Gujarat High Court
Pradipbhai vs Shekh on 10 May, 2010
Author: H.K.Rathod
Bench: H.K.Rathod
Gujarat High Court Case Information System
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SCA/4737/2010 27/ 27 ORDER
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
SPECIAL
CIVIL APPLICATION No. 4737 of 2010
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PRADIPBHAI
LALLUBHAI SHAH - Petitioner(s)
Versus
SHEKH
MUNVARMINYA MAHEMUDMINYA - Respondent(s)
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Appearance
:
MRS
YOGINI V PARIKH for
Petitioner(s) : 1,
MR RAJESH P MANKAD for Respondent(s) :
1,
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CORAM
:
HONOURABLE
MR.JUSTICE H.K.RATHOD
Date
: 10/05/2010
ORAL
ORDER
Heard learned advocate Mrs. Parikh on behalf of petitioner, learned advocate Mr. RP Mankad appearing for respondent.
In present petition, petitioner has challenged order dated 25/1/2010 and ex parte award dated 6/9/2007 passed by Labour Court Surat in reference (LCS) no. 154/2003 and also to quash and set aside order passed by Labour Court, Surat in Recovery application no. 288/2008.
Learned advocate Mrs. Parikh placed on record draft amendment, which has been allowed by this Court. Accordingly, same is required to be carried out during course of day. The copy of amended petition placed on record by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh and also supplied copy of amended petition to learned advocate Mr. Mankad. The amendment made in draft amendment is that in the month of February/ March, 2006 petitioner has sifted his factory (place of work) from Ribin House, Opp. Ratnasagar Apartment, Kaji's Maidan, Gupipura, Surat to Harihar Estate & Danav Estate, Vastadevi Road, nandi dosi ni vadi, Surat. It is a rented premises and copy of rent receipt dated 10/6/2006 for month of April/May 2006 also produced on record.
According to petitioner, workman has not effected this change of address of petitioner's establishment before Labour Court. The petitioner did not receive copy of award passed by Labour Court. She relied upon Bailiff's report dated 27/2/2007 with reference to notice dated 8/2/2007 of Labour Court, Surat, which also shows that on address mentioned in notice applicant means present petitioner is not found and notice is not served. She submitted that petitioner has sifted his factory. According to statement of Bailiff to the effect that notice was affixed on gate of petitioner's establishment is incorrect as no notice was affixed on petitioner's new factory (place of work).
Similarly, on 16/4/2008 respondent workman filed Recovery application no. 288/2008 and address in this Recovery application was also same as was in reference i.e. of old premises. After shifting place of work/factory, old premises is remained closed. Therefore, it may be possible that when workman Shri Bharatbhai had been to old premises for any work to bring something from old premises, he received this notice of Labour Court in reference. This notice of Labour Court was received by petitioner's employee workman Shri Bharatbhai Amarsinhbhai. He informed the petitioner about this notice in Recovery application. On receiving notice in this Recovery application, petitioner came to know about said proceeding and applied for relevant papers from record of Labour Court. On receiving certified copy of ex parte award and documents on record of Labour Court, immediately petitioner has filed petition before this Court on 25/8/2009. Therefore, according to her submission, there is no delay as per Industrial Disputes Gujarat Rules on the part of petitioner in filing restoration application before Labour Court, Surat.
She also submitted that after impugned award of Labour Court, Surat where reinstatement has been granted with back wages, workman has not come for work and sent any letter to report for work. She also submitted that she is having information from reliable source that since 2008/2009/2010, workman was working at factory of Patel Maganbhai (Vadgam wala), at address - Patel Maganbhai (Vadgam wala), under Vijay Diamond, first floor, Bardolia Building, Gotalavadi, Surat and workman was relieved or has left in February, 2010. Therefore, she submitted that looking to documentary evidence, which demonstrate by petitioner that immediately on having knowledge of ex parte award, Restoration Application was filed and in fact there was no delay in filing such application. She submitted that Labour Court has committed gross error in rejecting delay condone application filed by petitioner.
