Karnataka High Court
Kallayya S/O Madiwalayya Hiremath ... vs The State Of Karnataka on 21 March, 2024
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, DHARWAD BENCH
DATED THIS THE 21ST DAY OF MARCH 2024
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE E.S.INDIRESH
AND
THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAMACHANDRA D. HUDDAR
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.100631 OF 2022
BETWEEN:
KALLAYYA S/O. MADIWALAYYA
HIREMATH @ KALLUR,
AGED: 72 YEARS,
R/O: MELGADE ONI,
GOPANAKOPPA, HUBBALLI.
...APPELLANT
(BY SRI.S.P.KANDAGAL, ADVOCATE)
AND:
STATE OF KARNATAKA,
THROUGH P.I.ASHOK NAGAR PS,
HUBBALLI, DHARWAD DISTRICT,
REPRESENTED BY
THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR,
HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA,
DHARWAD BENCH.
...RESPONDENT
Location:
HIGH
COURT OF
(BY SRI.M.B.GUNDAWADE, ADDL. STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR)
KARNATAKA
SHIVAKUMAR DHARWAD
HIREMATH BENCH
Date:
THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374 (2)
2024.03.25
12:39:49
+0530
OF THE CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, SEEKING TO PASS AN
ORDER CALLING FOR THE RECORDS FROM THE TRIAL COURT,
AND SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 20.06.2020
AND ORDER OF SENTENCE DATED 20.06.2020 PASSED BY THE V
ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, DHARWAD, SITTING AT
HUBBALLI IN SESSIONS CASE NO.99/2018 CONVICTING THE
APPELLANT-ACCUSED NO.1 FOR THE OFFENCES U/S 302 OF IPC.
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022
THESE APPEALS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED ON
15.03.2024 COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF JUDGMENT
THIS DAY, E.S.INDIRESH, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
1. This appeal is filed by accused No.1/appellant, challenging the Judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20th June 2020 in S.C.No.99 of 2018 on the file of V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, sitting at Hubballi, convicting the accused No.1/appellant for the offence punishable under Section 302 of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE:
2. It is the case of the prosecution that, accused No.1- Kallayya, Erayya and Ningayya (deceased), are the brothers, having ancestral immoveable properties. Erayya, died leaving behind his two brothers Ningayya and accused No.1- Kallayya. It is further case of the prosecution that, there was a dispute with regard to sharing of the property between the accused No.1 and Ningayya (deceased) and in this connection, accused No.1 claimed 03 acres of land out of 5 acres 21 guntas in land bearing Sy.No.114/2 situate at -3- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 Sullada Road, Hubballi, and in this regard, deceased- Ningayya advised his brother-accused No.1 for equitable distribution as such, accused have conspired to kill Ningayya to get the land in question. It is also stated by the prosecution that, on 22.03.2018 at about 11.30 a.m., Ningayya was sitting on the podium of his house by watching TV and during that time, his daughter-in-law (complainant) and her minor son were in kitchen for preparing the food and at that time, accused No.1 started quarrelling with his brother-Ningayya and immediately, the daughter-in-law of the deceased-Ningayya came out and noticed that the accused No.1 was holding axe in his hand and as such, during the heated argument with his brother-Ningayya, accused No.1 hit Ningayya, causing deep cut in the neck and thereby, the said Ningayya succumbed to injuries. There afterwards, the accused No.1 left the blood-stained axe in front of the house i.e. near petty shop belongs to the deceased-Ningayya and ran away from the place. The daughter-in-law of Ningayya-P.W.1, lodged complaint with the Station House Officer of Ashoknagar Police Station and accordingly, Crime No.12 of 2018 came to be registered for -4- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 the offence punishable under Section 120(B), 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. After completion of the investigation, the charge- sheet was laid for the offence punishable under Section 120(B), 302 read with Section 34 of IPC.
3. In order to prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has examined 15 witnesses as P.W.1 to P.W.15 and 46 documents were marked as Ex.P.1 to Ex.P.46. The prosecution has produced 5 articles and the same were marked as M.O.1 to M.O.5. No witnesses were examined for the defence, however, Ex.D.1 to Ex.D.4 were marked on behalf of the defence. The statement of the accused was recorded as contemplated under Section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused denied all the incriminating circumstances appearing against them and also the case set up by the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge, on considering both oral and documentary evidence on record, has recorded a finding that, the prosecution has proved the guilt against the accused No.1 and accordingly, convicted accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. The Trial Court acquitted accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offences punishable under Section 120(B) and 302 of IPC. -5- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 20th June 2020, accused No.1 has preferred this appeal.
4. The Sessions Court records were called for and same are placed before this Court. We have perused the original records.
