Karnataka High Court
The Commissioner vs Hanumanthappa S/O. Ningappa Talawar @ ... on 21 July, 2025
Author: R.Devdas
Bench: R.Devdas
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB
WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W
WA No.100129 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF JULY, 2025
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
WRIT APPEAL NO.100107 OF 2025 (GM-SLUM)
C/W
WRIT APPEAL NO.100129 OF 2025 (GM-SLUM)
IN WRIT APPEAL NO.100107/2025
BETWEEN
1. THE COMMISSIONER,
KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
NO.55, ABHAYA COMPLEX, 3RD FLOOR,
RISALDAR STREET, SHESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
2. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
IN-CHARGE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
Digitally signed by KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
CHANDRASHEKAR
LAXMAN KATTIMANI 1ST SUB DIVISION (TOL NAKA),
Location: HIGH JANNAT NAGAR, DHARWAD - 04.
COURT OF
KARNATAKA ...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SHRIPRASAD J. JOSHI, ADVOCATE AND
SRI. RAVIRAJ C.PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND
HANUMANTHAPPA
S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
SINCE DECEASED BY HIS LRS:
1. CHANNABASAVVA W/O. HANAMANTHAPPA
TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
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WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W
WA No.100129 of 2025
HC-KAR
AGE. 75 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
2. YALLAMMA @ YALLAVVA
W/O. MARUTI BAIRAPPANAVAR,
AGE. 50 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
3. KASTURI @ KASTUREVVA
W/O. HANUMANTHAPPA MANNAGI,
AGE. 48 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
4. FAKKIRAMMA @ LAXMI
W/O. MANJU @ MANJUNATH HEBSUR,
AGE. 46 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
5. ANNAPURNA W/O. NINGAPPA
TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 44 YEARS, OCC. HOUSEHOLD,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
6. KUMAR S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 32 YEARS, OCC. STUDENT,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
7. RAVI S/O. NINGAPPA TALAWAR @ WALIKAR,
AGE. 28 YEARS, OCC. STUDENT,
R/O. BOMMAPUR, CHINDI ONI,
HUBBALLI TQ. HUBBALLI,
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB
WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W
WA No.100129 of 2025
HC-KAR
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 028.
8. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY/UNDER SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING SECRETARIAT,
GOVERNMENT OF KARNATAKA,
VIKAS SOUDHA, II FLOOR, BENGALURU - 560 001.
9. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT,
BOARDS AND MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
10. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDL. CHIEF SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, BOARDS AND
MUNICIPAL ADMINISTRATION,
VIKAS SOUDHA, BENGALURU - 560 001.
11. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DHARWAD, DIST. DHARWAD - 580 001.
12. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
SUB-DIVISION, DHARWAD,
DIST. DHARWAD - 580 001.
13. HUBBALLI-DHARWAD MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (HDMC),
REPRESENTED BY ITS MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER,
LAMINGTON ROAD, HUBBALLI - 580 020.
...RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, ADDL. GOVT. ADVOCATE FOR R10, R11
AND R12)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. NO.104671/2023 VIDE ORDER DATED
27.09.2024 AND ETC.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB
WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W
WA No.100129 of 2025
HC-KAR
IN WRIT APPEAL NO.100129/2025
BETWEEN
THE COMMISSIONER,
1. KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
NO.55, ABHAYA COMPLEX, 3RD FLOOR,
RISALDAR STREET, SHESHADRIPURAM,
BENGALURU - 560 020.
2. THE ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE ENGINEER,
KARNATAKA SLUM CLEARANCE BOARD,
1ST SUB DIVISION (TOL NAKA),
JANNAT NAGAR, DHARWAD - 04.
...APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. SHRIPRASAD J. JOSHI, ADVOCATE AND
SRI. RAVIRAJ C. PATIL, ADVOCATE)
AND
1. NINGAPPA S/O. MALLAPPA WALIKAR @ TALAWAR,
AGE. 65 YEARS, OCC. AGRICULTURE,
R/O. AYODHYA NAGAR, OLD HUBLI,
TQ. HUBBALLI, DIST. DHARWAD - 580 024.
2. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA,
R/BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY-2,
DEPT. OF HOUSING, M.S. BUILDING,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI, BENGALURU-01.
3. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
DHARWAD - 01.
RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, ADDL. GOVT. ADV. FOR R2 AND R3)
THIS WRIT APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF
KARNATAKA HIGH COURT ACT, 1961, PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS
APPEAL AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED
SINGLE JUDGE IN W.P. NO.101473/2023 C/W W.P. NO.104671/2023
VIDE ORDER DATED 27.09.2024 AND ETC.,.
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WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W
WA No.100129 of 2025
HC-KAR
THESE WRIT APPEALS, HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
ON 09.06.2025, COMING ON FOR 'PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT',
THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.DEVDAS
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER: THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K V ARAVIND) These writ appeals are filed by respondent No.1 under Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, being aggrieved by the common judgment dated 27.09.2024 passed in Writ Petition No.101473/2023 and Writ Petition No.104671/2023. Writ Appeal No.100129/2025 arises out of the order passed in Writ Petition No.101473/2023, whereas Writ Appeal No.100107/2025 pertains to the order passed in Writ Petition No.104671/2023.
2. These appeals are preferred by the Commissioner, Karnataka Slum Clearance Board (hereinafter referred to as 'the Board'). Learned counsels -6- NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR for the parties have advanced common arguments, and reliance is placed on common documents. Accordingly, both the appeals are heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. Brief facts:
3. The brief facts of the case are, the petitioners in Writ Petition No.101473/2023 claim to be the absolute owners of the land bearing R.S. No.37/2B of Nekar Nagar, Ayodhya Village, Hubballi. The appellants herein issued a notification under Section 3 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Slum Act'), notifying an extent of land measuring 1 acre 26 guntas and 08 annas as Slum Area. It is the grievance of the petitioners/respondents herein that they were not heard prior to the issuance of the said notification.
4. The petitioners in Writ Petition No.104671/2023 claim to be the owners of land bearing Survey No.37/3A of -7- NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR Nekar Nagar, Ayodhya Village, measuring 6 acres 18 guntas and 15 annas. The Board is stated to have developed an area measuring 26 acres 2 guntas and 14 annas, which includes the lands in question. After the development, possession certificates have been issued in favour of the beneficiaries, who have thereafter put up construction on the said land.
5. It is the common grievance of the petitioners that, pursuant to the issuance of the notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act, possession of the entire land was taken over by the Board, which thereafter undertook development and effected allotment in favour of beneficiaries. It is alleged that the Board failed to pay any compensation for the utilization of the said land. The petitioners submitted representations to the respondent- Board seeking compensation during the years 2015-16. As no action was taken by the Board, the petitioners approached this Court in Writ Petition No.103081/2016, seeking a writ of mandamus. The said writ petition was -8- NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR entertained and a direction was issued to consider the representation. However, as the directions issued therein were not complied with, the petitioners initiated contempt proceedings in C.C.C. No.100054/2018, during the course of which the Board made a statement that appropriate steps would be taken for acquisition of the land and payment of compensation. When the matter stood thus, the Board issued a preliminary notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act.
6. Respondent No.2-State issued a notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act for acquisition of the lands in question. Pursuant thereto, the Board submitted a proposal to Respondent No.2 quantifying the compensation payable to the landowners. As per the minutes of the meeting, at Annexure-H, it was recorded that the Department of Finance declined to grant financial approval and accordingly directed that the land be de- notified. The refusal of financial approval was on the ground that the proposal entailed a financial liability of -9- NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR ₹253.11 crores, which was neither concurred with the Finance Department nor made in compliance with the provisions of the Transaction of Business Rules, 1977 (for short, 'the Rules, 1977'). Acting upon the recommendation and advice of the Finance Department, the order of de- notification dated 11.04.2022, as at Annexure-K, came to be issued.
7. The petitioners challenged the de-notification before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge held that the de-notification of the land, after issuance of possession certificates and with reference to the Government Notification dated 18.10.2004, had created legal rights in favour of the beneficiaries. It was further held that unilateral de-notification, without disturbing the possession and third-party rights created through such possession certificates, was illegal. Accordingly, the notification dated 11.04.2022, the report of the Assistant Commissioner dated 23.03.2022, and the report of the Deputy Commissioner dated 25.03.2022 were quashed. A
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR writ of mandamus was also issued directing the respondents to quantify and pay compensation in terms of Section 20 of the Slum Act.
