favour. He further submits that the petitioners have not disclosed in their petition that they bonafidely require the tenanted premises.
On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner argues that the tenanted premises were allotted to Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Sh. Om Prakash sold the said premises to Sh. Mahinder Kumar, husband of the petitioner no. 1 and father of the petitioner No. 2. That the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent about 16 years back by late Sh. Mahinder Kumar and Sh. Mahinder Kumar expired on 23.01.2012 and the petitioners being only legal heirs of late Sh. Mahinder Kr. succeeded to the tenanted premises. That the petitioners require the tenanted premises bonafidely for occupation as residence for themselves as they have no reasonably ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -6- suitable accommodation available.
THE LAW:-
7. It is well settled that burden placed on a tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed by him discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of the premises on the ground specified in clause (e) are good enough to grant leave to defend.
It is further well settled that at a stage when the tenant seeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima-facie makes out a case by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction. Unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes a strong case as would non-suit the landlord leave to defend should not be granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25 B(5). A leave to defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or in a routine manner which will defeat the very object of the special provisions contained in Chapter IIIA of the Act, leave to defend cannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on a mere design or desire of landlord to recover possession of the premises from a tenant. Refusing to grant leave in such a case leads to eviction of a tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and his family members, if any, although he could establish if only leave is granted that a landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction.
It is also well settled at the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavits in support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptable evidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way or the other unless ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -7- there is a strong and acceptable evidence available to show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by the tenant seeking leave to defend where either frivolous, untenable or most unreasonable.
It is also well settled that when a possession is sought on the ground of personal requirement, a landlord has to establish his need and not his mere desire.
In short and substance wholly frivolous and totally untenable defence may not entitle a tenant to leave to defend but when a triable issue is raised a duty is placed on the rent controller by the statute itself to grant leave. It would expeditious disposal of eviction petition so that a landlord need not wait and suffer for long time. On the other hand, when a tenant is denied leave to defend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, will suffer great hardship. In this view a balanced view is to be taken having regard to competing claims.
There appears to be a mistaken belief that unless the tenant at that stage makes out such a strong case as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend cannot be granted. This approach is wholly improper. When leave to defend is sought for, the tenant must make out such a prima facie case raising such pleas that a triable issue would emerge and that in our opinion should be sufficient to grant leave. The test is the test of a triable issue and not the final success in the action.
8. I have carefully and minutely gone through the petition, leave to defend application accompanied by affidavit, reply, documents and case law relied upon.
ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -8-
9. It is expedient to reproduce the Section 14 (1)(e) of DRC Act which is as under:
"Section-14. Protection of tenant against eviction- (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by court or any controller in favour of the landlord against a tenant:
Provided that the controller may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:-
"That the premises are required bonafide by the landlord for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation."
As such, followings are the ingredients of Section 14 (1)(e) of D.R.C. Act:-
(i) There should be relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioners and respondent.
(ii) Landlord should be the owner of the tenanted premises.
(iii) That the premises are required bonafide by ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -9- the landlord for himself/herself or for any member of his/her family dependent upon him/her.
(iv) Landlord should not have other reasonable suitable accommodation.
10. Let us discuss the ingredients of Sec. 14(1)(e) of D.R.C. Act:-
(i) & (ii). LANDLORDSHIP AND OWNERSHIP:-
11. Perusal of record shows that the claim of the respondent is that she was residing in the tenanted premises as licensee by Sh. Om Prakash, who is the allottee of the tenanted premises and there is no direct relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the respondent is paying monthly rent of Rs. 3,000/- to the petitioner no. 1. Respondent further claims that the tenanted premises is the lease hold property of J.J. Land/ MCD allotted to Sh. Om Prakash on lease hold basis and the said premises cannot be transferred to anybody as per rules and regulations of the concerned department and the deceased husband of the petitioner no. 1 illegally got G.P.A and other documents annexed with the petition in his favour.