She submitted that petitioner is prepared to reinstate workman in service subject to out come of matter which is to be decided on merits and remanded matter back to Labour Court to decide on merits and petitioner is prepared to pay reasonable costs to workman.
Learned advocate Mr. Mankad submitted that workman is out of job since 3/11/2002 and ex parte award passed in favour of workman 6/9/2007. No order of reinstatement has been issued by petitioner and no wages has been paid by petitioner.
Learned advocate Mrs. Parikh submitted that let workman may file affidavit of unemployment then petitioner may be given opportunity to file counter for establishing facts that workman was in gainful employment and receiving adequate remuneration.
Initially, in this matter some negotiation were taken place and some suggestion has been made by this Court and this Court has passed an order on 19/4/2010 which was subsequently recalled by this Court by another order dated 3/5/2010. Thereafter, both learned advocates made their submission on merits.
Learned advocate Mrs. Parikh emphasized that ex parte award, which was passed on 6/9/2007 before that effective notice not served to petitioner because of sifting of place of work in February/March, 2006 and she also relied upon endorsement made by Bailiff at page 45 to 48, where notice issued by Labour Court to petitioner is not received by petitioner and in one occasion such notice was affixed to old premises of petitioner on 14/8/2007. The petitioner is not able to get copy of award. Thereafter, immediately Recovery application was filed by workmen and notice issued in Recovery Application received by petitioner at old premises or old place of working. Thereafter, matter was inquired by petitioner and approach to Labour Court by filing Restoration Application to set aside ex parte award with delay condone application and from date of knowledge of ex parte award in fact there was no delay at all. The workman has also not informed to petitioner about ex parte award and also not demanded to reinstate him in service.
Learned advocate Mr. Mankad submitted that Pradipbhai Lallubhai Shah is petitioner and rent receipt is in the name of Lallubhai & Sons, can not consider to be genuine receipt. Learned advocate Mr. Mankad insists that from date of award if petitioner is prepared to pay wages then ex parte order may be set aside but for that learned advocate Mrs. Parikh insists affidavit of unemployment from workman.
Learned advocate Mr. Mankad submitted that ex parte award was passed on 6/9/2007 and it was published on 30/10/2007. The demand letter of implementation of ex parte award sent to petitioner on 13/3/2008 and when no response is received by workman from petitioner then on 16/4/2008, Recovery Application was filed by respondent workman. Thereafter, petition which was filed by petitioner challenging ex parte award has been disposed of by this Court on having alternative remedy on 27/8/2009.
On 23/9/2009, an application was preferred by petitioner to set aside ex parte award is decided on 25/1/2010. The Labour Court has rejected delay condone application preferred by petitioner. Even in this petition also he submitted that petitioner has preferred this petition on 22/3/2010 and move for circulation on 19/4/2010 and it was notified on 20/4/2010. In short, both learned advocates made respective submission along with their respective suggestion.
I have considered submission made by both learned advocates and I have perused ex parte award and order passed in Restoration Application no. 5/2009 along with delay condone application. I have also considered relevant documents which are annexed to present petition and amendment made by petitioner along with documents of notice issued by Labour Court and endorsement made by Shri Vinodbhai Jadav Bailiff in both notice. I have also considered contention raised by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh that respondent workman is not an employee of petitioner.
