Karnataka High Court
Guramma D/O Late Kemmanni Maraiah vs Smt. Nagamma Nagalapura W/O Basaiah D/O ... on 15 December, 2025
Author: M.Nagaprasanna
Bench: M.Nagaprasanna
1
Reserved on : 30.10.2025
Pronounced on : 15.12.2025 R
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 15TH DAY OF DECEMBER, 2025
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA
WRIT PETITION No.101962 OF 2025 (GM-RES)
BETWEEN:
1. GURAMMA
D/O LATE KEMMANNI MARAIAH
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
2. SRI RAMAPPA
S/O LATE KEMMANNI MARAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
3. SRI MARENNA
S/O LATE KEMMANNI MARAIAH
AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
4. SMT. GOURAMMA NAYAKARA
W/O NAVEEN
D/O LATE KEMMANNI MARAIAH
AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
5. SRI THIPPESWAMY
S/O LATE KEMMANNI MARAIAH
2
AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
ALL ARE RESIDENTS OF
THIMMANATHKERE
WARD NO 14
KAMALAPUR - 583 221
HOSPETE TALUK
VIJAYANAGAR DISTRICT.
... PETITIONERS
(BY SMT. VIDYAVATI M.KOTTURSHETTAR, ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. SMT. NAGAMMA NAGALAPURA
W/O BASAIAH
D/O KARAKANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
R/O WARD NO.19
CHAWADIKERI
KAMALAPU - 583 221
HOSPETE TALUK
VIJAYANAGAR DISTRICT.
2. SRI DODDA HANUMANTHAPPA
S/O LATE KARAKANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 71 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE
3. SRI SIDDAPPA
S/O LATE KARAKANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS
OCC: WORKING IN ARCHEOLOGICAL DEPARTMENT
4. SRI SANNA HANUMANTHAPPA
S/O LATE KARAKANTAPPA
3
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
OCC: WORKING IN HAMPI UNIVERSITY
5. SRI DODDA BHARAMAIAH
S/O LATE KARAKANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS
OCC: SECURITY GUARD.
6. SRI SANNA BHARAMAIAH
S/O LATE KARAKANTAPPA
AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS
OCC: AGRICULTURE/SECURITY GUARD.
RESPONDENT NO.2 TO 6 ARE
R/O THIMMANATHKERE, KAMALAPUR
HOSPETE TALUK
VIJAYANAGAR DISTRICT - 583 221.
... RESPONDENTS
(BY SMT. RANJITA G.ALAGAWADI, ADVOCATE FOR R1, R2 AND
R4 TO R6)
THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND
227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT
OF CERTIORARI OR SUCH OTHER APPROPRIATE WRIT OR ORDER
OR DIRECTION, QUASHING THE DECREE DATED 08/07/2023
PASSED BY THE II ADDL. CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC, HOSPETE
DURING LOK -ADALATH) IN O.S. NO. 165/2023 VIDE ANNEXURE-A.
THIS WRIT PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED
FOR ORDERS ON 30.10.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT
THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-
4
CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA
CAV ORDER
The petitioners are before this Court calling in question a
decree dated 08.07.2023, passed by the II Additional Civil Judge
and JMFC, Hospete, in O.S.No.165 of 2023, drawn on the
compromise petition entered into between the respondents, before
the Lok Adalat and have also sought certain consequential reliefs.
2. Heard Sri Smt. Vidyavati M. Kotturshettar, learned counsel
for the petitioners and Smt. Ranjita G. Alagawadi, learned counsel
for respondent Nos.1, 2, 4 to 6.
3. Facts adumbrated, are as follows:
The petitioners and the respondents are said to be the
members of the same family belonging to different branches of the
children of one Khemmani Hanumanthappa who is the original
owner of the suit schedule properties. A suit in O.S.No.165 of 2023
is instituted by the respondents seeking a decree of partition and
separate possession of the suit properties. The said suit comes to
be decreed on account of a compromise entered into between the
5
respondents in terms of an order dated 08.07.2023. Aggrieved by
the said decree the petitioners file a regular appeal in R.A.No.41 of
2024 challenging the decree of compromise passed by the Lok
Adalat in O.S.No.165 of 2023. The petitioners then realize that a
regular appeal was not maintainable before the concerned Court
and therefore, they withdraw the same. After the withdrawal of the
said regular appeal, the present petition is preferred on 14.03.2025
challenging the compromise decree.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
vehemently contend that though the petitioners were necessary
parties to the suit in O.S.No.165 of 2023, they were not impleaded
as the parties in the said proceedings. The genealogical tree
produced before the concerned Court depicting it to be the family
was incomplete and erroneous. The plaintiff and the defendants
have in collusion, entered into a compromise with an ulterior
motive, without any share to the petitioners of their legitimate
rights in the suit schedule properties. Learned counsel submits that
the suit schedule properties were shared by all the branches of
Kemmanni @ Thimmanathkeri Hanumanthappa, in terms of the
6
partition deed dated 26.03.1968. In terms of the compromise
decree, the branch of Poojaraiah is getting more share than in
terms of the partition deed of the year 1968. On all these grounds,
learned counsel would submit that the rights of these petitioners
cannot be taken away by the compromise entered into between the
plaintiff and the defendants without making the petitioners as
parties. She would submit that the compromise decree is obtained
by fraud and only remedy to challenge the decree drawn before the
Lok Adalat is the present petition. Learned counsel would seek to
place reliance upon plethora of judgments all of which would bear
consideration in the course of the order, qua their relevance.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
would vehemently refute the submissions contending that the
petitioners admittedly were not parties to the proceedings. If the
petitioners are not parties to the proceedings, the petitioners
cannot file the subject petition and the writ petition is not
maintainable by third parties, who were not parties to the
compromise. Learned counsel would submit the aforesaid ground
would suffice for this Court not to entertain the petition. Learned
7
counsel would seek to place reliance upon several judgments to
buttress her submission, that a third party cannot maintain a writ
petition against a compromise decree.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
material on record.
7. In furtherance whereof, the following issues would emerge
for consideration:
(1) Whether the drawing up of a decree on the
award of the Lok Adalat, can be challenged in a
writ petition ?
(2) Whether a writ petition filed by a third party,
challenging the award of the Lok Adalat is
maintainable and entertainable ?
(3) Whether the decree passed on the award of the
Lok Adalat requires to be recalled in the facts
and circumstances of the case ?
8
8. Before going into above-mentioned issues certain
important facts are required to be noticed. It is not in dispute that
the suit is one for partition and separate possession. The suit in
O.S.No.165 of 2023 is filed seeking partition and separate
possession and in support of the said suit, a genealogical tree is
placed, which depicts as follows:
9
"Schedule "B"
Landed properties situated within the Registration District
of Vijayanagara, within the Sub Registration district of
Hosapete, situated at Kamalapura, Hosapete taluka,
Vijayanagara district, bearing:
Sl.No. Survey No. Extent Taram
A.C. Rs.P.
1 1123/D 7-01 acres 3-16
2 1123/B 8-80 acres
Common Boundaries for both lands:
East.. Land of Jangala Jogaiah,
West.. Land of Vetule Poojari,
North.. Land of Obaiah,
South.. Land of Kokka Maraiah."
After filing of the suit, which comes about on 19.04.2023, a
compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC is filed
before the concerned Court on 08.07.2023. The compromise
petition is as follows:
10
"COMPROMISE PETITION FILED UNDER ORDER
XXIII, RULE 3 OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, FILED
ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF AND DFENDANTS
At the instance of the Elders and well wishers of both the
parties and also agreement of both parties, the parties have
settled the matter as under-
1. Plaintiff have filed the above suit for partition and
allotment of 1/6th legitimate share of the plaintiff in the suit 'B'
Schedule properties with metes and bounds as absolute owner,
(b) award the costs of the Suit - and to pass such other Order or
Orders as the Honourable Court deems fit and proper in the
circumstances of the case.
2. The Plaintiffs and Defendants herein have agreed and
undertake that they have equal share in the suit Schedule "B"
properties and also described hereunder in the schedule.
3. Accordingly the Plaintiff is entitled for 1/6th share in the
suit "B" schedule properties which comes to 2.50 Acres situated
at Kamalapura. So too the Defendants No.1 to 5 together are
entitled for 1/6th share in the suit "B" schedule properties which
approximately comes to 2.50 Acres.
4. The Defendant No.1 to 5 are ready to pay the court fee
of Rs.200/- each and allot the 1/6th share of Plaint B Schedule
property i.e. Defendant No.1 Dodda Hanumanthappa S/o
Kakanteppa is entitled to 2.50 Acres, the Defendant No.2
Siddappa S/o Kakanteppa is entitled to 3.31 Acres, the
Defendant No.3 Sanna Hanumanthappa S/o Kakanteppa is
entitled to 2.50 Acres, the Defendant No.4 Dodda Bharmaiah is
entitled to 2.50 Acres and the Defendant No.5 Sanna Bharmaiah
S/o Kankanteppa is entitled to 2.50 Acres.
5. Further the Plaintiff and the Defendants are undertake
that they are entitled to enjoy the respective portion belongs to
their respective shares with right, title and interest and
undertake not to interfere with the rights of other party.
6. Both the parties are satisfied with the above terms and
conditions and agree that Compromise decree may be passed
accordingly.
11
7. Hence, it is prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be
pleased to pass a compromise decree accordingly and pass
separate decree on separate Bond papers given by the Plaintiff
and Defendants in the above case, in the interest of justice
Schedule
Landed properties situated within the Registration District
of Vijayanagara, within the Sub Registration District of
Hosapete, situated at Kamalapura, Hosapete Taluk,
Vijayanagara District, bearing:
Sl.No. Survey No. Extent Taram
A.C. Rs.Ps.
1 1123/D 7-01 acres 3-16
2 1123/B 8-80 acres 3-96
Common boundaries for both the lands
East - Land of Jangala Jogaiah,
West - Land of Vetule Poojari,
North - Land of Obaiah,
South - Land of Kokka Maraiah
Boundaries of land fallen to the 1/6th share of Plaintiff i.e. 2.50
Acres
East - Jangal Jogaiah land,
West - Land of Siddappa,
North - Land of Obaiah
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of Defendant No.2
i.e.3.31 Acres
East - Land of Nagamma,
West - Land of Sanna Hanumanthappa,
North - Land of Obaiah,
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
12
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of Defendant No.3 i.e.
2.50 Acres
East - Land of Siddappa
West - Land of Dodda Bharmaiah
North - Land of Obaiahi
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of Defendant No.4 i.e.
2.50 Acres
East - Land of Sanna Hanumanthappa
West - Land of Sanna Bharmaiah
North - Land of Obaiah,
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of Defendant No.5 i,e.
2.50 Acres
East - Land of Dodda Bharmaiah,
West - Land of Dodda Hanumanthappa
North - Land of Obaiah,
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of Defendant No.1 i.e.
2.50 Acres
East - Land of Dodda Bharmaiah,
West - Land of Vetule Poojari
North - Land of Obaiah,
South - Land of Kukkala Maraiah,
Advocate for Plaintiff.