5. We have heard Sri. S.P. Kandagal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Sri. M.B.Gundawade, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE APPELLANT.
6. Sri. S.P.Kandagal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that, evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2 are contradicting to each other and therefore, in view of the discrepancy in the oral evidence of these material witnesses, the trial Court has committed an error in imposing punishment on the accused. It is also urged by Sri. S.P.Kandagal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, P.W.10 - Doctor who has conducted postmortem failed to give proper reasons to the fact whether two injuries -6- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 mentioned in the postmortem report cause death of the father-in-law of the complainant. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, the two injuries mentioned in the postmortem report could not have been happened on account of single blow said to have been given by the accused through M.O.2 and accordingly, he sought for interference of this Court.
7. Referring to the evidence of P.W.13 and P.W.15- Investigating Officers, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that, the police authorities though visited the spot of the incident soon after the incident, directed the complainant to come to police station for registration of the case and same would indicate the falsity of investigation conducted by the prosecution and therefore, the appellant is entitle for benefit of doubt.
8. Lastly, it is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, as there is no motive on the part of the accused to kill his brother-Ningayya and further the appellant is aged about 75 years and undergoing sentence in the jail, requested the Court interfere with the oral evidence of witnesses by highlighting the evidence of P.W.10, P.W.13, -7- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 P.W.15, P.W.2 and P.W.1. Inviting the attention of the Court to the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that, the prosecution has set up accusations against the appellant to prove him guilty of the offence and therefore, sought for setting aside the Judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel appearing for the appellant places reliance on the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The State of Bihar Vs. Mohammad Khursheed, reported in 1971(3) SCC 423 and argued that, even if there is civil dispute between the parties, however, that itself is not a reason for the accused to kill his own brother, with whom he was residing at the time of commission of the offence and accordingly, sought for setting aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence.
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE RESPONDENT:
9. Per contra, Sri. M.B.Gundawade, learned Addl. SPP appearing for the State invited the attention of the Court to the complaint dated 22.03.2018 and argued that, the -8- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 prosecution has proved the motive behind causing death of Ningayya by the accused as there is a civil dispute with regard to the land property. He also refers to the Inquest report and the seizure mahazar, wherein the accused has identified the axe (M.O.2) used for killing the victim and accordingly, sought for confirmation of the Judgment of conviction. Referring to the injuries caused to the dead body of the Ningayya, learned Addl. SPP submitted that, the injuries inflicted on the neck would sufficient to kill the deceased and he further contended that, the evidence of the P.W.1 and P.W.2, who are the direct witnesses to the incident are sufficient to hold that, the accused has committed an offence causing death of Ningayya. It is the specific submission, by referring to the evidence of P.W.1 that, there was a provocation at the relevant point of time with regard to the fact that, the property in question consisting of 5 acres 21 guntas situate adjacent to the urban area, which is the joint family property of the deceased Ningayya and accused and therefore, the claim of the accused to have more than 03 acres out of 05 acres 21 guntas was rejected by deceased-Ningayya, resulting in -9- CRL.A. NO.100631/2022 unfortunate incident and as such, sought to justify the impugned Judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court. It is also submitted by the learned Addl. SPP that, the accused was intend to kill the deceased Ningayya to grab the property in question and therefore, the accused chooses the neck part being a vital organ to cause death and as such, sought for dismissal of the appeal. Nextly, it is contended by the learned Addl. SPP that the recovery of M.O.2 - axe at the instance of accused was not disputed by the other side and accordingly, he sought for rejection of the appeal. POINTS FOR DETERMINATION:
10. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, to re-appreciate the findings recorded by the trial Court, the points that arise for our consideration are :
i) Whether the accused proved that, there is no motive behind the culpable homicide of Ningayya to grab the property in question?
ii) Whether the Judgment of conviction passed by the trial Court requires interference of this Court on the ground that, there was no provocation to cause death of the deceased by accused?
iii) What order?
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022
11. Having heard the learned counsels appearing for the parties, we have carefully analysed the finding recorded by the learned Sessions Judge.
