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Jharkhand High Court

­­­ vs ­­ on 12 March, 2018

                                             1.


           IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
                        W.P.(C) No. 5664 of 2017     
                                       ­­­        
      M/s Gautam Ferro Alloys, a unit of M/s Bihar Foundry & Casting 
      Ltd., a company incorporated under the provisions of Companies 
      Act, 1956 having its factory premise at Ramgarh Industrial Area, 
      Marar, having its Registered Office at Main Road, Ranchi through 
      its Managing Director Dr. Hari Krishan Budhia, son of late R.K. 
      Budhia,   aged   about   78   years   resident   of   Near   Surendra   Nath 
      Centenary   School,   Hazaribagh   Road,   PO   Booty,   PS­Sadar, 
      District­Ranchi(Jharkhand)                    .....  ....   Petitioner
                                   ­­Versus­­
      1.Damodar Valley Corporation, having its office  at DVC Towers, 
      VIP Road, PO & PS­VIP Road, Kolkata, West Bengal through its 
      Chairman.
      2.Chief   Engineer   (Commercial),   Damodar   Valley   Corporation, 
      Commercial   Department,   having   its   office   at   DVC   Towers,   VIP 
      Road, PO & PS­VIP Road, Kolkata, West Bengal
      3.Deputy   Chief   Engineer   (Commercial),   Damodar   Valley 
      Corporation,   Commercial   Department,   having   its   office   at   DVC 
      Towers, VIP Road, PO & PS­VIP Road, Kolkata, West Bengal
      4.Law   Officer,   Damodar   Valley   Corporation,   Commercial 
      Department,   having   its   office   at   DVC   Towers,   VIP   Road,   PO   & 
      PS­VIP Road, Kolkata, West Bengal             .... ..... Respondents     

    ­­­ CORAM :   HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR ­­­ For the Petitioner :  Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, Advocate    Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh, Advocate     Mrs. Ranjana Mukherjee, Advocate     For the Respondent­DVC :  Mr. Srijit Choudhury, Advocate    Miss Srija Choudhury, Advocate    Miss Neha, Advocate           ­­­     5/ 12.03.2018   Challenge by the petitioner is to the order dated  27.12.2016 by which the respondent­authority has held that the  petitioner­company   is   not   entitled   to   remission   of   the   Demand  Charge and the Guaranteed Energy Charge under Clause­4 of the  bilateral   agreement,   for   the   period   between   03.09.2005   to  27.10.2005.  

2. This case has a chequered history of litigation. The  petitioner­M/s Gautam Ferro Alloys, a unit of M/s Bihar Foundry  and Casting Ltd., is engaged in manufacture of Silico Manganese  and Ferro Alloys.  It was granted electric connection for a contract  demand of 3000 KVA for which a bilateral agreement was entered  between the parties on 25.02.2003.  On the allegation of violation  of   certain   statutory   provisions,   the   Jharkhand   State   Pollution  2. Control Board (JSPCB) vide its order dated 20.12.2004 directed  closure   of   the   petitioner's   unit,   and   on   03.09.2005   its   factory  premises was sealed by JSPCB.  The petitioner came to this Court  in W.P.(C) No.5033 of 2005 challenging the impugned action of  the respondent­JSPCB and by an interim order dated 25.10.2005  the Pollution Control Board was directed to remove its seal from  the factory premises of the petitioner­company within three days,  and in compliance of the said order JSPCB removed its seal on  27.10.2005. Now, this period between 03.09.2005 to 27.10.2005  became a bone of contention, igniting series of litigation between  the parties.