Sd/-
Advocate for Defendants
13
Hosapete
Date:8.07.2023."
On the same day, the matter is referred to the Lok Adalat.
The Lok Adalat by the impugned order accepts the compromise and
directs drawing up of a decree. The award of the Lok Adalat is as
follows:
"BEFORE LOK-ADALATH
TALUK LEGAL SERVICE COMMITTEE, AT: HOSAPETE
AND
IN THE COURT OF THE
II ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE & JMFC, HOSAPETE.
Present: Sri. G. SANJEEV KUMAR, M.BA.LL.B.,
II Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC, Hosapete.
DATED THIS THE 08th DAY OF JULY 2023
O.8. No. 165/2023
PLAINTIFF: Nagamma Nagalapur W/o. Basaiah, D/o. Late
Karkanteppa, aged about 53 years, Occ.
Agriculturist, R/o. 19th Ward, Chowdikeri,
Kamalapura, Hosapete Taluk, Vijayanagar
District.
14
--V/s--
DEFENDANTS: 1. Dodda Hanumanthappa S/o.Late
Karkanteppa, aged about 69 years,
2. Siddappa S/o. Late Karkanteppa, aged
about 56 years, Occ. Employee in
Archaeological Department
3. Sanna Hanumanthappa S/o. Late
Karkanteppa, aged about 47 years, Occ.
Working in Hampi University
4. Dodda Bharamaiah S/o. Late
Karkanteppa, aged about 44 years, Occ.
Agriculturist and Security Guard in Hotel
Orange Count, Kamalapura
5. Sanna Bharamaiah S/o. Late
Karkanteppa, aged about 44 years, Occ.
Agriculturist and Security Guard in Hotel
Orange Count, Kamalapura.
All are Occ. Agriculturist, R/o.
Thimmanathakere, Kamalapura,
Hosapete Taluk, Vijayanagar District.
SUIT CLAIM: This is a suit for PARTITION and prayed that
Hono'ble court may be pleased to pass a decree in favour of the
plaintiff and as against the defendants.
a) For partition and allotment of 1/6th legitimate share of the
plaintiff in the suit "B" Schedule properties with metes and
bounds as absolute owner
b) award the costs of the Suit
and
c) to pass such other order or orders as the honorable court
deems fit and proper in the circumstances of the case.
15
Nature of suit- PARTITION SUIT
Cause of action arose on- 1967 and still continuing within
the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble
Court.
Suit was filed on- 19-04-2023
Suit valued at- Rs.2,50,000/-
Court fee paid- Rs. 200/-
:DECREE:
This suit coming on this day before me for final disposal
in the presence of Smt. V.R.Sharanamma, Advocate for the
Plaintiff and Sri. S. Lokesh Babu Advocate for the Defendant
No.1 to 5. The matter placed before Lok-Adalath. Plaintiff and
defendants and their counsels are present before Lok-Adalth.
Conciliation effected. After conciliation the counsels have filed
compromise petition U/o. XXIII, Rule 3 of CPC. reporting
settlement and same is allowed consequently the suit decreed in
terms of compromise as follows.
This court doth ordered and decreed that, the plaintiff and
defendant herein have agreed and undertake that they have
equal share in the suit schedule "B" properties and also
described here under in the schedule.
This court doth ordered and decreed that, accordingly the
Plaintiff is entitled for 1/6th share in the suit "B" schedule
properties which comes to 2.50 Acres situated at Kamalapura.
So too the Defendants No.1 to 5 together are entitled for 1/6th
share in the suit "B" schedule properties which approximately
comes to 2.50 acres.
This court doth ordered and decreed that, the
defendant No.1 to 5 are ready to pay the court fee of
Rs.200/- each and allot the 1/6th share of Plaint B
Schedule property i.e. Defendant No.1 Dodda
Hanumanthappa S/o. Kakanteppa is entitled to 2.50
acres, the Defendant No.2 Siddappa S/o. Kakanteppa is
entitled to 3.31 Acres, the Defendant No.3 Sanna
Hanumanthappa S/o. Kakanteppa is entitled to 2.50
Acres, the Defendant No.4 Dodda Bharmaiah is entitled to
16
2.50 Acres and the Defendant No.5 Sanna Bharmaiah
Kankanteppa is entitled to 2.50 Асrеs.
This court doth ordered and decreed that, further Plaintiff
and defendants are undertake that they are entitled to enjoy the
respective portion belongs to their respective shares with right,
title and interest and undertake not to interfere with the rights
of other party.
This court doth ordered and decreed that, both the
parties are satisfied with the above terms and conditions
and agree that Compromise decree.
This court doth ordered and decreed that,
boundaries of land fallen to the 1/6th share of Plaintiff
i.e., 2.50 Acres
East : Jangal Jogaiah land
West : Land of Siddappa
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of
Defendant No.2 i.e., 3.31 Acres
East : Land of Nagamma
West : Land of Sanna Hanumanthappa
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of
Defendant No.3 i.e., 2.50 Acres
East : Land of Siddappa
West : Land of Dodda Bharmaiah
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of
Defendant No.4 i.e., 2.50 Acres
East : Land of Sanna Hanumanthappa
West : Land of Sanna Bharmaiah
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North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of
Defendant No.5 i.e., 2.50 Acres
East : Land of Dodda Bharmaiah
West : Land of Dodda Hanumanthappa
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Boundaries of the land fallen to the share of
Defendant No.1 i.e., 2.50 Acres
East : Land of Dodda Bharmaiah
West : Land of Vetule Poojari
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
It is further ordered and decreed that, this
compromise petition may be treated as final decree.
Given under my hand and the seal of this Court on the
08th Day of July 2023.
Sd/-
14/9
II Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC,
Hosapete.
B SCHEDULE
Landed properties situated within the Registration District
of Vijayanagara, within the Sub-Registration District of
Hosapete, situated at Kamalapura, Hosapete taluka, Vijayanagar
district, bearing
Sl.No. Survey No. Extent A.C. Taram Rs.P.
1. 1123/D 7-01 acres 3-16
2. 1123/B 8-80 acres
Common boundaries for both lands
18
East : Land of Jangala Jogaiah
West : Land of Vetule Poojari
North : Land of Obaiah
South : Land of Kukkala Maraiah
Sd/-
14/9
II Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC,
Hosapete.
MEMORANDUM OF COST
Particulars Plaintiff Defendant No.1 to 5
Court fee on Plaint 200.00 1.00
Court fee on Power 1.00
Court fee on Process 24.00 FCMNF
IA's Fee 00.00
Advocates fee FCMNF
Total: 225.00 1.00
Sd/-
14/9
II Addl. Civil Judge & JMFC,
Hosapete."
(Emphasis added)
One factor becomes crystal clear is, that the suit is instituted
on the basis of a genealogical tree seeking partition and separate
possession. The suit ends in a compromise not before the
concerned Court but before the Lok Adalat. The admitted fact that
the suit is decreed on account of compromise entered into between
19
the parties before the Lok Adalat is a matter of record. In that
light, whether the writ petition against an award or decree drawn
on the strength of compromise before the Lok Adalat is
maintainable or entertainable is the question.
ISSUE NO.1:
Whether the drawing up of a decree on the award of the
Lok Adalat, can be challenged in a writ petition?
9. The Apex Court has time and again held that an award of
the Lok Adalat can only be challenged by filing a writ petition under
Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India on limited grounds of
fraud.
9.1 In the case of STATE OF PUNJAB v. JALOUR SINGH1,
the Apex Court has held as follows:
".... .... ....
"7. A reference to relevant provisions will be of some
assistance, before examination of the issues involved. Section
19 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 ("the LSA Act",
for short) provides for organisation of the Lok Adalats. Section
1
(2008) 2 SCC 660
20
19(5)(i) of the LSA Act provides that a Lok Adalat shall have
jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or
settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any
case pending before any court for which the Lok Adalat is
organised. Section 20 relates to cognizance of cases by the Lok
Adalats. Sub-section (1) refers to the Lok Adalats taking
cognizance of cases referred to by courts and sub-section (2)
refers to the Lok Adalats taking cognizance of matters at pre-
litigation stage. The relevant portions of other sub-sections of
Section 20, relating to cases referred by courts, are extracted
below:
"20. (3) Where any case is referred to a Lok
Adalat under sub-section (1) ... the Lok Adalat shall
proceed to dispose of the case ... and arrive at a
compromise or settlement between the parties.
(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any
reference before it under this Act, act with utmost
expedition to arrive at a compromise or settlement
between the parties and shall be guided by the
principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legal
principles.
(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat
on the ground that no compromise or settlement could
be arrived at between the parties, the record of the
case shall be returned by it to the court, from which
the reference has been received under sub-section (1)
for disposal in accordance with law.
***
(7) Where the record of the case is returned
under sub-section (5) to the court, such court shall
proceed to deal with such case from the stage which
was reached before such reference under sub-section
(1)."
(emphasis supplied)
8. It is evident from the said provisions that the Lok
Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their
functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat
21
determines a reference on the basis of a compromise or
settlement between the parties at its instance, and puts
its seal of confirmation by making an award in terms of
the compromise or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is not
able to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no award is made
and the case record is returned to the court from which the
reference was received, for disposal in accordance with law. No
Lok Adalat has the power to "hear" parties to adjudicate
cases as a court does. It discusses the subject-matter with
the parties and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In
their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by the
principles of justice, equity and fair play. When the LSA Act
refers to "determination" by the Lok Adalat and "award" by the
Lok Adalat, the said Act does not contemplate nor require an
adjudicatory judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory
determination based on a compromise or settlement, arrived at
by the parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok
Adalat. The "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any
independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision-
making process. The making of the award is merely an
administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or
compromise agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat,
in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal
of the Lok Adalat.
.... .... ....
12. It is true that where an award is made by the
Lok Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between
the parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed
to the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and
binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes
executable as if it is a decree of a civil court, and no
appeal lies against it to any court. If any party wants to
challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be
done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or
Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited
grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is
signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does
not refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to
either make payment if it agrees to the order, or
approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on merits,
22
if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok Adalat. The
question of challenging such an order in a petition under
Article 227 does not arise. As already noticed, in such a
situation, the High Court ought to have heard and
disposed of the appeal on merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
9.2 The Apex Court following JALOUR SINGH supra, in the
case of BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS V. KOTHAKAPU
MUTHYAM REDDY2, has held as follows:
"10. The defendants, on being served with the notice of
the suit, filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the
Code") and prayed for rejection of the plaint. According to the
defendants, since the suit seeks to challenge the award of Lok
Adalat, it is not maintainable being barred by virtue of rigour
contained in Order 7 Rule 11(d) of the Code. It was
contended that the remedy of the plaintiff was in filing
writ petition under Article 226 or/and Article 227 of the
Constitution of India to challenge the award dated 22-8-
2007 as held by this Court in State of Punjab v. Jalour
Singh [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC
660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] .
11. The trial court, by order dated 24-7-2013 allowed
the application filed by the defendants and rejected the
plaint by invoking powers under clause (d) of Rule 11.