12. Before proceeding further in re-appreciating the evidence on record, we are conscious of the fact that, it is an appeal against the Judgment of conviction passed by the learned Sessions Judge. Learned trial Judge after appreciating the entire material on record, passed an order of conviction which cannot be interfered on the sole ground that there is a discrepancy in the evidence of the witnesses, particularly in the present case P.W.1 and P.W.2. In order to ascertain whether the accused has committed an offence under Section 302 of IPC, or is there any motive and provocation on the part of the accused has been proved by the trial Court, it is relevant to cite the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of SUDERSHAN KUMAR VS. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, reported in (2014) 15 SCC 666, at paragraph No.31, held as follows:
"31. It has been stated and restated that a cardinal principle in criminal jurisprudence that presumption of innocence of the accused is reinforced by an order of the acquittal. The Appellate Court, in such a case,
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would interfere only for very substantial and compelling reasons. There is plethora of case laws on this proposition and we need not burden this judgment by referring to those decisions. Our purpose would be served by referring to one reasoned pronouncement entitled Dhanapal v. State which is the judgment where most of the earlier decisions laying down the aforesaid principle are referred to in paragraph 37, propositions laid down in an earlier case are taken note of as under:
37. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, this Court held: (SCC p.432, para 42) '(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.
(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."
13. The said aspect was also reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rai Sharma Vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another, reported in (2022) 8 SCC 536. Keeping in mind the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned Judgments, we proceed to re-appreciate the evidence placed in this matter.
14. P.W.1 is the daughter-in-law of the deceased Ningayya and complainant in the case. She is the star witness to prove the guilt of the accused. It is the deposition of P.W.1 that, the civil dispute is pending with regard to the share of the
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022joint family property of the accused and the deceased Ningayya, resulted in killing of deceased by the accused. She further deposed that, before the act of commission of offence, she noticed the verbal exchange of words/altercation by accused and the deceased Ningayya with regard to the settlement of civil dispute and in the meanwhile, she came out from the kitchen and saw that the accused was hitting her father-in-law - Ningayya on left side of the neck by using axe and thereafter, the deceased fell down and succumbed to the injuries. It is also her deposition that, the accused kept the axe at the petty shop owned by her family and immediately she lodged complaint against the accused. On her behalf complaint at Ex.P.1 was registered and criminal law was set into motion.
15. P.W.2 is the son of PW1 and according to the prosecution P.W.2 is the direct witness to the incident. P.W.2 is aged about 9 years and as such, the trial Court permitted for his evidence after putting reasonable questions to the P.W.2 to understand whether the P.W.2 would able to answer the questions. He deposed that he was watching TV on 22.03.2018 and his mother P.W.1 was preparing chapati.
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022He deposed that accused hit his grand-father by axe and accused left the spot. He further deposed that accused kept blooded axe near the petty shop belonging to them. He identified Exs.P4 to P7. In the cross-examination he deposed that, on 22.03.2018, he had Kannada examination in the school and examination was started at 9. a.m, and duration of the examination was three hours.
16. P.W.3 is a witness to the pachanama, identifying Ex.P2 to P7 and Ex.P8 to P13 and also witness to the inquest report. Partly, he turned hostile to the prosecution and accordingly cross-examined by the prosecution.
17. P.W.4 is a Panch witness to Ex.P17 to P20.
18. P.W.5 is a panch witness to Ex.P17 to P.20 and identified accused in Ex.P17 and P.18 (photos).
19. P.W.6 is a Panch witness to Ex.P22 and P23 (photos) and identifies the signature on Ex.P24-Panchanama. He partly turned hostile to the prosecution.
20. P.W.7 is a witness to Panchanama (Ex.P22 and P23) and deposed that, accused and the deceased Ningayya were
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022residing separately in a same house. He identified Ex.P22 and Ex.P23. He further deposed that, he is not aware about the civil suit between the accused and deceased Ningayya at Hubballi Civil Court and he denied that, the accused was claiming 03 acres of land from the deceased-Ningayya.
21. P.W.8 is the wife of the deceased-Ningayya. She deposed that, her husband Ningayya was retired railway employee and elder brother of her husband-Eraiah is no more. She deposed that there is dispute between the accused and the deceased-Ningayya about division of properties and accused is claiming three acres of land out of 5 acres, 20 guntas. She supported the case of prosecution.
22. P.W.9 is the son of deceased Ningayya and husband of P.W.1. He deposed that, there is land dispute between the accused and deceased-Ningayya for more than ten years with regard to division of properties and as such, supported the case of the prosecution.
23. P.W.10 is working as Associate Professor, KIMS, Hubballi, who has conducted post-mortem, pursuant to the requisition issued by the police. Requisition was marked as
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022Ex.P26 and he further deposed that, death of Ningayya was on account of haemorrhage and shock as a result of chop injuries sustained. Post-mortem report was marked as Ex.P28. He deposed that injuries mentioned at Ex.P28 could be possible by using the axe sent for examination. He deposed that, he had examined axe (MO2), the weapon used by the accused on the date of incident.
24. P.W.11 is the Assistant Engineer working in PWD, who prepared the sketch as per Ex.P30.
25. P.W.12 is Assistant Director, RFSL, Belagavi, he deposed that, there was blood stain on the article Nos. 2 to 5 and marked the certificate issued by him at Ex.P31.
