Madras High Court
P.J.Murthy vs P.A.Sundari on 16 April, 2012
Author: G.Rajasuria
Bench: G.Rajasuria
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 16.04.2012 Coram: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA C.R.P.(NPD).No.874 of 2012 and M.P.No.1 of 2012 P.J.Murthy ... Petitioner vs P.A.Sundari ... Respondent Civil revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 as amended by Act 23/73 and 1 of 1980 against the judgment and decree dated 22.11.2011 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Ranipet in R.C.A.No.2 of 2009 in confirming the order and decree dated 28.11.2008 passed by the learned District Munsif, Sholingur in RCOP No.2 of 2006. For Petitioner : Mr.M.V.Venkataseshan for Mr.S.Kumaresan For Respondent : Mr.C.Selvaraju, Senior counsel for Mr.M.V.Muralidharan ORDER
Animadverting upon the judgment and decree dated 22.11.2011 passed by the learned Subordinate Judge, Ranipet in R.C.A.No.2 of 2009 in confirming the order and decree dated 28.11.2008 passed by the learned District Munsif, Sholingur in RCOP No.2 of 2006, this civil revision petition has been focussed by the tenant.
2. The parties, for convenience sake, are referred to here under according to their litigative status and ranking before the Rent Controller.
3. Broadly but briefly, narratively but precisely, the germane facts, absolutely necessary for the disposal of this civil revision petition would run thus:
(i)The respondent herein filed an application seeking eviction of the tenant on the ground of wilful default in paying rent as well as for her personal requirement for occupying the premises for her intended fancy shop business by invoking Sections 10(2) (i) and 10(3) (a) (iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act.
(iii)The revision petitioner/respondent resisted the petition by disputing the landlady and tenant relationship and also challenging the very factum of the premises having been sold by the revision petitioner in favour of the respondent.
(v) During enquiry, on the landlady's side, her husband-K.Gopal was examined as PW1 along with PW2 and marked Exs.P1 to P13. On the side of the respondent/tenant, he examined himself as RW1 and marked Exs.R1 to R3.
(iv) Ultimately, the Rent controller ordered eviction and dismissed the RCOP.
(v) Aggrieved by the order of the Rent Controller, the tenant preferred appeal in RCA.No.2 of 2009 for nothing but to be dismissed by the Appellate Authority confirming the order passed by the Rent Controller.
(vi) Challenging and impugning the orders of both the courts below, this revision has been filed by the tenant on various grounds.
4. Heard both sides.
5. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant, placing reliance on the grounds of revision would pilot his argument, which could pithily and precisely be set out thus:
(i) Both the courts below failed to consider the fact that there was no iota or shred, shard or miniscule extent of evidence adduced on the side of the alleged landlady's side relating to the landlady and tenant relation ship between the the respondent and the revision petitioner herein.
(ii) There is nothing to indicate that the rent was fixed at Rs.2,500/- per month for each shop and altogether Rs.5,000/- for both the shops.
(iii) There is no evidence to show that any steps have been taken for starting the fancy shop business by the respondent.
(iv) Merely placing reliance on some stray sentences in the deposition of the revision petitioner, during enquiry, the Rent Controller was not justified in ordering eviction as though there was landlady and tenant relationship between the parties herein.
Accordingly, he would pray for setting aside the orders of both the courts below.
6. In a bid to torpedo and to make mincemeat of the arguments as put forth and set forth on the side of the revision petitioner/tenant, the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would advance his argument, the pith and marrow of the same would run thus:
a] There is no bar under the law that a Rent Controller should not place reliance on the candid and categorical admission made by the respondent/tenant while he was deposing in the RCOP proceedings. Here, the Rent Controller appropriately and appositely, correctly and convincingly highlighted the admission made by the revision petitioner herein during his cross-examination that he had been occupying the demised premises as a tenant under the respondent herein.
b] The counter is as silent as silence could be, relating to the claim of the respondent herein for her personal occupation of the demised premises for conducting fancy store business.
c] Without the back up of the pleadings, no party could put forth any new plea, for the first time before any fora. Quite antithetical to the sale deed, the executant of it, cannot put forth any plea.
d] The narration on the side of the revision petitioner as though the sale was not intended to be acted upon, but it emerged purely with the understanding that on repayment of the alleged loan amount by the revision petitioner to the respondent, the latter has to re-convey the property in favour of the former, is nothing but a mere nancy story dished out for the purpose of wriggling out of his liability to vacate the demised premises.