Submissions:
8. Sri Shriprasad J. Joshi, learned counsel, along with Sri Raviraj C. Patil, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board, submits that the petitioners-respondents have divested themselves of their right, title, and interest in the land by executing sale agreements along with General Power of Attorney in favour of certain individuals. These individuals, on the strength of the said sale agreements and powers of attorney, are stated to be in possession of the land much prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act. It is therefore contended that the petitioners have no subsisting legal right to seek compensation in respect of the said lands.
9. It is further submitted that the sale agreements and powers of attorney were executed after the formation
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR of the residential layout. Pursuant to the notification of the land in question, the Board has only issued 'Parichaya Patras' to the individuals, who are slum dwellers alleged to have been inducted by the petitioners themselves. It is contended that the land was notified under Section 3 of the Slum Act solely on account of its occupation by such slum dwellers. The appellants-Board further contends that there has been no acquisition of the land in question so as to attract any obligation for payment of compensation.
9.1 It is further submitted that the Board issued notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act dated 16.11.2018. Pursuant to the said notification, an enquiry was conducted by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, which revealed that the slum dwellers in possession had been inducted by the petitioners themselves through General Power of Attorney and sale agreements, much prior to the issuance of the notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act. Taking into account this factual position, the impugned notification de-
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR notifying the land came to be issued. However, the learned Single Judge, without duly considering the aforesaid aspects, proceeded to hold that the petitioners are entitled to compensation.
10. Per contra, Sri Praveen K. Uppar, learned counsel appearing for the original writ petitioners/respondent No.1, submits that the alleged transfer of property through General Power of Attorney and agreement to sell has not divested the petitioners of their right, title and interest in the land. It is contended that such transactions do not confer absolute ownership rights upon the agreement holders. The petitioners retained the right to exercise further legal remedies in respect of the lands in question. Even assuming the existence of agreements to sell and GPAs, it is submitted that, by virtue of the notification issued under Section 3 of the Slum Act and the issuance of possession certificates by the Board, third-party rights have been created which are prejudicial to the interests of the petitioners.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR
11. It is argued that once the Board has issued possession certificates, it has thereby perfected title in favour of the allottees, to the detriment of the petitioners' rights. It is further submitted that a large extent of land was developed by the Board subsequent to the notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act, and possession certificates were accordingly issued. The lands in question, belonging to the petitioners, form part of this developed area. It is lastly submitted that the Slum Act contains no provision for de-notifying lands once they have been notified.
11.1 It is submitted that the de-notification was a consequence of the Finance Department's refusal to grant financial approval, citing concerns over the financial burden. The correspondence placed on record by the Board clearly establishes that possession certificates were issued without following the due process of acquisition or payment of compensation. The act of de-notification, without cancelling the possession certificates already
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR issued by the Board, demonstrates an attempt to deprive the petitioners of compensation otherwise payable for the unauthorized utilization of their land. It is further submitted that the learned Single Judge, having rightly considered these aspects, correctly held the de-notification to be illegal and accordingly directed payment of compensation.
Issues:
12. Having considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties, the following points arise for consideration before this Court:
(i) Whether the provisions of the Slum Act empower de-notification of the land?
(ii) Whether the de-notification is justified in the facts and circumstances of the present case?
The Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973 - An overview:
13. Before adverting to the aforesaid points, it is apposite to refer to the Statement of Objects and Reasons
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR underlying the enactment. The Statement of Objects and Reasons, as published in the Karnataka Gazette (Extraordinary) dated 28.02.1973, reads as under:
"The Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1958 (Karnataka Act 8 of 1959) which was enacted for the improvement and clearance of slum areas in the State was struck down by the High Court and the appeal preferred by the State Government against the decision is pending before the Supreme Court.