26. P.W.13 was working at Ashok Nagara Police Station, between 28.03.2017 to 30.04.2018. He deposed that, on receiving message that, the deceased Ningayya was killed on 22.03.2018 at about 11.45 am, he visited the place along with AHC-1617 and made an enquiry with P.W.1, P.W.8 and P.W.9. He deposed that, he had seen the axe at the petty shop owned by family of deceased-Ningayya. He further deposed that, he informed the complainant-P.W.1 to lodge
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022complaint about the incident and accordingly, Ex.P1- complaint came to be registered by him. He further submitted that he has informed the higher officers for investigation.
27. P.W.14 is a photographer working at Bhavani Nagar, Hubballi and had taken photographs on receiving requisition from the police and same were marked as Ex.P4 to P11, P13 to P15 and P17 to P20.
28. P.W.15 is a Police Inspector, Airport Security Division, Hubballi, and the investigation officer. He deposed that, he had received information from P.W.13 about the incident on 22.03.2018 and visited the place around 2.35 p.m. and conducted spot inspection at the instance of panchas CW2 and CW3 as per Ex.P12. He had also seen axe near the spot and same was seized (MO2) as per panchanama-Ex.P12. Inquest panchanama was drawn in the presence of C.W.2 and C.W.3 as per Ex.P16 and sent requisition to the Doctor for conducting post-mortem. He further submitted that, around 4.50 pm, accused voluntarily came to police station and stated that, he had caused death of his brother Ningayya on account of land dispute between themselves
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022and accused also informed P.W.15 that, he will show the axe (MO2), where he had kept near the spot. He had arrested accused No.2 on 24.03.2008. He further deposed that on enquiry with the accused and panchas, the accused had planned to kill his brother-Ningayya, with regard to claiming more share in the land property.
FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE LEARNED SESSIONS JUDGE:
29. The trial Court, after considering the material on record arrived at a conclusion that accused No.1 alone committed murder of the deceased-Ningayya and the accused Nos.2 and 3 be acquitted for the offences punishable under Sections 120-B and 302 of IPC, and as such, convicted the accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. Recovery of bloodstained clothes (M.O.1) and blood stained axe (M.O.2) are the two objects on which the trial court has held the circumstance being proved. The material appreciated by the trial Court to convict the accused No.1 on the ground that, the recovery was made at the instance of the accused and P.W.1 has witnessed the entire incident of hitting the neck of the Ningayya by the accused No.1
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through axe (M.O.2) and particularly, based its conclusion that, P.W.1 and P.W.2 have contributed to each other consistently deposed that, the accused No.1 himself by using M.O.2 (axe) chopped on the neck of the Ningayya and caused death. The trial Court in entirety accepted the evidence of P.W.1 and held that, deposition of P.W.1 corroborates the commission of offence by the accused No.1 to get the benefit in the civil case.
CONSIDERATION:
30. In the light of the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the parties, we have given our anxious consideration to the finding recorded by the trial Court and re-appreciated the evidence of the witnesses, keeping in mind the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to assessing the material on record.
31. Having regard to the factual aspects on record, it is the case of the prosecution that, accused have conspired to kill Ningayya as the said Ningayya denied the claim made by the accused for granting 03 acres of land out of 5 acres, 20 acres of the joint family property. It is also the case of P.W.1, P.W.8 and P.W.9 that the accused was regularly quarreling
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with the deceased-Ninayya with regard to the civil suit. Undisputably, prosecution has not secured the copies of the suit or any other proceedings pertaining to the civil dispute between the accused No.1 and the deceased-Ningayya. P.W.1 is the star witness-daughter-in-law of deceased Ningayya. She deposed that, she had seen accused No.1 hitting the deceased with axe on 22.03.2018 around 11.30 a.m. and thereafter, accused No.1 fled away from the place, keeping the axe near petty shop. She further deposed that, before the incident of murder, there were verbal arguments/altercation between the accused and the deceased. It may be pointed out that, except the reason relating to the civil dispute, there is no enmity between the accused and the deceased. She also deposed that, P.W.7- Manjaiah, and Shankaraiah (C.W.17) have heard the conversation between the accused Nos.2 and 3 that in the event, the deceased Ningayya died, the accused will get 03 acres of land out of 5 acres 20 guntas. She also deposed that the civil dispute was filed by Basavva-daughter of Eraiah and same is pending consideration before the competent court, and she further deposed that, three brothers namely,
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022accused No.1-Kallayya, Ningayya and elder brother -Eraiah had divided the property by partition. It is also deposed by P.W.1 that accused No.1 was staying away from accused Nos.2 and 3 and P.W.1 was providing food to the accused No.1. It is also to be noted that the M.O.2-Axe was recovered during the course of investigation and said weapon was used to kill his brother Ningayya. It is also pertinent mention here that, accused No.1 himself visited the police station on the evening of the date of incident and surrendered himself before the police. Having taken note of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.2, to some extent, supports the prosecution case that, the accused No.1 has used M.O.2- Axe and hit the said Ningayya on the neck portion of the body, resulting in death and therefore, prosecution has proved the guilt of the accused No.1.