On the other hand, the petitioners claim that the tenanted premises were allotted to Sh. Om Prakash son of Sh. Ram Prakash by the Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Sh. Om Prakash sold the said premises to Sh. Mahinder Kumar. Petitioners further claim that the tenanted premises were let out to the respondent about 16 years back by late Sh. Mahinder Kumar and Sh. Mahinder Kumar expired on 23.01.2012 and the petitioners being ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -10- only legal heirs of late Sh. Mahinder Kr. succeeded to the tenanted premises. Further, the respondent has admitted herself to be tenant under late Sh. Mahender Kumar and after his death, respondent has been paying the rent to the petitioner no. 1 and, therefore, respondent is tenant under the petitioners.
In case titled as Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. 1995 RLR 162 a Bench of Hon'ble High Court of Delhi while dealing with the concept of ownership in a pending eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act had noted as follows:
"There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny ownership in cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the substance of such a plea on the part of the tenants the Courts have insisted that they should state who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In the present case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases involving disputes of title to the property. Ownership is not to be proved in absolute terms. The respondent does not claim the owner of the premises."
Further, in the case titled as Smt. Shanti Sharma & Ors. Vs Smt Ved Prabha & ors 1987 AIR 2028, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed : -
"That the meaning of term 'owner' is vis a vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant."
In the case titled as Bharat Bhushan Vij Vs. Arti Teckchandani 153(2008)DLT 247 the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter-alia observed as ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -11- under:-
4. The concept of ownership in a landlord-tenant litigation governed by the Delhi Rent Control Act, has to be distinguished from the one in a title suit. If the premises was let out by a person and after his death, the premises has come in the hands of beneficiary under a Will, the tenant has no right to challenge the title of such a beneficiary. If on the death of the original owner the tenant has any doubt as to who was the owner of the premises, he is supposed to file an interpleader suit impleading all the legal heirs of the deceased and ask the Court to decide as to who shall be the landlord/owner after the death of the original owner. Where no interpleader suit is filed by the tenant and the tenant continues in possession after death of the original owner without demur and without raising an objection against the person, who claims to have inherited the property under the Will, he later on cannot challenge the ownership of such a person.
It is not the domain of the tenant to challenge the Will of the deceased landlord. If a landlord is able to show that there is a testament in his/her favour, he/she is deemed to have discharged his/her burden of proving the ownership under the Act. If the tenant takes a frivolous objection about ownership, such an objection cannot be entertained unless the tenant comes forward as to who was the landlord/owner of the premises and to whom he has been paying rent after the death of the original owner.
5. This Court in Ram Chander v. Ram Pyari 109 (2004) DLT 388 and Plashchemicals Company v. Ashit Chadha & Anr. : 114(2004)DLT408 have laid down the law that it was not for the tenant to challenge the Will of the landlord and any such challenge made by the tenant is a baseless and frivolous challenge. I, therefore, consider that even if the learned Additional Rent Controller did not dwell upon this point, such a challenge made by the tenant would not result into non suiting the landlord. Moreover, the evidence led by the landlady in this case makes it clear that she inherited the property, in question, on the basis of Will left by her father in law. There is no other person who has ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -12- claimed ownership over the property and this objection was raised just for the sake of raising objection."
In the case titled as "Plastic Chemicals Company Vs Ashit Chadha & Ors. 114 (2004) DLT 408, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi inter- alia observed as under:-
"4. I have heard counsel for the parties and carefully examined the judgment under challenge as also the material on record. As regards the contentions raised by counsel for the petitioner challenging the Will, the law has since been crystalised by the Supreme Court in Smt. Shanti Sharma vs. Smt.Ved Prabha, as also in Sheela and others vs. Firm Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash, . Once the landlord has been able to show that there is a testament in his favor, the landlord is deemed to have discharged his burden of ownership, vis-a-vis, the Rent Control Act. In the present case, the landlord has been able to prove that a testament has been made in his favor by the previous owner which, at best, could be challenged by the heirs of Smt. Saroj Mohan and certainly not by the tenant. In this view of the matter I hold that the objection of the petitioner herein to the maintainability of the eviction petition by the landlord is frivolous."