Though local bodies have been effecting improvements to slums and have also cleared a few of them, the progress made so far has been very meagre and it is found that without adequate powers it has not been possible effectively to check the increase in the growth of slums and also clear the slums which are unfit for human habitation. A number of schemes for the improvement and clearance of slums are to be quickly implemented with financial assistance given by the Government of India. It has therefore become necessary to enact a law immediately to provide for the improvement and clearance of slums in the State."
14. The preamble to the Slum Act reads as under:
An Act to provide for the improvement and clearance of slums in the State of [Karnataka].
Whereas, the number of slums in certain areas in the State of [Karnataka] is increasing and is a source of danger to public health and sanitation of the said areas;
And, whereas, under the existing law it has not been possible effectively to check the increase, to eliminate congestion and to provide for basic needs such as streets, water-supply and drainage and to clear the slums which are unfit for human habitation;
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR And, whereas, to obviate this difficulty it is expedient to provide for the removal of un-hygienic and insanitary conditions prevailing in the slums, for better accommodation and improved living conditions for slum dwellers, for the promotion of public health generally and for the acquisition of land for the purpose of improving, developing or redeveloping slum areas, clearance of slums and rehabilitation of slum dwellers;
And, whereas, the Constitution of India enjoins, as a Directive Principle of State Policy that the State should improve public health;
15. This Court, in Bellam Thimmappa @ Guntige Thimmappa and Another v. Karnataka Slum Clearance Board and Others (AIR 1997 Kar 256), has succinctly summarised the object, scope, and implementation of the Act. The relevant extract reads as under:
10. xxx The Slum Areas Improvement and Clearance Act, has been enacted with a view to check increasing number of slums coming up throughout the State thereby endangering public health and sanitation and to eliminate congestion. The Act is also aimed at providing basic needs such as streets, water supply and drainage and to clear Slums which are unfit for human inhabitation. Section 3 which empowers the Government to declare an area as a slum does not in terms make any distinction between 'Slums' created with the permission of the owner of the land on which they come up and those which are created by acts of trespass by unauthorised occupants and squatters. What is important is whether an area sought to be declared as a 'Slum' satisfied the conditions prescribed by Section 3. If the answer is in the affirmative, such an area can be declared as a 'Slums' no matter the same is
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR the result of an act of trespass or has come into existence on account of the neglect or the licence of the owner. The provisions of the Act also do not forbid the 'Slum' dwellers from approaching the Government or the competent authority to make a declaration in terms of Section 3 or other provisions for that matter. Merely because the 'Slum Dwellers' had in the instant case themselves invoked the powers vested in the Government under Section 3 would not therefore invalidate a declaration made under the said provision. This is particularly so because any such determination or declaration has to be made after providing an opportunity of 'being heard' to the owners concerned who have a right of appeal against the final order that may be passed by the competent authority. The validity of any such order has therefore to be tested on its merits and not by a reference to the person at whose instance the same is passed. I therefore have no hesitation in rejecting the challenge mounted by the petitioner on that score also.
Analysis:
16. The determination of point No.(i) is contingent upon the outcome of point No.(ii). Accordingly, this Court proceeds to consider point No.(ii) first. Regarding point No.(ii):
17. Article 21 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to life, which serves as an inexhaustible source of several other fundamental rights. This Article has a wide and expansive application. The
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR judiciary has interpreted the right to life to include the right to live with human dignity. The bare necessities of life such as adequate nutrition, clothing, shelter, and a congenial, non-congested environment suitable for human habitation are inextricably intertwined with the right to life.
18. It is the bounden duty of the State to provide the aforesaid essential facilities. When the right to life is examined in conjunction with the State's fundamental obligations, it becomes evident that the enactment of the Act was intended not only to safeguard the right to life but also to enable the State to discharge its fundamental duty in that regard.
19. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Chameli Singh and Others v. State of U.P. and Others [(1996) 2 SCC 549], while analysing the scope of Article 21 of the Constitution guaranteeing the Right to Life observed as under:
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR "8. In any organised society, right to live as a human being is not ensured by meeting only the animal needs of man. It is secured only when he is assured of all facilities to develop himself and is freed from restrictions which inhibit his growth. All human rights are designed to achieve this object. Right to live guaranteed in any civilised society implies the right to food, water, decent environment, education, medical care and shelter. These are basic human rights known to any civilised society. All civil, political, social and cultural rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Convention or under the Constitution of India cannot be exercised without these basic human rights. Shelter for a human being, therefore, is not a mere protection of his life and limb. It is home where he has opportunities to grow physically, mentally, intellectually and spiritually. Right to shelter, therefore, includes adequate living space, safe and decent structure, clean and decent surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation and other civic amenities like roads etc. so as to have easy access to his daily avocation. The right to shelter, therefore, does not mean a mere right to a roof over one's head but right to all the infrastructure necessary to enable them to live and develop as a human being. Right to shelter when used as an essential requisite to the right to live should be deemed to have been guaranteed as a fundamental right. As is enjoined in the Directive Principles, the State should be deemed to be under an obligation to secure it for its citizens, of course subject to its economic budgeting. In a democratic society as a member of the organised civic community one should have permanent shelter so as to physically, mentally and intellectually equip oneself to improve his excellence as a useful citizen as enjoined in the Fundamental Duties and to be a useful citizen and equal participant in democracy.
The ultimate object of making a man equipped with a right to dignity of person and equality of status is to enable him to develop himself into a cultured being. Want of decent residence, therefore, frustrates the very object of the constitutional animation of right to equality, economic justice, fundamental right to residence, dignity of person and right to live itself. To bring the Dalits and Tribes into the mainstream of national life, providing these facilities and opportunities to them is the duty of the State
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR as fundamental to their basic human and constitutional rights."
20. In view of the exposition of law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is the fundamental duty of the State to safeguard the right to life by ensuring the provision of adequate living space, safe and decent housing structures, clean and hygienic surroundings, sufficient light, pure air and water, electricity, sanitation, and essential civic amenities such as roads and other infrastructural facilities.
21. In the facts of the present case more fully discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, it is evident that, in furtherance of the object of the Act and the constitutional mandate, a notification under Section 3 of the Act was issued, declaring the area in question as a slum. Since the slum came to exist on private land, and in order to guarantee the right to life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution, a notification under Section 17 of the Act was issued for acquisition of the said land.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR However, the acquisition proceedings were subsequently dropped on the ground of financial considerations. When it is the bounden duty of the State to provide essential civic amenities such as safe and adequate housing, sanitation, electricity, water, and clean surroundings, financial implications are inevitable and cannot be cited as a justification to abdicate such responsibility. Once it is demonstrated before the Court that the State has failed to protect the right to life, the only consideration for the Court is the enforcement and protection of that fundamental right. It hardly needs reiteration that the Constitutional Courts are the guardians of the fundamental rights of the citizens. It is wholly impermissible for the State to deny the enforcement of the right to life under Article 21 on the pretext that its protection would entail a financial burden on the State exchequer.
22. Once this Court concludes that there is a violation of the right to life attributable to the inaction or omission of the State, it is incumbent upon the State to
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR take appropriate measures to protect and restore such right, regardless of the financial implications. As noted in the minutes of the meeting referred and extracted in this judgment, the proposal for de-notification was based on untenable grounds, such as the absence of prior approval from the Finance Department before the issuance of the acquisition notification and the anticipated burden on the exchequer. This Court is unable to appreciate such excuses, particularly when a violation of the right to life under Article 21 has been established.
23. In the light of the judgments referred to above, this Court is of the considered view that, even where a slum exists on private land, irrespective of how or at whose instance such slum came into existence, directions may be issued for declaring the area as a slum and for undertaking its development, keeping in view the broader object and purpose of the Act. In such a situation, if the land is privately owned, the Court is empowered to direct
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR acquisition of the said land in furtherance of the objectives of the Act.
24. A notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act came to be issued, pursuant to which allotment letters and possession certificates were granted to the families residing on the said property. It is the contention of the appellants that the Board merely issued Parichaya Patras to the families who were already in occupation of the land in question. The Board, however, contends that the said families were inducted into possession by the petitioners themselves by executing sale agreements and General Power of Attorney (GPA) documents. The GPA was executed in favour of the Hubballi Siteless Labourers Association, pursuant to which the land was divided into plots and allotted to siteless labourers, who were put in possession and are stated to have perfected their title through such sale agreements. It is the further contention that, in view of the land having been divested by execution of GPAs and sale agreements, the petitioners
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR have lost their right to claim compensation. It is also stated that the notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act was issued without knowledge of the existence of the said sale agreements and GPA. Only upon submission of the report by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner did this aspect come to light. Thereafter, a decision was taken to de-notify the land in question.
