Calcutta High Court
The Calcutta Jute Manufacturing ... vs Jute Manufacturers Development ... on 21 May, 1997
Equivalent citations: 1998(59)ECC92
Author: Satyabrata Sinha
Bench: Satyabrata Sinha
JUDGMENT Satyabrata Sinha, J.
1. The petitioner No. 1 is a Company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act and is engaged in the business of manufacture of jute products from its jute Mills situated at 33, Narkeldanga Main Road, Calcutta.
2. In this application the petitioner has for all intent and purport questioned the grant of subsidy under the External Market Assistance Scheme (hereinafter referred to as EMA) to the manufactures of jute twine as contradistinguished from jute yarn. The question which after a great deal of argument has been crystallised is as to whether jute yarn of more than one ply (such as 2-ply yarn or 3-ply yarn etc.) exported by the added respondents is jute yarn and, thus eligible to the benefit of EMA ? Certain other subsidiary questions have been raised in this application, namely, (1) whether the disputes sought to be raisd by the petitioner can appropriately be decided in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Costitution of India ? (2) whether the writ petitioner has locus standi to maintain the writ application ? and (3) whether this Court should exercise its discretionary jurisdiction as the petitioners are guilty of delay and laches in filing this writ petition ?
3. Before the said questions are adverted to, the basic fact which is not disputed may be noticed. The Central Government took steps to levy Cess on jute manufactures under the provision of Jute Manufactures Cess Act, 1983 in terms whereof duty of excise is levied on certain items including hessian (which the petitioners manufacture) as referred to in the schedule appended thereto. Sub-section (4) of Section 3 of the said Act reads as follows:--
The provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, and the rules made thereunder, including those relating to refunds and exemptions from duty, shall, so far as may be, apply in relation to the levy and collection of the duty of excise on jute manufactures under this Act
4. A Jute Special Development Fund was created by the Ministry of Textiles to the tune of Rs. 100 Crores on 31.3.1987 and by a notification dated 30th March, 1988 the Central Government directed payment of subsidy for certain specific kinds of jute products sold in the domestic market which admittedly does not include jute twine.
5. On or about 8.2.1989 a notification was issued by the Ministry of Textile extending subsidy to Export of items included under the Internal Market Assistance Scheme and by another circular dated 24.2.1989 the same was extended to exports of the specified jute products covered thereunder. Although the EMA Scheme was later on discontinued, the EMA is still in force. By a letter dated 12.1. 1995 the said EMA Scheme was extended upto 31st March, 1997 which according to the petitioner does not include jute twine and confines to Jute yarn only.
6. Mr. S.K. Kapoor, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, inter alia, submitted that the jute yarn and jute twine are two different marketable commodities having been separately defined in different statutes including Export of Jute Yarn and Jute Twine (Quality Control and Inspection) Rules, 1982 and, thus there being no disputed question as regard the fact that jute yarn and jute twine are two different commodities, the private respondents, who were added pursuant to an order dated 11.10.1996 passed by this Court, could not and cannot any further enjoy the benefit of EMA Scheme as, they, admittedly, are exporting more than one ply of jute yarn twisted together which is a jute twine and not jute yarn. According to the learned cousel, the respondent No. 2 in paragraph 29 of its affidavit-in-opposition afirmed by Sutirtha Bhattacharya has stated that Jute Yarn and Jute Twine are the same things. It is contended that the legislative intent is clear from the aforementioned rules which were framed in the context of export. It was submitted that different tariffs including the excise tariff, customs tariff etc. where a distinction has been made between the aforementioned two commodities on the basis of weight cannot have any application in the instant case inasmuch as the rate of duty thereunder for both the Jute Yarn and Jute Twine is the same and, thus for the purpose of those statutes, the nomenclature was irrelevant. It was further submitted that in those statutes Jute Twine had not been defined. The learned Counsel has further drawn this Court's attention to the affidavit of Nirmal Pujara affirmed on behalf of M/s. Champdani Industries Ltd. and in particular to paragraph 10 at page 18 thereof for the pupose of showing that even the respondents have categorically admitted that Jute Twine and Jute Yarn are two different commodities. The learned Counsel in this connection has also placed strong reliance upon a decision of Supreme Court of India in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India .