  3. Raising a grievance against the Energy Bill issued  in the month of October, 2005, the petitioner came to this Court in  W.P.(C) No.5870 of 2009.   Specific plea raised by the petitioner  was  that   on   account   of  circumstances beyond its control which  would   attract   the   Force   Majeure   clause   as   incorporated   under  Clause­4   to   the   bilateral   agreement   dated   25.02.2003   it   is   not  liable   to   pay   the   Demand   Charge   and   the   Guaranteed   Energy  Charge to the respondent­DVC.   The petitioner by that time had  succeeded before the revisional authority.   The Member, Board of  Revenue, Jharkhand by an order dated 05.12.2006 quashed the  order passed by the Chairman, Jharkhand State Pollution Control  Board   holding   that   the   Pollution   Control   Board   had   issued   the  impugned order in breach of the 2nd proviso to Section 21(4) of  the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981. This order  by the Board of Revenue was one of the defences raised by the  petitioner  before   this  Court in W.P.(C) No.5870 of 2009.     This  Court accepting the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner,  that the issue of Force Majeure has been decided by the order of  Board   of   Revenue,   Jharkhand,   by   an   order   dated   29.03.2011  remanded   the   matter   to   the   respondent­Damodar   Valley  Corporation   to   decide   the   claim   of   the   petitioner   regarding  adjustment of the Energy Bill for the period between 03.09.2005  to 27.10.2005 vis­a­vis Clause­4 of the bilateral agreement. This  order of the writ Court was taken in appeal by the Damodar Valley  3. Corporation in LPA No.283 of 2011.   The Letters Patent Appeal  was confined only to the finding recorded by the writ Court in its  order dated  29.03.2011  by which the learned Single  Judge  has  held that the question of closure of petitioner's unit on account of  Force Majeure has already been decided by the Member, Board of  Revenue.  This part of the writ Court's order was interfered by the  Letters Patent Court and LPA No.283 of 2011 stood disposed of by  an order dated 12.03.2012, in the above term.  Thereafter, claim  of  the   petitioner,  on   remand, was rejected by the Deputy Chief  Engineer (Commercial) by a cryptic order dated 18.03.2013.   By  simply observing that the petitioner­M/s Gautam Ferro Alloys  has  not been able to establish its claim as per the law, its claim was  rejected.   Aggrieved, the petitioner came to this Court in W.P(C)  No.2408   of   2013.   The   writ   petition   stood   allowed   by   an   order  dated 10.09.2015 by which the impugned order dated 18.03.2003  was quashed by the writ Court and the matter was remanded back  to the Deputy Chief Engineer (Commercial) to pass a fresh order.  Impugned   order   dated   27.12.2016   is   the   order   passed   in  purported compliance of the writ Court's order dated 10.09.2015.

4. Heard.

5. Contending that the closure of petitioner's factory  premises   on   03.09.2005   by   the   respondent­JSPCB   which   is   a  statutory   authority   is   a   fact   which   does   not   require   any  investigation   on   facts,   insofar   as,   cessations   of   work   and  non­utilisation of the electric supply in the petitioner's unit during  the period in question is concerned,   Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, the  learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   submits   that   Clause­4   of   the  bilateral agreement is attracted in all its dimensions and merely  because   the   petitioner   did   not   inform   closure   of   its   factory  premises   in   time   it   would   not   alter   the   position   in   law   on  applicability   of   Clause­4   as   obtaining   on   03.09.2005,   nor   take  away the benefit accrued to the petitioner under Clause­4 of the  bilateral   agreement.     It   is   submitted   that   it   is   not   that   the  petitioner   alone   is   responsible   for   ensuring   compliance   of   the  terms and conditions under the bilateral agreement, it was also for  4. the   respondent­Damodar   Valley   Corporation   to   ensure   full  utilisation   of   the   agreement   between   the   parties.   The   learned  counsel   for   the   petitioner   has   relied   on   decision   in  "Industrial   Finance   Corporation   of   India   Ltd.   vs   Cannanore   Spinning   And   Weaving Mills Ltd. And Others" reported in (2002) 5 SCC 54. 

6. As   against   the   above,   Mr.   Srijit   Choudhury,   the  learned counsel for the respondent ­DVC has reiterated the stand  of the respondent­DVC as reflected in the impugned order dated  27.12.2016.  It is contended that the petitioner which has failed to  intimate closure of its factory premises on 03.09.2005 and did not  ask   DVC   for   disconnection   of   electric   supply   cannot   seek  exemption from paying Demand Charge and Guaranteed Energy  Charge for the period between 03.09.2005 to 27.10.2005.  

