Bombay High Court
State Of Mah. Thr. P.S.O., P.S. Mul vs Balkrushna S/O Maroti Meshram on 5 February, 2026
Author: Anil L. Pansare
Bench: Anil L. Pansare
2026:BHC-NAG:1893-DB
1 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
NAGPUR BENCH, NAGPUR.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 12 OF 2010
Balkrishna s/o Maroti Meshram,
Aged about 27 years, Occupation - Business,
R/o Khed (Matka), Tahsil - Bramhapuri,
District - Chandrapur,
at Present C/o Lilabai Gedam, Vihirgaon
Ward, Mul, Tahsil - Mul, District Chandrapur. .... APPELLANT
VERSUS
State of Maharashtra,
through Police Station Officer,
Police Station, Mul, District Chandrapur. .... RESPONDENT
____________________________________________________________________
Mr. A.R. Wagh, Counsel for the appellant,
Mr. S.S. Hulke, Addl.P.P. for the respondent/State.
____________________________________________________________________
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 301 OF 2010
State of Maharashtra,
through Police Station Officer,
Police Station, Mul, District Chandrapur. .... APPELLANT
VERSUS
Balkrushna s/o Maroti Meshram,
Aged about 27 years,
Occupation - Tyre Puncture Repairing,
R/o Khed (Makta), Tahsil - Bramhapuri,
District - Chandrapur,
at Present C/o Lilabai Gedam, Vihirgaon
Ward, Mul, Tahsil - Mul, District Chandrapur. .... RESPONDENT
2 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
____________________________________________________________________
Mr. S.S. Hulke, Addl.P.P. for the appellant/State,
Mr. A.R. Wagh, Counsel for the respondent.
____________________________________________________________________
CORAM : ANIL L. PANSARE & NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, JJ.
DATE OF RESERVING THE JUDGMENT : 29-01-2026
DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE JUDGMENT : 05-02-2026.
JUDGMENT :(PER : NIVEDITA P. MEHTA, J.) Both these appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 16.12.2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Chandrapur, in Sessions Case No. 19/2009. By the impugned judgment, the accused Balkrushna Maroti Meshram was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (for short, "IPC"), but was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 2 ½ years and to pay a fine of ₹3,000/-. In default of payment of fine, he was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months.
2. Criminal Appeal No. 301 of 2010 is preferred by the State seeking conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC, whereas Criminal Appeal No. 12 of 2010 is filed by the accused challenging his conviction under Section 324 of the IPC.
3. The prosecution case, in substance, is that the accused Balkrushna was married to PW 1-Meena on 10.04.2008. After marriage, they resided in a 3 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt rented premises at Mul, District Chandrapur. Initially the marital life was cordial, however, subsequently the accused allegedly started ill-treating PW 1 by abusing and assaulting her under the influence of liquor. 3.1 On 17.10.2008 at about 3.30 to 4.00 p.m., the accused returned home in an inebriated condition and demanded food. A quarrel ensued on the ground that the PW 1 had already taken her meal. According to the prosecution, in the course of the quarrel, the accused took a stove from the loft, opened the cock of the tank of the stove, poured kerosene from it on the person of PW 1 and ignited a matchstick, thereby setting her on fire. On hearing her cries, neighbours rushed to the spot. The accused then poured water on her person and extinguished the fire. PW 1 sustained burn injuries and was immediately taken to the Rural Hospital at Mul, where her statement came to be recorded.
3.2 The medical examination revealed that PW 1 had sustained burn injuries about 20-25% of her body. On the basis of her statement, the crime was registered and after investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of the IPC.
3.3 Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet came to be filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mul, who committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Chandrapur, as the offence under Section 307 of the 4 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt IPC was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. The case was registered as Sessions Case No. 19/2009. The learned Sessions Judge framed Charge (Exh.10) against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 498-A of the IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3.4 In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the accused denied the incriminating circumstances appearing against him and took the defence of total denial. The defence suggested that the complainant had poured kerosene on herself and sustained burns, and that he had, in fact, tried to save her by extinguishing the fire. The prosecution examined seven witnesses in all, including the complainant, neighbours, the maternal aunt of the complainant, two medical officers and the investigating officer, and relied upon documentary and medical evidence. The accused did not examine any defence witness nor did he adduce any evidence in support of his defence.
4. Upon appreciation of the evidence, the learned trial Court held that the testimony of PW 1 was reliable and sufficiently corroborated by PW 2, PW 3 and PW 4 as to the occurrence of the incident and the involvement of the accused. The prompt recording of her statement after medical certification, the spot panchnama and seizure of articles were found to support the prosecution case. Relying on the evidence of the Government Medical Officer, the learned trial Court held that the victim had sustained 20- 25% superficial first-degree burns. Considering the conduct of the accused in 5 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt immediately extinguishing the fire, taking the victim to the hospital and sustaining burn injuries himself, the learned trial Court concluded that intention or knowledge to cause death was not proved and thus acquitted him of the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. The charge under Section 498-A of the IPC was also held not proved in absence of evidence of cruelty. However, as the accused had voluntarily caused hurt by means of fire, the Court convicted him under Section 324 of the IPC and sentenced as stated above.
Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence, the accused preferred the present appeal. The State of Maharashtra has also preferred an appeal challenging the acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 of the IPC and seeking enhancement/ confirmation of the conviction and sentence.
5. Heard learned Counsel Mr. A.R. Wagh for the accused and learned Additional Public Prosecutor Mr. S.S. Hulke for the State. Submissions of behalf of the State :
6. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that the acquittal of the accused under Sections 307 and 498-A of the IPC is unsustainable, as the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the oral and medical evidence on record. The State submitted that the testimony of the injured witness (PW 1) is consistent and trustworthy, and duly corroborated by the testimonies of PW 2 to PW 4 on material particulars. The State further 6 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt submits that the medical evidence adduced through PW 5 clearly indicates that the injuries were potentially life-threatening and that, in the absence of timely medical intervention, the victim was exposed to the risk of septicemia, neurogenic shock, and possible death, and for an offence under Section 307 of the IPC, the intention or knowledge accompanying the act is decisive and not merely the nature of injury. It is contended that the act of pouring kerosene on the victim is, by its very nature, fraught with the likelihood of causing death and reflects the knowledge attributable to the accused as to the probable consequences of such conduct. The learned trial Court, therefore, erred in holding that the ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC were not established. Hence, it is urged that the findings of acquittal by the learned trial Court warrant interference.
Submissions on behalf of the Accused :
7. Learned Counsel for the accused submits that the impugned conviction under Section 324 of the IPC is unsustainable as the prosecution has failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The case rests mainly on the evidence of the PW 1 and the medical officer. PW 1 herself admits a quarrel preceding the incident, and the defence version that she set herself on fire in anger has not been properly considered. The medical evidence shows only 20-25% superficial burns, simple in nature and not dangerous to life, which materially weakens the prosecution case.
7 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
8. It is further submitted that the accused's conduct in extinguishing the fire, taking PW 1 to the hospital, and remaining with her till arrest clearly negates any criminal intention. The accused has no criminal antecedents and had already undergone about 14 months' imprisonment. In these circumstances, and particularly when he was acquitted of the graver charges under Sections 307 and 498-A of the IPC, the sentence imposed is harsh and disproportionate. It is, therefore, prayed that the conviction be set aside or, in the alternative, the sentence be reduced to the period already undergone.
9. Before addressing the points for determination, it is necessary to briefly appreciate the prosecution evidence on record to assess whether the case has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and whether the findings of the learned trial Court are justified. The evidence of the prosecution witnesses, both ocular and medical, along with the documentary material placed on record, therefore, requires to be examined in its proper perspective.
10. PW 1-Meena Meshram, the injured witness, has deposed that the accused poured kerosene on her and set her on fire, resulting in burn injuries. Being an injured witness, her testimony carries significant evidentiary value. In cross-examination, she admitted that no prior complaints of ill-treatment were made to the relatives and that there were financial disputes. However, she denied the defence suggestion of self- immolation. Cordial relations at times were also admitted. Her evidence 8 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt establishes the occurrence of a quarrel and the incident of burns, though the aspect of intention requires assessment in light of corroborative evidence.
11. PW 2- Mahesh Choudhary, the landlord's son, is an independent witness. He deposed that he rushed to the spot and found the wife of the accused in a burnt condition. PW 1 did not personally tell him immediately that the accused set her on fire. Such allegation was made only after the arrival of the maternal aunt. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had not heard prior quarrels. His evidence mainly proves the victim's burnt condition and the immediate aftermath, while the attribution to the accused is hearsay in nature and of limited corroborative value.
12. PW 3-Indirabai Nagpure, a neighbour, supports PW 1 to the extent that PW 1 stated the accused poured kerosene and set her on fire. However, in cross-examination, she admitted that the accused was holding the victim's hands when she first saw them and that several persons gathered at the spot. She denied the suggestion of false implication. Her evidence lends contemporaneous corroboration to the victim's version, though it is based on the victim's disclosure at the spot.
13. PW 4-Sombai Gedam, maternal aunt of the victim, has deposed that PW 1 disclosed in the hospital that the accused had poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. She admittedly did not converse with PW 1 immediately at the spot. Her evidence is confined to the victim's disclosure in 9 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt the hospital and serves as subsequent corroboration of the victim's version. Thus, her testimony appears interested and requires cautious scrutiny.