7. Mr. Dipankar Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Cheviot Company Limited submitted, inter alia, that there is nothing to show that Jute Yarn can only mean a single ply jute yarn and if it consists of more than one ply, it is Jute Twine. The learned Counsel submits that the definitions of Jute Yarn and Jute Twin as given in the Jute Yarn and Jute Twine (Quality Control & Inspection) Rules, 1982 and order dated 23rd October, 1982 or the classification of Jute Yarn under Heading No. 53. 07 and of Jute Twine under Heading No. 56.07 both in the Central Excise Tariff and in the Customs Tariff are not applicable in the instant case inasmuch as a single ply yarn, 2-ply yarn, 3-ply yarn etc. are only varieties of jute yarn which are used for weaving articles such as cloths, carpets etc. as would be evident from the Central Excise Tariff, Customs Tarif and ITC (HS) Clasification of Export and Import Items. This Court's attention has also been drawn to various authoritative books and publications on the subject and various certificates granted by various authorities to show that a Jute Yarn may be consisted of 2-ply or 3-ply. It was further submitted that as there existed some confusions, the Central Government and the concerned authorities had adopted the harmonised commodity description and coding system published by World Customs Organisation wherein it has categorically been stated that two-ply yarns or three-ply yarns are nothing else but different varieties of yarns and in suport of the aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on Fairchild's Dictionary of Texitiles (6th Edition), Encyclopedia of Textiles (Third Edition) Published by M/s. Prentice-Hall Inc., Textile Terms and Definitions (English Edition) Published by the Textile Institute, Manchester, Publication named "Yarns-A Survey of the Netherlands and other major Markets, in the European Union" Published by the Centre for the Promotion of Imports from developing countries and The Primary Structures of Fabrics published by the Textile Museum, Washington which have been annexed to the affidavit-in opposition filed on behalf of the State Government. It was submitted that the fact that such two-ply or three-ply yarns are yarns and are known and dealt with as yarns in trade and commercial parlance nationally as well as internationally would also be evident from the various certificates which have been annexed to the affidavits. Relying on certain invoices it was submitted that even prior to the coming into force of EMA Scheme two-ply or three-ply yarns are allowed to be exported as Jute Yarn and the same criteria is also now being followed. In the alternative it was submitted that Jute Twine is also a variety or type of jute yarn. It was submitted that 1982 Rules upon which Mr. Kapoor has placed reliance upon, has no application in the instant case and in any event, the concerned authorities who are experts on the subject having been allowing the private respondents to export their products as jute yarn, the same cannot be questioned before this Court nor can this Court exercise its jurisdiction in relation thereto under Article 226 of Constitution of India. It was further submitted that only because the petitioner pays Cess in terms of the Cess Act, the said fact by itself does not make them eligible to maintain a writ application questioning the subsidy granted by the Central Government to the private respondents only on the ground that had such subsidy been not granted, the money saved therefrom could have been utilised for development of other jute products. The learned Counsel further contends that keeping in view the fact that the said Scheme has been continuing since 1989, this application should not be entertained after such long delay. The learned Counsel in support of his contention that yarn and twine are not two different manufactured products relied on Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Banswara Syntex Ltd., and Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd., .
8. Mr. Bajoria, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of M/s. Champdani Industries Ltd. has drawn this Court's attention to paragraph 39 of the petition and submitted that from a perusal thereof it would appear that the contention of the petitioner is only that Jute Yarn of more than one strand is jute twine. It was pointed out that the purpose of yarn and twine are different inasmuch as while for the purpose of production of yarn sophisticated machinery are required but jute twine can be produced in ordinary machines.
9. Mr. Bhaskar Gupta, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 2 has referred to Annexure 'J' to the writ application which is a flow chart and submits that even on the petitioner's own showing, a jute yarn may be 2-ply for 3-ply. This Court's attention was also drawn to the sample invoices to show that2-ply or 3-ply jute yarns are exported as yarn. Mr. Gupta also relied upon a division bench decision in the Bomby High Court in Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors., reported in 1980 ELT 249 (Bom), which has been affirmed by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. .
10. Mr. Mallick and Mr. Saha, the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of other respondents and Mr. Roy Chowdhury, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of Union of India adopted the aforementioned submissions. In the aforementioned back-drop of facts and submissions the question in this application has to be considered.