7. Before   referring   to   Clause­4   to   the   bilateral  agreement, it is pertinent to record that order passed by the Board  of   Revenue   on   05.12.2006   has   attained   finality   is   an   admitted  position.  In the previous proceeding in its order dated 29.03.2011  the writ Court has dealt with this issue in detail. In none of the  proceedings either before the respondent­DVC or in this Court it  has been denied that the factory premises of the petitioner was  sealed   by   the   respondent­JSPCB   on   03.09.2005   and   only   when  this Court passed an order on 25.10.2005 in W.P(C) No.5033 of  2005,   JSPCB's   seal   from   the   factory   premises   of   the   petitioner­ company was removed; in fact it could not have been denied.  It is  not a case pleaded by the respondent­DVC that during the period  between 03.09.2005 and 27.10.2005   the petitioner has utilized  electric   connection   at   its   factory   premises   or   on   account   of  continued   electric   supply   in   the   petitioner's   premises   the  respondent­DVC   has   suffered   losses.   Specific   stand   of   the  respondent­DVC   appearing   from   the   impugned   order   dated  27.12.2016, in paragraph nos. 9 and 10 reads as under :

"9. Furthermore, it shall be imperative to note that the   Unit   had  informed  DVC of the sealing  of its factory   premises by way of a letter dated 30 September, 2005,   being the last day of the month of September while the   5. order   for   such   sealing   was   passed   by   JSPCB   on   3   September   2005.     Additionally,   upon   perusal   of   the   received   copy   of   the   said   letter   dated   30   September   2005, I have observed that the same was received by   DVC   only   on   4  October  2005.    The   Unit,  being   the   consumer,   itself   had   not   informed   DVC   of   the   contingency till the last day of the month. The delay   occasioned by the Unit in duly informing DVC of the   event is purely an act of negligence on its part.  Even   though   the   Unit   had   preferred   a   Writ   before   the   Hon'ble   High   Court   of   Jharkhand   challenging   the   sealing of the factory and had reasonable grounds to   believe that the Writ would succeed and such an order   of sealing would be held to be illegal, which it did, I   fail to see any reason as to why they waited till the   end of the month to intimate DVC of its situation.  The   entire   month   of   September   had   passed   before   the   sealing   of   the   factory   premises   was   brought   to   the   knowledge of DVC.  Therefore, I observe that DVC was   within its rights as per the Agreement to levy electrical   energy charges for the month of September 2005. 

  10. On a thorough perusal of the said letter dated 30   September 2005 I note that there is no specific prayer   for disconnection of supply of electrical energy by the   Unit.     In   the   said   letter,   the   unit   had   expressed   its   inability   to   utilize   the   electrical   energy   while   the   factory was sealed.  Hence, this letter cannot be treated   as   a   request   by   the   Unit   to   DVC   to   disconnect   or   discontinue supply of electrical energy to the factory.   It   shall   be   pertinent   to   consider   that   as   per   the   Electricity   Act,   2003,   disconnection   of   supply   of   electrical energy can only be done by the licensee in the   events of theft of electricity, interference with meters or   due to default of payment of energy bill.  Additionally,   the   (Electricity   Supply   Code)   Regulations,   2005,   6. bearing   Notification   No.JSERC/Regulation/64/268,   dated  28   July  2005,  issued  by  the Jharkhand  State   Electricity Regulatory Commission ('JSERC'), a licensee   can   disconnect   the   supply   of   electrical   energy   on   account of non­payment of charges by the consumer.   Neither did the Unit, being the consumer, apply to DVC   to disconnect supply of energy to its premises, nor did   the   other   aforementioned   circumstances   arise,   given   the factual matrix of the present case.  Hence DVC had   no statutory right to disconnect the supply of electrical   energy to the factory premises of the Unit.   Since no   disconnection   was   occasioned,   the   raising   of   energy   bills   by   DVC   on   the   Unit   for   the   electrical   energy   supplied   by   it   to   the   Unit   has   per   the   terms   of   the   Agreement is not unreasonable.  