It was held that the filing of the civil suit to challenge
2
(2018) 13 SCC 480
23
the award of Lok Adalat is impliedly barred and the
remedy of the plaintiffs is to challenge the award by
filing writ petition under Articles 226 or/and 227 of the
Constitution in the High Court as held by this Court
in State of Punjab [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh,
(2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1
SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] .
.... .... ....
22. The question arose before this Court (three-
Judge Bench) in State of Punjab [State of
Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC
(Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S)
535] as to what is the remedy available to the person
aggrieved of the award passed by the Lok Adalat under
Section 20 of the Act. In that case, the award was
passed by the Lok Adalat which had resulted in disposal
of the appeal pending before the High Court relating to
a claim case arising out of the Motor Vehicles Act. One
party to the appeal felt aggrieved of the award and,
therefore, questioned its legality and correctness by
filing a writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India. The High Court dismissed the writ
petition holding it to be not maintainable. The aggrieved
party, therefore, filed an appeal by way of special leave
before this Court. This Court, after examining the
scheme of the Act allowed the appeal and set aside the
order of the High Court. This Court held that the High
Court was not right in dismissing the writ petition as not
maintainable. It was held that the only remedy available
with the aggrieved person was to challenge the award
of the Lok Adalat by filing a writ petition under Article
226 or/and Article 227 of the Constitution of India in
the High Court and that too on very limited grounds. The
case was accordingly remanded to the High Court for
deciding the writ petition filed by the aggrieved person
on its merits in accordance with law.
24
23. This is what their Lordships held in para 12 : (Jalour
Singh case [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660
: (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 : (2008) 1
SCC (L&S) 535] , SCC p. 666, para 12)
"12. It is true that where an award is made by the Lok
Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the
parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to the
award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and binding on
the parties to the settlement and becomes executable as if
it is a decree of a civil court, and no appeal lies against it to
any court. If any party wants to challenge such an
award based on settlement, it can be done only by
filing a petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227
of the Constitution, that too on very limited grounds.
But where no compromise or settlement is signed by
the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat does not
refer to any settlement, but directs the respondent to
either make payment if it agrees to the order, or
approach the High Court for disposal of appeal on
merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the
Lok Adalat. The question of challenging such an order
in a petition under Article 227 does not arise. As
already noticed, in such a situation, the High Court
ought to have heard and disposed of the appeal on
merits."
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in JALOUR
SINGH and BHARGAVI CONSTRUCTIONS (supra), and the facts
obtaining in the case at hand, the decree so drawn on the basis of
25
the award of the Lok Adalat can only be challenged by filing a writ
petition under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India on the
grounds set out by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted two
judgments. The issue is answered accordingly.
ISSUE NO.2:
Whether a writ petition filed by a third party
challenging the award of the Lok Adalat is maintainable and
entertainable ?
10. To consider the said issue, it is necessary to consider the
facts that has lead the petitioners before this Court, though at the
periphery. It is not in dispute that the suit is for partition and
separate possession, in which the distinction of a plaintiff and
defendant is illusory, as all of them are entitled to a share in the
property. The contention of the petitioners is that, the genealogical
tree produced before the concerned Court is said to be in error, as
it has left out the petitioners from the family. The genealogical tree
upon which the present petition is preferred is as follows:
26
On the strength of the said genealogical tree, the petitioners
have built their submissions. The submission is, tracing the history
to 17.02.1968, when the partition deed was entered into by the
family. The partition recognized certain rights of the petitioners
and certain shares in the suit properties. The submission now is
27
that, the share that is allotted to the petitioners in the partition
deed in the year 1968 is further partitioned without providing the
respective shares to these petitioners. Further, the petitioners'
father, way back in the year 1970 had acquired by purchasing the
properties from Bharamaiah, who is the only son of Lakshmaiah,
who inherited his share of the properties in the partition deed dated
17.02.1968. Therefore, the petitioners ought to have been made as
parties - defendants before the concerned Court, especially when
the petitioners have a higher share in the suit properties. The
respondents instead, without impleading the petitioners in the suit
for partition, have fraudulently entered into a compromise decree
on the entirety of the suit properties, without having any right to
the same. Therefore, the issue now would be, whether a person
who is not arrayed as a party to the suit can challenge the decree
or award of compromise passed by the Lok Adalat, arising from the
said suit.
11. Jurisprudence is replete as to whether a person who is not
a party / third party can file a writ petition challenging an award of
28
the Lok Adalat. I deem it appropriate to quote a few judgments on
this issue.
11.1. A Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh,
in the case of BATCHU SUBBA LAKSHMI V. SANNIDHI
SRINIVASULU3, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok
Adalat Award
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third party
cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even if such
award causes prejudice. The remedy of such party would
be to institute a separate suit or proceeding for necessary
redressal and seek appropriate decree of declaration by
filing a suit within the period of limitation prescribed
under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act,
1963, any person entitled to legal character or any right
as to any property, may file a suit for declaration. Under
this provision, any person can even institute a suit for
declaration that the decree passed by Civil Court in an
earlier suit is not binding on him. When a civil Court can
even declare that an earlier decree of the Court is not
binding on the party before it, we do not see any
objection for a third party to institute a suit in a civil
Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok Adalat
is not binding on him/her subject to the law of limitation.
We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
3
2009 SCC OnLine AP 795
29
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution.
What are grounds of challenge
9. Insofar as legal position that the Lok Adalat cannot
pass award unless and until there is a compromise and
settlement under Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act between the
parties, is well settled. In State of Punjab v. Ganpat Raj, (2006)
8 SCC 364, respondent moved Punjab and Haryana High Court
by filing writ petition seeking writ of Mandamus to the State to
pay interest at 18% per annum on the delayed payment of
pension arrears and other retiral benefits. The case was sent to
Lok Adalat, which passed award without any settlement or
compromise between the pensioner and the State. The writ
petition filed by the State was dismissed as misconceived. In the
Supreme Court, it was submitted that the matter could not have
been disposed of by Lok Adalat in view of the specific provisions
contained in Section 20 of the Act. While allowing the appeal,
the matter was remitted to High Court for de novo
consideration. The purport of Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act is
explained by Supreme Court in the following words.
The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section
20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter
by way of a compromise or settlement between the parties.
Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section 20 are
"compromise" and "settlement". The former expression means
settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an
agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing
claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Termes de
la Ley, "compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties
that are at controversy". As per Bouvier it is "an agreement
30
between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit,
amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can
agree upon". The word "compromise" implies some element of
accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total
surrender. (See NFU Development Trust Ltd., Re, (1973) 1 All
ER 135 : (1972) 1 WLR 1548 (Ch D)). A compromise is always
bilateral and means mutual adjustment. "Settlement" is
termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent.
10. In State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 3 SCC 660,
the wife and son of Amarjit Kaur, who died in a motor accident,
filed petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT)
claiming Rs. 5,00,000/- as compensation. An award was passed
by MACT on 1.12.1998 for Rs. 1,44,000/-. The claimants filed
appeal before High Court, which was referred to High Court Lok
Adalat for settlement. On 3.8.2001, Lok Adalat passed an order
awarding Rs. 1,70,200/- observing that if the parties have any
objection to the order proposed, they may move the High Court
for disposal of appeal on merits. Aggrieved by the same, Punjab
Roadways filed application before the High Court to set aside
the Lok Adalat award. A learned Single Judge rejected the same
placing reliance on earlier judgment of another learned Single
Judge wherein it had been held that an order passed by Lok
Adalat can be challenged by filing a petition under Article 227 of
Constitution of India. Therefore, another petition was moved
under Article 227 of Constitution challenging the order of Lok
Adalat. The same was rejected by learned Single Judge on the
ground that such a petition is not maintainable under Article 227
of Constitution. The Supreme Court while reversing the award
and remanding the matter to High Court laid down as under.
It is true that where an award is made by the Lok
Adalat in terms of a settlement arrived at between the
parties (which is duly signed by parties and annexed to
the award of the Lok Adalat), it becomes final and
binding on the parties to the settlement and becomes
executable as if it is a decree of a civil Court, and no
appeal lies against it to any Court. If any party wants to
challenge such an award based on settlement, it can be
done only by filing a petition under Article 226 and/or
Article 227 of the Constitution, that too on very limited
grounds. But where no compromise or settlement is
signed by the parties and the order of the Lok Adalat
does not refer to any settlement, but directs the
31
respondent to either make payment if it agrees to the
order, or approach the High Court for disposal of appeal
on merits, if it does not agree, is not an award of the Lok
Adalat. The question of challenging such an order in a
petition under Article 227 does not arise. As already
noticed, in such a situation, the High Court ought to have
heard and disposed of the appeal on merits.
11. Dealing with the provisions of the Act especially
Sections 19 and 20, their Lordships observed as under:
It is evident from the said provisions that the Lok
Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their
functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat
determines a reference on the basis of a compromise or
settlement between the parties at its instance, and puts
its seal of confirmation by making an award in terms of
the compromise or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is
not able to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no
award is made and the case record is returned to the
Court from which the reference was received, for
disposal in accordance with law. No Lok Adalat has the
power to "hear" parties to adjudicate cases as a Court
does. It discusses the subject-matter with the parties
and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In
their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by the
principles of justice, equity and fair play. When the LSA
Act refers to "determination" by the Lok Adalat and
"award" by the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not
contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial
determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination
based on a compromise or settlement, arrived at by the
parties, with guidance and assistance from the Lok
Adalat. The "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any
independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any
decision-making process. The making of the award is
merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms
of settlement or compromise agreed by parties in the
presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable
order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat.
(emphasis supplied)
12. From the above judgments, it may be taken as
well settled that the award of Lok Adalat is administrative
act of incorporating the terms of compromise or
32
settlement agreed by the parties in the presence of Lok
Adalat and Lok Adalat does not sit in adjudication of the
dispute. When an award is passed in terms of the
settlement arrived between the parties, which is duly
signed by the parties annexed to the award of Lok Adalat,
it becomes binding on the parties to the settlement and
becomes executable as if it is a decree of Civil Court. No
appeal would lie against the award of Lok Adalat and if
any party wants to challenge such an award, it can be by
way of petition under Article 226 or 227 of Constitution. If
there is no compromise or settlement between the parties
before the Lok Adalat, it cannot pass any award nor such award
can bind the parties. The challenge to the award of Lok Adalat
under Article 226 of Constitution can be entertained on very
limited grounds raised only by parties to the
settlement/compromise before Lok Adalat and not by anybody
else."
(Emphasis supplied)
11.2 The High Court of Bombay, in the case of KUSUMBAI v.
BHAUSAHEB4, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
2. The issue raised in this petition is as to whether,
the third party can challenge the award of the Lok
Adalath before the High Court on the ground that the
litigating sides had excluded the third party from the
litigation?
.... .... ....
6. I find from Bhargavi Constructions (supra) that
the Honourable Supreme Court was not dealing with the
issue as to whether, a third party could also have the
4
2019 SCC OnLine Bom 585
33
same remedy of challenging the Lok Adalat award in the
High Court contending that such third party is aggrieved
by the Lok Adalat Award. The Honourable Supreme Court,
therefore, concluded that an "aggrieved party" can
challenge the Lok Adalat award before the High Court.