11. It is not in dispute that although subsidy under EMA Scheme is applicable to Jute Yarn the same is not applicable in respect of Jute Twine, It is also not in dispute that for a long time Jute Yarn and Jute Twine are treated differently by the concerned authorities depending upon the purpose for which it is used and the quality thereof as also their weight measured in 'Denier' which is unit numerically equal to one gram per 9,000 meters of yarn whereas years of heavy varieties exceeding 18,000 deniers have been artificially treated as 'twine' in the Central Excise Tariff.
12. The Jute Manufactures Cess Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as the 1983 Act) provides for levy of Cess, the proceeds whereof are credited to the consolidated fund of India and a portion thereof may be paid to Jute Manufacturers Development Council in terms of Jute Manufacturers Development Council Act, 1983. As noticed hereinbefore under Section 3(4) of the 1983 Act the provision of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the Rules made thereunder shall apply in relation to the levy and collection of the said Cess. Thus reference has to be made first to the provisions of the Central Excise Act, 1944.
13. Clauses 11 and 12 of section XI at page 436 of the Central Excise Tariff of India, 1996 by R.K. Jain (30th Edition), read thus:--
11. In this Section, the expression 'count; wherever it appears, means the size of grey yarn (excluding any sizing material) expressed in English count. For multiple fold yarn, count means the count of the basic single yarn. Where the count is in fraction, then, if the fraction is one-half or more it shall be treated as one and if such fraction is less than one-half, it shall be ignored.
12. (a) ...
(e) Of other vegetable fibres, measuring more than 18000 deniers.
14. Coloured (Dyed or Printed) Yarn has, inter alia, been stated to be multiple (folded) or cabled and consists of unbleached or bleached yarn and coloured yarn. Similarly bleached yarn has been defined as multiple (folded) or cabled and consists of unbleached and bleached yarns.
15. Clause 53.07 of Chapter 53 which deals with other vegetable Texitile Fibres, Paper Yarn, Woven Fabrics of such Yarn provides for the same amount of excise both for single or multiple (folded) or cabled yarn.
16. Clause 56.08, however, provides for 15% of duty in respect of knotted netting of twine, cordage or rope; made up fishing nets and other made up nets of textile materials.
17. Similar are the provisions under Customs Tariff of India, 1996-97.
18. In the ITC (HS) classification of Export and Import Items, Clause 3 of section XI Textiles and Textile Articles reads thus:--
3. (A) ...
(e) Of other vegetable fibres, measuring more than 20,000 decitex
19. In the Explanatory Notes, Second edition of Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, Volume-2 published by the World Customs Organisation, Clause 3 of Section XI reads thus:--
3. (A) ...
(e) Of other vegetable fibres, measuring more than 20,000 decitex.
20. Bleached yarn or coloured yarn like the Excise Tariff or the Customs Tariff has been stated to be consisted of multiple (folded) or cabled.
21. A great deal of literature and process have been placed by the private respondents to show that whereas yarn for export quality can be manufactured only on sophisticated machines, no such requirement exists for manufacture of twine.
22. In the affidavit-in-opposition afirmed by Nirmal Pujara on behalf of Champdani Industries Ltd, it is stated that twine is normally used for typing, packing and sewing whereas the ply yarn exported are used for weaving into carpets, fabrics etc. The details of manufacture of yarn and twine respectively have been stated in various subparagraphs of the said paragraph. Mr. Kapoor, the learned Counsel, has relied upon Clause 'J' of the said paragraph which reads thus:--
Two or more spun strands are twisted together directly from the spinning bobbins for obtaining twine. On the other hand, in export yarn making, the spun strands from spinning bobbins are first wound on primary winding spools on the Machroll winding machine which has a mechanical slub catcher to remove any thick places in the yarn and thereby ensure its uniformity. Further, the twisting machine in the case of export yarn making has an automatic individual spindle stop motion which ensures that the final yarn has the requisite number of plys. In other words, if any ply breaks in the twisting operation resulting in reduction of the number of plys in the final yarn then the concerned spindle immediately stops so that rectificatory action can be undertaken. The twisting machine used for twine making does not have any such feature and as a result the final yarn may have lesser than the requisite number of plys at places. Furthermore, ordinary knots are applied in the twisting operation for twine making whereas in export yarn making weaver's knots of much smaller size are applied in order to facilitate weaving.
23. It is well known that the entire pleading have to be read as a whole. The said pleadings have been made to show how twine and yarn are not only treated differently but manufactured from different quality of jute and are used for different purposes.
