Punjab-Haryana High Court
Sushila Mittal Alias Shiela vs Vxl India Ltd. And Anr. on 17 July, 1991
Equivalent citations: (1992)101PLR331
JUDGMENT Harphul Singh Brar, J.
1. This is a criminal miscellaneous application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for quashing the criminal complaint under Section 630, Sub-section 1(b), and Sub-section (2), of the Companies Act, 1956.
2. It is averred in the miscellaneous application that the petitioner was an employee of the respondent-company since 1960. Initially, the petitioner was appointed in O. C. M. (India) Ltd., but later on she was transferred to the East India Carpet Company Ltd., G. T. Road, Chheharta, with effect from 1978. Both the companies are concerns of the same proprietor.
3. It is alleged by the petitioner that, at the time of entry into service, a house was let to her by the company, being quarters No. 5, in the O. C. M. Estate, Amritsar, on monthly rent. The petitioner was in occupation and possession of the quarters which were rented out to her by the company and to which the Rent Act also applied. She was being threatened with forcible dispossession from the quarters. The petitioner, per force to save her interest, filed a civil suit for a permanent injunction against the respondent-company, restraining them from evicting the petitioner by force. In the suit, the respondent gave a statement that the petitioner would not be evicted by force and, on that assurance, the suit was decided on January, 15, 1986, vide annexure P-2, annexed to the petition.
4. It is further averred that, in spite of the fact that an assurance was given to the petitioner that no force would be used, the respondent started misusing the assurance by stopping electricity/water and other amenities, with the result that the petitioner had to file another suit for restraining the respondent from stopping the amenities and also not to obstruct the ingress/egress of the petitioner. According to the averments made in the petition, this suit is still pending and an interim injunction was granted by the trial court. The appeal filed by the respondent against the interim injunction was dismissed by the lower appellate court. Copy of the order, dated July 25, 1988, of the lower appellate court is attached as annexure P-3 to the petition.
5. It is also averred in the petition that, in the meantime, the respondent had filed a civil suit against the petitioner for vacation of the house and for claiming mesne profits/damages/rent which is pending in the Court of Subordinate Judge, First Class, Amritsar, and which is being defended by the petitioner. It is then said that, despite the fact that the civil litigation about the house in question was pending, the respondent-company in abuse of the process of law, filed a criminal complaint for prosecuting the petitioner under Section 630 of the Companies Act on the ground that the petitioner was using the property of the company. A copy of the complaint is attached as annexure P-5 to the petition and the petitioner was summoned to answer the charge in the court of Shri S.S. Gupta, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar.
6. The criminal complaint and the proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amritsar, according to the petitioner, are liable to be quashed on the following grounds :
(i) that no criminal complaint for summary trial under Section 630 of the Companies Act is maintainable in the court in the circumstances mentioned above, and Section 630 of the Companies Act does not authorise any of the officers of the company to file a criminal case against a tenant for criminal prosecution. Nor are the provisions of Section 630 applicable as made out in a case where the house has been validly under the tenancy of the employee and for which the employee is paying regular rent ;
(ii) that the company has already moved the civil court for vacation of the quarters in question and for claiming damages and the matter is seized by the civil court ; thus, filing of a criminal complaint in such circumstances is nothing but an abuse of the process of law and is a direct interference in the administration of justice ;
(iii) that the parties are already fighting for their respective rights under the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, as applicable, and proceedings are pending in the various courts and thus proceeding with the complaint when no offence whatsoever has been made out under the Companies Act is untenable ;
(iv) that the petitioner had never wrongfully obtained possession of any property. Rather, the tenancy was created by the company and thus Sub-section 1(a) of Section 630 of the Companies Act is not applicable and similarly Sub-section (1)(b) is not applicable to any such case. The initial occupation and possession of the house was in accordance with law and once a tenancy has been created, the only remedy available with the company was under the civil law which the company is well prosecuting ;
(v) that the company, by filing the complaint and the criminal court by summoning the petitioner without application of mind, have exercised the jurisdiction which is not vested in them either under law or otherwise ; and
(vi) that the action of the respondent is a mere abuse of the process of law."
7. Shri. C.L. Maheshwari, Law Officer, VXL India Ltd. (O.C.M. Woollen Mills) Chheharta, Amritsar, has filed a reply by way of affidavit. In his preliminary objections to the reply, it is stated as under :
"1. That this petition is not competent in the eye of law and it is necessary to refer to the correct factual position which is as under :
(a) That the petitioner was employed by the respondent-company and for her residence she was given quarters for living in the factory premises. However, she resigned her job and her resignation was accepted.