Accordingly, the learned senior counsel would pray for the dismissal of the revision.
7. The points for consideration are as under:
1. Whether the plea of the revision petitioner challenging the prayer of the respondent herein seeking eviction based on the sale deed executed by the revision petitioner in favour of the respondent, is tenable, and if so, whether it was not considered by both the authorities below in proper perspective?
2. Whether the admission of R.W.1 relied on by the authorities below, is legally tenable for deciding the landlady and tenant relationship?
3. Whether the revision petitioner is entitled to challenge the requirement of the respondent herein for her business the demised premises, without pleading so specifically in the counter and in that regard, whether both the courts below committed any error?
4. Whether both the courts below were justified in holding that the revision petitioner committed willful default in paying the rent in favour of the respondent herein?
5. Whether there is any perversity or illegality in the adjudication passed by both the courts below?
8. All these points are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven, inter-connected and entwined with one another.
9. At the outset itself, I would like to fumigate my mind with the following maxim:
judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata It is the duty of a judge to decide according to facts alleged and proved.
10. The aforesaid jurisprudential principle cannot be urged to be one not applicable to the Rent Control proceedings, which are indubitably judicial proceedings. Jurisprudential principles cannot be given a go-bye either by the Rent Controller or by the Appellate Authority under the Rent Control while dealing with matters.
11. As has been correctly pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady, the revision petitioner should stick on to his counter and he cannot for the first time in this revision put forth and set forth certain pleas and that too orally, which were not raised in the counter. He would also hasten to add that even in the revision petition, such grounds have not been raised.
12. A mere running of the eye over the counter filed by the revision petitioner in the RCOP, would exemplify and demonstrate that the main focus of the revision petitioner in the RCOP was as against the purport of the sale deed executed by the revision petitioner in favour of the respondent. He would also try to explain and expound that the oral arrangement between the revision petitioner and the respondent was to the effect that the sale deed was executed by the revision petitioner in favour of the respondent by way of securing the prompt repayment of the loan availed by the former from the latter and on repayment of such loan, the respondent herein was bound to re-convey the property to the revision petitioner. According to him, there was no landlady and tenant relationship and consequently, there is no liability on the part of the revision petitioner to pay rent also in favour of the respondent.
13. I recollect and call up Section 92 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 which is extracted here under for ready reference and the decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court emerged there under:
"92. Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement When the terms of any such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms:
Proviso (1) Any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto, such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, [want or failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.
Proviso (2) The existence of any separate oral agreement as to any matter on which a document is silent, and which is not inconsistent with its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or not this proviso applies, the court shall have regard to the degree of formality of the document.
Proviso (3) The existence of any separate oral agreement, constituting a condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation under any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved.
Proviso (4) The existence of any distinct subsequent oral agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition of property, may be proved, except in cases in which such contract, grant or disposition of property is by law required to be in writing, or has been registered according to the law in force for the time being as to the registration of documents.
Proviso (5) Any usage or custom by which incidents not expressly mentioned in any contract are usually annexed to contracts of that description, may be proved:
Provided that the annexing of such incident would not be repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract.
Proviso (6) Any fact may be proved which shows in what manner the language of a document is related to existing facts."