24. It is true that a submission has also been made that there is no difference between jute yarn and jute twine. It is also true that in Rule 2(d) and 2(e) of Rule 1982, Jute Yarn and Jute Twine has been defined in the following terms:--
(d) 'Jute Yarn' means all varieties of Jute Yarn spun out of jute fibre.
(e) 'Jute Twine' means plied jute yarn made by twisting together two or more strands of jute yarn.
25. No restriction has been put so that 2 ply or 3 ply Jute Yarn would cease to be jute yarns. In other words a jute yarn is not converted into a different commodity viz., jute Twine, only because two or more strands are twisted together.
26. The various literatute, documents and certificates produced before this Court by the respondents do not leave any manner of doubt that a particular type of yarn meant for export and which are used for manufacture of fibre, carpet etc. whether consisting of 2 plies or3 plies have been treated to be yarn for the said purpose and adistinction between twine and yarn is also made on the basis of the weight of the materials. The rate of excise duty or the customs dutyis not relevant as was suggested by Mr. Kapoor. In this view of the matter, this Court cannot but hold that there existed a great deal of confusion in the definition of Jute Yarn and Jute 'Twine. Even the Judicial opinion appears to be divergent.
27. It is true that in 1982 Rules, Jute Yarn and Jute Twine are defined separately but there is nothing to show that a jute Yarn would consist of only one ply although the trend of the definition suggests so but the said definition is only for a particular purpose i.e for the purpose of the said Rules. A commodity defined in a particular rule may not have much relevance in the context of definition of the said commodity in another statutes, particularly when the purposes of such statutes are different. The court in a case of this nature, although may come to a conclusion that the submission of the petitioner has some substance, would refrain from interpreting it differently as the definition of Jute Yarn and Jute Twine in the context of grant of subsidy under EMA Scheme has been giving different meaning by all concerned. It is now well known that where two interpretations are possible, the court would lean in favour of one which had been holding the field for a long time. It is further well known that a provision granting fiscal benefit to an industry should be construed and liberally.
28. The Scheme has been interpreted by the concerned authorities in a particular manner for the benefit of the exporter of yarn. Such a beneficent scheme, in view of the well known interpretation of statutes should be construed in favour of those persons for whose benefit the scheme has been enacted and understood as such by all concerned.
29. Francis Bennion in Statutory Interpretation at Section 94 states:--
Strained construction: former 'equitable construction' in former times the practice of giving a strained meaning to statutes was known as equitable construction. This term had not more than an oblique reference to the technical doctrines or equity, but mainly indicated a free or liberal construction.
COMMENTARY Equitable construction was felt to be required for two reasons. The first concerned the need to soften the harshness of some general rule laid down by Parliament. As Buckland and McNair said in their Roman Law and Common Law--
In all systems of law, at all stages except the most primitive, there is a constant conflict between two methods of interpretation, the strict and the 'equitable' sometimes expressed as being between verba and voluntas, which is not quite the same. There is both in Roman and in English law a steady tenancy towards the triumph of the "equitable" doctrine. (2nd Edn. 1952, at p. xviii)
30. The other reason for so-called equitable construction arose from an opposite consideration. Early statutes were drawn by the Judges, and lacked precision of language. In a case in 1305 Hengham CJ told counsel that he must not gloss the statute, adding: "We understand it better than you do, for we made it". (YB 33-35 Edw I (RS) 82). Often the wording of statutes was not settled until after the close of sessin in which they were passed. It seemed quite natural for the judges to continue the drafting process in court. As Coke put it--
Equity is a construction made by the judges, that cases out of the letter of a statute, yet being within the same mischief, or cause of the making or the same, shall be within the same remedy, that the statute provideth, and the reason hereof is, for that the law makers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms'. (1 Co Inst 24(b). )
31. The principle of equitable construction was described in asixteenth century case as follows--
For everthing which is within the intent of the makers of the Act, although it be not within the letter, is as strongly within the Act as that which is within the letter and intent also.