7. The Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court, in the matter of Batchu Subba Lakshmi v. Sannidhi
Srinivasulu, 2010 (1) ALT 483 : 2010 (1) ALD 277, dealt
with the issue of a third party challenging the award of
the Lok Adalat. The observations made by the Andhra
Pradesh High Court as to who can challenge the Lok
Adalat award are found in paragraph 8 of the judgment,
which read as under:--
"Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok
Adalat Award.
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such party
would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding for
necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character or
any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
34
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution."
8. While dealing with such challenge, the Andhra
Pradesh High Court also concluded in Batchu Subba
Lakshmi (supra) that such a challenge can be posed on
certain grounds. The grounds for challenge are recorded
in paragraph 9 of the said judgment, which read as
under:--
"What are grounds of challenge.
9. Insofar as legal position that the Lok Adalat
cannot pass award unless and until there is a
compromise and settlement under Section 20(3) and (5)
of the Act between the parties, is well settled. In State of
Punjab v. Ganpat Raj : (2006) 8 SCC 364 : 2006 (7) SCJ
364 : 2007 (1) ALT 283 (DNSC), respondent moved
Punjab and Haryana High Court by filing writ petition
seeking writ of Mandamus to the State to pay interest at
18% per annum on the delayed payment of pension
arrears and other retiral benefits. The case was sent to
Lok Adalat, which passed award without any settlement
or compromise between the pensioner and the State. The
writ petition filed by the State was dismissed as
misconceived. In the Supreme Court, it was submitted
that the matter could not have been disposed of by Lok
Adalat in view of the specific provisions contained in
Section 20 of the Act. While allowing the appeal, the
matter was remitted to High Court for de novo
consideration. The purport of Section 20(3) and (5) of
the Act is explained by Supreme Court in the following
words.
The specific language used in Sub-section (3) of
Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose
of a matter by way of a compromise or settlement
between the parties. Two crucial terms in Sub-sections
(3) and (5) of Section 20 are 'compromise' and
'settlement'. The former expression means settlement of
35
differences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement
reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims
by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Tertnes de
la Ley, 'compromise is a mutual promise of two or more
parties that are at controversy'. As per Bouvier it is 'an
agreement between two or more persons, who, to avoid
a law suit, amicably settle their differences, on such
terms as they can agree upon'. The word 'compromise'
implies some element of accommodation on each side. It
is not apt to describe total surrender. (See NFU
Development Trust Ltd., Re (2) (1973) 1 All ER 135 :
(1972) 1 WLR 1548 (Ch D)). A compromise is always
bilateral and means mutual adjustment. 'Settlement' is
termination of legal proceedings by mutual consent."
9. In the instant case, RCS No. 730/2017 was filed on
30.06.2017 and the Defendants appeared suo moto in the said
matter. It was immediately placed in the list of matters, which
could be taken up in the Lok Adalat after 08 days, scheduled on
08.07.2017. On the said date, the suit was compromised with
reference to the properties mentioned above. Prima facie, a
fraud is played by the Plaintiff and the Defendants on
these Petitioners. All of them were parties to the earlier
RCS No. 447/2000. The entire family as appearing in the
family tree was before the Civil Court. The said first suit
was compromised on 02.09.2002 and the shares of the
parties were demarcated. The property at Survey No. 104
in Vadjai sector was mentioned in the suit properties in
the 2000 suit as well as in the 2017 suit as noted above.
The Plaintiff in the 2017 suit, therefore, had no reason to
exclude these Petitioners.
10. The learned counsel for the Petitioners submits that
this mischief is played because the husband of Petitioner No. 1
(deceased Ramesh), who is the brother of the Plaintiff
Bhausaheb in the 2017 suit, had passed away in 2000 and
Bhusaheb along with other relatives desired to deprive the
widow of Ramesh with that share of the property to which
Ramesh would have a right. This prima facie appears to be
the fraud played upon these Petitioners as well as the
court when the 2017 suit was settled in the Lok Adalat
within 08 days of it's institution and when the Defendants
had appeared suo moto without any notice. All had
declared that there are no other family members.
36
11. These set of facts are not found in the judgments
delivered by the Honourable Supreme Court in Bhargavi
Construction (supra) and in State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh,
(2008) 2 SCC 660 and in the matter decided by the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in the case of Shalu v. Vineet, 2014
(174) (2) PLR 602 : 2013 TLP & H 4103.
12. It is true that a party aggrieved by the Lok
Adalat award can approach the High Court if it discovers
any fraud post the Lok Adalat award. It is equally true
that the third party, which is not a litigant in a suit which
has suffered a compromise decree, can also file a
separate suit for seeking a declaration that such decree
which affects the rights of the third party, would not be
binding upon the said party as the said decree was
delivered in the matter in which, such third party was
never arrayed. It, therefore, appears that an option to
either prefer a separate suit or file a writ petition in the
High Court would be available to such third party. At
times, the issue of limitation would crop up and the suit
to be preferred by such third party might be barred, of
course, subject to the date of the knowledge of such
decree.
13. Both the learned Advocates submit that despite
their best efforts, they could not locate any judgment,
directly on this law point, delivered by this Court or by
the Honourable Supreme Court. It is conceded that the
judgment delivered by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh
in the matter of Batchu Subba Lakshmi (supra) is the only
judicial pronouncement available dealing with a third
party being aggrieved by the Lok Adalat award on the
ground of fraud and his/her exclusion from such
proceedings, which culminated into the Lok Adalat award.
14. The learned Advocate for the Petitioners, who
are the third parties, relies upon the judgments delivered
by the Honourable Supreme Court in Bhargavi
Constructions (supra) and State of Punjab (supra) to
contend that when any aggrieved party can approach the
High Court for challenging the Lok Adalat award, such
37
"aggrieved party" would also include a "third party" as
like the Petitioners herein.
15. While hearing the learned Advocates for the
respective sides, notwithstanding that prima facie the
contention of fraud is sustainable, I have perused the record
and have found that the property situated in Survey No. 104
which is known as Vadjai area, was the suit property in the
2000 suit for partition and separate possession and the same
survey number involving a larger area of land in Vadjai area was
the suit property in the 2017 suit, in which these Petitioners
were excluded. As such, if at all there is any fraud played by the
Plaintiff (Bhausaheb) or the Defendants (Kondabai and
Lahanabai) in the 2017 suit, it relates to the property Survey
No. 104 in Vadjai area and which, therefore, fortifies the
contention of the Petitioners that the property admeasuring 3
Acres 35 Gunthas, which was subject matter of the 2000 suit is
the suit property in the 2017 suit, which is shown to be
admeasuring 7 Acres 19 Gunthas.
16. In view of the above, I conclude, in the light of
the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in
Bhargavi Constructions (supra) and State of Punjab
(supra), that the third party would be covered by the
meaning "aggrieved person" and as is held by the High
Court of Andhra Pradesh in the matter of Batchu Subba
Lakshmi (supra), such a third party can challenge the Lok
Adalat award provided the ground of fraud and
misrepresentation is, prima facie, made out."
(Emphasis supplied)
The view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the afore-
quoted case was subsequently followed by the same High Court of
again in the case of LATA v. SHANKAR reported in 2021 SCC
ONLINE BOM 6358.
38
11.3 The High Court of Madras, in the case of M.
ANTONYSAMY v. S. MUMTAJ5, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
21. When the entire facts leading to the registration of
the award obtained before the Lok Adalat is established to have
been obtained by playing a fraud and the parties colluding
among themselves, the award itself would be a nullity and non-
est in the eyes of law.
22. The learned Senior counsel for the petitioner relied
upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath reported in (1994) 1 SCC 1 :
AIR 1994 SC 853 on these proposition and the relevant
observation reads as follows:--
"1."Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or
temporal" observed Chief Justice Edward Coke of England about
three centuries ago. It is the settled proposition of law that a
judgment or decree obtained by playing fraud on the court is a
nullity and non est in the eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree
by the first court or by the highest court has to be treated as a
nullity by every court, whether superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings.
8. The facts of the present case leave no manner of
doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by
playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate
deception with the design of securing something by taking
unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain
by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an
advantage...."
23. Insofar as what constitutes a fraud or collusion has
been discussed by this Court in a decision reported in 1998 (1)
CTC 66 [Ranipet Municipality v. M. Shamsheerkhan] and this
Court made the following observations:
5
2018 SCC OnLine Mad 12537
39
"9. It is this conduct of the respondent that is attacked
by the petitioner as abuse of process of Court. What is 'abuse
of the process of the Court'? Of course, for the term 'abuse of
the process of the Court' the Code of Civil Procedure has not
given any definition. A party to a litigation is said to be guilty of
abuse of process of the Court, in any of the following cases:--
(1) Gaining an unfair advantage by the use of a rule of
procedure.
(2) Contempt of the authority of the Court by a party or
stranger.
(3) Fraud or collusion in Court proceedings as between
parties.
(4) Retention of a benefit wrongly received.
(5) Resorting to and encouraging multiplicity of
proceedings.
(6) Circumventing of the law by indirect means.
(7) Presence of witness during examination of previous
witness.
(8) Institution vexatious, obstructive or dilatory actions.
(9) Introduction of Scandalous or objectionable matter in
proceedings.
(10) Executing a decree manifestly at variance with its
purpose and intent.
(11) Institution of a suit by a puppet plaintiff.
(12) Institution of a suit in the name of the firm by one
partner against the majority opinion of other
partners etc. (See The Code of Civil Procedure -
A.I.R. Commentary to Section 151, C.P.C.) The
above are only some of the instances, where a party
may be said to be guilty of committing abuse of the
process of Court."
24. The issue as to whether the revision petitioner,
who was not a party to the suit, can seek for setting aside
an award obtained by fraud or misrepresentation is also
no more res-integra in view of the following decisions:
1) 1998 (1) CTC 470 [J. Sivasubramanian v. N.
Govindarajan],
"1. A person who is not a party to the suit, but
who is aggrieved by the decree, has come to this Court,
under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India, alleging fraud
and collusion in obtaining the decree.
40
13. I feel that all these decisions will show that a
duty is cast on the litigant to plead, pray and get relief by
placing all materials before Court. By suppressing facts
and without impleading the necessary parties, a collusive
decree is obtained. In the case on hand, the collusion is
apparent. A person who has no right in the property
concedes the right of the plaintiff to get a decree, and
that too within 49 hours of filing of the suit. The result of
this is getting unfair advantage over the rights of the
petitioners and to deprive them of their properties. Both
the respondents were aware that the petitioners are in
possession on the basis of documents. They themselves
(i, e. parties to the suit) admit the possession of the
petitioners. But, without disclosing any of these
documents, the power of attorney (agent) filed the suit
against the principal and gets a decree, by consent. I
have already stated as to what is the legal effect, i.e., the
second respondent (defendant) himself is the plaintiff
and defendant. It will be unjust to accept the contention
of the respondents. Such a collusive decree also cannot
be allowed to stand. After coming to know of these facts,
if any Court shuts its eyes to realities, it will cease to be
a Court of Justice. By invoking the judicial supervisory
jurisdiction, I declare that the decree in O.S. No. 7631 of
1997, on the file of XV Assistant Judge, City Civil Court at
Madras is a nullity and on the basis of the said decree,
possession of the petitioners shall not be disturbed. I
further find that since the suit is filed fraudulently, the
same is liable to be quashed, and I do so. O.S. No. 7631
of 1997 is struck off from the file of the lower Court. The
Civil Revision Petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's
fee Rs. 2,500/- (Rupees Two thousand five hundred).