8. Clause­4   of   the   bilateral   agreement   is   extracted  hereunder:  

               "Both the parties shall ensure compliance with the   terms of this agreement. However, no party shall be   liable   for   any   claim   for   any   loss,   damage   or   compensation whatsoever arising out of the failure   to carry out the terms of this agreement or shortage   of  power  supply  to the extent that  such failure or   shortage is due the Force­Majeure on account of the   events such as strike, lock­out, fire, accident, cyclone   or any other act of God beyond the control of any   party  or  due to any  restraint  or  regulation of the   State Govt. or Central Govt. or any other statutory   authority.  But any party claiming the benefit under   this   clause   shall   satisfy   the   other   party   of   the   existence of such a Force­Majeure and shall make the   best endeavour to perform its normal obligations as   per terms of this Agreement as soon as possible after   the cessation of such Force­Majeure. If at any time   the  consumer   is prevented  from receiving or   using   7. the   electrical   energy   to   be   supplied   under   this   agreement   either   in   whole   or   in   part   or   if   the   Corporation is prevented from supplying or unable   to supply such electrical energy owing to any one of   the aforesaid reasons, then the Demand Charge and   the   Guaranteed   Energy   Charge   as   set   out   in   Schedule­II annexed hereto payable by the consumer   shall be reduced in proportion to the ability of the   consumer to take or the Corporation to supply such   power. 

  Provided that the failure of the consumer to use   the electrical energy under this agreement either in   whole or in part due to planned shut­down and/or   breakdown   of   machinery   or   plant   in   course   of   normal   operation   or   shutdown   of   machinery   or   plant   due   to   non­availability   of   raw   materials   or   similar   other   reasons   shall   not   be   ground   for   the   aforesaid   reduction   in   Demand   Charge   and   the   Guaranteed Energy Charge."   

9. A   glance   at   the   above   provision   would   make   it  apparent that Clause­4 breaks into three parts; the first part is in  the   nature   of   an   exclusion   clause,   the   second   part   deals   with  obligation   of   the   party   seeking   benefit   under   Clause­4   and   the  third part explains the incidents in which benefit under Clause­4 is  available to a party. The first part relates to claim for any loss,  damage  or  compensation by any of the  party to the  agreement  arising   out   of   failure   to   carry   out   terms   of   the   agreement   or  shortage   of   power   supply   to   the   extent   that   such   failure   or  shortage is due to Force Majeure on account of the events such as  strike, lock­out, fire, accidents, cyclone or any other Act of God  beyond   the   control   of   any   party   or   due   to   any   restraint   or  regulation of the State Government or Central Government or any  other statutory authority.  It has been made explicitly clear that no  party   shall   be   liable   for   any   claim   for   any   loss,   damage   or  compensation   in   the   above   circumstances.     The   second   part   of  8. Clause­4 deals with a claim by a party to the agreement claiming  benefit under Clause­4. The party claiming benefit is required to  satisfy the other party of the existence of Force Majeure, besides  making its best endeavour to perform its normal obligation as per  the terms of the agreement as soon as possible after the cessation  of   such   Force   Majeure.   The   third   part   of   Clause­4,   which   is  relevant   for   deciding   legality   of   the   impugned   order   dated  27.02.2016, provides that if at any time the consumer is prevented  from   "receiving"   or   "using"  the   electrical  energy  to   be   supplied  under   this   agreement   either   in   whole   or   in   part   or   if   the  Corporation is prevented from supplying or unable to supply such  electrical energy owing to any one of the aforesaid reasons, then  the Demand Charge and the Guaranteed Energy Charge as set out  in Schedule­II annexed to the agreement payable by the consumer  shall be deducted in proportion to the ability of the consumer to  take or the Corporation to supply such power.

10. Proviso   to     Clause­4     is   in   the   nature   of   an  explanation   expanding   the   scope   of   non­admissibility   of   benefit  under Clause­4.

11. The   issue   raised   by   the   petitioner   is,   "whether  closure   of   its   factory   premises   by   an   order   of   the   respondent­ JSPCB, which has been found illegal by the Board of Revenue, as a  result   of   which   it   was   prevented   from   utilising   the   electrical  supply at its unit would entitle it to claim benefit under Clause­4?" 