[Eyston v. Stud (1574) 2 Plowd 459; 75 ER 692. See also Stradling v. Morgan (1584) 1 Plowd 199 : 75 ER 308 (quoted in Cox v. Hakes (1890) 15 AC 506 at p. 518) : Vernon's Case (1572) 4 Co Rep la, at p. 4a; Turtle v. Hartwell (1795) 6 Term Rep 426, at p. 429; Johnes v. Johnes (1814 3 Dow 1, at p. 15; Lyde v. Barnard (1836) 1 M & W 101. at p. 113; Hay v. Perth Lord Provost and Magistrates (1863) 4 Macq 535, at p. 544; Shuttelworth v. he Fleming (1865) 19 CBNS 687, at p. 703; Re Bolton Estates, Rusell v. Meyrick (1903) 2 CH 461. See Example 146. 28).
Dwarris described equitable construction in this way--
Sometimes the makers of a statute put the strongest case, and, by construction, the lesser shall be included; here the cases are put by way of example, and not as excluding other thing of a similar nature. Where, moreover, the words are general, and a statute is only declaratory of the common law, it shall extend to others besides the persons or things named. Sometimes, on the contrary, the expressions used are restrictive, and intended to exclude all things which are not enumerated. Thus, where certain specific things are taxed, or subjected to any charge, it seems probable, that it was intended to exclude everything else even a similar nature, and, a fortiori, all things different in genus and description from those which are enumerated for instance it is agreed that mines in general are not rated to the poor within the stat. 43 Eliz Order 2, and that the mention in that statute of coal mines is not by way of example, but in exclusion of all other mines. (2 Dwarr Stats 712)
32. Towards the end of the eighteenth century a reaction set in favouring literal construction. (See Brandling v. Barrington (1927) 6B & C 467 at p. 475; A-G v. Sillem (1864) 2H & C 431, (at p. 532).Nevertheless in his selection of legal maxims first published in 1854, Broom could still writ--
In interpreting an act of Parliament it is not, in general, a true line of construction to decide according to the strict letter of the Act; but the Courts will rather consider what is its fair meaning, and will expound it differently from the letter, in order to preserve the intent.
33. Lord Denning pointed out that community instruments are not expressed against the background of English Rules, principles, presumption and cannon of constructions and should not be construed as if they were.
(H.P. Balmer Ltd. v. J. Bollinger SA (1974) 1 Ch. 410.)
34. In Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes 12th Edition Page 82 it is stated:--
but whether they are faced with a choice between a wide meaning which carried out what apears to have been the object of the legislature more fully, and a narrow meaning which carries it but less fully or not at all, they will often chose the further. Beneficial constructions is a tendency rather than rule.
35. In this peculiar context, the rule of law that any beneficent provision has to be liberally construed would also come into play. Way back in (Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chuganda & Co. (Securities) it had been observed as follows:--
Lastly, it was argued by Mr. Palkhivala that, since we are dealing with an exemption clause, if there was any doubt as to the true interpretation of the exemption clause, the exemption should be liberally construed provided no violence is done to the language employed in the section. This, no doubt, has been held to be the proper canon of construction by the Calcutta High Court in Commissioner of Agricultural Income-tax v. Raja Jagadish Chandra Deo (1949) 17 ITR 426,438 and by the Patna High Court in Kameshwar Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax and we certainly accept that canon of construction.
36. Again a Division Bench of Madras High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Tamil Nadu I v. Simoson and Co. (1980) 122 ITR283, has held as follows:--
It is also a well-settled principle of construction that in construing a provision for exemption of relief, if should be liberally construed. The reason behind this rule of interpretation is that the administrative authorities or the courts should not whittle down the plenitude of the exemption or relief granted by Parliament by laying stress on any ambiguity here or there.
37. In Garware Nylons Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. reported in1980 ELT 249 (Bom), the division bench of the Bombay High Court was considering the question as to whether nylon yarn and nylon twine are the same commodities or not. It was observed :--
The term 'yarn' has been considered in a number of cases by different Courts, mainly in connection with Sales Tax, Thus, in Madura Mills Co. Ltd. v. Government of Madras and Anr. 25 STC 407, the Madars High Court was required to consider whether cotton tyre-cord warp sheet could be considered as cotton yarn under the provisions of the Sales Tax Acts. The Court came to the conclusion that string, cord and rope are merely different species of the same genus, namely, yard, and held that cord is cotton yard in the accepted commercial sense. In Commissioner of Sales Tax. U.P. v. Sarin Textile Mills, 35 STC 634, the Supreme Court was required to consider whether woollen carpet kati was yarn under the U.P. Sales Tax Act. The Supreme Court, after referring to the dictionary meaning of the term 'yarn' that a fibre, in order to answer the description of yarn in the ordinary commercial sense, must have two characteristics. Firstly, it should be a spun strand. Secondly, such strand should be primarily meant for use in weaving, knitting or rope-making. In this case also the Supreme Court applied the test of ordinary commercial sense. There is also an unreported decision of the Calcutta High Court in Civil Rule No. 3934(W) of 1970, General Distributors (International) v. Commercial Tax Officer, Radhabazar Charge, dated 1st March, 1973, where Chittatosh Mukherjee, J. has considered twine thread purchased by the petitioner therein as yarn within the meaning of the Bengal Finance (Sales Tax) Act. In the present case also, if we consider the characteristics of Yarn as laid down in the above case by the Supreme Court, twine satisfies both the tests. It is a spun strand and it is primarily meant for use in weaving, fishing nets and in rope-making.
