Patna High Court
Chotrai Manjhi And Ors. vs Rupi Manjhian And Anr. on 5 February, 1990
Equivalent citations: 1990(1)BLJR508
Author: S.B. Sinha
Bench: S.B. Sinha
JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J.
1. This First Appeal at the instance of the plaintiffs arise out of a judgment and decree, dated 31.8.1981 passed by Shri Madan Mohan Verma, Subordinate Judge, Chaibasa in Title Suit No. 230 of 1980 whereby and whereunder the said learned court dismissed ths plaintiffs-appellants suit.
2. Admittedly, one Dalhat Manjhi was the original owner in respect of the properties in suit. He died leaving behind four sons namely (1) Palu Manjhi (2) Sangram Manjhi (3) Chotrai Manjhi and (4) Jitral Manjhi. The plaintiff No. 3 is the decendants of Palu Manjhi Whereas the plaintiffs No. 2, 4 and 5 are the decendants of Sangram Manjhi and plaintiff No. 1 is the decendants of Chotrai Manjhi.
3. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that after the death of Palu Manjhi, the aforementioned parties remained joint. In fact, it appears from the pleadings of the parties that they separated from Jitrai Manjhi who died leaving behind his son Hari Manjhi. Hari Manjhi died prior to the Survey, Settlement Operation and the suit Khata being Khata No. 75 of village Balrampur was recorded in the name of Rupi Manjhian widow of Hari Manjhi.
4. According to the plaintiffs, at the time of Survey Settlement Operation, Man Singh Manjhi was a minor, whereas according to the defendants, he was a major.
5. However, it is the case of both the parties that Man Singh Manjhi died after Rupi Manjhian (widow of Hari Manjhi) as would be evident from paragraph 5 of the plaint and paragraph 10 of the written statements.
6. Man Singh Manjhi died leaving behind a daughter also named Rupi Manjhian who is the defendant-respondents.
7. According to the plaintiffs, after the death of Man Singh Manjhi, the properties in suit reverted back to them, in view of the fact that the parties are governed by their customary laws (sic) where a widow or a daughter does not inherit the properties of the last male holder.
8. On the other hand, the case of the defendants-respondents is that the parties were sufficiently Hinduised and are governed by Hindu Law ia the matters of inheritance and succeession.
9. Upon the aforementioned pleadings of the parties, the learned trial court framed the following issues:
1. Is the tuit, as framed, maintainable?
2. Have the plaintiffs got any valid cause of action for the suit?
3. Is the suit barred by the law of limitation?
4. Is the suit property valued and court-fee paid sufficient.
5. Have the parties to the suit been sufficiently Hinduised and are they governed by Hindu Law in the matters of inhenuuee and succession?
6. Have the plaintiffs got right, title and interest in the suit lands and are they in possession of the same?
7. To what relief or reliefs, if any, are the plaintiffs entitled?
10. The learned trial court while deciding issue No. 5 held that the parties have become sufficiently Hinduised and are governed by the Hindu Law in the matters of inheritance and succession.
11. The learned trial court, therefore, held that Rupi Manjhian, daughter of Man Singh inherited the properties of her rather and the plaintiffs are not reversioners of Man Singh in respect of the properties in suit. The learned court below, in this regard has relied upoa a decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in 1929 page 577, Narendra Narain Choudhuri v. Nagendra Narain Choudhuri and Ors. ; Babu Manjhi and Anr. v. Bukhan Manjhi and Ors. ; Rafail Uraon and Anr. v. Baiha Uraon and Anr. 1970 PLJR p. 573; Langa Manjhi and Ors. v. Jaba Manjhian and Ors. AIR 1946 Pat p. 218 and Chunku Manjhi and Ors. v. Bhabani Manjhian and Ors.
12. Mr. P.K. Sinha, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants did not challenge the finding of fact that the parties were sufficiently Hinduised. He, however, submitted that in view of the fact that the parties are not governed by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as they are a originals, they would be governed by their customary law and in that view of the matter, Rupi Manjhian could not have inherited her father's estate.
13. Alternatively, the learned Counsel submitted that as Man Singh died during the life time of Rupi Manjhian widow of Hari Manjhi as purported to have been held by the learned court below in paragraph 30 of the judgment, the interest of the aforementioned Rupi Manjhian being that of a limited owner in terms of the provisions of Hindu Women's Right to Property Act, 1987, upon her death, even according to the Hindu Law, the same would revert back to her next revergenors namely the plaintiffs.