25. The above submissions may appear persuasive at first blush. However, upon deeper scrutiny of the records placed before this Court, the underlying reason for the de-notification becomes apparent. In order to demonstrate the arbitrary exercise of power by the Board, it is necessary to set out the sequence of events in detail. The contentions urged by the Board are found to be untenable for the following reasons:
a. The sale agreements and the General Power of Attorney (GPA), at best, created only an interest in
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR the property and did not divest the petitioners of their absolute rights therein.
b. The execution of sale agreements and GPA cannot be construed as a lawful transfer of right, title and interest in the property in accordance with law.
c. The petitioners retained the right to enforce their title or any other lawful claims against the occupants of the land.
d. The contention that the Board merely issued Parichaya Patras is far from the truth. The material on record, particularly as seen from Annexure-Y, clearly establishes that possession certificates were issued by the Board in exercise of its powers under the Slum Act, subject to certain conditions. Notably, the possession certificates make no reference to the alleged sale agreements or GPA.
e. The issuance of possession certificates has conferred absolute rights in favour of the beneficiaries, and the property has thereby vested in them.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR f. Consequently, any enforceable rights that the petitioners may have had stand extinguished by virtue of the said possession certificates.
g. The possession certificates imposes condition as;
"µÀgÀvÀÄÛUÀ¼ÀÄ
1. ¤ªÉñÀ£À/ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß 15 ªÀµÀðUÀ¼À PÁ® ¥ÀgÀ¨Ás gÉ ªÀiÁqÀ¨ÁgÀzÀÄ.
2. F ¤ªÉñÀ£À/ªÀÄ£ÉAiÀÄ£ÀÄß ¸Áé¢üãÀzÁgÀgÄÀ ¸ÀéAvÀ Rað£À°è ¸ÀĹÜwAiÀÄ°èlÄÖPÉƼÀîvÀPÌÀ zÄÀ Ý.
3. ªÀÄAqÀ½AiÀÄ PÁAiÉÄÝ ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ¤AiÀĪÀÄUÀ½UÉ M¼À¥nÀ ÖzÉ."
26. The list of beneficiaries under the slum development scheme in the larger extent of 26 acres, 2 guntas, and 14 annas is detailed in Annexure-B. Annexure-B contains particulars of the beneficiaries along with the respective plot numbers, boundaries, and measurements. Notably, the measurements reflected in the sale agreements do not correspond with those mentioned in the possession certificates. The Board has made no effort to reconcile its contention that Parichaya Patras were issued to the persons found in possession of the sites by the petitioners. If such contention were to be
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR accepted, the measurement and boundaries of the sites ought to have matched, which is clearly not the case herein. Furthermore, if the Board had issued only Parichaya Patras, there would be no plausible justification for imposing a condition of non-alienation for a period of 15 years.
27. A notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act was issued in the year 1992. The petitioners subsequently submitted a representation to the Board seeking compensation for the notified land. Upon receiving no response, the petitioners approached this Court by filing Writ Petition No.103081/2016, wherein a direction was issued to the Board to consider the said representation. Alleging disobedience and non-compliance with the order passed in the writ petition, the petitioners filed a contempt petition in CCC No.100054/2018. Pursuant thereto, respondent No.2 issued an endorsement stating that acquisition proceedings would be initiated and compensation would be paid. The endorsement dated
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR 01.08.2018, in fact, records that sites had been allotted without initiating acquisition proceedings, and that steps would be taken to acquire the land and disburse compensation.