The Labour Court, Surat has passed an ex parte award on 6/9/2007. The statement of claim was filed by workman exh 4 and dispute has been referred for adjudication by Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Surat on 29/4/2003. At that time, petitioner has not sifted his premises. It is necessary to note that copy of statement of claim sent by workman to present petitioner which was received by petitioner on 23/9/2003 and documents relating to original receipt from postal department produced on record by workman exh 6. The workman was examined before Labour Court vide exh 7. It is not a case of petitioner that order of reference dated 29/4/2003 referred by Assistant Commissioner of Labour, Surat is not received by petitioner. Nowhere, such contention was raised by petitioner. The copy of statement of claim received by petitioner that facts have been proved by workman before Labour Court. The workman was examined exh 7, none remained present to cross examine him on behalf of petitioner. Therefore, Labour Court has considered exh 6 and 7 and notice issued by Labour Court which has been referred and relied by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh at page 43. At page 44, an endorsement is made by Bailiff Shri V. R. Jadav that on 30/6/2003 Shri Rashikbhai Dumasiya has received it and notice has been served to respondent workman also. This being a first notice issued by Labour Court in filing written statement by petitioner after receiving statement of claim from respondent in reference no. 154/2003 at page 44. Thereafter, notice issued on 26/2/2007 at page 46 where Bailiff has made endorsement that on given address employer is not found from place of address. Therefore, notice was not served to petitioner. Then another notice at page 47 has been served by affixing on gate of old premises and endorsement has been made by Bailiff on 14/8/2007. The evidence of workman exh 7 page 49 in terms deposed before Labour Court that copy of statement of claim was served to petitioner and original postal acknowledgment was produced on record. This facts has not been denied by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh before this Court. Therefore, contention which has been raised by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh to the effect that notice is not received by petitioner can not be accepted because notice dated 7/5/2003 page 42 received by one Rashikbhai on 30/6/2003 from Bailiff Shri V. R. Jadav. In another information on receiving copy of statement of claim exh 6 original postal acknowledgment was produced by respondent workman before Labour Court and that has been supported by oral evidence of workman exh 7. Inspite of this fact, petitioner has not made any inquiry before Labour Court, Surat about pending reference and no care has been taken to engage any advocate or to remain present personally or to give answer or reply to statement of claim received from workman. Therefore, ex parte award was passed by Labour Court considering aforesaid documents which are on record. According to my opinion, Labour Court has taken sufficient care while deciding ex parte award.
The submission made by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh that petitioner was not aware about ex parte award passed by Labour Court. On 13/3/2008 demand notice was sent by workman to petitioner which was received by it and on 16/4/2008 Recovery Application was filed which notice was also received by petitioner.
The delay condone application in filing application to set aside ex parte award has been considered by Labour Court after examining contention raised by petitioner. The petitioner has relied upon certain decision before Labour Court as discussed by Labour Court in para 4. The Labour Court has considered merits of matter in para 6 and come to conclusion that before Conciliation Officer, petitioner was remained present and dispute has been referred for adjudication. So from very beginning dispute was raised by workman against his termination and for that conciliation proceeding was initiated by Conciliation Officer. At that occasion, petitioner was remained present before Conciliation Officer, then dispute has been referred for adjudication to Labour Court, Surat. Therefore, petitioner was aware about this industrial dispute and proceeding from very beginning. It is not the case of petitioner before this Court that order of reference dated 29/4/2003 sent by Assistant Commissioner of Labour is not received by petitioner. The first notice as discussed above received by Rashikbhai Dumasiyabhai and also received copy of statement of claim exh 6 and thereafter notice has been served by affixing on gate of old premises. Even though, petitioner remained absent and ex parte award has been passed after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to petitioner. Unfortunately, petitioner has remained inactive and not availed opportunity which provided by Labour Court, Surat and also not remained vigilant and ignored intentionally proceeding.