14. The learned Counsel, in support of his submissions relied upon a decision of mine in Daudwa Uraon and Anr. v. Karualuous Uraon and Ors. F.A. No. 32 of 1975 disposed on 12.5.1987 and another decision of mine in Arjun Soren and Ors. v. Negi Santhalin, F.A. No. 250 of 1975 (R) disposed on 7.8.1989.
15. In the facts and circumstances of this case, therefore, the only question which arise for consideration is as to whether the parties will continue to be governed under the Old Hindu Law deposite coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
16. Before proceeding with the case, it must be mentioned that the learned trial court committed an error in holding that Man Singh died during the lifetime of his mother Rupi Manjhian, in as much as, as indicated hereinbefore, both the parties are ad-idem in their pleadings that Man Singh died after his mother as is evident from the statements made in paragraph 3 of the plaint and paragraph 10 of the written statement. The learned trial court further committed a mistake in considering the case of inheritance of property by a 'Ghardamad', in paragraph 29 of his judgment, inasmuch as, under the customary laws of certain tribes, a Ghardamad inherits his father-in-law's properties to a limited extent subject to the certain conditions. However, as indicated hereinbefore, it is not the case of either of the parties that Rupi's husband was a Ghardamad of Man Singh, in asmuch as, it has not been proved that Rupi's husband succeeded to interest of father-in-law as 'Ghardamad'.
17. It is now well settled by various decisions of this Court as also of the Calcutta High Court that the aboriginals may also in course of time become sufficiently Hinduised so as to be governed by Hindu Law in the matter of Inheritance and succession.
18. Once, they became Hinduised and are governed in the matter of inheritance and succession under the Hindu Law, in my opinion, they do not ceased to be so governed only because of coming into force of Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
19. Hindu Succession Act, 1956 is a Parliamentary Act which has no application so far as the ab-aborigtnals are concerned.
In Arjun Soren's case (supra) I have held that in view of Sub-section (2) of Section 2 of the Hindu Succssion Act, 1956, the said Act has no application in respect of aboriginals despite the fact that they have became sufficiently Hinduised and are governed by Hindu Law in the matters of succession and inheritance. But in that case, it has been held that once the family has became Hinduised and are governed by Hindu Law in the matter of inheritance and succession, they will continue to be governed under the Old Hindu Law irrespective of coming into force the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 inasmuch as the provisions of the said Act have no application, so far as the aboriginals are concerned.
In this situation, as the parties have proceeded on the basis that Man Singh died after the death of his mother (mother of Hari Manjhi) leaving behind a daughter Rupi Manjhian mother namely Rupi Manjhian as his only legal heir and successor, there cannot be any doubt that after his death his properties devolved upon in terms of the provisions of the Old Hindu Law.
20. In this connection, reference may be made to Section 43 of the Mulla's Hindu Law where the learned author has stated that in the absence of Son, grandson (Son's son) and great-grand son (Son's son's sons), and widow, predeceased son's widow, and predecesed son's predeceased son's widow (after 14th April, 1937), daugthter will succeed to the separate properties of her father.
21. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below cannot be interferred with.
22. At this juncture, the decisions relied upon by Shri Sinha may be considered.
23. In Daudwa Uraon's case (supra) it was merely held that so far as Uraons of Chhotanagpur are concerned, a Ghardamad (adopted as such before marriage) can inherit certain properties of his father-in-law but in no cases, he would inherit the Bhumidhari lands of his deceased father-in-law.
24. As noticed hereinbefore, the learned Court below has not held nor the defendant could prove that husband of Rupi Manjhian was an adopted Ghar damad of Man Singh and as such he inherited some properties of his deceased father-in-law.
25. In Arjun Soren's case (supra) held as follows:
However, the matter does not rest there. Although the provisions of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 may not have any application in view of the statutory exclusion thereof in the case of members of the Scheduled Tribes but still the parties having been sufficiently Hinduised, in the matter of inheritance and succession, they would be governed by the Hindu Law i.e., the law as prevailing before coming into force the Hindu Succession Act.
26. From what has been stated hereinbefore, it is evident that even in Arjun Soren's case (supra). I have held that if the parties having been sufficiently Hinduised and were being governed iu the matter of inheritance and succession by Hindu Law, they would continue to be governed thereunder despite coming into foice of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.
27. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, my decision in Arjun Soren's case (supra) runs contrary to the submissions made by Shri Sinha and in fact, supports the judgment of the learned trial court.
28. In view of what has been found hereinbefore, in my opinion, the judgment and decree passed by the learned court below cannot be interfered with.
29. In the result, this appeal is dismissed. In the fact and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.