12. Under   Clause­4   to   the   bilateral   agreement,   the  expression Force Majeure  has been explained to mean any event  which is beyond the control of the parties such as, strike, lock­out,  fire,   accident,   cyclone   or   any   Act   of   God.     This   expression   has  further   been   expanded   by   including   an   order   of   restraint   or  regulation of the State Government or Central Government or any  other   statutory   authority.   Clause­4,   apparently,   is   very   wide­ worded; it encompasses within its fold almost all the circumstance  beyond   the   control   of   the   parties.   Jharkhand   State   Pollution  Control   Board   is   a   statutory   authority   and   closure   of   the  petitioner's   factory   premises   on   03.09.2005   would   amount   to  9. restraint   by   a   statutory   authority,   in   my   opinion,   cannot   be  disputed. The expressions "receiving" and "using" in Clause­4 are  relevant. Benefit under Clause­4 on account of any of the reasons  indicated in Clause­4 is available to the consumer, even if it was  prevented from receiving or using the electrical energy supplied,  in   part.   On   account   of   closure   of   its   factory   premises   on  03.09.2005 the petitioner was prevented from using the electrical  supply at its  factory premises, is a matter of record.   The facts  pleaded   by   the   petitioner;   notice   issued   by   Jharkhand   State  Pollution Control Board on 20.12.2004 directing it to close down  its unit, closure of it's factory premises by 03.09.2005, order dated  25.10.2005   passed   in   W.P.(C)   No.5033   of   2005   and   removal   of  seal of JSPCB on 27.10.2005 by its authorities, all stand admitted.  Closure of its factory premises on 03.09.2005 which continued till  27.10.2005 was not on account of any act or omission on the part  of the petitioner, nor the reason for the closure is attributable to  the   petitioner.     In   fact,   this   is   not   the   case   pleaded   by   the  respondent­DVC that due to closure of its factory premises during  the   aforesaid   period   the   petitioner   was   not   prevented   from  utilizing   electric   supply   at   its   factory   premises.   Order   dated  20.12.2004   pursuant   to   which  petitioner's   factory  premises  was  sealed   on   03.09.2005   has   been   held   illegal   by   a   quasi­judicial  authority. In view of the aforesaid uncontroverted facts, any delay  or   even   negligence   on   the   part   of   the   petitioner­company   in  communicating closure of its factory premises on 03.09.2005, or  immediately thereafter, would not alter position of the parties in  law, on applicability of Clause­4 to the bilateral agreement which  is a statutory contract.   Delay may in a case be a bar in seeking  remedy and it may be a ground to resist enforcement of a right,  may be under an agreement, but it cannot be a ground to hold  that Clause­4 of the bilateral agreement is not applicable in this  case.   To resist benefit under Clause­4 to the bilateral agreement  on the ground of delay is one thing, but in the absence of any  clause in the bilateral agreement requiring invocation of Clause­4  immediately on occurrence of the events mentioned thereunder, to  10. say that Clause­4 on account of delay in communication of closure  of   the   factory   premises   would   render   Clause­4   inapplicable   is  different.     In   the   facts   of   a   case   while   the   plea   of   delay   on  enforcement of Clause­4 may succeed, it can not be pleaded that  on account  of  delay  in  communication Clause­4 to the bilateral  agreement has been rendered inapplicable. The respondent­DVC  has not pleaded any fact which may deny the petitioner benefit  under Clause­4 on account of delay in communication of closure  of its factory premises on 03.09.2005.  

  13. It   needs   to   be   indicated   at   this   stage   that   the  respondent­authority   has   recorded   that   the   order   of   Board   of  Revenue   passed   on   05.12.2006   is   "irrelevant".     Every   judicial/  quasi­judicial   authority   must   display   judicial   restraint   and  discipline.   All   that   could   have   been   done   by   the   respondent­ authority was to record a finding on the claim of the petitioner vis­ a­vis order of the Board of Revenue, and not to label order dated  05.12.2006 as an irrelevant one.

  14. Apparently, the respondent­authority has adopted  a   procedure,   for   arriving   at   a   conclusion   that   the   consumer   is  liable   to  pay   Demand   Charge   and  Guaranteed     Energy   Charge,  which   apparently   was   erroneous   and,   therefore,   the   impugned  order   dated   27.12.2016   has   been   rendered   unsustainable.   The  impugned order dated 27.12.2016 is quashed and it is held that  the petitioner­company is not liable to pay Demand Charge and  the Guaranteed Energy Charge for the period between 03.09.2005  to 27.10.2005.

15. Another prayer in the writ petition is for payment  of interest on the Demand Charge and Guaranteed Energy Charge  paid   by   the   petitioner   for   the   period   between   03.09.2005   to  27.10.2005.   Contending that a consequential relief on quashing  of the Energy Bill for the months of September and October, 2005  was sought in W.P.(C) No.5870 of 2009, Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari,  the   learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   submits   that   in   view   of  Regulation   11.10.3   of   Jharkhand   State   Electricity   Regulatory  Commission (Electricity Supply Code) Regulations, 2005 payment  11. of interest, on the excess payment made by the petitioner, at the  rate DPS is charged by the respondent­DVC, is the consequential  relief sought by the petitioner.