28. In compliance with the undertaking given in the contempt proceedings, a notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act was issued on 16.11.2018 for acquisition of the lands in question. In its communication dated 07.01.2021 addressed to the Secretary, Housing Department, the Board even computed the approximate amount of compensation payable. It appears that the proposal was placed before the Finance Department for financial concurrence. However, the Finance Department declined to accord concurrence, citing that the notification issued under Section 17 of the Slum Act was in violation of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Rules, 1977. Consequently, a decision was taken to de-notify the land, and the impugned de-notification was issued on 11.04.2022.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR 28.1 The relevant minute of the meeting is extracted below:
"59) ªÉÄîÌAqÀ »A§gÀºÀzÀ£éÀAiÀÄ DyðPÀ E¯ÁSÉ ¸ÀASÉå:DE 631 ªÉZÀÑ-9/2021, ¢£ÁAPÀ:12.01.2022 gÀ°è PɼÀPÀAqÀAvÉ »A§gÀºÀªÀ£ÄÀ ß ¤ÃqÀ¯ÁVzÉ.
"The proposal has been examined.
Administrative Department is directed to:-
1)The de-notify forthwith, all the cases for which preliminary or final notification has been issued under Section 17 of Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1973.
2)To submit detailed report on why financial liability Rs.253.11 crores was created without taking Finance Department concurrence, in violation of Transaction of Business Rules, 1977."
29. The deviation from the acquisition process is stated to be on account of the execution of sale agreements and General Power of Attorney (GPA) documents by the petitioners. Noticeably, the proceedings commenced with representations and a writ petition seeking a writ of mandamus in the year 2016. Until the
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR Finance Department declined to accord financial concurrence, the Board never raised the issue of sale agreements or GPA. It is only after the refusal of financial concurrence that the question of sale agreements was brought forth. The belated reference to the sale agreements and GPA in the impugned order raises serious doubts as to its genuineness. The veracity of this ground can be tested by examining the correspondence exchanged between the Board and the Government prior to the refusal of financial concurrence.
30. It is both interesting and relevant to refer to the communication addressed by the Board to the Secretary, Housing Department, dated 12.04.2022. In this communication, after adverting to the reports submitted by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner, reference is made to the issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act. It is recorded therein that, due to the inaction of the landowners, migrant labourers came to occupy the lands
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR in question and began residing there. Since the persons residing on the said land were unauthorized occupants belonging to marginalized sections of society, and in order to provide them with basic civic amenities such as drinking water, sanitation, hygiene and reasonable accommodation, a notification under Section 3 of the Slum Act was issued. The communication further states that, once a notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act is issued, there is no enabling provision under the Act to de-notify the same. It is also recorded that, in the event of de-notification, the Board would lose its rights over the land developed by it, and consequently, the slum dwellers would be rendered unauthorized occupants, liable to be evicted.
31. A combined reading of the aforesaid communication and the resolution passed pursuant to the decision of the Finance Department makes it explicitly clear that the Slum Act contains no provision for de- notification of land once a notification under Section 17 has been issued. Furthermore, the decision to de-notify
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR the land from acquisition appears to have been taken solely to avoid the financial burden of compensation, while simultaneously continuing the third-party interests already created through the issuance of possession certificates.
32. The Board undertook two distinct actions:
firstly, the issuance of the notification in respect of the land, and secondly, the issuance of possession certificates.
While the effect of the notification can be nullified by de-
notification, the third-party interests created through the possession certificates continue to subsist. The de-
notification, in isolation, does not ipso facto annul the rights conferred through the possession certificates. As a consequence, the Board has failed entirely to cancel the possession certificates or to restore the status of possession to what it was prior to their issuance. This omission renders the de-notification process incomplete and ineffective in law.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR
33. The manner in which the de-notification has been effected is contrary to the object and spirit of welfare legislation, and is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. The petitioners claim to possess right, title and interest in the property in question. It is a well-settled principle that no person can be deprived of their property save by authority of law. Without acquisition in accordance with law and without payment of compensation, the State or its instrumentalities cannot divest or extinguish the rights vested in the petitioners.
34. Even if it is assumed that the petitioners had transferred certain rights in the land through the execution of sale agreements, such transfer did not result in complete divestment of their ownership, as the sale agreements do not constitute a transfer of title in the manner recognized by law. The petitioners continued to retain certain rights from the bundle of ownership rights, which could have been enforced, but for the issuance of possession certificates. However, with the creation of title
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR in favour of the slum dwellers through the possession certificates issued by the Board, whatever residual rights the petitioners may have had stood effectively extinguished, thereby rendering them incapable of enforcement.
35. For the reasons stated hereinabove, it is evident that the decision to de-notify the land is legally impermissible. The mere existence of a financial burden cannot constitute a valid ground for such de-notification. Any such decision would directly defeat the object and purpose of the Act and would amount to a breach of the fundamental obligation of the State to safeguard the right to life as enshrined under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
36. Further, this Court is inclined to direct the appellant-Slum Board to conclude the acquisition proceedings initiated pursuant to the issuance of the notification under Section 17 of the Act and to complete
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR the development of the slum by providing the civic amenities referred to in this judgment. While issuing such directions, it is equally imperative to safeguard the rights of the landowner in terms of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. It is a well-settled position of law that no person's property can be occupied or utilised without the payment of just compensation. In this view of the matter, the private respondent is entitled to compensation for the utilisation of his land.
37. If the Board was genuinely not in need of the lands in question, it ought to have restored possession to the petitioners in the manner in which it existed prior to the issuance of the notification and the subsequent possession certificates.
38. In the light of the foregoing discussion, the de- notification of the land under the impugned order dated 11.04.2022 is held to be illegal, arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR Regarding point No.(i):
39. The correspondence of the Board with the Secretary, Housing Department, dated 12.04.2022, and produced at Annexure-J, clearly acknowledges that there is no provision under the Slum Act for de-notification. The Board has sought to invoke Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899 to justify the de-notification.
However, a comparative reading of the scheme of acquisition under the Slum Act with other enactments that provide for acquisition makes it evident that, wherever the legislature intended to permit de-notification, a specific enabling provision has been incorporated into the statute. In the absence of any such enabling provision under the Slum Act, the concession made by the Board that de- notification is not contemplated under the Act requires no further elaboration.
40. The learned Single Judge, after considering all the aforementioned factual aspects, has rightly held that
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR the notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act was issued proposing to acquire the lands in question, and in view of the submissions made, the contempt proceedings were accordingly dropped. Thereafter, a preliminary notification under Section 17 of the Slum Act came to be issued. Upon a combined reading of Sections 17 and 18 of the Slum Act, it was held that the land vests absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances, from the date of issuance of the notification under Section 17. The learned Single Judge further held that the possession certificates issued by the Board pursuant to the Government notification created rights in favour of the beneficiaries. It is further held that once the land vests with the Government under Section 17(1) of the Slum Act, the same cannot be de-notified by invoking Section 21 of the Karnataka General Clauses Act, 1899. In support of this proposition, the learned Single Judge placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR Lt. Governor of H.P. vs. Avinash Sharma [(1970) 2 SCC 149].
41. The learned Single Judge also held that mere execution of a sale agreement and General Power of Attorney does not convey title unless a registered sale deed is executed in accordance with law. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Suraj Lamp and Industries Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Haryana and Another [(2012) 1 SCC 656]. It was further held that the possession certificates expressly declare that the occupants are in possession pursuant to the Government notification dated 18.10.2024. Once such possession is reconfirmed and rights are created, de-notification cannot be effected without first addressing the legal consequences of the rights so created under the possession certificates.
42. For the aforesaid reasons and upon careful consideration of the findings recorded by the learned
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR Single Judge in quashing the impugned de-notification and directing payment of compensation, this Court is of the considered view that the de-notification is illegal and unjustifiable. The findings recorded by the learned Single Judge do not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference by this Court.
43. Accordingly, appeals are dismissed.
44. The learned Single Judge, while issuing a direction to the authorities to quantify and pay compensation under Section 20 of the Karnataka Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1973, has not prescribed any specific time frame for compliance. This Court deems it appropriate to direct the concerned authorities to complete the process of quantification and payment of compensation within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. It is needless to
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NC: 2025:KHC-D:8995-DB WA No. 100107 of 2025 C/W WA No.100129 of 2025 HC-KAR observe the respondent-land owners shall be entitled to interest on the compensation in accordance with law.
Sd/-
(R.DEVDAS) JUDGE Sd/-
(K V ARAVIND) JUDGE DDU CT: UMD List No.: 1 Sl No.: 3