32. Insofar as the assessment of evidence with regard to accused Nos.2 and 3 is concerned, P.W.1 and P.W.2 being direct witnesses to the incident did not mention about the presence of the accused Nos.2 and 3 and there is no acceptable evidence adduced by P.W.1 and P.W.2 to prove the guilt of accused Nos.2 and 3 involving themselves in
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022killing Ningayya and therefore, the finding recorded by the trial court acquitting the accused Nos.2 and 3 for the offences under Section 120B and 302 of IPC is just and proper which cannot be interfered with under the circumstances of the case.
33. Nextly, it is the argument advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, if this Court arrived at a conclusion that accused No.1 has caused death of the Ningayya, however, accused No.1 had no knowledge that a single blow by using axe would cause death of Ningayya. It is also argued by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant that, there is no intention or motive on the part of the accused No.1 to kill his brother Ningayya and also made submission that, the accused No.1 was having food in the house of deceased-Ningayya and the said aspect was admitted by P.W.1 in her deposition. He also submitted that, accused No.1 aged about 75 years, and therefore, made submission with regard to reducing the punishment imposed by the trial court. The said submission was opposed by the learned Additional SPP appearing for the respondent-State and argued that, as the accused No.1 has caused death of
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022late Ningayya and prosecution has proved the guilt of accused No.1 and there is no chance for reduction of punishment. In the backdrop of these arguments, on careful examination of the finding recorded by the trial court and evidence on record would indicate that, accused No.1 and Ningayya were the brothers and there is dispute with regard to joint family properties. It is also forthcoming from the evidence that, the accused No.1 was having food in the house of the deceased. The death was on account of hitting by axe-M.O.2. Both P.W.1 and P.W.2 deposed that, accused No.1 hit on the neck of Ningayya, during altercation with regard to the land dispute and thereafter, accused No.1 left the spot keeping the axe near the petty shop belonging to deceased-Ningayya. It is also the deposition of P.W.15 that the accused No.1 himself surrendered before the police on the same evening. Undisputably, prosecution has not placed any material, pending consideration before the competent court regarding civil dispute. Prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the accused, causing death of Ningayya, as there is no discussion on motive to cause the death of Ningayya. In that view of the matter it is well established principle in
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022law that, before an accused is held guilty and punished under Part I or Part II of Section 304 of IPC, the condition precedent would be a death must have been caused by assailant under any of the circumstances mentioned in the five exceptions to under Section 300 of IPC. Though the entire prosecution case revolves around the circumstances that the death of Ningayya caused by accused No.1 was due to pending civil dispute relating to joint family property, and looking into two injuries caused on the body of Ningayya as per Post-mortem report-Ex.P28 and also it is forthcoming from the records that, there is single blow on the neck part of the body of the Ningayya, it could be safely held that the accused No.1 has no intention to kill accused on the date of incident and the entire incident had taken place in a spur of moment of exchange of words between the Ningayya and accused No.1 and therefore, it is to be held that, though the accused No.1 had involved in causing death of Ningayya, however, there is no pre-meditation and it is also not forthcoming from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses nor in the statement recorded by the police with regard to how axe was found by accused No.1 to kill Ningayya at the
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022time of incident. Whether the M.O.2- axe was brought by accused No.1 or the said weapon was lying in the house of the deceased Ningayya was not touched upon by the prosecution during investigation and therefore, there is no pre-meditation in a sudden fight took place in a heat of passion between the accused No.1 and deceased Ningayya. Therefore, applying the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajpaul Singh vs. State reported in 2012 10 SCC 144, wherein it is held that, culpable homicide will not amount to murder if it is committed without pre-meditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel provided that an offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. It is also pertinent to mention here that, to invoke Exception-IV to Section 300 of IPC, the following four ingredients have to be satisfied.
i) It was a sudden fight;
ii) There is no pre-meditation;
iii) The act was done in a heat of passion;
iv) Accused had not acted in a cruel manner;
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34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Patel Rasiklal Becharbhai vs. State of Gujarat reported in AIR 1992 SC 1150 held that, infliction of the injury on the vital part of the body, with agricultural instrument by the enraged accused in a sudden quarrel did not cause the injury intentionally. Keeping in mind the aforesaid principles, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Tr.P.S Lodhi Colony, New Delhi, vs. Sanjeev Nanda reported in AIR 2012 SC 3104 had an occasion to deal with regard to the cases falling under sections 304A and 304 part II of the IPC, wherein paragraphs 25 and 95 to 99 of the said judgment reads as under:
"25. The learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Mr Ram Jethmalani further contended that the case would not fall within the parameters of Section 304 Part II IPC. The impugned judgment and order calls for no interference. Even otherwise, looking to the facts and features of the case, no case for taking any other view is made out.