38. The aforementioned decision has been upheld by the Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Garware Nylons Ltd. . The learned Judges, inter alia, noticed:--
In this case, clinching evidence is afforded to demonstrate that trade and industry which deals with the goods, consider 'Nylons Twine' as a kind of Nylon Yarn.
In Collector of Central Excise, Jaipur v. Banswara Syntex Ltd. it was held:--
It is immaterial, in view of Rule 9(1) of the Central Excise Rules and Section 49 of the Act whether the yarn so manufactured is capitively consumed or is subject to any other or further process. Reference may be made to J.K. Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd. and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. where Rules 9 and 49, of the Central Excise Rules, 1944, after they were amended with retrospective effect by Section 51 of the Finance Act 1982 came up for interpretation. It was held that in view of the deeming provisions under Explanation to Rules 9 and 49, although the goods which are produced or manufactured at an intermediate stage and thereafter, consumed or utilised in the integrated process for the manufacture of another commodity is not actually removed, shall be construed and regarded as removed.
39. On the other hand, in Aditya Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, , Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J. speaking for a two Judge division bench observed:--
Hence, the short question involved in this appeal, is whether the words in question, namely, a special type of yarn marked as a finished product known as PPRF Yarn should be treated as such and taxed on that basis. Excise duty is a duty on the manufacture of goods and not on sale. Manufacture is complete as soon as by the application of one or more process, the raw materials undergoes some change. If a new substance is brought into existence or if a new or different article having a distinct name, character or use results from particular process or processes, such process or activity would amount to manufacture. The moment there is transformation into a new commodity commercially known as a separate and distinct commodity having its own character and use, 'manufacture takes place.
40. In Indian Cable Co. Ltd., Calcutta v. Collector of Central Excise, Calcutta and Ors., , it was held:--
In the latest decision in A.P. State Electricity Board v. CCE Hyderabad, one of us (B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J.) speaking for the Bench succinctly stated the law thus at pages 549 and 550:
Marketability is an essential ingredient in order to be dutiable under the Schedule to the Act. The 'Marketability' is thus essentially a question of fact to be decided in the facts of each case. There can be no generalisation.
41. It is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom.
42. As there is no direct decision on the point, I am of the opinion, that keeping in view the fact that jute yarn and jute twine have been considered separately by all concerned, it cannot be said that they have the same meaning but as I have noticed hereinbefore, there is no other option but to hold that the Court will assume the same norms as has been adopted by the concerned authorities for describing jute yarn and jute twine for the purpose of EMA Scheme particularly in view of the fact that the said practice is in vogue for a long time.
43. Moreover, such a question normally should not be decided in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Before this Court samples of Jute Yarn and Jute Twine had been produced. A bare look to the said commodities does not leave any manner of doubt that the purpose for which the said commodities are manufactured is completely different. It is in this sense, it has a different trade name as also defined separately in the concerned statutes, but the distinction between the definition of two commodities therein is clear. The petitioners are not directly affected by reason of grant of subsidy to the private respondents under EMA Scheme. The said Scheme is in force from 1989. If the contention of Mr. Kapoor is accepted, the private respondents have to return a huge amount to which they became entitled by reason of a long standing practice. In that view of the matter too it is a case in which this Court should not exercise its discretion in favour of the petitioner particularly when the writ petition has been filed after a long time. The writ petitioners are also gulity of serious delay and laches in filing the writ application. In view of my findings aforementioned it is not necessary to consider the question of locus of the petitioner.
44. For the reasons aforementioned this application is dismissed but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs.