Madhya Pradesh High Court
M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, ... vs Pehlad Behari And Ors. on 6 December, 1985
Equivalent citations: AIR1986MP212, AIR 1986 MADHYA PRADESH 212, (1986) 2 TAC 238 (1986) MPLJ 140, (1986) MPLJ 140
JUDGMENT Rampal Singh, J.
1. M.P. State Road Transport Corporation, the appellant in this case, has preferred this appeal under Section 110 D, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (for short, hereinafter called 'the Act') against the award and decree passed by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Shivpuri for short, hereinafter called 'the Claims Tribunal') in Claim Case No. 39 of 1969 dated 11-5-1974.
2. The facts of the accident are not very much disputed. The short facts are that Santosh Bihari, the son of respondent 1, was at the time of the fatal accident in the service of the State of Madhya Pradesh as Sub-Inspector of Excise and was getting a salary of Rs. 215/- per month. From Guna he boarded the ill-fated bus belonging to the appellant. The findings of the Claims Tribunal, which have not seriously been disputed by the appellant, are that the deceased boarded Ujjain-Gwalior Bus No. M P.G. 3547 at Guna It was being driven by a driver employed by the appellant-Corporation. From the opposite direction two trucks were coming. The first truck brushed this bus of the Corporation and the following truck dashed headlong with the bus injuring the deceased seriously, resulting in his instantaneous death on the spot The Claims Tribunal has rightly found that the bus of the appellant was being driven rashly and negligently and the Corporation is liable to pay the claim. The (Claim) has been awarded at Rs. 20,000/- though respondents 1 to 8 had prayed for a compensation for Rs. one lac.
3. Shri V.G. Khot, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that according to Section 1A, Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, the brothers of the deceased, i.e., respondents 2 to 8 are not entitled to receive any compensation. The relevant part of this provision is reproduced below:
"***** Every such action or suit shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death shall have been so caused....."
Thus, the stand taken by Shri Khot seems to be tenable in view of this provision. It may be mentioned at the outset that respondents 2 to 8 are neither the dependants of the deceased as mentioned in Section 1A, Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, nor the legal representatives of the deceased under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Respondent 1 alone, who is the unfortunate father of the deceased, is dependant under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, and is also the legal representative in accordance with Section 8 Clause (1) of the Schedule to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. It is respondent 1 who could have maintained the action for recovery of the damages under Sections 1A and 2, Fatal Accidents Act, 1855. This view of mine gets a direct support from a Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Rameshchandra v. M.P. S. R. T.C, 1983 Acc CJ 221 : (AIR 1982 Madh Pra 165) and also the case of Budha Heer, 1981 MPLJ 30 : (AIR 1981 Mad Pra 151).
4. Shri M.M. Kaushik, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents 1 to 8, has seriously contended that even the brothers, Le., respondents 2 to 8, have also a right to receive the claim for the death of their brother. In support of his contention he has cited the case of M.A. Rahim, 1972 Acc CJ 470 : (AIR 1973 Mad 83). This is also a Division Bench judgment of the Madras High Court. According to this judgment, "the provisions of Sections 110 to 110-A of the Act purport to consolidate and amend the law relating to claims arising out of the motor accidents. These provisions are self-contained and exhaustive. There is no warrant for literally importing the provisions of the Fatal Accidents Act into Section 110-B, Motor Vehicles Act, so as to read both the provisions as part and parcel of the provisions." Thus, the Madras High Court's view is in direct conflict with the view of the Division Bench of this Court I shall prefer to follow the Division Bench judgment of this Court, and I refuse to follow the law laid down by the Madras High Court. I, therefore, hold that only respondent 1 Pahlad Bihari, the father of the deceased was a proper claimant before the Claims Tribunal and not his other sons, who are respondents 2 to 8. It is only respondent 1 who is entitled to receive the claim for the death of his son Santosh Bihari.
5. Respondents 1 to 8 have also filed a cross-objection to the appeal of the appellant According to this cross-objection, they have repeated their demand for getting a compensation of Rs. one lac. But, during the course of the arguments, Shri M.M. Kaushik has confined his demand only to Rs. 67,000/-He has calculated this amount that if the deceased remained receiving Rs. 215/- per month as pay, then he would have retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation at the age of 58 years, and the total salary for this period comes to Rs. 67,000/-He claims that even if the life expectancy is not taken into account but only the general damages are awarded, then respondent 1 has a right to get at least Rs. 67,000/- as compensation and not Rs. 20,000/- as awarded by the Claims Tribunal.