14. PW 5-Dr. Sachin Dongarwar, Medical Officer, has deposed that on 17.10.2008 he examined PW 1 and found about 20-25% first-degree burn injuries on multiple parts of the body. His evidence proves the presence, extent and timing of burn injuries and lends medical corroboration to the prosecution case, but also indicates that the burns were superficial.
15. PW 7-Dr. Balmukund Paliwal, Private Practitioner, has deposed that the victim was admitted to his hospital on the date of the incident and treated till 04.11.2008, and he issued a certificate opining 55% superficial to deep burns and describing them as life-threatening without producing indoor case papers. In cross-examination, he could not specify the percentage of burns on different body parts, nor comment on whether the burns were accidental, suicidal or homicidal. His evidence supports that the victim sustained burn injuries requiring treatment, though the exact extent and nature require cautious evaluation.
Both doctors admit inability to opine whether burns were homicidal, suicidal or accidental. The medical evidence establishes burns but does not conclusively prove homicidal intent.
16. PW 6-Avinash Vyankatwar, ASI proves procedural aspects like registration of the First Information Report and recording of statements. His 10 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt evidence proves prompt recording of the victim's statement and registration of the First Information Report, lending procedural support to the prosecution, though it does not appear to establish by itself the nature of the offence.
17. Points for Determination :
Sr.No. Points Findings
(i) Whether the learned trial Court was In the affirmative.
justified in acquitting the accused of the
offence punishable under Sections 307
and 498-A of the IPC?
(ii) Whether the offence punishable under In the affirmative.
Section 324 of the IPC is made out against
the accused?
(iii) Whether the conviction and sentence Conviction is maintained.
imposed under Section 324 of the IPC call Sentence is reduced. for interference?
(iv) What Order? As per final order.
REASONS
As to Point No. (i) :
18. The conduct of the accused immediately after the incident assumes significance. The evidence of PW 1 as well as the prosecution witnesses discloses that after the victim caught fire, the accused attempted to extinguish the flames by pouring water on her person. This circumstance is not disputed by the prosecution. Though such conduct by itself cannot absolve the accused of criminal liability, it is a relevant factor while assessing the intention or knowledge with which the act was committed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently held that post-occurrence conduct of the 11 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt accused is a material circumstance in determining the nature of the offence, particularly in cases arising out of sudden domestic quarrels. The act of attempting to save the victim, therefore, assumes relevance while examining whether the accused possessed the requisite mens rea for the offence alleged.
19. Section 307 of the IPC embodies the principle that criminal liability for attempt to murder hinges not merely on the consequence of the act, but primarily on the intention or knowledge accompanying it. The provision makes punishable an act done with such intention or knowledge and in such circumstances that, if death had ensued, the act would amount to murder. Thus, the gravamen of the offence lies in the mental element of the accused, to be gathered from the totality of circumstances including the nature of the act, the weapon or means employed, the part of the body targeted, the severity of injuries, and the conduct of the accused before and after the occurrence. Section 307 of the IPC is extracted hereinbelow :
"307. Attempt to murder - Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and, if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned."
20. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is evident that the incident occurred in the course of a sudden domestic quarrel between the accused and his wife. There is no material on record to suggest any premeditation or prior intention on the part of the accused to cause the 12 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt death of PW 1. The evidence further discloses that after PW 1 caught fire, the accused himself attempted to extinguish the flames by pouring water on her person. Such conduct on the part of the accused is a relevant circumstance which militates against the inference of an intention to cause death. The medical evidence on record also does not appear to be sufficient. PW 5 assessed the burn injuries to the extent of 20 to 25 per cent and described them as superficial, whereas PW 7 subsequently opined that the injuries were 55 per cent in nature, without producing indoor case papers. Significantly, none of the medical witnesses have opined that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In such circumstances, the learned trial Court was justified in holding that the essential ingredients of Section 307 of the IPC were not established. We find no perversity or illegality in the acquittal of the accused under Section 307 of the IPC and, therefore, the State's appeal challenging the said acquittal deserves to be dismissed. Accordingly, Point No. (i) is answered in the affirmative. As to Point No. (ii) :
21. Section 324 of the IPC punishes voluntarily causing hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or by any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, poison or any corrosive substance. Thus, the essential ingredients of Section 324 IPC are: (i) that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to the victim; and (ii) that such hurt was caused by dangerous means, including fire or any substance likely to cause death.
13 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
22. In the present case, the evidence on record unequivocally establishes that the accused poured kerosene on the person of the victim and thereafter ignited it. The act of setting a person on fire squarely falls within the ambit of "fire" and "means likely to cause death" as contemplated under Section 324 of the IPC. The medical evidence on record proves that PW 1 sustained burn injuries as a direct consequence of the said act, thereby establishing the factum of hurt.