Therefore, Labour Court has no other option to pass ex parte award on 6/9/2007. The award was published on 30/10/2007 and same was published on 1/11/2007 also. The affidavit filed by petitioner that notice received by Rashikbhai Dumashiya and affidavit of Rashikbhai can not be helpful to petitioner because according to his affidavit Shekh Munvarminya Mahemudminya was not working in establishment. Therefore, though notice has been received by him, but he has not informed or communicate to Pradipbhai Lallubhai Shah. That does not mean that notice has not been received by petitioner which was issued by Labour Court, Surat. If any lapse have been committed by employee of petitioner, for that, no fault can be find out from Labour Court. Similarly, first notice has been received by petitioner through Rashikbhai Dumashiyabhai who was employee of petitioner. The award was also received by petitioner but no proceeding has been initiated immediately and application for setting aside ex parte award was filed by petitioner on 23/9/2009 which is beyond period. For that, sufficient cause has not established even it can not consider to be genuine cause which has been advanced by petitioner before Labour Court. The delay in filing such application comes to more than 1? year, which has not been specifically explained by petitioner before Labour Court. On the contrary, petitioner has given one or other reason for their intentional absent. The delay comes to more than 500 days in filing such application to set aside ex parte award. In fact, delay has not been explained at all. Therefore, according to my opinion, an excuse has been shown while raising technical plea before Labour Court which has been rightly examined by Labour Court and rightly rejected it by Labour Court.
Recently, an application to set aside ex parte award, delay of 470 days from date of publication of award, has been dismissed by Madras High Court in case of E. M. E. Edwards St. George School V. The Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal Chennai and Anr. reported in 2010 Lab IC 1195. The relevant discussion made in para 11, 12, 17 to 19 are quoted as under:
11. In Sangham Tape Company V. Hans Raj, reported in 2004 (3) LLJ 1141 :
(AIR 2004 SC 4776) : 2004 Lab IC 4039, the respondent workman, who was not provided with the duties, sought for reinstatement with full back wages and continuity of service. An ex parte award was passed. On the application moved by the appellant Management, the ex parte Award was set aside. Contending inter alia that the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to set aside the Award, after the lapse of 30 days from the date of its publication, the respondent employee filed a Writ petition before the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The High Court set aside the order of the Labour Court. Being aggrieved by the same, the Management moved the Supreme Court. While adjudicating the correctness of the order of the High Court, which set aside ex parte Award, the Supreme Court, after considering the provisions under Section 17-A of the Industrial Dispute Act and Rules 22 and 24 of the Industrial Dispute (Central) Rules, 1957, and the decisions in Grindlays Bank Ltd Vs. Central Government in Industrial Tribunal and others reported in AIR 1981 SC 606 : 1980 Supp SCC 420 : 1981 (1) LLJ 327 : (1981 Lab IC 155), at Paragraph 10, held as follows:
10. In view of this Court's decision in Grindlays Bank (supra), such jurisdiction could be exercised by the Labour Court within a limited time frame, namely within thirty days from the date of publication of the Award. Once an Award becomes enforceable in terms of Section 17 A of the Act, the Labour Court or the Tribunal as the case may be, does not retain any jurisdiction in relation to setting aside of an Award passed by it. In other words, upon the expiry of 30 days from the date of publication of award in the Gazette, the same having become enforceable, the Labour Court would become functus officio.
12. It is also useful to extract the law laid down in Grindlays Bank Ltd Vs. Central Government Industrial Tribunal and others, reported in 1981 (1) LLJ 327 : AIR 1981 SC 606 : 1981 Lab IC 155) as follows:
14. The contention that the Tribunal had become functus officio and, therefore had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte Award and that the Central Government alone could set it aside, does not commend to use sub section (3) of Section 20 of the Act provides that the proceedings before the Tribunals would be deemed to continue till the date on which the award becomes enforceable on the expiry of 30 days from the date of its publication under Section 17.
The proceedings with regard to a reference under section 10 of the Act are, therefore, not deemed to be concluded until the expiry of 30 days from the publication of the Award. Till then the Tribunal retains jurisdiction over the dispute referred to it for adjudication and upto the date it has the power to entertain an application in connection with such dispute. The stage is not reached till the Award becomes enforceable under Section 17-A. In the instant case, the Tribunal made the ex parte Award on December 9, 1976. That award was published by the Central Government in the Gazette of India dated December 25, 1976. The application for setting aside the ex parte Award was filed by the respondent 3, acting on behalf of respondents 5 to 17 on January 19, 1977, i.e. before the expiry of 30 days of its publication and was, therefore, rightly entertained by the Tribunal.