6. Shri Khot, learned counsel for the appellant, has cited several authorities of other High Courts and contended that the amount of Rs. 20,000/- awarded by the Claims Tribunal was not just and proper. These authorities do not cover the facts of the case at hand. The cases cited concern and determine the compensation with regard to the injuries in which no death has occurred.
7. With regard to the quantum of compensation, unfortunately, the Claims Tribunal has not applied its mind to the settled principles of law and has persuaded itself to be misled by such case laws which concern only with the compensation in injury casess. In the case of Ramesh Chandra (AIR 1982 Madh Pra 165) (supra), the Division Bench of this Court has exhaustively discussed the English law and also the Indian law on the point. According to Ramesh Chandra's case (supra) the correct approach in law to the assessment of damages in cases of this type should be fair compensation for the loss suffered by the deceased in his lifetime. There is no room for a 'conventional' award in case of the alleged loss of earnings of the lost years. The loss is pecuniary. As such, it must be shown, on the facts found, to be at least capable of being estimated. If sufficient facts are established by the claimants to enable the Claims Tribunal or this court to avoid the fancies of speculation, even though not enabling it to reach mathematical certainty, the Court must make the best estimate it can. In civil litigation it is the balance of probabilities which matters. In the case of death of a young man, who was not married, the old father, i.e., respondent 1, was definitely dependant upon the son, or he would have become so in future, Shri Khot has strenuously argued that in the testimony of respondent 1 it has been said that he was not dependant upon the earnings of the deceased son. This claim is very old, and may be at that time, respondent 1 was not dependant upon the earnings of the son, but by now, he must have attained old age. Had his deceased son been alive, respondent 1 would have received pecuniary benefits from his earning. In the case of Smt Manjushri Rana, AIR 1977 SC 1158, their Lordships have laid down the law and calculated the damages as given below:
"Held (i) that the Claims Tribunal and the High Court were wrong in not taking into account the salary of the deceased which he would have earned while reaching' the maximum of his grade long before his retirement The deceased was 37 years of age at the time of his death and would have reached his maximum pay of 900/-, 9 years before superannuation. The certificate from the Accountant GeneraFs office showed that the deceased would have drawn Rs. 1,88,000/-including the increments and the maximum grade drawn. Even if half of this be deducted as being rightly taken to have been spent by the deceased to cover day to day domestic expenses, payment of income-tax and other charges, the actual income lost to the family including the value of the estate and the loss to the dependants would be Rs. 94,000/-. This will be a fair estimate which does not take into account the economic value of the deprivation to the wife of her husband's company forever and the shock felt by the children. In those 'circumstances, therefore, the amount of Rs. 90,000/- would represent the correct compensation so far as the salary part of the deceased was concerned."
8. Keeping in view of all the facts and circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that this appeal should partly be allowed to the extent that respondents 2 to 8 are not entitled ft) receive any compensation for the death of their brother. I am also of the view that the cross-objection filed by respondents 2 to 8 deserves to be dismissed, but the cross-objection filed by respondent 1 deserves to be allowed. Shri Kaushik, learned counsel for the claimant-respondent 1 has submitted that only the salary till the date of superannuation should be considered as the adequate pecuniary compensation and has, thus, abandoned other grounds of the cross-objection, the prayer seems to be reasonable. But, he, while making this submission, has forgotten the vagaries of service in the department in which the deceased was serving. I, therefore, balancing every fact and after considering all the aspects involved, quantify the claim at Rs. 35,000/- as compensation to respondent i for the accidental death of his son. Accordingly, the award given by the Claims Tribunal is modified to the extent that respondent 1 shall receive the compensation quantified at Rs. 35,000/- from the appellant.
9. Before parting, I would like to observe that it is found that the Claims Tribunal avoided awarding interest on the amount of the damages awarded Keeping in view the taw propounded by the Supreme Court, respondent 1 shall also receive an interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the awarded compensation from the date on which the application for compensation was filed before the Claims Tribunal The appellant shall also bear the costs of the litigation throughout Counsel's fee according to schedule if certified.