Allahabad High Court
Ram Pujan And Others vs Dy. Director Of Consolidation, ... on 19 May, 2000
Equivalent citations: 2000(3)AWC1950, 2000 ALL. L. J. 2133, 2000 A I H C 4162, 2000 ALL CJ 2 1129, (2000) 3 ALL WC 1950, (2000) REVDEC 433
Author: Shitla Prasad Srivastava
Bench: Shitla Prasad Srivastava
JUDGMENT Shitla Prasad Srivastava, J.
1. This petition, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, has been filed, by the petitioners for quashing the orders dated 8.1.1991 and 1.3.1988, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and Settlement Officer. Consolidation respectively. Further prayer has been made for issue of writ In the nature of mandamus commanding the respondent No. 1 (Deputy Director of Consolidation) to reconsider the case on merit and finally decide it.
2. The brief facts as stated in the writ petition are that the petitioners were recorded in the basic year khatauni and the respondents were given joint chak over plot Nos. 7. 22 and 108. Respondents moved an application under Rule 109A (1) of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Rules for partition before the consolidation court and the same was decided in their favour. On the basis of the orders dated 25.8.1976 and 12.1.1979, passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation and Consolidation Officer respectively, the respondent Nos. 3 to 6 moved an application for partition under Rule 109 of U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act. The application was allowed on 1.3.1979 in the absence of the petitioners. The petitioners on 27.4.1979 filed a restoration application recalling the order dated 1.3.1979. which was allowed on 27.6.1979. Against the order dated 27.6.1979, respondent Nos. 3 to 6 moved an application dated 20.7.1979. on the ground that ex parte order has been recalled by the Court concerned without giving opportunity of hearing to the respondents. On 11.10.1979, the Consolidation Officer allowed the application and set aside the order dated 27.6.1979. The application dated 27.4.1979 came for hearing again. It was rejected and dismissed in default of the petitioners by the Consolidation Officer on 7.10.1982. Therefore, the order dated 27.4.1979. was upheld which was in favour of the respondents. In paragraph 5 of the writ petition it is stated that In the aforesaid case 6.10.1982, was the date fixed in the Court but on account of holiday, the Court was closed. On 7.10.1982, the petitioners could not appear and the case was dismissed in default. The petitioners again filed time-barred restoration application along with affidavit to condone the delay. The Consolidation Officer on 22.8.1985, recalled the ex parte order dated 1.3.1979 and 7.10.1982, on payment of Rs. 50 as cost. The respondent Nos. 3 to 6 filed appeal before the respondent No. 2. Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who on 1.3.1988 quashed the order dated 22.8.1985 and restored the application dated 27.4.1979. A revision was filed by the petitioners against the order dated 1.3.1988 passed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation on the ground that the Settlement Officer. Consolidation has misinterpreted Rule 109A of the aforesaid Rules. The Deputy Director of Consolidation decided the question of maintainability of the revision and held that the order passed by the appellate court under Rule 109A of the aforesaid rule was final and dismissed the revision as not maintainable. The petitioners have challenged this order by means of the present writ petition in this Court.
3. Heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the record. From a perusal of the order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation it is apparent that he dismissed the revision as not maintainable, firstly, on the ground that the order passed in appeal against the decision in proceeding under Rule 109A is final and, secondly, the village has been notified under Section 52 of the aforesaid Act, therefore, no revision is maintainable under Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act.
4. Before discussing the argument of the learned counsel for the parties it is necessary to see the relevant Rule 109A of the aforesaid Rules, which is quoted herein below :
"109A. (1) Orders passed in cases covered by sub-section (2) of Section 52 shall be given effect by the consolidation authorities authorised in this behalf under sub-section (2) of Section 42. In case there be no such authority the Assistant Collector, incharge of the sub-division, the Tehsildar, the Naib Tehsildar the Supervisor Kanungo, and the Lekhpal of the area to which the case relates shall, respectively, perform the functions and discharge the duties of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation, Consolidation Officer, the Assistant Consolidation Officer, the Consolldator and the Consolidation Lekhpal respectively for the purpose of giving effect to the orders aforesaid.
(2) If for the purpose of giving effect to any order referred to in sub-rule (1), it becomes necessary to reallocate affected chaks, necessary orders may be passed to the Consolidation Officer, or the Tehsildar, as the case may be after affording proper opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.
(3) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Consolidation Officer, or the Tehsildar, as the case may be, within 15 days of the order passed under sub-rule (2), file an appeal before the Settlement Officer. Consolidation, or the Assistant Collector incharge of the sub-division, as the case may be, who shall decide the appeal after affording reasonable opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, which shall be final.