95. This Court in Parmanand Katara v. Union of India pointed out that it is the duty of every citizen to help a motor accident victim, more so when one is the cause of the accident, or is involved in that particular accident. Situations may be there, in a highly charged
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atmosphere or due to mob fury, the driver may flee from the place, if there is a real danger to his life, but he cannot shirk his responsibility of informing the police or other authorised persons or good Samaritans forthwith, so that human lives could be saved. Failure to do so may lead to serious consequences, as we see in the instant case. Passengers who are in the vehicle which met with an accident, have also a duty to arrange proper medical attention for the victims. Further they have equal responsibility to inform the police about the factum of the accident, in case of failure to do so, they are aiding the crime and screening the offender from legal punishment.
96. No legal obligation as such is cast on a bystander either under the Motor Vehicles Act or any other legislation in India. But greater responsibility is cast on them, because they are people at the scene of the occurrence, and immediate and prompt medical attention and care may help the victims and their dear ones from unexpected catastrophe. Private hospitals and government hospitals, especially situated near the highway, where traffic is high, should be equipped with all facilities to meet with such emergency situations. Ambulance with all medical facilities including doctors and supporting staff should be ready, so that, in case of emergency, prompt and immediate medical attention could be given. In fact, this Court in Paschim Banga Khet Mazdoor Samity v. State of W.B, after referring to the report of Justice Lilamoy Ghose, a retired Judge of the Calcutta High Court, gave various directions to the Union of India and other States to ensure immediate
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medical attention in such situations and to provide immediate treatment to save human lives. The Law Commission in its 201st Report dated 31-8-2006 had also made various recommendations, but effective and proper steps are yet to be taken by the Union of India and also many State Governments. We call for the immediate attention of the Union of India and other State Governments, if they have not already implemented those directions, which they may do at the earliest.
97. Seldom we find that the passing vehicles stop to give a helping hand to take the injured persons to the nearby hospital without waiting for the ambulance to come. Proper attention by the passing vehicles will also be of great help and can save human lives. Many a times, bystanders keep away from the scene, perhaps not to get themselves involved in any legal or court proceedings. Good Samaritans who come forward to help must be treated with respect and be assured that they will have to face no hassle and will be properly rewarded. We, therefore, direct the Union of India and the State Governments to frame proper rules and regulations and conduct awareness programmes so that the situation like this could, to a large extent, be properly attended to and, in that process, human lives could be saved.
Hostile witnesses
98. We notice, in the instant case, the key prosecution witnesses PW 1 Hari Shankar, PW 2 Manoj Malik and PW 3 Sunil Kulkarni turned hostile. Even though the
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abovementioned witnesses turned hostile and Sunil Kulkarni was later examined as court witness, when we read their evidence with the evidence of others as disclosed and expert evidence, the guilt of the accused had been clearly established. In R.K. Anand, the unholy alliance of Sunil Kulkarni with the defence counsel had been adversely commented upon and this Court also noticed that the damage they had tried to cause was far more serious than any other prosecution witness.
99. Witness turning hostile is a major disturbing factor faced by the criminal courts in India. Reasons are many for the witnesses turning hostile, but of late, we see, especially in high profile cases, there is a regularity in the witnesses turning hostile, either due to monetary consideration or by other tempting offers which undermine the entire criminal justice system and people carry the impression that the mighty and powerful can always get away from the clutches of law, thereby eroding people's faith in the system."
35. Recently, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.Ramkumar vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, reported in AIR 2023 SC 4246 at paragraphs 14 to 19 laid down the principles of law relating to importing Section 304 Part II into Section 302 of IPC.
"14. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report as already noticed is "died of head injury". It is a trite law that "culpable homicide" is a genus and
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"murder" is its species and all "murders" are "culpable homicides, but all "culpable homicides" are not "murders" as held by this court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2012) 8 SCC 289. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances.
15. In the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu AIR 1956 SC 488 at page 490 the following observations have been made:
"Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion."
16. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be 14 unsafe to treat
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022'intent' and 'knowledge' in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely "intention" and "knowledge" has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury 15 which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. This Court in the case of Pulicherla Nagaraju @ Nagaraja Reddy vs State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 2006 SC 3010 has observed:
"Therefore, the court should proceed to decide the pivotal question of intention, with care and caution, as that will decide whether the case falls under Section 302 or 304 Part I or 304 Part II. Many petty or insignificant matters -- plucking of a fruit, straying of cattle, quarrel of children, utterance of a rude word or even an objectionable glance, may lead to altercations and group
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clashes culminating in deaths. Usual motives like revenge, greed, jealousy or suspicion may be totally absent in such cases. There may be no intention. There may be no premeditation. In fact, there may not even be criminality. At the other end of the spectrum, there may be cases of murder where the accused attempts to avoid the penalty for murder by attempting to put forth a case that there was no intention to cause death. It is for the courts to ensure that the cases of murder punishable under Section 302, are not converted into offences punishable under Section 304 Part I/II, or cases of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, are treated as murder punishable under Section 302. The intention to cause death can be 16 gathered generally from a combination of a few or several of the following, among other, circumstances: (i) nature of the weapon used; (ii) whether the weapon was carried by the accused or was picked up from the spot; (iii) whether the blow is aimed at a vital part of the body;
(iv) the amount of force employed in causing injury; (v) whether the act was in the course of sudden quarrel or sudden fight or free for all fight; (vi) whether the incident occurs by chance or whether there was any premeditation; (vii) whether there was any prior enmity or whether the deceased was a stranger; (viii) whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and if so, the cause for such provocation; (ix) whether it was in the heat of passion; (x) whether the person inflicting the injury has taken undue advantage or has acted in a cruel and unusual manner; (xi) whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows. The above list of circumstances is, of course, not exhaustive and there
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may be several other special circumstances with reference to individual cases which may throw light on the question of intention. Be that as it may.
17. This Court in the case of Pratap Singh @ Pikki v. State of Uttarakhand (2019) 7 SCC 424 had noticed that the deceased-victim had suffered total 11 injuries and had been convicted for offences under Section 304 Part- II/Section 34 IPC apart from other 17 offences. It was noticed that some altercation took place and the groups entered into scuffle without any premeditation and convicted accused for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part-II/Section 34 IPC. Taking into consideration that the appellants therein were young boys and had served sentence of more than three years and five months and there was no previous enmity, persuaded this Court that the quantum of sentence is excessive and accordingly sentenced them to the period already undergone for the offence under Section 304 Part-II/ Section 34 IPC by observing thus:
"27. We do find substance in what being submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant and in the first place, it is to be noted that the trial Court, while awarding sentence to the appellant has not made any analysis of the relevant facts as can be discerned from the judgment (page 96−97 of the paper book) dated 12th January, 1998. Even the High Court has not considered the issue of quantum of sentence. From the factual position which emerge from the record, it is to be noticed that they were young boys having no previous enmity and were collectively sitting and watching Jagjit Singh night. On some comments made to the girls
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sitting in 18 front of the deceased, some altercation took place and they entered into a scuffle and without any pre−meditation, the alleged unfortunate incident took place between two group of young boys and it is informed to this Court that the appellant has served the sentence of more than three years and five months. Taking into consideration in totality that the incident is of June 1995 and no other criminal antecedents has been brought to our notice, and taking overall view of the matter, we find force in the submission of the appellant that the quantum of sentence is excessive and deserves to be interfered by this Court."
18. In the case of Deepak v. State of Uttar Pradesh reported in (2018) 8 SCC 228 it came to be noticed by this Court that incident had taken place in the heat of the moment and the assault was by a single sword blow in the rib cage was without any premeditation and incident had occurred at the spur of the moment, and thus inferred there was no intention to kill and as such the offence was converted from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part II IPC and the appellant was ordered to be released forthwith by sentencing them to the period of conviction already undergone. It was held:
"7. On consideration of the entirety of the evidence, it can safely be concluded that the occurrence took place in the heat of the moment and the assault was made without premeditation on the spur of time. The fact that the appellant may have rushed to his house across the road and returned with a sword, is not sufficient to infer an intention to kill, both because of the genesis of the occurrence and the single assault by the appellant,
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coupled with the duration of the entire episode for 1½ to 2 minutes. Had there been any intention to do away with the life of the deceased, nothing prevented the appellant from making a second assault to ensure his death, rather than to have run away. The intention appears more to have been to teach a lesson by the venting of ire by an irked neighbour, due to loud playing of the tape recorder. But in the nature of weapon used, the assault made in the rib-cage area, knowledge that death was likely to ensue will have to be attributed to the appellant.