17. Reading of the statutory provisions makes it clear that the Labour Court or Tribunal, may for sufficient cause, set aside, after notice to the opposite party, an ex parte decision either wholly or in part, on an application made within 15 days of the ex parte decision. Provided that an application may be admitted after the said period of 15 days, if the applicant satisfies the Labour Court or Tribunal, as the case may be that he had sufficient cause for not preferring an application within that period.
18. As stated supra, the award was passed on 28/4/2006 and it was published in the Notice board on 28/8/2006. After 470 days, an application has been taken out by the writ petitioner to condone the delay in seeking to set aside the ex parte Award. In the light of the decision in Grindlays Bank's case, (AIR 1981 SC 606 : 1981 Lab IC
155), the fourth respondent has held that as the grounds stated in Section 17-A are not applicable to the case of the writ petitioner and dismissed the condonation petition. Perusal of the order impugned in this Writ Petition shows that the Tribunal has considered the application on merits and held that sufficient cause has not been shown for condonation.
19. In the light of the decision in Sangham Tape Company (AIR 2004 SC 4776 : 2004 Lab IC 4039) (cited supra), this Court is of the considered view that the order dismissing the condonation petition is in accordance with the legal principles and in conformity with the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act and the Rules framed thereunder. Hence, I do not find any manifest illegality in the impugned order. The Writ petition is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.
Therefore, Labour Court has rightly come to conclusion that reason which has been advanced by petitioner that notice has not been received by petitioner is not found to be correct from record of Labour Court. The copy of award also sent to original address. It is necessary to note one important aspect that whatever draft amendment placed on record before this Court that fact has not been placed before Labour Court by petitioner that premises has been sifted by petitioner from old place to new place as referred in draft amendment. The first time such facts have been placed on record that premises has been sifted by petitioner can not be accepted. Apart from that, old premises is remained in possession of petitioner because it is belongs to petitioner. The fact about shifting of premises by petitioner was not placed before Labour Court, Surat by petitioner. This Court can not accept such subsequent facts which are not placed on record before Labour Court. Therefore, contention raised by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh can not be accepted.
The Recovery application no. 288/2008 is pending before Labour Court, Surat. Therefore, this Court is not made any observation or expressed any opinion about it. It is necessary to note how legal machinery has been used by petitioner to harass poor workman who has completed more than 13 years service with petitioner while working as diamond cutter in petitioner establishment where more than 70 workmen are working. The respondent workman was receiving salary of Rs. 7000/- per month from petitioner, who is out of job since eight years because his date of termination is 3/11/2002.
According to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly passed an ex parte award after giving reasonable opportunity of hearing to petitioner which has not been availed by petitioner by adopting lethargic approach, irresponsible attitude and ignoring labour Court proceeding. The reason is that in conciliation proceeding, petitioner was remained present. The order of reference received by petitioner because it is not disputed by petitioner. The copy of first notice received by Shri Rashikbhai and copy of statement of claim sent by workman received by petitioner. Inspite of this facts, it was found from record that petitioner has not made any inquiry or made any sincere efforts to know why such notice has been issued and why such statement of claim is filed by workman. So, petitioner intentionally remained inactive and irresponsible conduct suggests that Labour Court has rightly passed ex parte award. The delay of more than 1? years not explained by petitioner. The reason or explanation is not found to be correct from record of Labour Court and it can not consider to be sufficient cause for condoning this much delay and Labour Court rightly not satisfied caused pointed by petitioner. Accordingly, Labour Court has rightly dismissed delay condone application, for that, Labour Court has not committed any error which would require interference by this Court.