(4) In case delivery of possession becomes necessary as a result of orders passed under sub-rule (2) or sub-rule (3). as the case may be, the provisions of Rules 55 and 56 shall, mutatis mutandis, be followed."
5. Sub-rule (3) of this Rule is relevant which says that the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in appeal shall be final. Section 48 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act is also relevant which is quoted below :
"48. Revision and reference.--(1) Director of Consolidation may call for and examine the record of any case decided or proceedings taken by any subordinate authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the regularity of the proceedings : or as to correctness, legality or propriety of any order (other than an interlocutory order) passed by such authority in the case of proceedings, may, after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, make such order in the case or proceedings as he thinks fit.
(2) Powers under sub-section (1) may be exercised by the Director of Consolidation also on a reference under sub-section (3).
(3) Any authority subordinate to the Director of Consolidation may. after allowing the parties concerned an opportunity of being heard, refer the record of any case or proceedings to the Director of Consolidation for action under sub-section (1).
Explanation (1)--For the purpose of this section. Settlement Officers, Consolidation, Consolidation Officers, Assistant Consolidation Officers, Consolldator and Consolidation Lekhpals shall be subordinate to the Director of Consolidation."
Explanation (2)--For the purpose of this Section the expression interlocutory order In relation to a case or proceeding, means such order deciding any matter arising in such case for proceeding or collateral thereto as does not have the effect to finally disposing of such case or proceeding."
6. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners urged that though it is mentioned that the order of the Settlement Officer. Consolidation shall become final but it does not mean that no revision lies. He interpreted Section 48 of the aforesaid Act quoted above and submitted that revision is maintainable against the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation. He placed before the Court Sections 11 and 21 of the aforesaid U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act which is quoted below :
"11. Appeals.--(1) Any party to the proceedings under Section 9A, aggrieved by an order of the Assistant Consolidation Officer or the Consolidation Officer under that section, may, within 21 days of the date of the order, file an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, who shall after affording opportunity of being heard to the parties concerned, give his decision thereon which, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final and not be questioned in any Court of law."
7. Section 21 (2) also says that the appeal filed before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation shall be decided by him and his decision shall, except as otherwise provided by or under this Act, shall be final.
8. Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that in both sections, finality has been attached to the judgment of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation while exercising power of the appellate court and here also the Settlement Officer, Consolidation decides the appeal arising out of the proceeding under section 109 of the Act as appellate court, therefore, when revision was maintainable against the order passed by the Settlement Officer. Consolidation while deciding the appeal under Section 11 or 21 the revision is also maintainable against the order passed arising out of section 109A proceeding. He has submitted that "final" means final for the purpose of appeal but never-the-less revision is maintainable. For that purpose, he has placed reliance in a case in Ashraf v. L. Saith Mal, AIR 1938 All 47. It was a case under the provisions of U. P. Encumbered Estates Act in which the Court interpreted the word "final". Head Note (a) is relevant which says that word "final" in Section 45 (5) of U. P. Encumbered Estates Act only means 'not subject to appeal". It does not mean final in the sense that power of revision of the High Court under Section 115 of Civil Procedure Code is also shut out. He has further placed reliance in a case in Smt. Krishna Devi v. Board of Revenue. U. P. at Allahabad and others, 1972 RD 228, for the purpose that revision lies.
9. Sri S. K. Verma, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently urged that when there is specific provisions in the special Act, then the provisions of other Act cannot be taken into consideration. His submission is that under Sections 11 and 21 of the U. P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, it has been stated that the order shall become final unless otherwise specially provided under the Act but the same word has not been used in Rule 109A of the aforesaid Rules. Therefore, revision was not maintainable. He has placed reliance upon a case in Ram Narain v. State of U. P. and others, AIR 1957 SC 18. Relevant paragraph 10 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinbelow :
"(10). In the 1948 Allahabad decision, the main question was whether the provisions of Section 2. Professions Tax Limitation Act (20 of 1941) affected the powers conferred upon the District Board by Section 108, U. P. District Boards Act, to levy a tax on 'circumstances and property'. A subsidiary question was also raised, whether Section 131, U. P. District Boards Act, barred the suit. With regard to the main question, it was pointed out that the name given to a tax did not matter, what had to be considered was the pith and substance of it. It was held that in pith and substance the tax was one, which attracted the provisions of Section 2. Professions Tax Limitation Act (20 of 1941).
A tax on 'circumstances and property' is a composite tax and the word 'circumstances' means a man's financial position, his status as a whole depending, among other things, on his income from trade or business. Far from militating against the principle that in considering the circumstances of a person his income from trade or business within the Town Area may be taken into consideration, the decision approves of the principle. In the course of his judgment. Bind Basni Prasad, J.. referred to Section 128, U. P. Municipalities Act, 1916, where 'taxes on circumstances and property' appear as a head distinct from the 'taxes on trades, callings and vocations and employments' and the argument was that the taxes being under different heads should be treated as being entirely different, one from the other.