23. The consistent testimony of PW 1 that kerosene was poured on her person and set ablaze, was duly supported by her prompt disclosures to PW 2 and PW 3 and further corroborated by the medical evidence on record, clearly establishes that the burn injuries were caused by the use of fire. Even assuming that the intention to cause death has not been proved, the voluntary nature of the act stands proved, as the accused consciously used fire as a means to cause harm to PW 1.
24. For the purpose of Section 324 of the IPC, it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove either an intention to cause death or the knowledge that death was likely to ensue. What is required is proof that hurt was voluntarily caused by dangerous means, which stands sufficiently established in the present case. In the case of Kundan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1982 SC 2013, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed as under: -
"We are of the view that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and particularly in view of the fact that P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 were in the courtyard of their house when the appellant fired gun shots and he could not, therefore, 14 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt have intended to injure them, the conviction of the appellant under Section 307, I.P.C. was not justified. We think that the conviction of the appellant could be maintained only under Section 324 of the I.P.C. since P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 received simple injuries. We accordingly allow the appeal and alter the conviction of the appellant to one under Section 324 of the I.P.C. for causing simple injuries to P.W. 6 and P.W. 7 and since the appellant has already suffered imprisonment for about 16 months, we direct that the sentence imposed on the appellant be reduced to that already undergone by him and that he may be set at liberty forthwith."
25. The defence plea of self-infliction remains a bare suggestion, unsupported by any cogent evidence. Accordingly, the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to PW 1 by means of fire, attracting the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. The conviction of the accused under Section 324 of the IPC, therefore, cannot be said to be unsustainable or contrary to law. Accordingly, Point No. (ii) is answered in the affirmative. As to Point No. (iii) :
26. Considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we find no infirmity in the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC. The evidence on record clearly establishes that the accused voluntarily caused hurt to the victim by means of fire, which is one of the dangerous means expressly contemplated under Section 324 of the IPC. The finding of guilt recorded by the learned trial Court is, therefore, well-founded and does not warrant interference.
15 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
27. While Section 324 of the IPC prescribes imprisonment which may extend to three years, or fine, or both, it vests the Court with discretion to impose a sentence commensurate with the gravity of the offence and the degree of culpability of the offender. The sentencing policy under Section 324 of the IPC is thus guided by the principles of proportionality, fairness, and the overall ends of justice.
28. While affirming the conviction, this Court is conscious of the settled principle that sentencing must be proportionate and must take into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The object of sentencing is not merely to punish but also to reform. Nevertheless, the punishment must adequately reflect the gravity and consequences of the act, so that the administration of justice is neither seen as trivializing the offence nor indifferent to its impact.
29. In the present case, it is significant to note that the prosecution has failed to establish that the accused had any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. The charge under Section 307 of the IPC has rightly not been sustained. The injuries suffered by the victim, though caused by a dangerous means, have been medically opined to be simple in nature and not grievous or life-threatening. There is no material on record to indicate that the act resulted in permanent disability or prolonged hospitalization of the victim.
16 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
30. Further, the incident appears to have occurred in the heat of the moment, without premeditation, and there is nothing on record to show that the accused is a habitual offender or has any prior criminal antecedents. The incident in question occurred in the year 2008 and has its genesis in a sudden domestic dispute. It is also an admitted position that the accused has already undergone incarceration for a period of about fourteen months, which cannot be ignored while considering the quantum of sentence.
31. In these circumstances, while the act of the accused undoubtedly attracts the mischief of Section 324 of the IPC, this Court is of the considered view that the continuance of the sentence of two and a half years' rigorous imprisonment would be unduly harsh and disproportionate. The ends of justice would be adequately served by reducing the substantive sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone by the accused. Point No. (iii) is answered accordingly.
As to Point No. (iv) :
32. Such a modification of sentence would strike a balance between the gravity of the offence and the mitigating circumstances, while at the same time upholding the rule of law and the deterrent object of criminal jurisprudence. Hence, we proceed to pass the following order-
ORDER
(i) Criminal Appeal No. 301/2010 preferred by the State challenging the acquittal of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC stands dismissed.
17 apeal 12 & 301-10.odt
(ii) Criminal Appeal No. 12/2010 preferred by the accused is partly allowed.
(iii) The conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the IPC is maintained. However, the sentence of two and a half years' rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court is reduced to the period already undergone by the accused. The order as to fine, if any, shall remain undisturbed.
(iv) Bail bond of the accused shall stands cancelled.
(Nivedita P. Mehta, J.) (Anil L. Pansare, J.)
adgokar
Signed by: MR. P.M. ADGOKAR
Designation: PS To Honourable Judge
Date: 05/02/2026 16:18:33