CMP. No. 17556 of 1997 for stay is closed."
2) 2009 SCC OnLine AP 795 [Batchu Subba Lakshmi
v. Sannidhi Srinivasualu]
"7. Under Section 21(1) of the Act an award of Lok
Adalat shall be deemed to be decree of a Civil Court and
under Section 21(2) of the Act every award made by Lok
Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties. No
appeal shall lie to any Court against the award, and
therefore, ordinarily a writ petition challenging award is
also barred. But there may be situations where there
being no compromise or settlement as envisaged under
Section 20(3) and (5) of the Act, Lok Adalat may have
41
passed an award. In other words, what would be the
position if Lok Adalat passes an order even without
parties arriving at a compromise or settlement among
themselves. In such a situation, it cannot be said that
there is an award of Lok Adalat, which can be enforced
by a Civil Court as a decree. There may be yet another
situation where in the absence of the parties to the lis or
in the absence of one of the parties to the lis, award of
Lok Adalat may have been obtained by impersonation,
misrepresentation or fraud. Even in such cases, there
being no valid award, Section 21(1) of the Act is not
attracted. Having regard to the language of Article
226(1) of Constitution of India, which empowers the
High Court of a State to issue writs, orders or directions
against any public authority or against authorities
discharging public functions, the High Court can
entertain a writ petition against an award of Lok Adalat.
The phrase 'for any other purpose' appearing in Article
226(1) of Constitution, in our opinion, is broad enough to
take within its purview the situations where a statute
contains 'no Certiorari clause'. It is well settled that 'no
Certiorari clause' in a statute does not bar the
Constitutional Court from entertaining a petition for
redressal of grievance and issue an appropriate order ex
debito justitiae. Therefore, in either of the situations or
any such other situations, a writ petition would lie.
Who can file writ petition challenging the Lok
Adalat Award
8. The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such party
would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding for
necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character or
any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
42
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution.
13. Reverting to the facts of this case, there is no
dispute that respondents 1, 2 and 4 are partners in 3rd
respondent firm. There is also no dispute that
respondents 1 and 2 filed O.S. No. 1 of 2004 against third
respondent and its Managing Partner, the fourth
respondent, for dissolution of firm and rendition of
accounts. On 07.2.2004, plaintiffs and defendants
therein signed memorandum of compromise and
settlement whereunder they agreed to withdraw from
the firm and fourth respondent was permitted to
continue the business till 31.3.2008, failing which it shall
be open to first respondent to execute the decree and
recover possession of vacant site used as stockyard for
the business of third respondent. The award passed by
Lok Adalat on 07.2.2004 was signed by respondents 1
and 2. Fourth respondent signed on his behalf and also
on behalf of third respondent firm. Either on the date of
award of Lok Adalat or during pendency of suit before
District Court, Nandyal, allegation of reconstitution of
third respondent firm with petitioners and fourth
respondent as new partners was not revealed. There is
also no dispute nor it can be denied that partnership
deed dated 01.4.2003 was executed by petitioners and
fourth respondent on the stamp papers which had been
produced (sic. purchased) by third respondent firm on
27.3.2001 long prior to disputes arose among
respondents 1 to 4. This creates any amount of doubt on
the case put up by petitioners. This doubt becomes
43
strong when we realised that the petitioners 1 to 3 are
stepmother, wife and grandfather respectively of fourth
respondent and they are all living under the same roof.
The allegation made by respondents 1 and 2 in their
counter affidavit remains uncontroverted. These lend
support to the submissions made on behalf of
respondents 1 and 2 and we do not see strong reasons to
discredit those submissions."
3) 2013 (6) CTC 166 [P. Subramani v. A.
Periyasamy]
"21. In the present case, the entire proceedings
relating to delivery of possession are vitiated by fraud.
When an order is obtained by resorting to fraud, all the
subsequent proceedings thereto will also render it
vitiated. In this context, I am fortified by the decision of
this Court reported in (J. Sivasubramanian v. N.
Govindarajan) 1998 1 CTC 470 relied on by the learned
counsel for the revision petitioner. In that case, this
Court took note of the fact that the suit was filed by
suppressing material facts and by not impleading the
proper and necessary parties. This Court held that fraud
and collusion are palpable and that the decree was
obtained by power of attorney agent as against his own
principal thereby depriving his right over the property,
which was purchased by him from the original owner. As
the power agent filed the suit by suppressing the
material facts, this Court held that "....in such cases, it is
the duty of the Court to see that the suit itself is wiped
off from the file." It was also held by this Court that in
such circumstances the revision petition under Article
227 of the Constitution of India is very much
maintainable. In that case, this Court, relying on the
decision of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in
S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by Lrs. v. Jagannath
(dead) by Lrs., (1994) 1 SCC 1 culled out the legal
propositions as follows:
"12. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v.
Jagannath (dead) by LRs., their Lordships have decided
as to what is meant by 'fraud'. In paragraph 6, Their
Lordships have held thus:--
"... A fraud is an act of deliberate deception
with the design of securing something by taking unfair
advantage 14 of another. It is a deception in order to
44
gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get
an advantage..." Their Lordships have further said
thus:-- "A litigant who approaches the Court, is bound
to produce all the documents executed by him which
are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital
document in order to gain advantage on the other side,
then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the Court as
well as on the opposite party." In the earlier portion of
that Judgment, their Lordships have held thus:-- "... We
have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is
based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court.
He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the
litigation." The effect of such a decree obtained in such
cases is also stated in that judgment thus:-- "... The
principle of "finality of litigation" cannot be pressed to
the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an
engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The
Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between
the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come
with clean hands.... A judgment or decree obtained by
playing fraud on the court is a nullity and non est in the
eyes of law. Such a judgment/decree by the first Court
or by the highest Court has to be treated as a nullity by
every Court, whether superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court even in collateral proceedings."
In Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail, of the judgment,
Their Lordships declared thus:-- "... The reason is that
fraud is and extrinsic collateral act, which vitiates the
most solemn proceedings of courts of justice. If a party
obtains a decree from the Court by practicing fraud or
collusion, he cannot be allowed to say that the matter
is res judicata and cannot be reopened. There can also
be no question of res judicata in a case where signs of
fraud or collusion are transparently pregnant or
apparent from the facts on record." In paragraph 10,
Their Lordships further declared thus:--
"... Section 44 of the Evidence Act
envisages that any party to a suit or proceeding
may show that any judgment, order or decree,
which is relevant under Sections 40, 41 or 42
has been obtained by fraud or collusion. Under
Section 40, the existence of the judgment,
order or decree which by law prevents any
Court from taking cognizance of a suit or
holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the
question is whether such court ought to take
cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial."
In Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Pvt.
Ltd., it was declared thus:--
"The authorities, be they constitutional, statutory
or administrative, (and particularly those who have to
decide a lis) possess the power to recall their judgments
or orders if they are obtained by fraud as fraud and
justice never dwell together (Fraud et jus nunquam
cohabitant). Fraud and deceit defend or excuse no man
45
(Fraud et dolus nemini patrocinari debent). The
judiciary in India also possesses inherent power,
specially under Section 151, CPC., to recall its judgment
or order if it is obtained by fraud on court. In the case of
fraud on a party to the suit or proceedings, the Court
may direct the affected parly to file a separate suit for
setting aside the decree obtained by fraud. Inherent
powers are powers which are resident in all Courts,
especially of superior jurisdiction. These powers spring
not from legislation but from the nature and the
constitution of the tribunals or courts themselves so as
to enable them to maintain their dignity, secure
obedience to its process and rule, protect its officers
from indignity and wrong and to punish unseemly
behaviour. This power is necessary for the orderly
administration of the Court's business. Since fraud
affects the solemnity, regularity and orderliness of the
proceedings of the court and also amounts to an abuse
of the process of court, the courts have been held to
have inherent power to set aside an order obtained by
fraud practised upon that Court."
25. On a overall appreciation of the observations in
the aforesaid decisions, I am of the view that the award
before the Lok Adalat was obtained by fraud and
collusion exercised by the parties to the suit and as such,
the award itself has no validity and deemed to be non-
est. It is a settled law that fraud vitiates all solemn acts
and an award obtained by playing fraud is nullity. Hence,
this Court would be justified in setting aside the award by
exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India."
(Emphasis supplied)
11.4 A Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana, in the
case of DASARI LOKESH CHANDRA v. LOK ADALAT6 has held as
follows:
6
W.P.18369/2021 decided on 20.12.2021
46
".... .... .....
6. Point No.1:-
Arguing at length in respect of the merits of the case, the
learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner
is a bona fide purchaser of Plot Nos.379 and 452 admeasuring
400 square yards in Survey No.175 of Patancheru Mandal,
Sangareddy District and he purchased the said property on
30.01.2021 through a registered sale deed for valuable
consideration, but subsequently he came to know that an Award
was passed by the Lok Adalat in respect of the said property
and other property in a suit between the sons and the daughters
of late Lakkaraju Laxmana Rao and the said Award is based on
the terms of compromise entered into between the parties i.e.,
the sons and the daughters of late Lakkaraju Laxmana Rao and
indeed, the said deed of compromise is a collusive one and
therefore, the Award passed basing on the said deed of
compromise is unsustainable. He further submitted that as there
is no other remedy for the petitioner who is a third party to the
proceedings to question the Award of the Lok Adalat, he filed
the present Writ Petition challenging the same.
7. Undoubtedly, challenge to an Award of the Lok Adalat
can be done only by filing a Writ Petition under Article
226 or 227 of the Constitution of India, as observed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhargavi Constructions and
another Vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others -
(2018) 13 SCC 480.
8. Under Section 21(1) of the Legal Services Authority
Act, 1987, an Award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to
be a decree of the civil Court. Also, as per Section 21(2)
of the said Act, the Award made is final and binding on
the parties. Law does not provide any appeal to any Court
against the said Award. Thus, only, Writ Petitions can be
filed challenging the Award passed by the Lok Adalat.
However, the grounds of challenge are very limited.