(i) (1982) 1 SCC 4, at page 10 -Gangabai v. Chhabubai, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"11. The next contention on behalf of the appellant is that sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Evidence Act bars the respondent from contending that there was no sale and, it is submitted, the respondent should not have been permitted to lead parol evidence in support of the contention. Section 91 of the Evidence Act provides that when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself. Sub-section (1) of Section 92 declares that when the terms of any contract, grant or other disposition of property, or any matter required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, have been proved according to the last section, no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to any such instrument or their representatives in interest, for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms. And the first proviso to Section 92 says that any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake in fact or law. It is clear to us that the bar imposed by sub-section (1) of Section 92 applies only when a party seeks to rely upon the document embodying the terms of the transaction. In that event, the law declares that the nature and intent of the transaction must be gathered from the terms of the document itself and no evidence of any oral agreement or statement can be admitted as between the parties to such document for the purpose of contradicting or modifying its terms. The sub-section is not attracted when the case of a party is that the transaction recorded in the document was never intended to be acted upon at all between the parties and that the document is a sham. Such a question arises when the party asserts that there was a different transaction altogether and what is recorded in the document was intended to be of no consequence whatever. For that purpose oral evidence is admissible to show that the document executed was never intended to operate as an agreement but that some other agreement altogether, not recorded in the document, was entered into between the parties (Tyagaraja Mudaliyar v. Vedathanni919). The trial court was right in permitting the respondent to lead parol evidence in support of her plea that the sale deed dated January 7, 1953 was a sham document and never intended to be acted upon. It is not disputed that if the parol evidence is admissible, the finding of the court below in favour of the respondent must be accepted. The second contention on behalf of the appellant must also fail.
(ii) 1993-2-L.W.205 NANJAMMAL (DIED) AND ANOTHER V. PALANIAMMAL, certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"5. It was one of the contentions urged in the Court below that the plaintiff had not even obtained encumbrance certificate before the execution of Exhibit A1 and she had not taken the title deed from the defendant. The Court below has pointed out the recital in Exhibit A1 under which the defendant had undertaken to obtain an encumbrance certificate and give it to the plaintiff. The fact that the plaintiff had not taken the title deed in advance does not in any way discredit the truth of the agreement in Exhibit A1. In fact, the evidence of the defendant is that what was written was really an agreement though it was only for the purpose of securing the loan. She (defendant) has admitted that the plaintiff wanted her to execute an agreement for sale by way of security for the loan and she did execute such an agreement. When that is the fact, it is not open to the defendant to raise a plea that the terms of the agreement should be ignored as the real purpose was to secure the loan transaction. It is conceded by learned counsel for the appellants that the defendant is barred from raising such a plea by S.92 of the Indian Evidence Act.
6. Hence the only question to be considered is whether the relief of specific performance should not be granted to the plaintiff. The normal rule is that once the truth of the agreement is made out the Court shall enforce it unless there are circumstances which would prove that equity will suffer by enforcing the agreement for sale. In the present case no such circumstances has been brought to the notice of the Court either in the pleadings or in the evidence to show that equity favours the defendant and relief of specific performance should be denied. The defendant has stated in the evidence that the property was worth much more than Rs.1,01,000/- at the time of the agreement. But there is absolutely no evidence in support of the same. No document has been produced to prove the value of the lands in the locality and no witness has been examined to speak to the same. In such circumstances we cannot accept the case of the defendant that the property is more valuable than the consideration mentioned in Exhibit A1."
(iii) (2007) 10 SCC 231 [ P.S.Ranakrishna Reddy vs. M.K.Bhagyalakshmi and another]. An excerpt from it would run thus:
"7. Mr.G.V.Chandrashekhar, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submitted that the learned trial Judge as also the High Court committed a serious error in construing the said document as an agreement for sale instead and place of an agreement for loan. It was urged that having regard to the fact that diverse amounts had been taken by the appellant from the respondents as also the fact that similar agreements for sale were entered into by and between the appellant and other persons categorically demonstrate that he had merely borrowed some amount and the purported agreement for sale was not meant to be acted upon.
12. No part of the agreement supports the contention of Mr.Chandrasekhar that the same was not meant to be acted upon. It was signed by the parties. Two witnesses who had attested the signature of the parties to said agreement, respondent 1 was allowed to continue to remain in possession of the premises in question as a tenant and not in part performance of the said agreement for sale, but it was not necessary for the parties to adopt the latter course only. The parties, on a plain reading of the agreement, apparently intended to continue their relationship as landlord and tenant till a regular deed of sale was executed.