12. As such, in view of the observations made by the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi and Hon'ble Apex Court, it is manifestly clear that the tenant has no right to challenge the memorandum of partition or family settlement.
It is also well settled that the petitioner should be something more than the tenant and the petitioner need not prove his ownership in absolute terms. It is sufficient for the petitioner to prove or to show that he is something more than a tenant. In my considered view, the petitioners have ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -13- been able to prove that they are something more than the respondent. Moreover, the respondent herself has admitted that she is the tenant under Sh. Mahinder Kumar. Furthermore, she has also admitted that she is paying rent to the petitioner No. 1.
In view of the settled proposition of law, this contentions of the respondent do not have any force. As such, these cannot be considered as triable issue.
As such, these contentions of the respondent in respect of ownership and landlordship of the petitioners do not raise any triable issue which disentitle the petitioners to obtain the eviction order.
(iii) & (iv). BONAFIDE REQUIREMENT AND ALTERNATIVE ACCOMMODATION:-
13. It is expedient to discuss some case laws before deciding the leave to defend which are as under:-
In the case titled as Sudesh Kumar Soni & Ors. Vs. Prabha Khanna & Ors. 153 (2008) DLT 652 it was observed that:-
"24. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.
25. Suitability has to be seen from the convenience of the landlord and his family members and on the basis of the circumstances including their profession, vocation, ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -14- style of living, habits and background. Landlord is the best judge of his residential requirement".
In the case titled as Ragavendra Kumar Vs Firm Prem Machinery AIR 2000 SC 534, it was observed as under:-
"It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter, (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.K Krishnan, [1996] 5 SCC
353. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."
In the case titled as Sarla Ahuja Vs United India Insurance Co. Ltd. AIR 1999 SC 100 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that:
"The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section 14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When a landlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that the requirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause are satisfied and when the landlord shows a prima facie case it is open to the Rent Controller to draw a presumption that the requirement of the landlord in bona fide. It is often said by courts that it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to how else he can adjust himself without getting possession of the tenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides of the requirement of the landlord it is quite unnecessary to make an endeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself."
ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -15- In Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta AIR 1999 SC 2507, at pg-2512 in para 14 & 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:-
"14. The availability of an alternate accommodation with the landlord i.e. an accommodation other than the one in occupation of the tenant wherefrom he is sought to be evicted has a dual relevancy. Firstly, the availability of another accommodation, suitable and convenient in all respects as the suit accommodation, may have an adverse bearing on the finding as to bonafides of the landlord if he unreasonably refuses to occupy the available premises to satisfy his alleged need. Availability of such circumstance would enable the Court drawing an inference that the need of the landlord was not a felt need or the state of mind of the landlord was not honest, sincere, and natural. Secondly, another principal ingredient of Clause (e) of Sub-section (1) of Section 14 which speaks of non- availability of any other reasonably suitable residential accommodation to the landlord, would not be satisfied. Wherever another residential accommodation is shown to exist as available than the court has to ask the landlord why he is not occupying such other available accommodation to satisfy his need. The landlord may convince the court that the alternate residential accommodation though available is still of no consequence as the same is not reasonably suitable to satisfy the felt need which the landlord has succeeded in demonstrating objectively to exist. Needless to say that an alternate accommodation, to entail denial of the claim of the landlord, must be reasonably suitable, obviously in comparison with the suit accommodation wherefrom the landlord is seeking eviction. Convenience and safety of the landlord and his family members would be relevant fact Ors. While considering the totality of the circumstances, the court may keep in view the profession or vocation of the landlord and his family members, their style of living, their habits and the background wherefrom they come."
ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -16-
14. Perusal of record shows that the respondent has alleged that the petitioners have not disclosed in their petition that they bonafidely require the tenanted premises.
On the other hand, petitioners have mentioned that they require the tenanted premises bonafidely for occupation as residence for themselves as they have no alternative reasonably suitable accommodation available.
As such, record itself shows that the petitioners have sought the tenanted premises for bonafide requirement for themselves for residential purposes. As such, this contention of the respondent does not have any force.