(b) That, thereafter, she left the city of Amritsar and shifted to Dehradun where her husband resided but did not vacate the premises. She raised a number of disputes and also raised an industrial dispute which was ultimately decided against her.
(c) That the respondent-company filed a civil suit for mandatory injunction for ordering the petitioner to vacate the quarters in dispute on July 28, 1986. The petitioner instituted a counter-suit on April 25, 1986, for a permanent injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with her possession.
(d) That, during the pendency of the above suit, the petitioner filed the present complaint under Section 630 of the Companies Act with the plea that the petitioner had not vacated the premises and was liable to be prosecuted as she had not delivered possession of the company's property. This complaint was filed on November 9, 1987.
(e) That, ultimately, the Senior Sub Judge, Amritsar, dismissed the suit filed by the petitioner on August 11, 1990, holding that she was not entitled to possession of the premises and was a mere licensee and had not been occupying the premises and had not paid any amount for the use and occupation of the premises since December 1, 1984.
(f) That the suit filed by the respondent had also come up for hearing before the Senior Sub-Judge, Amritsar, on August 11, 1990, and the court decreed the suit for possession and directed the petitioner to vacate the premises and hand over possession immediately and also pay mesne profits with effect from December 15, 1984, up to date.
(g) That the petitioner filed an appeal against the aforesaid decrees along with an application for stay which came up for hearing before Shri Iqbal Singh, Additional District Judge, Amritsar, on February 25, 1991. The lower appellate court, after going through the facts of the case, held that "it is not disputed that she is not residing there but is residing, at Dehradun . . . She is no longer an employee of the company and the quarters was allotted to her for her convenience and it is lying vacant and locked" and dismissed the application.
(h) That, in the meantime, the respondents had filed an application for execution and possession but the petitioner got the execution adjourned to April 27, 1991, on the plea that she had moved the Hon'ble High Court for stay but no such orders have been granted to the knowledge of the respondent.
(i) That the petitioner still retains possession of the quarters illegally which are lying vacant for the last eight years."
8. It is an admitted fact that the quarters were allotted to the petitioner on the basis of her being an employee of the company. It is also an admitted fact that the petitioner is still in possession of the quarters even after she has ceased to be the employee of the company. It is also a fact that the Senior Subordinate Judge, Amritsar, dismissed the suit filed by the petitioner on August 11, 1990, holding that she was not entitled to possession of the premises and was a mere licensee and has been occupying the premises and has not paid any amount for the use and occupation of the premises since December 1, 1984. It is again a patent fact that a suit filed by the respondent-company for possession against the petitioner was decreed on August 11, 1990, in which the petitioner was directed to vacate the premises and hand over possession immediately, and also to pay mesne profits with effect from December 15, 1984. The petitioner's appeal against that judgment and decree dated August 11, 1990, was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Amritsar, on February 25, 1991.
9. It is in the background of these facts that it has to be decided as to whether a complaint filed by the respondent-company against the petitioner under Section 630 of the Companies Act is maintainable. It is undisputed that the petitioner occupied the quarters of the company when she was its employee. It is an unrebutted fact that she is keeping possession of the quarters till today. In my considered view, the complaint filed by the company under Section 630, Sub-section 1(b) and Sub-section (2) of the Companies Act is maintainable and, consequently, the summoning order passed by the Magistrate is in order. The question of interpretation of the maintainability of a complaint under Section 630 of the Companies Act and its applicability to the ex-employees of the company is not res integra. It has been held by the Bombay High Court that Section 630 of the Companies Act applies not merely to existing officers and employees of the company but also to ex-employees and ex-officers (reference in this behalf may be made to Govind T. Jagtiani v. Sirajuddin S. Kazi [1984] 56 Comp Cas 329 (Bom)). It has also been held in another case by the same High Court that, if an officer or employee of a company wrongfully withholds the property of the company, he would be liable to prosecution for wrongful withholding of the property under Section 630 of the Companies Act (reference in this connection may be made to Harkishin Lakhimal Gidwani v. Achyut Kashinath Wagh [1982] 52 Comp Cas 1 (Bom)). I am in respectful agreement with the views expressed by the Bombay High Court on this point.
10. It is an admitted fact that the quarters in question were allotted to the petitioner when she was an employee of the company. She did not vacate it for the last about eight years and is still in possession. The allegation in the complaint filed by the company against the petitioner is that she is wrongfully withholding it. In these circumstances and on the basis of facts and the legal position stated above, I hold that the complaint, annexure P-5, filed by the company against the petitioner and the consequent summoning order are valid and legal. I do not find it a case in which interference under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is called for. This petition is, thus, dismissed.