15. The decision of this Court in Dadarao whereupon reliance has been placed by Mr.Chandrashekhar is wholly misplaced. The terms of the agreement therein was absolutely different. We need not dilate on the said decision in view of the fact that in a subsequent decision of this Court in P.D'Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu it has been held to have been rendered per incuriam, stating : (SCC pp.657-58, paras 34-36).
34. In Dadarao whereupon Mr.Bhat placed strong reliance, the binding decision of M.L.Devender Singh was not noticed. This Court furthermore failed to notice and consider the provisions of Section 23 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The said decision, thus, was rendered per incuriam.
35. Furthermore, the relevant terms stipulated in Dadarao was as under: (SCC p.417, para 2) "2. ........"Tukaram Devsarkar, aged about 65, agriculturist, r/o Devsar, purchaser (GHENAR) Balwantrao Ganpatrao Pande, aged 76 years, r/o Dijadi, Post Devsar, vendor (DENAR), who hereby give in in writing that a paddy field situated at Dighadi Mouja, Survey No.7/2 admeasuring 3 acres belonging to me hereby agree to sell to you for Rs.2000 and agree to receive Rs.1000 from you in presence of V.D.N.Sane. A sale deed shall be made by me at my cost by 15.04.1972. In case the sale deed is not made to you or if you refuse to accept, in addition of earnest money an amount of Rs.500 shall be given or taken and no sale deed will be executed. The possession of the property has been agreed to be delivered at the time of purchase. This agreement is binding on the legal heirs and successors and assigns.
Interpreting the said term, it was hedl: (SCC p.418, paras 6-7)
6. The relationship between the parties has to be regulated by the terms of the agreement between them. Whereas the defendants in the suit had taken up the stand that the agreement dated 24.04.1969 was really in the nature of a loan transaction, it is the plaintiff who contended that it was an agreement to sell. As we read the agreement, it contemplates that on or before 15.04.1972 the sale deed would be executed. But what is important is that the agreement itself provides as to what is to happen if either the seller refuses to sell or the purchaser refuses to buy. In that even the agreement provides that in addition to the earnest money of Rs.1000 a sum of Rs.500 was to be given back to Tukaram Devsarkar and that "no sale deed will be executed". The agreement is very categorical in envisaging that a sale deed is to be executed only if both the parties agree to do so and in the event of any one of them resiling from the same there was to be no question of the other party being compelled to go ahead with the execution of the sale deed. In the event of the sale deed not being executed, Rs.500 in addition to the return of Rs.1000, was the only sum payable. This sum of Rs.500 perhaps represented the amount of quantified damages or as the defendants would have it, interest payable on Rs.1000.
7. If the agreement had not stipulated as to what is to happen in the event of the sale not going through, then perhaps the plaintiff could have asked the Court for a decree of specific performance but here the parties to the agreement had agreed that even if the seller did not want to execute the sale deed he would only be required to refund the amount of Rs.1000 plus pay Rs.500 in addition thereto. There was thus no obligation on Balwantrao to complete the sale transaction."
36. Apart from the fact that the agreement of sale did not contain a similar clause, Dadarao does not create a binding precedent having not noticed the statutory provisions as also an earlier binding precedent".
17. The contention of the appellant has been rejected both by the learned trial Judge as also by the High Court upon assigning sufficient and cogent reasons. The agreement has been held to have been executed by the parties in support whereof large number of witnesses had been examined. The High Court, in particular in its judgment, has categorically opined that when the respondents served a notice upont he appellant on 29.05.1981, it was expected of the appellant to raise a contention that the said agreement was sham one or nominal one and was not meant to be acted upon but it was not done. Failure on the part of the appellant to do so would give rise to an inference that the plea raised in the suit was an afterthought."
(emphasis supplied) A mere poring over and perusal of the above provision of law and also the aforesaid precedents emerged thereunder, would connote and denote that once there is a registered sale deed then, pleading quite against it is normally barred. No evidence on the revision petitioner's side is available in support of his plea that the sale deed was not intended to be acted upon.