Learned advocate Mrs. Parikh pointed out gainful employment of workman which was subsequent period from date of ex parte award which is otherwise also not relevant in deciding delay condone application filed by petitioner.
Learned advocate Mr. Mankad has disputed submission of gainful employment made by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh. According to him, workman was remained unemployed from date of termination till date even subsequent to ex parte award passed by Labour Court, Surat. Learned advocate Mr. Mankad submitted that in present petition whatever contentions have been raised by learned advocate Mrs. Parikh about shifting premises means work place was not raised before Labour Court, Surat. Therefore, such contention have been got up by petitioner. He submitted that in present petition address of original premises was given by petitioner. The original premises where factory was running is belonging to petitioner means of ownership of petitioner. Whether that premises was given on rental base or whether it has been sold out to someone or not and whether possession of that premises is remained with petitioner or not? No details have been disclosed by petitioner before this Court. If premises has been sifted to other place, it require separate license for running factory under provisions of various Labour Laws but not a single documents have been produced by petitioner before this Court to justify defence of sifting of premises. He submitted that once first notice received by petitioner that facts have been proved before Labour Court on the basis of evidence and exh 6 copy of statement of claim sent by workman received by petitioner. In such circumstances, it is a duty of petitioner to appear before Labour Court. For that, second notice from Labour Court is not necessary at all but care is required to be taken by petitioner.
He submitted that similar aspect has been examined by Division Bench of this Court in case of N. D. Patel & Co. Vs. Manubhai Karsanbhai Parmar and another reported in 1984 Lab IC 1245, where Division bench of this Court has made observation in para 1 and 2 which are quoted as under:
1. The petitioner herein challenged the award passed by the Labour Court, Vadodara, in Reference (LCS) No. 190 of 1979 by which the respondent workman was ordered to be reinstated on his original post (Helper) with 50% back wages from the date of discharge till reinstatement.
The case of the workman was that he was working with the petitioner Company for last about 2? years before the date of reference. On December 7, 1979 without any reason and without any fault on his part, he was discharged from service. Despite the demand having been made by him, he was not taken on service and therefore he preferred his claim. The reference having been made by the competent authority, the respondent workman submitted his statement of claim while the petitioner Company though served with a notice, did not appear. Hence the Labour Court proceeded ex parte and after examining the workman and on the basis of the evidence recorded, passed an award on August 11, 1980, directing the petitioner Company to reinstate the workman on his original post with 50% back wages from the date of discharge till the date of reinstatement.
2. This award is challenged by the petitioner Company on the ground that no notice has been served upon the petitioner by the Labour Court. It is contended that the proceedings before Labour Court have been carried on in violation of the principles of natural justice in asmuch as no notice of the proceedings was ever served upon the petitioner. In reply affidavit, the workman has filed certain correspondence and at Annexures F and G two letters have been produced. Annexure F shows that the Secretary of Gujarat Engineering and General Kamdar Union had written a letter addressed to the petitioner Company. By this letter the petitioner Company was informed that the date of filing reply to the claim statement which was sent to the petitioner along with the letter was May 20, 1980. it was also mentioned in the letter that the information was given as per the direction given by the Labour Curt. This letter was replied to by the petitioner by its letter dated April 16, 1980 (Ann, G ) wherein the petitioner acknowledged the letter dated April 19, 1980. In this letter, the petitioner contended that they were working as Conductor to M/s. Dodsal Private Limited for supplying Labourers on each and every contract and in that view of the matter, the petitioner had no other alternative but to terminate the services when the contract for which the workman was engaged was over. It was also mentioned in the letter that the workman was taken in service on daily wage basis and in case there is any possibility of giving a new job, he would be engaged in a new job in future. It may be noted that in this letter the petitioner has nowhere stated that they were not award of the proceedings before the Labour Court or that the intimation given by the Secretary of the Union was not proper and sufficient or that it was not in accordance with law. Strangely enough, there is no reference to these two letters in the entire petition which runs into about seven pages. A pointed question was put to the counsel for the petitioner as to why the fact regarding this correspondence particularly Annexures F and G by which it clearly transpires that the petitioner had a notice of the proceedings before the Labour Court, was not brought to the notice of the Court by mentioning the same in the petition? The petitioner was even given intimation about the next date of hearing by a letter written by the Secretary of the Union as per the direction given by the Labour Court. There is no explanation whatsoever as to why this fact was not brought to the notice of the Court at the time of admission of the petition. This is a very important and material fact. Since this important and material fact appears to have been deliberately suppressed from the Court, we are not inclined to interfere with the award passed by the Labour Court on this ground of suppression of material of fact alone. Even on merits, we feel that once there is a notice either in prescribed form or in any other manner, the party concerned is bound to take cognizance thereof and appear before the Court concerned. It may be noted that it was not the contention of the petitioner that it had received notice but since the same was not in prescribed form it had chosen not to appear before the Labour Court. In this view of the matter also, the award passed by the Labour Court is not required to be interfered with. Hence, the petition requires to be rejected. Rule discharged with cost.