9. Observing that there may be extra-ordinary cases
where a third party is meted with injustice at the behest
of two or more conniving and colluding parties, who may
47
have obtained the Award of the Lok Adalat by fraud or
misrepresentation, the Courts in a series of decisions held
that even a third party may maintain a Writ Petition
challenging the Award of the Lok Adalat. One of such
cases where the said observation is made is Batchu
Subba Lakshmi and others Vs. Sannidhi Srinivasulu and
others - 2010(1) ALD 277 DB, wherein a Division Bench
of this Court at para 8 held as follows:-
"The parties to the compromise or settlement,
which is the basis for award of Lok Adalat, no doubt
entitled to challenge the award on any of the grounds
referred to herein above grounds. Ordinarily, a third
party cannot challenge the award in a writ petition even
if such award causes prejudice. The remedy of such party
would be to institute a separate suit or proceeding for
necessary redressal and seek appropriate decree of
declaration by filing a suit within the period of limitation
prescribed under law. Under Section 34 of the Specific
Relief Act, 1963, any person entitled to legal character or
any right as to any property, may file a suit for
declaration. Under this provision, any person can even
institute a suit for declaration that the decree passed by
Civil Court in an earlier suit is not binding on him. When
a civil Court can even declare that an earlier decree of
the Court is not binding on the party before it, we do not
see any objection for a third party to institute a suit in a
civil Court seeking a declaration that the award of Lok
Adalat is not binding on him/her subject to the law of
limitation. We however hasten to add that there may be
extraordinary cases where a third party is meted with
injustice at the behest of two or more conniving and
colluding parties, who may have obtained an award of
Lok Adalat by fraud or misrepresentation only to defeat
the rights of such third party. In such cases within a
reasonable period such third party may maintain a writ
petition. But in such cases, there should be prima facie
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation or collusion in
obtaining the award of Lok Adalat. Even if such
allegations are made and the question involves
complicated questions of fact requiring voluminous
evidence, third party should be left to seek remedy in a
civil Court rather than preferring extraordinary remedy
under Article 226 of Constitution."
(Emphasis supplied)
48
The views taken in the cases of BATCHU SUBBALAKSHMI
supra and DASARI VENKATESH supra were subsequently affirmed
by another Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana in the
case of SMT. B. LAVANYA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA in Writ
Petition No.2906 of 2021, decided on 16.12.2023.
11.5. Therefore, in the light of the law as laid down by the
Apex Court, and different High Courts, what would unmistakably
emerge is that a writ petition challenging the award of the Lok
Adalat filed by third parties is maintainable in extraordinary
circumstances, provided that there is prima facie evidence of fraud,
misrepresentation or collusion in obtaining the award. Further, the
definition of an 'aggrieved party' to the award would also include a
'third party' to the suit, thereby allowing such third parties to
challenge the award of the Lok Adalat. I therefore answer the issue
holding that the present petition by a person who is not a party to
the suit is entertainable owing to the peculiar facts of the case.
49
ISSUE NO.3:
Whether the decree requires to be recalled in the facts
and circumstances of the case?
12. The subject issue relates to the concerned Court drawing
up a procedure, which runs counter to the law, which leads to
passing of the award before the Lok Adalat. Time and again, this
Court, in a series of judgments has laid down the correct procedure
to be followed by the trial courts while drawing a compromise
decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC and the Lok Adalat
while passing an award.
12.1. In the case of SRI ANANTHAIAH v. SMT.
GANGAMMA7, a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
9. From 17.01.2008, the case was adjourned to
23.01.2008 on which day the defendants were present but, the
plaintiff was absent. Therefore, the case was again adjourned to
7
2014 SCC OnLine Kar 12041
50
02.02.2008 on which day the plaintiff as well as the defendants
were present before the Court and the matter was referred to
Lok Adalath. On receipt of the records from the Court, the case
was called before the Lok Adalath on the same day and the
following order was passed:
"Plaintiff and defendants are present. Already the parties
arrived for a compromise and filed compromise petition u/o. 23
Ride 3 CPC. Since the matter has been compromised by the
respective parties, Compromise Petition is accepted. Suit is
decreed in terms of the compromise petition. Draw decree
accordingly."
And the order sheet bears the signature of the Learned
Judge as well as the Conciliator.
10. Had the dispute been resolved by the parties to O.S.
10/2008 on 17.01.2008 as per the compromise petition the
petitioner herein would have been spared the tribulation of
knocking at the doors of this Court. Nothing prevented the Court
from passing a decree on the compromise petition on the very
day it was filed or on 2.2.2008 when admittedly all the parties
to the suit were present before the Court. Strangely the Court
did not choose to pass any orders on the compromise petition
on both the occasions, instead referred the matter to Lok
Adalath on 2.2.2008.
11. Whenever the parties, with the assistance of the
conciliators and advocates, resolve the dispute and arrive at an
amicable settlement before Lok Adalaths, there would be no
victors and vanquished, and thus no rancour. In other words
once dispute is resolved in Lok-Adalath, there would be no more
litigation by way of appeals and revision. Thus, the actual time
spent on litigation would be less than the time spent in a Civil
Court.
12. The functions of Lok Adalaths relate purely to
conciliation. A Lok Adalath determines a reference on the basis
of a compromise or settlement at its instance, and puts its seal
of confirmation by making an award in terms of the compromise
or settlement as observed by the Apex Court in State of Punjab
v. Jalour Singh [(2008) 2 SCC 660] . Thus, if the parties have
already entered into a compromise and report the same
51
by filing a compromise petition before the Court, nothing
else is required to be done in the matter and therefore
the Civil Court is not justified in referring the same to the
Lok Adalath. There was no dispute existing at the time of
reference to the Lok-Adalath, which is a condition
precedent for reference. When the compromise petition is
filed before the Court, it is the obligation on the part of
the Court to look into the compromise, find out whether
the same is lawful or not. If the compromise is lawful, the
Court has to record the same. In a situation like the one
on hand if the Judge refers the matter to Lok Adalath, it
is a clear case of abdication of responsibility of
considering the compromise petition by the Judge and
refusing to pass an order thereon.
13. It is thus evident from the orders passed in O.S.
10/2008 that the Learned Judge did not know what he was
expected to do when a compromise petition was filed before the
Court under Order XXIII Rule 3 of CPC. It appears that he does
not know which matter should be referred to Lok Adalath and at
what stage the cases are to be referred to Lok Adalath. It is
interesting to note that the very Judge, who referred the matter
to Lok Adalath, sat in the Lok Adalath on 2.2.2008 the very
same day of reference and accepted the compromise, passed
the order giving credit to the Lok Adalath for speedy disposal of
the cases. In the process, he, neither as a Judge nor as judicial
member presiding over the Lok Adalath, applied his mind to the
terms of compromise.
14. The original grantee of the suit land Chikkaiah died
on 18.5.1980 and the plaintiff claiming to be the daughter of
Chikkaiah filed the suit for declaration of title nearly after 28
years after his death, asserting that she is in peaceful
possession and enjoyment of the property. Now, the petitioner
herein claims that he is the only son of the grantee of suit land
late Chikkaiah and the plaintiff in O.S. 10/2008 Gangamma is
not daughter of said Chikkaiah and therefore has nothing to do
with him or the property in question. The petitioner along with
the writ petition has produced number of documents to show
that he is the son of Chikkaiah.
52
15. Admittedly on the date of filing the suit the plaintiffs
name was not entered in the revenue records and she had not
produced any documents to show that she is the daughter of
late Chikkaiah. The persons who were said to be
attempting to dispossess her from the suit property
appeared before the Court without notice or summons
and filed a compromise petition accepting her title. From
this it is clear that the Learned Judge and the conciliator
have failed to apply their mind to the facts and
circumstances of the case and the manner in which
parties had compromised the matter as well as the terms
of compromise. It is a clear case of collusion. A collusive
decree/order is non est in the eye of law and void ab
initio.
16. This is a clear case of fraud played on the Court
as well as the Lok Adalath. It is this aspect that hurts the
administration of justice. It is here the High Court cannot
be a silent spectator to the happenings before the Lok
Adalath. This case should be an eye opener to Learned
Judges as to how the parties are abusing the process of
Lok Adalath to achieve what possibly could not be
achieved in the Court. Whether it is in the Court or before
the Lok Adalath, law is well settled 'whenever an
agreement is entered into it should be lawful., If the
agreement is not lawful, there is no question of passing
an order accepting the same by the Lok Adalath.
17. It is to be borne in mind that every Presiding
Judge of a Court or the Lok Adalath shoulders an onerous
duty of finding out if the terms of the compromise are
lawful and in a suit for declaration of title, to find out
whether the person in whose favour declaration is sought
has got a valid title to the property or not and only
thereafter accept the compromise and pass orders. These
things have not been followed in this case and the Judge has
become an easy prey to the fraud played by the parties. Only
for statistical purposes one case is resolved in the Lok
Adalath but in reality, such resolution of dispute has
given rise to the present Writ Petition thereby reducing
the ADR method of Lok Adalath to a farce. Therefore,
every one of us has a duty to see that the purity and
53
sanctity of the alternative dispute resolution mechanism
called Lok Adalath is not misused or abused."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.2. In the case of SMT. RENUKA W/O ANAND @
ANANTSA BAKALE v. SRI. RAMANAND S/O RAMKRISHNASA
BASAWA8, another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as
follows:
".... .... ....
20. This Court has also been coming across several
matters relating to such compromise before the Lok-Adalat
which are challenged by way of writ petitions. Hence, I also
deem it fit to issue general directions in respect of such matters
which are referred to Lok-Adalat and compromise recorded as
under:
(i) When a compromise is filed before the
Court in terms of the decision in
Smt.Akkubai vs. Shri Venkatrao and
Others [ILR 2014 KAR 2051] (supra) it is
for the Court to record the compromise
and not refer the matter to the Lok-
Adalat.
(ii) It is only if there is no settlement arrived
at before the Court and the parties
request for the matter to be referred to
Lok-Adalat to enable a settlement then in
such event the parties are to be referred
to the Lok-Adalat and in the event of a
compromise being arrived at before the
Lok-Adalat, the same could be recorded
by the lok-Adalat.
8
W.P.NO.103766 OF 2018 (GM-RES), DISPOSED ON 31-03-2022
54
(iii) When the matter is referred to Lok-
Adalat, separate order sheets would have
to be opened and maintained by the said
Lok-Adalat and the order sheet of the
Court in the suit cannot be used by the
Lok-Adalat.
(iv) The trial Court and or the Lok-Adalat
while recording compromise is required
to ascertain if the parties are present
personally as also to ascertain and verify
their identities by production of suitable
documentary proof.
(v) In the event of a power of attorney
appearing, it would be the bounden duty
of the Court or the Lok-Adalat to
ascertain if the concerned party has been
served with notice.
(vi) The Court as also the Lok-Adalat would
always have to be suspicious if the party
were to enter appearance even before
service of notice which is a red flag that
there is something that is fishy in the
matter.
(vii) When recording a compromise being
entered into by a power of attorney, the
original of the power of attorney is
required to be examined by the Court and
the Lok-Adalat and necessary
endorsement made in the order to that
effect and the original power of attorney
returned to the parties.
(viii) As far as possible the trial Court and or
the Lok-Adalat to secure the presence of
the party and obtain signature of such
party rather than the power of attorney.
55
(ix) The Trial Courts shall ensure that proper
and acceptable proof of identity of the
parties to proceedings as mandated by
the Government for various purposes
(such as Aadhar Card, Driving Licence,
Passport Copy, Election Identity card,
etc.,) are obtained as a matter of rule."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.3 Yet again, another Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the
case of ABHISHEK v. CHOURADDY9, has held as follows:
".... .... ....