It was rightly pointed out that it is no sound principle of construction to interpret expressions used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act. The meanings of words and expressions used in an Act must take their colour from the context in which they appear. It is true that in the Act under our consideration the taxes which the Town Area Committee may impose appear under different heads in sub-section (1) of Section 14. We have already stated that though the clauses are different, the words used in the section show that there may be overlapping between the different clauses, and to prevent the same person being subjected to multiple taxation, a proviso was incorporated in clause (f)."
He has further submitted that after notification under Section 52 of the Act. revision was not maintainable. For that purpose, he has placed reliance in a case in Hari Ram v. D. D. C., Azamgarh and others. 1989 RD 281. Relevant portion of the judgment is quoted below :
"We find that on October 29. 1987 an objection was preferred by the petitioner before the Deputy Director of Consolidation. The position of law is well-settled. The Deputy Director of Consolidation has no jurisdiction to exercise power under Section 48 (3) of the Act. if a de-notification has already taken place under Section 52 of the Act. The Deputy Director of Consolidation, therefore, will first record a finding as to whether a Notification under Section 52 of the Act had, in fact, been issued on February 13, 1982. If he finds that such a notification exists and if he also finds that the land which is the subject-matter of dispute is covered by the said Notification, he shall desist from exercising any power under Section 48 (3) of the Act. With this direction the petition is disposed of finally."
10. His submission is that under Section 42 of the aforesaid Act. the officers and authorities under the Act have been described but while hearing the appeal arising out of proceeding under Section 109A of the aforesaid Act the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was not exercising power of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and he was not subordinate to the Deputy Director of Consolidation but he was a tribunal. He has submitted that the case in AIR 1938 All 47 (supra) is not applicable as it was arising out of U. P. Encumbered Estates Act.
11. Sri Sankalha Rai in reply to the argument of Sri S. K. Verma has submitted that appeal was filed after notification under Section 52 (2) of the aforesaid Act, therefore, the word used except otherwise of the Act under Sections 11 and 21 of the aforesaid Act will not take away the right of the petitioners to file revision. He has placed reliance in a case in Dilawar Singh v. Gram Samaj and others, AIR 1973 All 411. Paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereinbelow :
"6. The principle of a vested right of a litigant to take a proceeding to the superior court by an appeal would be equally applicable in case of a revision. It is true that a revision is a power conferred on a Court or authority to be exercised at its discretion but it does not mean that the litigant does not possess the right to approach the superior Court through a petition for revision. The only basic difference between an appeal and a revision is that in case of an appeal, the appellant is entitled to a relief if he succeeds in establishing that the order of the subordinate Court or authority was unsound or contrary to law. In case of a revision the Court has discretion to refuse the relief if for example, in its opinion substantial justice had been done between the parties although the order sought to be revised suffered from infirmities which could justify an interference by the revising Court."
12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties at length and going through the record of the case and perusing the relevant provisions of the Act. I am of the view that in view of the amended provisions of Section 48 of the aforesaid Act when Deputy Director of Consolidation has been given vide power to summon the record and see the propriety, etc. of the order of the subordinate authorities and revision was maintainable against any order passed by the Settlemeni Officer Consolidation. Section 44A of the aforesaid Act says that where powers are to be exercised or duties to be performed by any authority under this Act or the rules made thereunder, such powers or duties may also be exercised or performed by an authority superior to it. Section 42 of the aforesaid Act mentions the officers and authorities and had said that the State Government may appoint such authorities and officers, and for such areas, as may be necessary, to give effect to the provisions of this Act. Sub-section (9) of Section 3 of the aforesaid Act defines the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, which is as under :
"(9) Settlement Officer, Consolidation means the person appointed as such by the State Government to exercise the powers and perform the duties of a Settlement Officer, Consolidation under this Act or the rules made thereunder and shall include an Additional Settlement Officer, Consolidation and Assistant Settlement Officer, Consolidation."
13. There is nothing on record to prove that the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was not appointed by the State Government, therefore, he was subordinate to the Deputy Director of Consolidation and in view of Section 48 of the aforesaid Act, as amended, the Deputy Director of Consolidation has jurisdiction to entertain the revision and decide the same.
14. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order passed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Ghazlpur dated 8.1.1991 is, hereby, set aside and the matter Is sent back to the Deputy Director of Consolidation with a direction to restore the revision to its original number and decide the same afresh on merit. There will be no orders as to cost.