15. One of the contentions of the respondent is that the present petition is barred by the Section 3 (a)(b)(c) of D.R.C. Act as the tenanted premises is a government leased hold accommodation/ property provided/ allotted to Sh. Om Prakash on rental basis @ Rs. 1500/- per month approximately.
On the other hand, in reply to the aforesaid contentions, the petitioners have inter-alia contended that the provisions as mentioned by the respondent in the leave to defend are not applicable to the suit premises.
I have carefully gone through the aforesaid provision i.e. Section 3
(a)(b)(c) of D.R.C. Act. It is expedient to reproduce here the aforesaid provision of law:-
"3. Act not to apply to certain premises- Nothing in this Act shall apply-
(a). To any premises belonging to government;
(b) To any tenancy or other like relationship created by a grant from the government in respect of the premises taken on lease, or requisitioned, by the government:
provided:- where any premises belonging to government ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -17- have been or are lawfully let by the person by virtue of an agreement with the government or otherwise, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court or other authority, the provisions of this Act shall apply to such tenancy;
(c). To any premises, whether residential or not, whose monthly rent exceeds Three Thousand and Five Hundred Rupees; or"
16. As such, the Section 3 of the D.R.C Act manifestly shows that the present case is not barred under this provision as it is not within the ambit of aforesaid provision as the tenanted premises is neither belonging to government as mentioned in clause-(a) nor it is within the ambit of clause-
(b) and (c) also. Moreover, it is also not included within the ambit of clause-
(c).
17. The another contention of the respondent is that she is not having any other premises excepting the tenanted premises.
In the case titled as Raj Kumar Khanna vs. Parduman Singh passed in RC Rev. No. 548/2012 and C.M. No. 18936/2012 on 04.10.2013; the Hon'ble High court of Delhi observed as under:-
"17. In the case of Mohd. Ayub vs. Mukesh Chand (2012) 2 SCC 155 it was observed that the hardship appellants would suffer by not occupying their own premises would be far greater than the hardship the respondent would suffer by having moved out to another place. We are mindful of the fact that whenever the tenant is asked to move out of the premises some hardship is inherent. We have noted that respondent is in occupation of the premises for a long time. But in our opinion, in the facts of this case that circumstance cannot be sole determinative ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -18- factor."
18. In my view this plea of the respondent certainly attracts the sympathy of this court but it is well settled that in deciding the present eviction proceeding, this kind of plea need not be weighed by the court.
19. In the light of the aforesaid legal proposition, all the pleas taken by the respondent has failed to raise any triable issues. The contents of the application for leave to defend have failed to rebut the presumption of bonafide qua the requirement of the petitioner.
CONCLUSION:-
20. In view of the above discussion, I am of the considered opinion that no purpose would be served, even if, the petitioners are compelled to appear in the witness box and position would not be different than it is today. For this reason also, I find no triable issue in the leave to defend application of the respondent. The application for leave to defend filed by the respondent is thus, dismissed.
21. Hence, as a consequence thereof, an eviction order is passed U/s. 14 (1) (e) of DRC Act in favour of petitioner and against the respondent in respect of two rooms, latrine, bath and kitchen and also covered room in the front portion at first floor in property bearing No. A-67-B, Raghubir Nagar, Near Central School, New Delhi-110027 as shown in red colour in the site plan which is marked as Mark- P1 (Put by the ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari -19- court for the purpose of identification).
22. However, this order shall not be operative before the expiry of six months from today keeping in view Sec. 14(7) of D.R.C. Act.
23. File be consigned to the Record Room after due compliance.
Announced in the open Court on 6th December, 2018.
Digitally signed
(This order contains 19 pages)
AJAY by AJAY NAGAR
NAGAR Date: 2018.12.06
16:58:23 +0530
(Ajay Nagar)
Commercial Civil Judge-Cum
Additional Rent Controller,
West District, THC, Delhi.
ARC No. 152/2017 Smt. Sharda Rani & Anr. vs. Ms. Kamlesh Kumari