8. In the entirety of the evidence, the facts and circumstances of the case, we are unable to sustain the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC and are satisfied that it deserves to be altered to Section 304 Part II IPC. It is ordered accordingly. Considering the period of custody undergone after his conviction, we alter the sentence to the period of custody already undergone. The appellant may be released forthwith if not required in any other case.
9. The appeal is therefore allowed in part with the aforesaid modification of the conviction and sentence."
19. This Court in a recent judgement in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under:
"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:
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(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused.
To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in 21 ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.
(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is 22 punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.
(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.
(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of 23 the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.
(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.
(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.
(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant 24 must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.
(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.
(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."
36. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Velthepu Srinivas and others vs. State of Andra Pradesh reported in AIR 2024 SC 1050 at paragraphs 24 and 28 has held as under:
24. As per the post-mortem report, the cause of death is "cardio pulmonary occipital joint". The atlanto occipital joint is at the back of the neck, which is the exact place where A-1 assaulted the deceased with the help of an axe. This axe was then taken by A-2 and thereafter, by A-4, who also assaulted the deceased. All the eye witnesses are clear in this account. In other words, it was only A-3 who never took the axe in his hand. He only used to stone to assault the deceased.
28. Even though, A-3 might not have had the common intention to commit the murder, nevertheless, his participation in the assault and the wielding of the stone certainly makes him culpable for the offence that he has committed. While we acquit A-3 of the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC, he is liable for the offence under 304 Part II IPC. The law on Section 304 Part II has been succinctly laid down in
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Camilo Vaz V. State of Goa, (2000) 9 SCC1, where it was held that:
14.This section is in two parts. If analyzed, the section provides for two kinds of punishment to two different situations: (1)if the act by which death is caused is caused is done with the intention of causing death or causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
Here the important ingredient is the "intention"; (2) if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. When a person hits another with a danda on a vital part of the body with such force that the person hit meets his death, knowledge has to be imputed to the accused..."
37. Applying the aforesaid principles to the case of hand, as noted above, we have already arrived at a conclusion that the accused No.1 caused death of Ningayya by inflicting injury on the neck through axe (M.O.2), however, on careful re appreciation of evidence of P.W.1, P.W.8 and P.W.9, there is quarrel between the accused No.1 and deceased Ningayya about the land dispute on the earlier occasion also. It is also forthcoming in the evidence that, accused No.1 getting food from the house of deceased Ningayya and the entire unfortunate incident was happened in a spur of moment on 22.03.2018, due to altercation
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022between the deceased Ningayya and accused No. and therefore, looking into the injury on the body of late Ningiah as per Post-Mortem report and further as the accused No.1, fled away from the place by keeping weapon-axe-M.O.2 near to the petty shop belonging to the deceased-Ningayya and that apart, the accused No.1 himself surrendered before the police on the very same evening, we are of the opinion that, the trial court ought to have convicted accused No.1 for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part II and not under Section 302 of IPC. Though the prolonged age of the accused and the injuries inflicted on the body of the deceased-Ningayya are not a sole factors to decide the matter for conversion of punishment to Section 304 part II of IPC, however, the conduct of the accused No.1 and as accused himself was getting food from the house of the deceased, and that apart, the single assault made by accused No.1 on the neck of the deceased was sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that the accused No.1 had no intention to kill the deceased. Therefore, we find force in the arguments advanced by the learned counsel appearing for
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CRL.A. NO.100631/2022the appellant to alter the conviction of the accused No.1 from Section 302 to Section 304 part II of IPC.
CONCLUSION:
38. We have carefully and consciously gone through the Judgment of the trial Court and the learned Sessions Judge appreciating the evidence available on record and has rightly come to the conclusion of involvement of the accused No.1 in the incident took place on 22.03.2018, wherein, accused No.1 used M.O.2-Axe to his brother-Ningayya. However, keeping in view the discussion made by us above and taking into consideration the provisions contained under exception IV to Section 300 of IPC, we are of the opinion that, punishment imposed by the trial court under Section 302 of IPC is to be converted/altered to Part II of Section 304 of IPC in the circumstance of the case.
39. For the foregoing reasons, we proceed to pass the following:
ORDER
i) Appeal is allowed in part;
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ii) The Judgment of conviction dated 20.06.2020 in S.C.No.99 of 2018 on the file of the V Additional District and Sessions Judge, Dharwad, sitting at Hubballi, is partly set aside and order of conviction of accused No.1 to undergo imprisonment for life is altered/converted into Section 304 Part II of IPC with fine as imposed by the trial court.
iii) The accused No.1 shall undergo imprisonment for ten years including the term already spent by him with fine as imposed by the learned Sessions Judge in the impugned judgment and order of conviction.
Sd/-
JUDGE Sd/-
JUDGE SB