14. Here, the revision petitioner also has not pleaded any fraud or coercion or forgery etc. I would like to point out that there is also nothing to indicate that the revision petitioner as respondent in the RCOP invoked the relevant provision under Section 10 the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act, 1960 for getting any order from the Rent Controller that there was bona fide title dispute involved in the matter.
15. Hence, ex facie and prima facie, I could see no substance in the contention of the revision petitioner that the said sale deed executed by the revision petitioner was not intended to be acted upon as sale. By way of adding fuel to the fire and also by fanning the flame, RW1 the revision petitioner himself during cross examination had stated thus:
@ehd; FoapUg;gJ thliff;F jhd;/ tpahghuk; thliff;F ,y;iy/ ehd; fpuak; bfhLj;j kD brhj;jpy; jhd; thliff;F cs;nsd;/ Mdhy; kDjhuUf;F ,jw;fhf thlif vJt[k; bfhLf;ftpy;iy/ kDjhuhplk; ehd; kD brhj;jpypUe;J fpuaj; njjpapypUe;J 2 khjj;jpy; fhyp bra;tjhf brhd;ndd;/@ (emphasis supplied)
16. Here, the learned senior counsel for the respondent/tenant would place reliance on that portion of the admission by R.W.1 heavily and argue that no law, envisages that such sort of admissions has to be ignored or belittled or slighted. The categorical admission made by the revision petitioner before the Rent Controller should necessarily be relied on for adjudging the lis and correctly, both the authorities below placed reliance on the same, which cannot be challenged by the revision petitioner.
17. I could see no embargo under the law to the effect that such sort of admissions should not be relied on. In fact, in those two distinct sentences, RW1 admitted that there existed landlady and tenant relationship between the respondent and the revision petitioner herein and that he had been occupying the premises only in his capacity as a tenant. As such, I am of the considered view that both the authorities below au fait with law and au courant with facts and that too after analysing the evidence on record held that the revision petitioner was none but a tenant under the respondent and such a finding on fact, warrants no interference and I could see no perversity or illegality in it.
18. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner by inviting the attention of this court to the Rejoinder filed by the petitioner in RCOP would submit that the respondent herein before the RCOP court as petitioner clearly admitted that there was a typographical error in specifying as from which period, there was default in paying the rent, so to say, in the main petition, RCOP, the petitioner alleged as though rent was paid by the respondent therein upto 05.12.2005; however, in the rejoinder she would state that the rent was paid up to 05.12.2006.
19. No doubt, that is only with regard to the starting period of default. The RCOP was filed on 10.07.2006. If the actual arrears have to be quantified, then the question of going further deep into the fact would arise as from which period there was default. But, such a situation has not arisen here, because it is not at all the case of the revision petitioner that any rent was paid. Precisely, the case of the revision petitioner is that no rent was paid at all and that there was no relationship of landlady and tenant between the respondent and the revision petitioner herein. When such is the scenario, the said typographical error or otherwise dies down in oblivion.
20. The core question arises here, is as to what prevented the revision petitioner herein from depositing the rent pendente lite, in compliance with Section 11 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960.
21. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that there was no petition filed by the respondent herein invoking Section 11 of the Act.
22. Whereas the learned senior counsel for the respondent/tenant would explain and expound by pointing out that no specific application under Section 11 of the Act is contemplated and it is the duty of the tenant to deposit regularly as a condition precedent for prosecuting his defence in the RCOP proceedings. But, in this case, it was not done so. The tenant very heavily placed reliance only on one plea, viz., disputing the landlady and tenant relationship; thereon, he ultimately met with failure.
23. I could see considerable force in the submission made by the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady and accordingly, in view of the finding that the plea of the revision petitioner disputing the landlady and tenant relationship was untenable, he has to suffer the ground of willful default in paying the rent.
24. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner/tenant would submit that pre litigation notice Ex.P6 dated 01.06.2006 was issued to the revision petitioner herein and thereafter the respondent/landlady without even waiting for a period of two months as contemplated under law, filed the RCOP, for which the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady herein would submit that there was no such requirement so far this case is concerned, because the willful default in paying rent was with effect from 05.12.2006, so to say, much earlier to the date of issuance of the notice, Ex.P6.