48. Thus, the judgment and decree passed by the trial
court in dismissing the suit is liable to be set aside accordingly it
is set aside by decreeing the suit filed by the plaintiffs.
SOME OBSERVATIONS AND DIRECTIONS ON LOK ADALAT
"The Lok Adalat is an unique institution
which does handle only their mutual disputes and
points of contention but also contributes to their
well-beings in several other ways. It means the
aspirations of the people by getting them
economic and social justice. Their main aim is to
settle the dispute in such a manner that the
mutual relations of the disputants remains
practically the same as existed before the
commencement of such a disputes. They aim not
only at the restoration of normal relations
between the disputing individuals and families but
also at a better and more lasting solution of the
problem so that their future relations might not
get strained at a slight provocation and a tense
situation in the immediate future might be
avoided. More so, Lok Adalat lays a great emphasis
on the social aspect of the dispute also. Obviously,
it holds that the aim of justice is not to pronounce
a barren decision on the basis of law evidence only
9
REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.100154 OF 2015 (PAR/POS), 25-04-2024
56
but that it should also have two aims and
objectives in its decision-making process: (a) The
wrong doer might repent and mend his ways and
may not repeat the wrong, and (b) the tension
between the two parties may be minimized so that
their mutual relations might again get normalized.
It always aims at the removal of misunderstanding
at the initial state so that any trivial disputes
might not grow into proportions and reach a point
of no return.
From the above study of Lok Adalat it is now
quite evident that the mechanism of Lok Adalat is
not just a dispute resolution forum or a
contrivance introduced to reduce court arrears,
but a peoples movement for orderly progress
through rule of law and participate in self-
government in the cause of social justice. To quote
Madhava Menon."
"Lok Adalat has the potential for social
reconstruction and legal mobilization for social
change. It can influence the style of
administration of justice and the role of lawyers
and judges in it. It can take law closer to the life
of the people and reduce disparity between law in
the books and law in action. Of course, in wrong
hands it has also the potential to undermine
stability and respect for the system of justice and
to act as yet another forum of exploitation of
ignorant and poor masses. It may be used by self-
seeking politicians, lawyers and judges to advance
their own interests and malign their enemies in
the profession. It may become another
bureaucracy if attempted to be stereotyped and
made an appendage of the formal court system.
The dangers are infinite and the potentialities are
limitless."
[Courtesy: Lok Adalats in India, authored by Sunil
Deshta,
published by Deep and Deep Publications 1995 Edition.]
(Emphasis supplied)
49. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of STATE OF
PUNJAB & ANOTHER VS. JALOUR SINGH & OTHERS
57
reported in (2008) 2 SCC 660 were pleased to observe at
Paragraph Nos.8 & 9 as follows:
"8. It is evident from the said provisions that Lok
Adalats have no adjudicatory or judicial functions. Their
functions relate purely to conciliation. A Lok Adalat
determines a reference on the basis of a compromise or
settlement between the parties at its instance, and put
its seal of confirmation by making an award in terms of
the compromise or settlement. When the Lok Adalat is
not able to arrive at a settlement or compromise, no
award is made and the case record is returned to the
court from which the reference was received, for
disposal in accordance with law. No Lok Adalat has the
power to "hear" parties to adjudicate cases as a court
does. It discusses the subject matter with the parties
and persuades them to arrive at a just settlement. In
their conciliatory role, the Lok Adalats are guided by
principles of justice, equity, fair play. When the LSA Act
refers to 'determination' by the Lok Adalat and 'award'
by the Lok Adalat, the said Act does not contemplate nor
require an adjudicatory judicial determination, but a
non- adjudicatory determination based on a compromise
or settlement, arrived at by the parties, with guidance
and assistance from the Lok Adalat. The 'award' of the
Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or
opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The
making of the award is merely an administrative act of
incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise
agreed by parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in
the form of an executable order under the signature and
seal of the Lok Adalat.
9. But we find that many sitting or retired
Judges, while participating in Lok Adalats as members,
tend to conduct Lok Adalats like courts, by hearing
parties, and imposing their views as to what is just and
equitable, on the parties. Sometimes they get carried
away and proceed to pass orders on merits, as in this
case, even though there is no consensus or settlement.
Such acts, instead of fostering alternative dispute
resolution through Lok Adalats, will drive the litigants
away from the Lok Adalats. The Lok Adalats should
resist their temptation to play the part of Judges and
constantly strive to function as conciliators. The
58
endeavour and effort of the Lok Adalats should be to
guide and persuade the parties, with reference to
principles of justice, equity and fair play to compromise
and settle the dispute by explaining the pros and cons,
strength and weaknesses, advantages and
disadvantages of their respective claims."
50. Certain observations regarding Lok Adalath in the
background of the case, as discussed above the Court opines
and imperative to observe certain aspects on the institution of
Lok Adalat and necessary directions are liable to be issued which
are as follows:
51. The Legal Service Authorities Act, 1987 is enacted to
provide free and competent legal services to the weaker
sections of the society to ensure that opportunities for securing
justice are not to be denied to any citizen by reason of economic
or other disabilities, and to organize Lok Adalat to secure that
operation of the legal system promotes justice on the basis of
equal opportunity.
52. The discussion in the present case is only confined to
organize Lok Adalat and not permanent Lok Adalat. It secures
operation of legal system to promote justice. Section 2(d) Legal
Services Authority Act stipulates as follows:
"Section 2(d) 'Lok Adalat' means a Lok Adalat
organized under chapter VI."
53. Under Chapter-VI, section 19 stipulates organization
of Lok Adalats. Section 20 enshrines cognizance of cases by Lok
Adalats. Section 21 says 'award of Lok Adalats'. Section 22
stipulats powers of Lok Adalat and Permanent Lok Adalat.
54. Organization of Lok Adalat is as such intervals and
places and for exercising such jurisdiction for the areas. Sub-
section (5) of Section 19 of Legal Services Authority Act which
stipulates as follows:
"(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to
determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement
between the parties to a dispute in respect of--
(i) any case pending before; or
59
(ii) any matter which is falling within the
jurisdiction of, and is not brought before,
any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organised:
Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no
jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to
an offence not compoundable under any law."
55. Therefore, Lok Adalat is to determine and to
arrive at compromise of the dispute in respect of any case
pending before it or pre litigation of it by conciliation.
Therefore, it is function of Lok Adalat to determine and to
arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties
in respect of dispute by holding negotiations and
conciliations. The Lok Adalats shall not decide any case
which do not have any element for
negotiations/conciliation. If compromise petition is filed
by invoking the provision of Order 23 of the Code of Civil
Procedure and if the parties are present at the time of
submitting the compromise petition and stated they have
compromised the matter then the matter shall not be
referred to Lok Adalat since, the matter is already settled
between the parties and reduced into writing in the
compromise petition. Therefore, where already the
matter is settled/compromised between the parties and
reduced into writing in compromise petition, then the
Court itself shall pass an appropriate order without
referring to the Lok Adalat, on the compromise petition.
56. If parties have agreed or one of the parties thereof
makes an application to the Court for referring the case to Lok
Adalat and if the Court is prima facie satisfied that there are
chances of such settlement or the Court is satisfied that the
matter is an appropriate one, cognizance of which is to be taken
by Lok Adalat, the Court shall refer the case to Lok Adalat. But,
where one of the parties only makes an application to
refer the case to Lok Adalat or the Court is satisfied that
the matter is fit to be referred to Lok Adalat, but before
referring to Lok Adalat the Court shall give reasonable
opportunities of being heard to the parties or to the
Advocates.
60
57. The Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of
any case or a matter relating to of which is not compoundable
under any law.
58. The Lok Adalat shall not take up the case or matter
pertaining to grant of divorce or annulment of marriage. It is
task of the Lok Adalat to make endeavour to unite husband and
wife by negotiation/conciliation but shall not pass decree of
divorce or annulment of marriage.
59. The Lok Adalat shall pass decree after referring the
case to it referred by the Court as expeditious as possible by
fixing dates of Lok Adalat of its convenient dates and places of
convenience by holding negotiations/conciliation not later than
three months from date of referring the case by the Courts and
receipt of the matter by the office of the Legal Services
Authority at Taluk, District and at the office of the High Court
Legal Service Committee.
60. If there is no settlement and compromise arrived at in
the Lok Adalat between the parties, the records of the case shall
be returned to the court with an advice to the parties to seek
remedy in Court after referring the case to Court. The Court
without being influenced what has transpired in Lok Adalat, the
Court shall decide the case on merits in accordance with law.
61. The Lok Adalat shall ensure itself there should not
be any fraud, coercion, undue influence, threat or any
other mode of impersonation of the parties at the time of
negotiations/conciliation in the process of compromise.
62. The Lok Adalat after referring the cases from the Court,
may hold pre conciliation meetings between the parties in the
presence of advocates. The object of holding pre conciliation
meetings is to save time of Lok Adaklat process. During pre
conciliation meetings assistance may be taken of by the law
interns, social activities, advocates and may by following
modalities:
(A) Presentation and registration of case.
(B) Issuance of invitation letters to the opposite parties for
attending the session of Lok Adalat along with witness and
friends on a specific date for the settlement of disputes.
61
(C) Starting of the hearing process.
(D) The summation of disputes matter.
(E) Nomination of the any person for negotiation.
(F) Deliberation by parties, advocates, social activities in the
case on hand and the proclamation of the out come of
compromise.
(G) Approval of the compromise by Lok Adalat.
(H) Preparation of the Decrees/Award.
THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY LOK ADALAT MAY BE
SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:
1. The Lok Adalat, at first instance calls both the
parties to the disputes for the presentation of
their case before it.
2. It asks for elucidation on the points of disputes
and afford opportunities for both the parties to
explain their view points of the disputes.
3. The members of the Lok Adalat endeavours to
provide guidelines for both the parties for arriving
at truth of the matter.
4. The Lok Adalat provides even a solution with
regard to resolution of dispute in case of any
difficulty faced by them in the decision-making
process.
5. A Kararkhat is finally drawn on the basis of the
pre consent of the parties and the signed by the
both parties in the presence of the members of
the Lok Adalats.
6. The Lok Adalats take initiative to acquaint the
regular Court with the resolution of dispute and
request for the execution of agreement arrived at
between the parties
7. Finally, the Lok Adalat request the Court to
withdraw the case of the party on the lines
62
agreed to by both the parties before the Lok
Adalat.
63. Before the Lok Adalat the parties shall produce their
identity by producing Aadhar Card, PAN Card, Voter identity Card
or any other document for the purpose of identification of the
parties.
64. In the case of minors and the parties want to get
compromise also on behalf of minors, the Lok Adalat shall not
pass decree/award unless there is judicial order from the Court as
per Order 32 of Code of Civil Procedure of permission or by any
other law. The Lok Adalat also shall not pass order on application
for condonation of delay. It is the function of the Court to
consider application under the provisions of the Limitation Act for
condonation of delay, but not by the Lok Adalat.
65. The Lok Adalat shall not keep pending the matter for
negotiation/conciliation for more than three months, if
matter/case is not settled or compromised within the period of
three months, then the case records shall be returned to the
Court.
66. The Lok Adalat while conducting negotiation/conciliations
shall ensure fair play, principle of natural justice, equity and to
ensure providing justice to the parties.
67. The Lok Adalat shall not pass exparte decree/award."
(Emphasis supplied)
12.4. The Co-ordinate Benches in the afore-quoted judgments
have clearly laid down certain guidelines as to how the concerned
Court should act while an application for compromise is made. The
Co-ordinate Benches hold that if there no settlement arrived at
before the concerned Court, and if the parties make a request to
63
refer the matter to the Lok Adalat to enable the same, it is only
then the matter should be referred to the Lok Adalat by the
concerned Court. Further, if the parties have already entered into a
compromise and file a compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule
3 of the CPC before the concerned Court, then the concerned Court
should not refer the matter to the Lok Adalat and should instead
adjudicate upon the validity of the compromise by itself. In the
case at hand, when a compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule 3
of the CPC was filed before the concerned Court, the Court, instead
of adjudicating upon the compromise by itself, refers the matter to
the Lok Adalat for the mere asking of the parties and the award is
passed on the same day. Therefore, there are gross procedural
aberrations by the concerned Court in the case at hand. On all
these factors, what would unmistakably emerge is the obliteration
of the compromise and restoration of the suit.
12.5 Further, the Apex Court, in the case of NEW OKHLA
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (NOIDA) v.
YUNUS10, while differentiating between an award passed by the
10
(2022) 9 SCC 516
64
Lok Adalat and a compromise decree under Order XXIII Rule 3 of
the CPC holds that an award of the Lok Adalat is not a compromise
decree in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3 of the CPC. The Apex Court
observes as follows:
".... .... ....
Findings
37. The object of the 1987 Act inter alia as can be
noticed from the Preamble to the Act, also is the organisation of
Lok Adalats. It is clear beyond the shadow of any doubt that the
jurisdiction of the Lok Adalat under Section 20 is to facilitate a
settlement of disputes between the parties in a case. It has no
adjudicatory role. It cannot decide a lis. All that it can do is to
bring about a genuine compromise or settlement. Sub-section
(4) of Section 20 is important insofar as the law giver has set
out the guiding principles for a Lok Adalat. The principles are
justice, equality, fair play and other legal principles. The
significance of this provision looms large when the Court bears
in mind the scheme of Section 28-A of the Act.
38. The scheme of Section 28-A of the Act is
unmistakably clear from its very opening words. What Section
28-A contemplates is a redetermination of compensation under
an award passed under Part III. Part III takes in Section 23.
Section 23 deals with the matters to be taken into
consideration. Various aspects including the market value on the
date of the notification under Section 4(1) are indicated. What
we wish to emphasise is that elements of Section 23 are not in
consonance as such with the guiding principles set out in
Section 19(4) of "the 1987 Act" which are to guide a Lok Adalat.
When the Court deals with the matter under Section 18, in other
words, it is bound to look into the evidence and arrive at
findings based on the evidence applying the legal principles
which have been enunciated and arrive at the compensation.
While it may be true that there is reference to "other legal
principles" in Section 19(4) of the 1987 Act, the Lok Adalat also
65
can seek light from the principles of justice, equity, and fair
play. The Lok Adalat by virtue of the express provisions is only a
facilitator of settlement and compromise in regard to matters
which are referred to it. It has no adjudicatory role (see State of
Punjab v. Jalour Singh [State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008)
2 SCC 660 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 669 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 524 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 535] ).
39. In Union of India v. Ananto [Union of India v. Ananto,
(2007) 10 SCC 748] , this Court inter alia held as follows :
(Phulan Rani case [State of Punjab v. Phulan Rani, (2004) 7 SCC
555] , SCC p. 557, para 7)
"7. The specific language used in sub-section (3) of
Section 20 makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a
matter by way of a compromise or settlement between the
parties. Two crucial terms in sub-sections (3) and (5) of Section
20 are "compromise" and "settlement". The former expression
means settlement of differences by mutual concessions. It is an
agreement reached by adjustment of conflicting or opposing
claims by reciprocal modification of demands. As per Termes de
la Ley, "compromise is a mutual promise of two or more parties
that are at controversy". As per Bouvier it is "an agreement
between two or more persons, who, to avoid a law suit,
amicably settle their differences, on such terms as they can
agree upon". The word "compromise" implies some element of
accommodation on each side. It is not apt to describe total
surrender. [See N.F.U. Development Trust Ltd., In re [N.F.U.
Development Trust Ltd., In re, (1972) 1 WLR 1548] ]. A
compromise is always bilateral and means mutual adjustment.
"Settlement" is termination of legal proceedings by mutual
consent. The case at hand did not involve compromise or
settlement and could not have been disposed of by Lok Adalat.
If no compromise or settlement is or could be arrived at, no
order can be passed by the Lok Adalat."
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, question of merger of Lok Adalats order does
not arise.
40. An argument was raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta,
learned Senior Counsel for the respondents, that the Lok Adalat
insofar as it manifests the stand of the appellant and it being
66
consensual based on the consent of Noida, Noida is estopped. In
this regard, he drew our attention to the judgment of this Court
in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job [P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job,
(2005) 6 SCC 478] .
.... .... ....
51. In the light of the principles which have been laid
down, we are inclined to take the following view. An award
passed by the Lok Adalat under the 1987 Act is the culmination
of a non-adjudicatory process. The parties are persuaded even
by members of the Lok Adalat to arrive at mutually agreeable
compromise. The award sets out the terms. The provisions
contained in Section 21 by which the award is treated as if it
were a decree is intended only to clothe the award with
enforceability. In view of the provisions of Section 21 by which it
is to be treated as a decree which cannot be challenged,
undoubtedly, by way of an appeal in view of the express
provisions forbidding it, unless it is set aside in other
appropriate proceedings, it becomes enforceable. The purport of
the law giver is only to confer it with enforceability in like
manner as if it were a decree. Thus, the legal fiction that the
award is to be treated as a decree goes no further.
52. The further argument of Shri Dhruv Mehta is that
apart from the award of the Lok Adalat being treated as a
decree, it is also capable of being treated as an order of the
Court, as the case may be. In this regard, we have already
noticed the scheme of the 1987 Act. We have considered the
definition of the word "case" and the word "court". We have also
noticed the provisions of Section 19(5) and Section 20(1). The
conspectus of these provisions would yield the following result:
52.1. The Lok Adalat as constituted under Section
19(2) would have jurisdiction inter alia to determine and
to arrive at a compromise or settlement between the
parties to a dispute in respect of any case pending before
any court for which the Lok Adalat is organised. The word
"court" in this context would mean the court as defined
in Section 2(aaa) viz. a civil, criminal or Revenue Court.
The word "court" also includes any tribunal or any
authority constituted under any law for the time being in
67
force which for exercising judicial or even quasi-judicial
functions. Thus, the word "court" in the 1987 Act in the
context of Section 19(5) embraces the bodies referred to
in Section 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act. The manner of taking
cognizance by Lok Adalats is provided in Section 20(1)
read with Section 19(5). The "court" as defined in Section
2(aaa) can refer the case to the Lok Adalat. Such court,
as already noticed, can be civil, criminal or a Revenue
Court. It can be even a tribunal or authority. When
success is achieved as a result of the holding of the Lok
Adalat culminating in an award, the words, as the case
may be, in Section 21 predicate that it may be instead of
a decree of a civil court, an order of any other court.
.... .... ....
62. The award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself
without anything more is to be treated by the deeming
fiction to be a decree. It is not a case where a
compromise is arrived at under Order 23 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, between the parties and the court
is expected to look into the compromise and satisfy itself
that it is lawful before it assumes efficacy by virtue of
Section 21. Without anything more, the award passed by
Lok Adalat becomes a decree. The enhancement of the
compensation is determined purely on the basis of
compromise which is arrived at and not as a result of any
decision of a "court" as defined in the Act.
63. An award passed by the Lok Adalat is not a
compromise decree. An award passed by the Lok Adalat without
anything more, is to be treated as a decree inter alia. We would
approve the view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala High
Court in P.T. Thomas [Thomas Job v. P.T. Thomas, 2003 SCC
OnLine Ker 270 : (2003) 3 KLT 936]. An award unless it is
successfully questioned in appropriate proceedings,
becomes unalterable and non-violable. In the case of a
compromise falling under Order 23 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it becomes a duty of the court to apply its
mind to the terms of the compromise. Without anything
more, the mere compromise arrived at between the
parties does not have the imprimatur of the court. It
68
becomes a compromise decree only when the procedures
in the Code are undergone.
64. An award passed under Section 19 of the 1987
Act is a product of compromise. Sans compromise, the
Lok Adalat loses jurisdiction. The matter goes back to the
court for adjudication. Pursuant to the compromise and
the terms being reduced to writing with the approval of
the parties it assumes the garb of an award which in turn
is again deemed to be a decree without anything more.
We would think that it may not be legislative intention to
treat such an award passed under Section 19 of the 1987
Act to be equivalent to an award of the court which is
defined in the Act as already noted by us and made under
Part III of the Act. An award of the court in Section 28-A
is also treated as a decree. Such an award becomes
executable. It is also appealable. Part III of the Act
contains a definite scheme which necessarily involves
adjudication by the court and arriving at the
compensation. It is this which can form the basis for any
others pressing claim under the same notification by
invoking Section 28-A. We cannot be entirely oblivious to
the prospect of an "unholy" compromise in a matter of
this nature forming the basis for redetermination as a
matter of right given under Section 28-A."
(Emphasis supplied)
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS:
13. On the observations made above, a decree drawn on the
compromise entered into before the Lok Adalat, is not a
compromise that is entered into under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the
CPC. Therefore, the writ petition alone is maintainable challenging
the said compromise. Even a third party in certain circumstances
69
depending upon the facts of a case, can prefer a writ petition
challenging the award of the Lok Adalat on the score that fraud was
committed by not arraying the petitioner as a proper and necessary
party to the suit. If a compromise petition under Order XXIII Rule
3 of the CPC is filed before the concerned Court, the concerned
Court has to mandatorily decide upon the compromise and not refer
the matter to the Lok Adalat. The concerned Court can refer the
matter to the Lok Adalat only upon the joint request of all the
parties to the suit.
14. The procedure is clear as is laid down by the Co-ordinate
Benches of this Court in the judgments as quoted hereinabove. The
concerned Courts shall follow the procedure, failing which, the
concerned Courts would be generating litigations and there will be
mushrooming of cases before this Court.
15. For all the aforesaid reasons, the following:
ORDER
(i) The Writ Petition is allowed.
(ii) The impugned decree dated 08.07.2023, drawn by the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, 70 Hospete, in O.S.No.165/2023 stands quashed and the suit in O.S.No.165/2023 is restored to the file.
(iii) In the event of any financial transaction has happened pursuant to the compromise in the suit, the same shall be deposited before the concerned Court, which shall however remain subject to the result of the proceedings in O.S.No.165/2023. Ordered accordingly.
SD/-
(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE nvj CT:SS