16. After removal of the seal from its factory premises  on 27.10.2005 when the petitioner found that Energy Bill for the  month   of   September   and   October,   2005   was   also   raised   by  including   the   Demand   Charge   and   the   Minimum   Guarantee  Energy Charge, it made a claim for remission in terms of Clause­4,  however,   it   was   rejected   by   an   order   dated   01.08.2006.     This  rejection   was   protested   by   the   petitioner   vide   letter   dated  08.08.2006 and the matter was  re­examined by the DVC; by letter  dated   01.11.2006   the   petitioner   was   communicated     that   this  objection   has   been   rejected.   On   17.11.2006   the   petitioner  preferred   an   appeal   before   the   Chairman,   Damodar   Valley  Corporation which was followed by  letters dated 18.12.2006 and  05.04.2007.  On 03.05.2011, pursuant to order dated 29.03.2011  passed in W.P.(C) No.5870 of 2009, the petitioner submitted its  claim vide letter dated 03.05.2011 in which it raised a claim for  interest   at   the   rate   of   15%   per   annum   compounded   quarterly.  After   disposal   of   L.P.A   No.   283   of   2011,   the   petitioner   again  submitted   its   claim   on   17.04.2012   in   which   it   claimed   simple  interest at the rate of 15% per annum (DPS charge).  However, by  order   dated   18.03.2013   the   Dy.   Chief   Engineer   (Commercial),  DVC while rejecting remission for the period between 03.09.2005  to   26.10.2005   declined   interest   on   the   amount   paid   by   the  petitioner towards Demand Charge and the Minimum Guarantee  Charge for the aforesaid period.

17. By   an   order   dated   13.10.2017,   the   respondents  were permitted to file response to the writ petition and when this  writ petition was listed for hearing on 05.02.2018, on instruction  of Mr. Rajeev Goswami, Deputy Chief Engineer (Commercial), the  learned counsel for the respondent­DVC   made a statement that  the writ petition may be finally disposed of on the basis of the  materials   on   record.   The   respondent­DVC   has   not   filed   its  response   to   the   prayer   for   grant   of   interest   on   the   amount   of  12. Demand   Charge   and   Guaranteed   Energy   Charge   paid   by   the  petitioner to the DVC.  

18. Under   Clause   11.10.3   of   Jharkhand   State  Electricity   Regulatory   Commission   (Electricity   Supply   Code)  Regulations,   2005   which   is   pari­materia   to   Clause   10.7.4   of  Jharkhand   State   Electricity   Regulatory   Commission   (Electricity  Supply Code) Regulations, 2015, a distribution licensee is required  to pay interest on the excess payment, at the rate delay payment  surcharge is charged from the consumer. Regulation 10.7.4 reads  as under : 

     If the consumer has paid any excess amount, it shall   be   refunded   to   the   consumer   within   15   days   or,   if   consumer   opts,   be   adjusted   within   two   subsequent   bills.     The   Distribution   Licensee   shall   pay     to   the   consumer interest charges at the rate equivalent to the   delay   payment   surcharge   as   per  tariff   on  the   excess   amount outstanding on account of such wrong billing   from  the  date of payment  till  the  date of refund  or   adjustment in subsequent bills.

19. As held in the preceding paragraphs the petitioner  was   not   liable   to   pay   Demand   Charge   and   Guaranteed   Energy  Charge   for   the   period   between   03.09.2005   to   27.10.2005   and,  therefore, payment by the petitioner of the above charges becomes  excess   payment   in   terms   of   Clause   11.10.3   (new   10.7.4).   On  quashing of the impugned order dated 27.12.2016, the petitioner  becomes entitled for interest in terms of Clause 10.7.4 of 2015  Regulations  on   the  amount  of Demand Charge  and Guaranteed  Energy   Charge   from   the   date   it   was   paid   to   the   DVC,   till   this  amount with interest is actually paid to it.   

20. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid  terms.          

           (Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)                         SI/,    AFR