In view of above observation made by Division Bench of this Court as referred above and considering facts which are on record before this Court ex parte award itself, passed by Labour Curt can not consider to be contrary to principle of natural justice because though an opportunity was given, same has not been availed, i.e. how lapse intentionally made by petitioner. Therefore, Labour Court has not committed any error in deciding delay condone application filed by petitioner.
This Court is having very limited jurisdiction to interfere such kind of order passed by Labour Court almost based on facts. Therefore, this Court can not interfere or disturb fact finding decided by Labour Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of Constitution of India. The recent view taken by Apex Court in case of State of Haryana & Ors Vs. Manoj Kumar reported in 2010 AIR SCW 1990. The relevant para 22 to 29 are quoted as under:
22. The appellants urged that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 is very limited and the High Court, while exercising the jurisdiction under Article 227, has to ensure that the courts below work within the bounds of their authority.
23. More than half a century ago, the Constitution Bench of this court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others AIR 1958 SC 398 settled that power under Article 227 is limited to seeing that the courts below function within the limit of its authority or jurisdiction.
24. This court placed reliance on Nagendra Nath's case in a subsequent judgment in Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu AIR 1963 SC 1895. The court observed that jurisdiction conferred under Article 227 is not by any means appellate in its nature for correcting errors in the decisions of subordinate courts or tribunals but is merely a power of superintendence to be used to keep them within the bounds of their authority.
25. This court had an occasion to examine this aspect of the matter in the case of Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others (1983) 4 SCC 566 . The court observed as under:-
"The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is limited "to seeing that an inferior Court or Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority,"
and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less an error of law. for this case there was, in our opinion, no error of law much less an error apparent on the face of the record. There was no failure on the part of the learned Subordinate Judge to exercise jurisdiction nor did he act in disregard of principles of natural justice. Nor was the procedure adopted by him not in consonance with the procedure established by law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or Tribunal. It will not review or reweigh the evidence upon which the determination of the inferior court or tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of law in the decision."
26. This court again clearly reiterated the legal position in Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576. The court again cautioned that the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes.
27. A three-Judge Bench of this court in Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others (1998) 3 SCC 341 again abundantly made it clear that the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the subordinate court or the tribunal while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227. Its function is limited to seeing that the subordinate court or the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority. It cannot correct mere errors of fact by examining the evidence and re-appreciating it.
28. In Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others (1999) 1 SCC 47 this court held that the limited power under Article 227 cannot be invoked except for ensuring that the subordinate courts function within its limits.
29. This court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and set aside the judgments of the courts below on merit.
There is no substance in present petition. Accordingly, present petition is dismissed with costs quantified Rs. 10,000/- to be paid by petitioner to respondent workman.
(H.K.RATHOD, J) asma Top