25. Be that as it may, I would like to reiterate the point that even pendente lite, as per Section 11 of the Act, the revision petitioner did not deposit any rent at least without prejudice. However, he very heavily relied upon his only one plea, so to say, disputing the landlady and tenant relationship; ultimately, he met with his waterloo, so far that plea is concerned and as a sequela he should face the consequential music also.
26. Wherefore, the tenant cannot try to wriggle out of his liability, which he has to face on the ground of willful default in paying the rent. Over and above that there is also one other important feature that should be taken note of. To the pre-litigation notice issued by the respondent herein, the revision petitioner did not reply.
27. I recollect and call up the maxims -
1. Princiipis obsta Oppose beginnings. Oppose a thing in its inception in order to have any success against it.
2. Qui non negat fatetur A person who does not deny admits.
In this case, there is no plausible explanation forth coming from the revision petitioner's side in not replying to the pre-litigation notice issued by the respondent herein.
28. As such, the finding of both the courts below on the aspect of willful default, cannot be found fault with.
29. Indubitably and indisputably, the landlady's husband is doing textile business in a premises just opposite to the demised premises. It seems that the respondent herself wants to start a business in fancy store in the demised premises, for which the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would put forth his argument to the effect that absolutely, there is nothing to establish and evince, that the land lady raised even her little finger in respect of starting such business.
30. Whereas the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would submit that for starting a fancy store business, no prior permission is required and in such a case, the tenant cannot expect to prove objectively her intention to start such business.
31. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner would cite the decision of this court reported in 2006(1) CTC 333 [ Shahjahan vs. Janath Ashraf Uduman]. Certain excerpts from it would run thus:
"19. In paragraph No.5 of the Rent Control Original Petition, it is said that the landlord's relative is running a business in the name and style of Agja Traders, dealing with T.Vs, Fans, Refrigerators, etc and in order to carry out an agency business of the same, this building is required for the son of the landlord. Further, it is alleged, necessary arrangements have been made out. The petition was filed, as per the verification, on 3.7.1997. In view of the above admission, P.W.1 also stated that the building is required for him, to run an agency business in the premises. Thus, it is seen, it is not the case of the landlord, either in the petition or while letting in evidence, that P.W.1 was 'carrying on business'. But, the business is only in the initial stage of 'an intention to commence the same', which is not contemplated under the Act. The documents relied on, to make out a case for personal occupation viz. Exs.A2 to A4, are all correspondence between Agja Traders and P.W.1, wherein there is no specific order appointing P.W.1 as the agent for the business, which is intended to be commenced, in the petition mentioned premises."
32. Placing reliance on the said decision, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner would submit that mere intention on the part of the landlord/landlady to start business would not be sufficient and there should be some objective evidence in that regard, for which, the learned senior counsel for the respondent/landlady would submit that had the revision petitioner raised such a specific plea then the landlady would have adduced some evidence in that regard also.
33. In the cited precedent, agency business was intended to be started by the landlord concerned for which the court observed that no specific order appointing PW1 therein as agent was produced. However, this case is distinguishable on facts, as fancy store business is intended to be started by the landlady for which, no preliminaries are required.
34. In view of the non-challenging of the landlady's plea of personal occupation in the counter and owing to lack of any ground raised in the revision on that aspect, the tenant cannot try to find fault with the landlady for allegedly having not proved her personal requirement by adducing evidence aliunde.
35. Hence, in view of the bona fide requirement of the demised premises on the part of the respondent/landlady, I could see no perversity or illegality in the orders passed by both the courts below, which are based on correct analysis of evidence.
36. On balance, the aforesaid points are decided in favour of the respondent/landlady herein.
37. In the result, I find no merit in this revision and accordingly, the same is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.
16.04.2012
vj2
Index : Yes
Internet : Yes
To
1. The Subordinate Judge, Ranipet
2. The District Munsif, Sholingur
G.RAJASURIA,J.,
vj2
CRP NPD No.874 of 2012
16.04.2012